巴菲特致股东的信（1995年）
⑥保险业务营运

Insurance Operations

     In addition to acquiring GEICO, we enjoyed other favorable developments in insurance during 1995.

保险业务营运

除了收购 GEICO 保险以外，1995 年我们还享受到保险行业其他有利的发展。

     As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.

就像我们在过去年报跟各位解释过的，保险业务最重要的关键，首先是保险浮存金的数量，其次是它的成本，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的钱，保险业务营运之所以能有浮存金的原因在于，大部分的保单都会要求保户必须预付保险费，另外更重要的是保险公司在被知会并真正理赔之前，通常都要经过好长的一段时间。

     Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float. An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.

通常，保险公司实际上收到的保费并不足以支付实际发生的全部损失与费用，所以会产生承保的损失，而这就是浮存金的成本，长期而言，保险公司的浮存金成本若能低于其它资金渠道获得资金的成本，则保险业务会随着时间的推移而有利可图。但若是其浮存金成本高于货币市场利率的话，保险业务就是得不偿失的。

     As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last three, our cost of float has been negative, which means we have calculated our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.

如下表所示，伯克希尔的保险业务大获全胜，表中的浮存金，是将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本及相关再保递延费用。相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金规模算是相当大的，浮存金的成本由所发生的承保损失或收益而定，像最近三年由于我们有承保利润，所以我们的资金成本就是负的，此时我们的保险业务收益等于由浮存金的收益再加上承保利润。

     Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way.

自从 1967 年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以 20.7%复合成长率增加，大部分的年度，我们的资金成本都低于零以下，得益于这些免费的资金，大大地提升了伯克希尔的绩效。

     Any company's level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of "leverage" - that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity. Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly - to a degree that is not generally well-understood - because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms. The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances, leverage becomes a disadvantage.

任何一家公司的盈利能力取决于三个因素(1)资产回报率(2)负债的成本(3)财务杠杆的运用，也就是资产中运用负债而非股东权益的程度。多年以来，我们在第一项表现的相当不错，运用资产所产生的回报很高，然而在另外一方面由于负债成本极低，也使得我们受惠不少，这点就比较不为人所知，资金成本之所以可以压得很低，主要是由于我们可以用很有利的条件取得保险浮存金，关于这点在其它同业身上就不敢说了，通常他们也能取得大量的保险浮存金，但是取得的成本可能远超过资金的价值，在这种状况下，运用财务杠杆反而变得相当不利。

     Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years, it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true equity in that it doesn't belong to us. Nevertheless, let's assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result - more shares, equal assets and lower earnings - would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business - if it is obtained at a low cost.

由于多年来这些保险浮存金几乎没有成本，所以它们实际上等同于股本，当然不同于真正的股本，这些资金并不真正属于我们。尽管如此，假设在 1994 年我们持有的不是 34 亿美元的浮存金，而是 34 亿美元的股本的话，在这种情况下，我们拥有的总资产并不会增加，但我们的收益却可能下滑很多，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的，也就是说浮存金产生了额外的贡献。当然，资本的增加代表着伯克希尔必须额外再发行许多新股，所以，更多的股份代表着更低的资本收益率，等于大大降低了我们股票的价值，所以大家应该理解，为什么浮存金对于保险公司如此的重要，尤其是当它们取得的成本极低之时。

     Our acquisition of GEICO will immediately increase our float by nearly $3 billion, with additional growth almost certain. We also expect GEICO to operate at a decent underwriting profit in most years, a fact that will increase the probability that our total float will cost us nothing. Of course, we paid a very substantial price for the GEICO float, whereas virtually all of the gains in float depicted in the table were developed internally.

