巴菲特致股东的信（2003年）⑤公司治理

Corporate Governance

公司治理

In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren’t encouraging. A few CEOs, such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his example has been more admired than followed.

在判断美国企业是否真的有心进行改革，CEO 的薪资回报绝对是最关键的指标之一，然而直到现在，其结果显然令人感到相当失望，少数的 CEO 包含 GE 的 JeffImmelt 带头推动公平对待经理人与股东双方的方案，然而总的来说，他的示范所获得表面的赞许显然远多于实际的跟进动作。

It’s understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest is equal on both sides of the table. One party’s gain is the other party’s loss, and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest-to-God negotiation.

我们很容易理解薪资给付为何会失去控制，当管理层聘雇员工或是公司与供货商讨价还价时，双方的利益属于零和游戏，一方得利就等于就是另一方的损失，中间牵涉的利益对彼此都极具意义，所得结果一般相信较公正客观。

But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation committees, too often one side – the CEO’s – has cared far more than the other about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem unimportant – particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the negotiation often has a “play-money” quality.

但是当 CEO(或是其代表)与薪资委员会谈到回报时，则 CEO 这边在乎最后敲定的条件的情况远胜于另一方，比如说，CEO 可能会对是否能多争取到 10 万股的认股权或是 50 万美元的年薪而耿耿于怀，然而对于另一边身为配角的委员会来说，这样的差异看起来似乎无关紧要，尤其是对大部分的公司来说，给或不给对于公司的收益报表不会有任何影响，在这样的情况下，谈判的过程往往带点数字游戏性质。

Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages gained by the most avaricious– a title for which there was vigorous competition – were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments, which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one compensation consultant commented: “There are two classes of clients you don’t want to offend – actual and potential.”

CEO 越线的行为在 1990 年代变本加厉，一旦某个离谱的薪资回报方案被采纳，其它经理人立刻就会跟进比照，这种贪婪习气的传播者，往往就是那些人力资源顾问与公关部门，他们很清楚谁才是喂奶给他们喝的娘，就像是一位人力资源顾问曾说的「有两种客户是你绝对不愿意得罪的，现有的以及潜在的」。

In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for “independent” directors. But the question of what truly motivates independence has largely been neglected.

在所有试图解决这个失控系统的改革方案中，呼声最高的是引进"独立"的董事，但问题是真正促使董事独立的因素却反而被忽视了。

In last year’s report, I took a look at how “independent” directors – as defined by statute – had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we’ve had an extended test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should perform – whether at a mutual fund business or any other. These two all-important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.

为此我特定检视了一下去年发布的一些年报，看看目前共同基金依照法令设置的独立董事是如何行使其职权的，独立董事设置的法源系根据 1940 年就制定的投资公司法，这也意味我们可以有一段很长的时间来检视法令制定后的成果，身为董事，不论是共同基金或是其它行业，有两项最重要的任务，分别是找到或留住才干品行兼备的经理人，以及给予其适当合理的回报，因此我们乃针对基金董事有关这两项任务的表现记录进行检讨。

Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company, however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold – invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets – the directors experienced a “counter-revelation” and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would pay the most for the old management company was the party that should manage the shareholders’ money in the future.

我们调查的结果并不乐观，年复一年，成千上万的共同基金，不论其绩效有多惨，现任的基金管理公司不断地被续聘。依照惯例，董事们毫不用心地核准远超过合理程度的管理费用，之后当管理公司被卖掉，通常会以高于有形账面价值的价格出售，董事们突然又"幡然悔悟"，立刻与新的经理人签约，并全盘接受其所提出的收费结构，实际上，董事们的考量是谁愿意出最高价买下原有管理公司的人，就可以在未来管理投资人的钱。

Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are bad people. They’re not. But sadly, “boardroom atmosphere” almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.

尽管这些基金独立董事的摇摆狗行为，但不代表我们认为这些人是坏人，他们显然不是，但遗憾的是，董事会的气氛让他们的忠诚基因沉寂下来。

On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire’s report appeared, the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about “The State of our Industry.” Responding to those who have “weighed in about our perceived failings,” he mused, “It makes me wonder what life would be like if we’d actually done something wrong.”

2003 年 5 月 22 日，在伯克希尔的年报公布不久之后，投资公司协会的主席对其会员发表有关"产业现况"的报告时，在有人问到「权衡我们目前感受到的失败气氛」，他半开玩笑地回答："这让我不禁想到，如果我们真的做错了什么事时，结果会怎样"。

Be careful what you wish for.

小心你的期望落空！

Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund-management companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.

