巴菲特致股东的信（2002年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 2002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.0%. Over the last 38 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $41,727, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually. *

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

公司 2002 年的账面价值增加 61 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值增加 10.0%(标普下跌 22.1%)，自现任管理层接手的 38 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元增长到现在的 41727 美元，年复合增长率为 22.2%。

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

* 本报告中使用的所有数据都适用于伯克希尔的A股，这是公司在1996年之前唯一发行在外的股票。B股的经济权益等于A股的1/30。

In all respects 2002 was a banner year. I’ll provide details later, but here’s a summary:

从任何角度来看，2002 年都是丰收的一年，后面我会再详加说明，以下是几点总结：

• Our various non-insurance operations performed exceptionally well, despite a sluggish economy. A decade ago Berkshire’s annual pre-tax earnings from our non-insurance businesses was $272 million. Now, from our ever-expanding collection of manufacturing, retailing, service and finance businesses, we earn that sum monthly.

1，整体经济不景气，但伯克希尔旗下所有非保险事业表现异常优异。十年前，我们非保险事业年税前收益为2.72 亿美元，时至今日，在持续扩张零售、制造、服务以及金融事业版图之后，我们一个月就能赚到这个数。

• Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of $5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%. Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was restored at General Re.

2，2002 年我们旗下保险事业的浮存金大幅增加了 57 亿美元，累积达到 412 亿美元。更棒的是，2002 年度运用这些资金的成本仅为 1%。浮存金再度回到低成本状态，让人感觉真好，特别是刚经历过惨淡的三年之后。伯克希尔的再保险部门以及盖可保险在 2002 年都大放异彩，而通用再保险的承保纪律也已恢复。

• Berkshire acquired some important new businesses – with economic characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy, the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy – we buy to keep. That’s one reason why Berkshire is usually the first – and sometimes the only – choice for sellers and their managers.

3，伯克希尔并购了几项重要的新事业，其产业竞争力在各自的业界均数一数二，经理人也都很出色。这是我们制定「进入」策略的两个关键要素，第三个要素是合理的价格。不过不同于杠杆收购者(LBO)及私募股权投资公司，我们并没有「退出」策略——我们买进以后，就会一直留着。这也是为什么伯克希尔往往成为众多卖方及其经理人心目中的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选择。

• Our marketable securities outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson, who manages equities at GEICO, this was old stuff. But, for me, it was a welcome change from the last few years, during which my investment record was dismal.

4，我们的股票投资组合表现超越了市场上大多数的指数。对于负责管理盖可保险资金的 LouSimpson 路易·辛普森来说，这是司空见惯的事，但对我而言，却是在经历过好几个悲惨的年头后，终于迎来可喜的转折。

The confluence of these favorable factors in 2002 caused our book-value gain to outstrip the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points. This result is aberrational: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I hope to achieve – at most – an average annual advantage of a few points. In the future, there will be years in which the S&P soundly trounces us. That will in fact almost certainly happen during a strong bull market, because the portion of our assets committed to common stocks has significantly declined. This change, of course, helps our relative performance in down markets such as we had in 2002.

这些有利的因素在 2002 年来了个大会师，使得我们的帐面价值增幅大幅超越标普 500 指数 32.1 个百分点。这样的成绩有点反常：查理和我至多只是希望伯克希尔能平均每年稳定地超越指数几个百分点就好。我想在以后的某些年度，极有可能会看到标普指数大幅超越我们的表现。事实上，在强劲的牛市期间这种情况几成定局，因为我们的普通股投资占总资产的比例已大幅下降，当然也由于这样的转变，让我们在类似 2002 年这样的股市走低之际，相对来说取得不错的表现。

I have another caveat to mention about last year’s results. If you’ve been a reader of financial reports in recent years, you’ve seen a flood of “pro-forma” earnings statements – tabulations in which managers invariably show “earnings” far in excess of those allowed by their auditors. In these presentations, the CEO tells his owners “don’t count this, don’t count that – just count what makes earnings fat.” Often, a forget-all-this-bad-stuff message is delivered year after year without management so much as blushing.

关于去年的结果，我还有一点要补充。如果你经常阅读最近几年上市公司的财务报表，你会发现满是所谓"备考盈利"这类的报表——这种报表所显示的收益数字往往都远高于经过会计师签证的查核数，而公司的 CEO 会告诉股东们："不要算这个，不要算那个，只要算那些会让收益数字好看一点的就好了。"这种"把糟糕的全忘掉，只记得那一点点好"的报告方式一年接一年地出现，管理层根本不会因此感到脸红。

We’ve yet to see a pro-forma presentation disclosing that audited earnings were somewhat high. So let’s make a little history: Last year, on a pro-forma basis, Berkshire had lower earnings than those we actually reported.

我们还没有看过有哪家公司的备考盈利报表，其收益是低于会计师查核数字的。现在就让我们来小小创造一下历史：去年按备考盈利来算，伯克希尔的收益数字低于实际报告的数字。

That is true because two favorable factors aided our reported figures. First, in 2002 there was no megacatastrophe, which means that Berkshire (and other insurers as well) earned more from insurance than if losses had been normal. In years when the reverse is true – because of a blockbuster hurricane, earthquake or man-made disaster – many insurers like to report that they would have earned X “except for” the unusual event. The implication is that since such megacats are infrequent, they shouldn’t be counted when “true” earnings are calculated. That is deceptive nonsense. “Except for” losses will forever be part of the insurance business, and they will forever be paid with shareholders’ money.