在并购 GEICO 保险之后，我们的保险浮存金马上增加近 30 亿美元，而且展望未来这数字还会继续成长，此外我们预期 GEICO 保险每年还能够继续拥有相当的承保利润，这意味着这些浮存金继续增加且无需成本。当然就内部而言，我们还是必须支付 GEICO 保险一笔相当的对价以取得浮存金。

     Our enthusiasm over 1995's insurance results must be tempered once again because we had our third straight year of good fortune in the super-cat business. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. We know that the results of years like the past three will be at least partially offset by some truly terrible year in the future. We just hope that "partially" turns out to be the proper adverb.

对于 1995 年我们的保险营运绩效的兴奋程度可能要再度稍微降温一下，原因在于我们的巨灾再保险业务连续第三年大放异彩，我们出售保单给保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的巨灾险业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项巨灾险业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年才有办法看得清，我们很清楚的知道过去三年来优异的成果一定会被未来某些悲惨的年度给部分抵消，当然我们希望所谓的“部分”是个适当的形容词。

     There were plenty of catastrophes last year, but no super-cats of the insured variety. The Southeast had a close call when Opal, sporting winds of 150 miles per hour, hovered off Florida. However, the storm abated before hitting land, and so a second Andrew was dodged. For insurers, the Kobe earthquake was another close call: The economic damage was huge - perhaps even a record - but only a tiny portion of it was insured. The insurance industry won't always be that lucky.

去年天灾不断，但没有一个达到巨灾再保险的理赔的界限，当 Opal 飓风在美国东南部以每小时 150 英哩的速度徘徊在佛罗里达附近，所幸它在登陆前及时转弱，而避免成为第二个 Andrew 飓风，另外对保险公司来说，神户大地震同样令人印象深刻，不可讳言，那次造成的总体经济损失可算是空前，不过由于其中仅有一小部分有保险，所以最后真正保险理赔的金额有限，当然保险业不可能永远都那么幸运。

     Ajit Jain is the guiding genius of our super-cat business and writes important non-cat business as well. In insurance, the term "catastrophe" is applied to an event, such as a hurricane or earthquake, that causes a great many insured losses. The other deals Ajit enters into usually cover only a single large loss. A simplified description of three transactions from last year will illustrate both what I mean and Ajit's versatility. We insured: (1) The life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that, fight-by-fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years; (2) Lloyd's against more than 225 of its "names" dying during the year; and (3) The launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd's folk avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier, no one would get in the ring with him.

阿吉特·贾恩可说是我们巨灾再保险业务的天才，当然他同时也负责许多重要的非巨灾业务，在保险业巨灾指的是诸如飓风或地震可能导致巨大理赔损失的事件，另外阿吉特也负责受理一些单一重大事件的投保，以下三件个案应该可充分以说明我所说的意思，同时展现阿吉特的多才多艺，我们受理(1)拳王迈克·泰森(Mike Tyson)的生命险，当然一开始金额相当的高，但随着一场场的比赛在几年后逐渐递减到最后变成零(2)英国最大保险劳合社总计 225 人的生命再保险以及(3)保证两颗中国卫星的发射及在轨道上周转一年；结果所幸中国卫星发射顺利，并在轨道上正常运转，同时劳合社的死亡率还算正常，而拳王泰森看起来再健康不过，看不出有谁可以从他手上抢下冠军戒指。

     Berkshire is sought out for many kinds of insurance, both super-cat and large single-risk, because: (1) our financial strength is unmatched, and insureds know we can and will pay our losses under the most adverse of circumstances; (2) we can supply a quote faster than anyone in the business; and (3) we will issue policies with limits larger than anyone else is prepared to write. Most of our competitors have extensive reinsurance treaties and lay off much of their business. While this helps them avoid shock losses, it also hurts their flexibility and reaction time. As you know, Berkshire moves quickly to seize investment and acquisition opportunities; in insurance we respond with the same exceptional speed. In another important point, large coverages don't frighten us but, on the contrary, intensify our interest. We have offered a policy under which we could have lost $1 billion; the largest coverage that a client accepted was $400 million.