就在几个月内，全世界慢慢开始明了许多基金管理公司过去一直以来，一面进行着伤害其所管理基金投资人权益的程序，一面又大幅增加基金经理人的管理费用，必须说明的是，这些基金管理公司在大幅越线之前，本来就享有比一般美国企业还高的投资回报率，但为了进一步提高获利，他们竟胆敢以骇世惊人的手法，践踏投资人的利益。

So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys-will-be-boys attitude?

那么这些被掠夺的基金，其董事到底做了些什么？直到我下笔的时刻，我还没有看到任何一位董事跳出来终止与胆大妄为基金经理公司所签订的合约(虽然这些公司会意思意思开除几个员工)，我就不相信当这些董事自身的权益被侵害时，还会采取如此吊儿郎当的态度。

To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for “delivering” the mutual funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a travesty. Why in the world don’t the directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge “payoff” to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on this approach to obtaining a new manager.

更惨的是，至少有一家为非作歹的管理公司公开对外标售，明目张胆的想要将自己掌管的资金出卖给出价最高的竞标者，这完全是一场拙劣的闹剧，为何这些董事就不能选出一个真心替投资人着想的管理公司，同时直接跟对方签约？如此得标者就可以省下一笔原本必须给前任经理人的巨额补偿金，因为这位奢言治理原则的经理人根本就不配拿到任何一毛钱，而由于不必承担这笔并购的成本，接任者肯定会接受以远比通常管理费率还低的收费来管理公司，我相信任何一位真正独立的董事都应该坚持采用这种方式选任新的基金经理人。

The reality is that neither the decades-old rules regulating investment company directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his income from director fees – and who may wish to enhance his income through election to other boards – is deemed independent. That is nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from any source would not torpedo Ron’s independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50% of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I think it’s clear that at mutual funds, it has.

现实的情况是，几十年规范投资公司董事的老规矩，或者是压倒美国企业的新规定，都无法选任出真正具独立性的董事，在两种情况下，一旦有人可以百分之百靠收取董事酬劳过活，那么他一定会想法子再去争取担任其它公司的董事，而离谱的是，这样的做法竟然还可以被视为独立，这实在完全没有道理，另一方面，根据相同的规定，在伯克希尔董事之一的 RonOlson 律师反而变得不独立，虽然他从伯克希尔所得的收入仅占其整体收入的3%，但他不被视为独立的理由，竟然是因为他领的是法律顾问费而非董事的酬劳，我想大家可以确定的是，不论这 3%的来源为何，都不会妨碍到 Ron 的独立性，反之我认为不论名目为何，只要你从任何一个地方拿到 20%、30%或 50%，那肯定就会影响到独立性，尤其考量到其它收入相对微薄之时，而我可以相当肯定的是在共同基金界的情况就是如此。

* * * * * * * * * * *

Let me make a small suggestion to “independent” mutual fund directors. Why not simply affirm in each annual report that “(1) We have looked at other management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds would negotiate.”

在这里让我对共同基金的董事们给予一个衷心的建议，大家为何不在基金年报上做出以下的声明：(1)在征询过其它基金管理公司后，我们确信目前选定的公司堪称业界一时之选；(2)我们已经与基金经理人商议过管理费用，并获得与规模相当同业一致的收费水准。

It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors – who are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually – to declare themselves on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the maxim “If you don’t know whose side someone is on, he’s probably not on yours.”

我想投资人期望基金董事们能够做到上述这些声明的要求并不过分，尤其考量这些董事每年平均收到超过十万美元以上的高额酬劳，而且我们可以肯定的是如果他们在处理个人金钱的时候，他们也一定会做到以上这些事情，而如果有董事不愿做出以上这两点声明，投资人就必须要特别小心，俗谚有云：如果你不确信他是不是站在你这边，那么他很可能就是敌人。

Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that charge above-average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low-cost (such as Vanguard’s) are investor-friendly by definition and are the best selection for most of those who wish to own equities.

最后，是一项声明，许多基金的运作相当正常良好，即使舞弊的机会确实存在，这些基金的投资人依然因此受惠，经理人也赚取其应得之份，确实如果我担任某些基金的董事，包含那些我认为收费过高的基金，我一定会积极地做出以上的那些声明，此外，还有一些收费相当低廉的指数型基金(比如说先锋基金)其本质相当适合某些投资人，我认为对于某些想要投资股票的人来说，算是相当不错的选择。

I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for owners or for managers.

现在的我就像是站在肥皂箱上，眼见公然露骨的行为不断发生，背叛了数百万投资人的信任，许多业内人士都相当清楚事件发生的来龙去脉，但就是没有人敢站出来说一句公道话，最后还是劳驾 Eliot Spitzer 检察官以及其它协助办案的执法同仁，出面来进行一次大清扫，我们敦促这些共同基金董事们继续执行这些工作，就像是全美其它企业的董事，这些受托的人士必须决定他们到底是为了投资人或是经理人服务。