巴菲特致股东的信（1998年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. :

Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 1998 年的账面价值增加 259 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值增长了 48.3%(标普 28.6%)，自现任管理层接手的 34 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 37801 美元，年复合成长率约为 24.7%。*

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔的A股，该公司在1996年之前唯一发行在外的股票。B股的经济权益等于A股的1/30。

Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but not this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that 48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.

通常当公司的账面价值一年能够成长 48.3%时，大家应该要高兴的手舞足蹈，但今年不行，还记得德国音乐天才瓦格纳吗？他的音乐曾被认为盛名难副。我想伯克希尔在 1998 年的进展，虽然表面上看起来进步巨大，但实际并没那么好，主要的原因在于在增加的 48.3%账面价值当中，绝大部分来自于因并购交易所发行的新股。

To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value, which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share book-value figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up. These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms, and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and 62.)

再进一步说明，由于我们公司目前的股价远高于帐面价值，这意思代表每当我们溢价发行新股，不管是现金增资还是换股合并，都会立即大幅拉高我们每股的帐面价值，但实际上我们没有因此多赚进半毛钱，而真实的情况是，这类交易并不会立即提升我们每股的内在价值，我们所得到的跟我们所付出的只能算是大致相等。而就像我与合伙人查理·芒格不厌其烦，但却一再强调的真正重要的是内在价值的增加而非帐面账面价值的增加。虽然伯克希尔 1998 年的内在价值也大幅成长，但绝不到帐面账面价值增加 48.3%的那种幅度，不过尽管如此，我还是必须强调，目前的内在价值仍远高于帐面账面价值。(有关“内在价值”等名词的解释，请大家参阅股东手册，手册中揭示了本公司经营的宗旨，也包含了许多对伯克希尔股东相当重要的信息。)

We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.

展望 1999 年，我们拥有有史以来最佳企业与经理人的黄金组合，我们在 1998 年买下的两家公司，分别是通用再保险(GeneralRe)与公务机航空(ExecutiveJet)，它们在各方面皆是一流的(后面还会详加说明)。而原来拥有的企业表现更是超乎我个人的预期，GEICO 保险再一次获得傲人业绩，当然也有不好的消息，几家我们拥有大笔投资的大型上市公司经营下滑，这是当初我们没有预期到的，因此我们股票投资组合的绩效表现不如同期标普 500指数，还好这些公司所发生的问题都只是暂时的，查理跟我都相信他们长期发展的远景还是相当的乐观。

In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在最近三年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为最能够估计伯克希尔内在价值的一张表，在今年更新的版本中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保险的数字加入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我们持有的平均每股投资金额(包括现金与类现金，但扣除金融子公司通过金融产品持有的证券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与经营费用之后，伯克希尔来自本业的经营收益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出，若是把伯克希尔分拆成两家公司的话会变成怎样，一家是持有我们投资组合的投资公司，另一家是经营旗下所有业务并负担全部成本的经营性公司。

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

下表是这两个部分每十年的成长率：

During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, or 25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re (included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest gain.

回顾 1998 年，我们每股的投资规模增加了 9604 美元或 25.2%，不过每股经营收益却减少 33.9%，主要原因是通用再保险(如先前所说，在今年以拟制的方式并入伯克希尔)，这家公司拥有相当大的投资部位，这使得我们每股的投资金额大幅增加，不过另一方面，该公司在 1998 年也产生了承保损失，这又拖累了我们的每股经营收益表现，事实上，要是我们没有买下通用再保险，我们当年的每股经营收益可能还能维持小幅增加。

Though certain of our acquisitions and operating strategies may from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can't).

虽然某些特定的并购案与经营策略会影响到其中某一栏数字，但我们还是尽量让两栏数字能够均衡发展，不过有一点可以确定的是，我们未来的成长率将远不及过去所创造的水准，伯克希尔现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事销售工作，而不是去教数学(请永远记住，世界上只有两种人，一种会算术，另一种不会)。

Currently we are working to compound a net worth of $57.4 billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course, our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three times Berkshire's. Net worth, though, measures the capital that managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become huge.

现在我们可以掌控的账面价值高达 574 亿美元，这数字居所有美国公司之冠，(如果埃克森和美孚石油合并成功，我们将会让出宝座)，当然这并不代表伯克希尔实际的价值，对于股东来说，公司总市值才是最重要的，就这点而言，通用电气与微软的市值就是伯克希尔的三倍以上。总而言之，账面价值代表着一家公司经理人可以运用的资金，就这方面而言，伯克希尔的规模无疑是相当可观的。

Nonetheless, Charlie and I will do our best to increase intrinsic value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far short of that -- including years showing negative returns -- and those will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands just won't do. Today's markets are not friendly to our search for "elephants," but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.

不过，说归说，查理跟我还是希望能够尽力让公司的价值在未来以每年 15%的平均速度成长，这是我们认为可能达到的极限，在往后的日子，有时我们可能可以超过 15%，但也很有可能远不如这个标准，甚至可能会变成负的，而使得我们平均成长率往下拉，另外大家要知道，所谓每年平均 15%的成长率代表在往后的五年之内，我们的账面价值必须要成长 580 亿美元，如果没有几个轰轰烈烈的大案子的话，是绝对不可能办的到的，像卖卖爆米花这种小生意可不行，而现在的市场环境也不利于我们寻找合适的大象猎物，不过我们可以向大家保证一定会全神贯注。

Whatever the future holds, I make you one promise: I'll keep at least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party. To that end, I've already selected a "power spot" at the office for my urn.

不管未来会如何，有一点我可以向各位保证的是，只要我还在，我都会将我个人 99%以上的身家放在伯克希尔，至于能够维持多久？我则是希望能够效法忠诚的民主党员 FortWayne，临终时还表示希望死后能够葬在芝加哥，好就近参加党的活动，所以我也在办公室事先选好了一个好位置，以后可以用来摆我的祭坛。

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Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth: We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998 bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another 2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8 doesn't refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting, working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5 million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the assets we manage.

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随着经济实力的增长，我们雇用员工的人数也同步增加，我们现在拥有 47566 位员工，其中包含 1998 年并购通用再保险后并进来的 7074 人，以及内部增聘的 2500 人，而为了服务新增加的 9500 个人手，我们的总部人员也从原来的 12 人扩编为 12.8 人(0.8 指的不是查理或是我本人，而是我们新请的一位会计人员，一个礼拜工作四天)，尽管这是组织浮滥的警讯，但是我们去年税后总部开支却只有区区 350 万美元，大概占我们管理总资产的一个基点(万分之一)还不到。