伯克希尔目前积极寻求各类保险业务，包含巨灾再保险与大型单一风险，因为(1)我们无与伦比的财务实力，使得投保客户可以确定不论在多糟的状况下，他们都可以顺利获得理赔(2)我们能以最快的速度向客户完成报价(3)我们可以签下比其他保险公司金额更高的保单。其它竞争同业大多都有范围广阔的再保条款，并将大部分的业务分保出去，虽然这样的做法可以让他们避免重大的损失意外，但却也破坏掉他们的灵活性与反应时间。大家都知道，伯克希尔抓住投资与并购的动作向来相当的快，在保险业务方面我们的反应速度也是如此，另外还有很重要的一点，高额的保单吓唬不了我们，相反地更能引起我们的兴趣，我们可以接受的最高理赔上限是 10 亿美元，相较之下，其它同业所能容忍的最高限度仅为 4 亿美元。

     We will get hit from time to time with large losses. Charlie and I, however, are quite willing to accept relatively volatile results in exchange for better long-term earnings than we would otherwise have had. In other words, we prefer a lumpy 15% to a smooth 12%. Since most managers opt for smoothness, we are left with a competitive advantage that we try to maximize. We do, though, monitor our aggregate exposure in order to keep our "worst case" at a level that leaves us comfortable.

总有一天我们会碰上大麻烦，但是查理跟我本人却相当愿意接受这种变动剧烈的结果，只要长期来说我们的回报可以令人满意，换句话说，我们宁要波动的 15%，也不要平稳的 12%，而正因为大部分的经理人倾向平稳，这使得我们长期回报极大化的目标享有绝对的竞争优势，当然我们会密切注意我们总的风险敞口，避免让最坏的状况超越我们可以容忍的范围。

     Indeed, our worst case from a "once-in-a-century" super-cat is far less severe - relative to net worth - than that faced by many well-known primary companies writing great numbers of property policies. These insurers don't issue single huge-limit policies as we do, but their small policies, in aggregate, can create a risk of staggering size. The "big one" would blow right through the reinsurance covers of some of these insurers, exposing them to uncapped losses that could threaten their survival. In our case, losses would be large, but capped at levels we could easily handle.

事实上，即使是发生百年一遇的超级巨灾的最坏情况下，我们账面价值所可能受到的损害程度，也远比其它签下一大堆财产意外险保单的知名保险业者要来的轻微许多，虽然这些同业没有像我们一样签下单一极高上限的保单，但是所谓积沙成塔，他们累积的小额保单却可能造成无以弥补的后果，因为后者可能突破再保险的防护，使他们面临没有上限的损失，并威胁其生存。至于我们，损失数字虽然很大，但却是在我们可以轻易化解的范围之内。

     Prices are weakening in the super-cat field. That is understandable considering the influx of capital into the reinsurance business a few years ago and the natural desire of those holding the capital to employ it. No matter what others may do, we will not knowingly write business at inadequate rates. We unwittingly did this in the early 1970's and, after more than 20 years, regularly receive significant bills stemming from the mistakes of that era. My guess is that we will still be getting surprises from that business 20 years from now. A bad reinsurance contract is like hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.

近年来巨灾再保险保单的价格一直萎糜不振，这点可以理解的原因在于几年前大量的资金涌入再保险行业竞逐有限的保单生意，然而不管别人怎么做，我们是绝对不会以不合理的价格赔钱抢保单的，早在 1970 年代初期，我们就一直在不知情的情况下，犯下类似的错误，结果在往后的二十年内，还经常因为那些错误收到大额的赔付帐单，而我有预感我们将会为 20 年前所犯的错误继续付出代价。一张糟糕的再保合约就像是地狱一样，进去容易，但想要出来可就难了。

     I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions, and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can't attend school on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar, disastrous experience in the early 1980's, when it plunged enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks. GEICO's folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd's further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore how vital it is that the interests of the people who write insurance business be aligned - on the downside as well as the upside - with those of the people putting up the capital. When that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.