这是因为去年有两项有利因素确实让我们的财报数字更加好看。第一，由于 2002 年没有发生什么重大的灾难，所以伯克希尔(以及其它保险业同行)赚取的承保利润比一般正常的年度更多。而在情况相反的年份里，比如遇到飓风、地震与其它人为灾害的时候，许多保险同业往往会声明「要是」没有发生意外事件的话，本来可以赚到多少多少。意思是说，由于这类大灾难很不寻常，所以在计算"真实"的收益时就不应考虑在内。这根本就是骗人的一派胡言。要知道「意外」损失本来就是保险业司空见惯的事，而且绝对必须要由公司背后的股东来买单。

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this exercise, we’ll take a page from the industry’s book. For last year, when we didn’t have any truly major disasters, a downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to “normalize” our underwriting result.

不论如何，我们因为这样的备考盈利声明，将在各类保险业报告上记得一笔。由于去年我们没有遇到什么重大的灾难，所以实有必要将帐面收益向下调整，以算出"正常合理的"承保绩效。

Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies we employed in our finance and financial products business. Gains from those strategies will certainly diminish within a year or two – and may well disappear.

第二，2002 年的债券市场特别有利于我们金融产品部门的策略运作。这类策略的利得在未来一两年内很可能会逐渐缩减，甚至完全消失。

Soooo . . . “except for” a couple of favorable breaks, our pre-tax earnings last year would have been about $500 million less than we actually reported. We’re happy, nevertheless, to bank the excess. As Jack Benny once said upon receiving an award: “I don’t deserve this honor – but, then, I have arthritis, and I don’t deserve that either.”

所以呢……在"扣除"这几项有利的短期因素后，我们去年实际的税前获利应比实际报告值减少约 5 亿美元。当然，我们也很开心多赚这些钱。正如喜剧演员 JackBenny 杰克·本尼在一次获奖后所说的："我实在是不配得到这个奖项，但我还得了关节炎呀，那不也不应该得嘛。"

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We continue to be blessed with an extraordinary group of managers, many of whom haven’t the slightest financial need to work. They stick around, though: In 38 years, we’ve never had a single CEO of a subsidiary elect to leave Berkshire to work elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have six managers over 75, and I hope that in four years that number increases by at least two (Bob Shaw and I are both 72). Our rationale: “It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.”

伯克希尔旗下一直有一大群杰出的经理人为我们打拼着，且其中绝大部分都已经可以不必再为这份薪水工作，但他们依然坚守岗位，38 年来还没有任何一家子公司的 CEO 离开伯克希尔跳槽到他处上班。包含查理在内，目前我们共有 6 位经理人的年龄超过 75 岁，预期 4 年后还会再增加 2 名，那就是 BobShaw 鲍勃·肖跟我本人，我们现年都是 72 岁，我们的观念是：实在是很难教会新狗玩老把戏！

Berkshire’s operating CEOs are masters of their crafts and run their businesses as if they were their own. My job is to stay out of their way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses generate. It’s easy work.

伯克希尔的 CEO 们都是各自行业的佼佼者，并把公司当作是自己的一样在经营。我的工作很简单，就是尽量不要妨碍他们，并好好地运用他们所赚来的收益资金。

My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a batboy. In 1919, at age 19, Eddie began his work with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went to the World Series. The next year, Eddie switched to the Brooklyn Dodgers, and they, too, won their league title. Our hero, however, smelled trouble. Changing boroughs, he joined the Yankees in 1921, and they promptly won their first pennant in history. Now Eddie settled in, shrewdly seeing what was coming. In the next seven years, the Yankees won five American League titles.

我遵从的管理模式源自埃迪·班尼特(Eddie Bennett)，他曾是一个棒球手。1919年，19岁的埃迪开始在芝加哥白袜队工作，那一年他们参加了世界大赛。第二年，埃迪转投布鲁克林道奇队，他们也赢得了联赛冠军。然而，我们的英雄嗅到了麻烦。1921年，他改变了选区，加入了洋基队，他们很快就赢得了历史上的第一面锦旗。现在埃迪安顿下来，精明地看到了即将发生的事情。在接下来的七年里，洋基队赢得了五次美联冠军。

What does this have to do with management? It’s simple – to be a winner, work with winners. In 1927, for example, Eddie received $700 for the 1/8th World Series share voted him by the legendary Yankee team of Ruth and Gehrig. This sum, which Eddie earned by working only four days (because New York swept the Series) was roughly equal to the full-year pay then earned by batboys who worked with ordinary associates.

这跟管理有什么关系？很简单——想要成为赢家，就是与其他赢家一起共事。例如，1927 年，埃迪因为扬基队赢得世界大赛(当年棒球界传奇人物Ruth和Gehrig也在阵中)而分到 700 美元的奖金，这笔钱大约相当于其它棒球手一整年的收入，结果埃迪总共只工作 4 天就拿到手(因为当年度扬基队四连胜横扫对手)。

Eddie understood that how he lugged bats was unimportant; what counted instead was hooking up with the cream of those on the playing field. I’ve learned from Eddie. At Berkshire, I regularly hand bats to many of the heaviest hitters in American business.

埃迪很清楚地知道：他如何拎球棒并不重要，重要的是他能为球场上最当红的明星拎球棒才是关键。我从埃迪身上学到很多，所以在伯克希尔，我就经常为美国商业大联盟的超级强打者拎球棒。