巴菲特致股东的信（1998年）⑪会计问题：第二部分

Accounting -- Part 2

The role that managements have played in stock-option accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB's attempts to replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight, pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.

会计问题：第二部分

管理层在员工股票期权会计问题上所扮演的角色很难是正面的，近年来，许多 CEO 与会计师极力反对美国财务会计准则委员会 FASB 试图将期权计入成本的做法，反对者甚至动员国会议员参与游说，甚至将这种收益虚增提升到国家利益的层次。

Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been even worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here, many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington: "The scandal isn't in what's done that's illegal but rather in what's legal."

尽管如此，我认为有些管理层在公司重组与合并的会计处理上的行为更糟，很多管理层故意操纵损益数字欺骗投资人，正如 Michael Kinsley 曾经批评华府所说的：真正的丑闻不是那些违反法律的，而是那些完全合法的行为。

It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accounting from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what one charlatan dubbed "bold, imaginative accounting" (the practice of which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America's most-admired companies then shunned deception.

在以前通过财务报表，很容易可以分辨一家公司的好坏。如 1960 年代末掀起一波被骗徒称之为“大胆且富想象力的会计”的热潮。这种做法在当时受到华尔街人士的热烈追捧，因为他们从来都不会让人失望。不过在当时大家都知道谁是老千。而且值得称道的是，几乎所有受到崇敬的美国大公司基本上都洁身自好。

In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise high-grade managers -- CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or as trustees under your will -- have come to the view that it's okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street's desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty.

近年来，道德逐渐沦丧，虽然许多大企业还是坚持走正道，但越来越多所谓高格调的经理人，(就是那种你想要把女儿许配给他或请他担任遗嘱执行人的人)，渐渐认为玩弄数字以满足华尔街预期的做法没有什么大不了的。事实上，有许多经理人不但觉得这类操纵收益的行为很正常，甚至是他们的工作责任之一。

These managers start with the assumption, all too common, that their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don't produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired "earnings" or set the stage for them in the future.

这些经理人一开始往往就认定他们的主要工作之一是让公司的股价越高越好，(关于这点我们实在不敢苟同)，而为了撑高股价，他们可以说是无所不用其极地在公司的运营上冲刺，但是当运营结果不若预期时，他们就会诉诸难以想象的会计手法，要么“制造”出想要的收益数字，要么为未来的收益数字创造条件。

Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that their shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals -- that is, their stock -- is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what everybody else does. Once such an everybody's-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad accounting drives out good.

而为了让这样的行为合理化，这些经理人常常表示，如果公司股票的价格不能合理反应其价值，则公司股东的权益将会受损，同时他们还辩称，在运用会计诡计来获得想要的数字的时，他们只是在做其他人都在做的事，而一旦这种“人人都在做”的态度确立后，道德上的顾虑就消失殆尽了，Gresham 之子称这样的行为叫做：糟糕的会计会驱逐好的会计。

The distortion du jour is the "restructuring charge," an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share.

有一种会计科目叫做“重组损失”，在法律上虽然合法但却通常被用作操纵损益的工具。在这次特别设计的骗局中，通常公司会将多年来累积的成本在单一季度一次性提列损失，而这个季度必定让投资人大失所望。有时候，公司则是为了将过去虚假不实的收益一次性出清，或是为虚增未来年度的收益预先做准备。不管怎样，这些做法的主要前提都是基于这样一种心理：华尔街只关心未来年度的收益高于预期的五分钱，却一点也不在乎公司当季的收益少了五美元。

This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behavior suggests a corresponding "bold, imaginative" approach to -- golf scores. In his first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers -- double, triple, quadruple bogeys -- and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having established this "reserve," he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro that he wishes to "restructure" his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds, then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94, 92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 -- which, after all, came from a "discontinued" swing -- and will classify our hero as an 80 shooter (and one who never disappoints).

这种将所有的垃圾在当季一次性出清的做法，跟高尔夫球场上一种大胆投机的得分方法类似，在球季一开始，取巧的高尔夫球员忽略自身的实际实力，先在计分卡上填上最糟糕的成绩(柏忌、双柏忌、三柏忌)，结果一算下来可能有 140 杆之多。建立这个储备之后，接着他再跑到高尔夫俱乐部给教练表示他想要调整一下不理想的挥杆，然后等到他再度回到球场上时，他就专挑打的好的洞的成绩，而不好的部分则全部归到先前所预留的储备中。结果五回合下来，他的成绩就变成 140 杆、80 杆、80 杆、80 杆、80 杆，而不是本来的 91 杆、94 杆、89杆、94 杆、92 杆。不过对华尔街的哪些人来说，他们根本就不管最前面的 140 杆，因为那不是正常情况下的表现，然后直接把这位选手归类为平均 80 杆的高手(而且成绩还相当稳定)。

For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a variant of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier scorekeeping sins with this "big bath," he may mumble a few apologies but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add, will have acquired a loyal patron.)

而对于这种喜欢预先作弊的球员来说，这种策略会有一种变体。这位球员与一位能够配合的球童单独比赛，也就是会计师，好让他可以将不好的洞数往后递延，顺利地先拿下四局 80 杆，使得这位球员可以得到表现杰出且稳定的运动家称号后，然后再交出第五局的 140 杆球卡，用一场大洗澡纠正前面的欠账。他随便应付几句抱歉的话，但他不会退还之前在俱乐部比较加分卡时赢得的金额。而这位球童，不用我们说，当然是深得其老板的心，不怕下次得不到主人的惠顾。

Unfortunately, CEOs who use variations of these scoring schemes in real life tend to become addicted to the games they're playing -- after all, it's easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the practice tee -- and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior brings to mind Voltaire's comment on sexual experimentation: "Once a philosopher, twice a pervert."