早年我积极参与再保业务，结果使得伯克希尔必须为我这一堂课支付高昂的学费，更不幸的是，再保课程的根本没有办法拿到奖学金。另外， GEICO 保险在 1980 年代初期，也遭受过类似悲惨的命运，当时该公司热情地冲进再保与大型灾害保险的业务，虽然 GEICO 保险愚蠢的举动只是短短几年，但是它却必须花费十年以上的工夫收拾残局，著名的英国劳合社保险的困境进一步说明了不当再保可能造成的灾难，也强调了承保人和保险共同出资人的利益保持一致是多么重要，不管是在顺境与逆境皆然。一旦人们失去对于这点观念的聚焦，保险业者就注定会发生问题，而且通常必须经历一段时间后，问题才会逐渐地浮上台面。

     A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the analyst's questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his balance sheet weren't adequate for ordinary claims, much less those likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the sack. But then the CEO brightened: "Still, things could be a lot worse," he said. "It could be my money." At Berkshire, it's our money.

有一段小故事道出了这个行业的实情，说的是一位保险公司 CEO 接受一位分析师访问，面对分析师询问关于其公司的情况时，CEO 的答案显得相当无奈，费率低得离谱、财务报表上所提的准备连一般理赔都不够，更不要说其它那些因为石绵与环保问题所引发的重大损害赔偿，想到许多他投保的再保公司大多都已倒闭，只剩他一个人独撑大局，突然间这位 CEO 略微释怀的说到：当然情况有可能会更糟，再来可能就会轮到我的荷包。天啊！在伯克希尔，这可是我们的你钱呢！

     Berkshire's other insurance operations, though relatively small, performed magnificently in 1995. National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 84.2 and developed, as usual, a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 85.6. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, grew at a good rate in 1995 and achieved a combined ratio of 81.4. Its three-year combined ratio is an amazing 82.4. Berkshire's California workers' compensation business, run by Brad Kinstler, faced fierce price-cutting in 1995 and lost a great many renewals when we refused to accept inadequate rates. Though this operation's volume dropped materially, it produced an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, continues to do an extraordinary job. His premium volume was up 23% in 1995, and underwriting profit grew by 59%. Ajit, Don, Rod, Brad and John are all under 45, an embarrassing fact demolishing my theory that managers only hit their stride after they reach 70.

伯克希尔其它的保险营运，虽然规模相对较小，但在 1995 年的表现却同样极为出色，国民保险公司传统业务的综合比率只有 84.2，同时以其保费收入来看，还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由 Don Wurster负责的部门平均的综合比率只有 85.6；另外由 Rod Eldred 负责的住宅保险业务(Home-State)也有相当幅度的增长，去年的综合比率更只有 81.4，过去三年平均为 82.4；由 Brad 负责的加州劳工退休基金在 1995 年面对激烈的价格竞争，同时还因为拒绝不合理的降价要求而失去续约的机会，虽然此举使得业务量大幅缩减，但整体的承保利益仍然相当可观；最后负责中央州赔偿保险公司营运的 John 则依然表现出色，1995 年的保费收入成长23%，承保利益更大幅增加 59%，阿吉特、Don、Rod、Brad 与 John 的年纪都在 45 岁以下，这种情况也让我以往认为经理人要到 70 之后才能随心所欲的论点被推翻。

     To sum up, we entered 1995 with an exceptional insurance operation of moderate size. By adding GEICO, we entered 1996 with a business still better in quality, much improved in its growth prospects, and doubled in size. More than ever, insurance is our core strength.

总的来说，1995 年我们规模适中的保险业务缴出了漂亮的成绩单，而展望 1996 年，在 GEICO 保险加入之后，在维持保险业务原有的品质之下，规模与成长皆可期，较之以往，保险业务已成为我们核心竞争事业。

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〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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