不幸的是，现实中使用这些惯用作弊技俩的 CEO 往往习惯于玩这种把戏，毕竟与其花费时间在辛苦练习上，还不如轻轻松松在计分卡上动动手脚，要说服他们放弃不玩可能比登天还难，他们这种行为不禁让我想到法国文豪伏尔泰对于性实验的评论：一回生，二回熟。(伏尔泰一次到妓院去体验生活，事后有人问他感觉如何，他回答说，第一次去还算是哲学家，但要是再去的话，可能便会成为堕落者)。

In the acquisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies that lead to increased future "earnings."

在并购领域，重组已被提升至艺术的层次，经理人现在越来越习惯通过合并来操控公司资产与负债的价值，以使得公司未来的收益能够平稳地虚增。事实上，在交易的时候，大型的会计师事务所偶尔也会建议公司来点小小会计戏法(当然有时也可能会搞的很大)。而在得到领路者的引诱，一流的人格往往会屈服于三流的伎俩，CEO实在是很难拒绝会计师所提出让公司未来收益好看一点的美意。

An example from the property-casualty insurance industry will illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of reserves -- though it is uncanny how often an actuarial "revelation" of this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets up the possibility of 'earnings" flowing into income at some later date, as reserves are released.

财产意外险业有一个很好的例子可以作为说明，当一家公司取得另一家财产险公司时，买方通常会顺势大幅补提大量的损失准备金，这项举动只会凸显以前损失准备提拨不足的问题。虽然你会发现这种精算调整的时机与整个交易签字的时点是如此令人惊异的巧合。更重要的是，这样的举动等于是为以后损失准备回冲，以增加公司未来盈利数字所预埋的伏笔。

Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at least one of those virtues must have been lacking -- or, alternatively, that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of "earnings."

不过伯克希尔从来都不会干这类的勾当，如果我们真要让你们失望，那么宁愿是真实的盈利情况而不是会计手法。在我们所有的并购案当中，我们皆让损失准备的数字保持在当初我们发觉时的水准，因为一直以来与我们共事的保险业务经理人都很了解自己本业的状况，同时在财务报表的编制上也都坦诚布公。所以，如果是在这些并购案进行的同时，还发生负债大幅增加的状况的话，那么就代表这些美德其中之一出现了问题，或者说并购方为虚增未来收益预留的后路。

Here's a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view in corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man who'd made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly merger discussion (which in the end didn't produce a deal). The veteran acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination, only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: "But won't that mean a huge charge," he asked, "perhaps as much as $1 billion?" The "sophisticate" wasted no words: "We'll make it bigger than that -- that's why we're doing the deal."

这里有一件真实的故事充分说明美国企业普遍存在的一种观点。有两家大型银行的 CEO，其中有一位主导了很多并购案，在不久前参与了一项友善并购的讨论(虽然后来并没有成功)，正当这位经验丰富的并购老手侃侃而谈合并后可能的种种好处时，突然被另一位 CEO 的问题给打断：那不是意味着高额的成本吗？我想可能不下十亿美元吧！这位老练的银行家毫不迟疑的回答到：这正是我们要做这笔交易的原因，而且我们想把它搞的更大。

A preliminary tally by R. G. Associates, of Baltimore, of special charges taken or announced during 1998 -- that is, charges for restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs -- identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997 earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune's famous list totaled $324 billion.

根据巴尔的摩 R.G.协会初步的统计，光是 1998 年宣布或认列的特别费用，包含重组费用、研发费用、并购费用以及减值费用等共计 1369 项，加总的金额就超过 721 亿美元。这真是一个惊人的数字。相比之下，1997 年财富 500 大企业的总盈利也不过是 3240 亿美元而已。

Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. ("Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.")

显然，现今许多经理人对于编制正确报表的藐视态度可说是商业界的一大耻辱，正如我们先前所提到的，会计师在导正这种偏见方面几乎没有什么作为。尽管理论上会计师应该要把投资大众当作是他们的老板，但他们却选择向那些有权决定会计师人选并发放薪酬的经理人卑躬屈膝(唉！正所谓拿人手短)。

A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman, Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to "earnings management." He correctly observed, "Too many corporate managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks." And then he laid on a real indictment: "Managing may be giving way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion."

不过告诉各位一个大消息，在现任主席 Arthur Levitt 的带领下，证监会似乎有意要好好地整顿美国企业的种种不当行为，在去年 9 月的一次历史性演说中，Levitt 呼吁大家停止“收益管理”，他一针见血地指出太多的企业经理人、会计师与分析师参与这种大家心知肚明的骗局，接着他又开门见山地提出一项指控，当经理人得到太多的机会来操纵收益的同时，其人格也随着消失殆尽化成幻影。

I urge you to read the Chairman's speech (you can find it on the Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt's job will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for him to take on.

我强烈建议大家读一读 Levitt 主席的演说内容(你可以在 www.sec.gov 上找到)，同时共同声援他致力于导正美国企业向股东们提供真实财务报告所作的努力，Levitt 这项工作或许相当艰巨，但也很难再找到其它任何比这个更重要的任务了。