巴菲特致股东的信（2004年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2004 was $8.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.5%. Over the last 40 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $55,824, a rate of 21.9% compounded annually.*

公司 2004 年的账面价值增加 83 亿美元，A/B 股每股的账面价值增加 10.5%(标普 10.9%)，自现任管理层接手的 40 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 55824 美元，年复合成长率约为 21.9%。

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

* 本报告中使用的所有数据都适用于伯克希尔的A股，这是公司在1996年之前唯一发行在外的股票。B股的经济权益等于A股的1/30。

It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2004, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 40-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 21.9% gain in book. (For an explanation of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 73.)

真正重要的是内在价值，而不是账面价值，而好消息是，在 1964 年到 2004 年期间，伯克希尔已经从一家原本摇摇欲坠的北方纺织公司，蜕变成一个跨足各个产业的大型集团，其内在价值大幅超越账面价值，可以这样说，40 年来内在价值的成长率甚至远超过账面价值 21.9%的成长率，(想要对内在价值以及本人与查理·芒格经营伯克希尔的原则有更多的了解的人，我建议大家阅读股东手册)。

Despite their shortcomings, yearly calculations of book value are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculations are less relevant, however, than they once were in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings (including convertible preferreds) have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to less than 50% in recent years. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case, a fact that will normally cause us to underperform in years when stocks rise substantially and overperform in years when they fall.

虽然账面价值并非完美，但仍不失为衡量内在价值长期成长率的有效工具，当然单一年度账面价值的表现与标普 500 指数的比较(相关比较参阅首页)，其意义已不若以往，主要原因在于，我们的股票投资部位，含可转换特别股在内，占账面价值的比重已大幅下降，从 1980 年代早期的 114%，到近年 50%不到。因此，与过去相比，现在股票市场的年度变动对我们净资产的影响要小得多，这通常会导致我们在股票大幅上涨的年份表现不佳，而在股票下跌的年份表现优异。

However the yearly comparisons work out, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.

不过即便如此，伯克希尔相对于标普 500 长期的表现还是很重要的，因为股东们现在可以非常低的手续费买到指数型基金，间接投资标普 500，因此除非在往后我们能够以高于标普 500 的速度累积每股内在价值，否则查理跟我就没有存在的价值。

Last year, Berkshire’s book-value gain of 10.5% fell short of the index’s 10.9% return. Our lackluster performance was not due to any stumbles by the CEOs of our operating businesses: As always, they pulled more than their share of the load. My message to them is simple: Run your business as if it were the only asset your family will own over the next hundred years. Almost invariably they do just that and, after taking care of the needs of their business, send excess cash to Omaha for me to deploy.

去年伯克希尔的账面价值仅增加了 10.5%，略低于标普 500 指数 10.9%的回报率，这种平庸的表现与我们旗下经理人完全无关，一如往常，他们已分担了许多重担，我给他们的指示相当简单明确，以继承自家百年老店的心来经营事业，而他们大多都照办，并把多余的资金送回奥马哈交由我运用。

I didn’t do that job very well last year. My hope was to make several multi-billion dollar acquisitions that would add new and significant streams of earnings to the many we already have. But I struck out. Additionally, I found very few attractive securities to buy. Berkshire therefore ended the year with $43 billion of cash equivalents, not a happy position. Charlie and I will work to translate some of this hoard into more interesting assets during 2005, though we can’t promise success.

去年是我没有做好份内的工作，我本来希望能够谈成几个数十亿美元的并购案，好让我们能够再增加稳定的收益创造能力，可惜我一事无成，此外我也找不到什么股票可以买，就这样到年底伯克希尔帐上累积的高达 430亿美元的约当现金，真伤脑筋，明年查理跟我会更努力地将这些闲置资金转化为较吸引人的资产，不过我们实在是不敢打包票。

In one respect, 2004 was a remarkable year for the stock market, a fact buried in the maze of numbers on page 2. If you examine the 35 years since the 1960s ended, you will find that an investor’s return, including dividends, from owning the S&P has averaged 11.2% annually (well above what we expect future returns to be). But if you look for years with returns anywhere close to that 11.2% – say, between 8% and 14% – you will find only one before 2004. In other words, last year’s “normal” return is anything but.

从另一方面来说，2004 年的股市表现确实不错，如果看看自 1960 年以来的 35 年间，你会发现包含股息在内的投资回报率，年化高达 11.2%，这远高于未来我们预期可获得的回报率，但如果看看最近几年回报率，你会发现 2004 年之前只有一年达到以前的水准，所以说去年看起来正常的回报可以说是特例。

Over the 35 years, American business has delivered terrific results. It should therefore have been easy for investors to earn juicy returns: All they had to do was piggyback Corporate America in a diversified, low-expense way. An index fund that they never touched would have done the job. Instead many investors have had experiences ranging from mediocre to disastrous.

过去 35 年来，美国企业创造出优异的成绩单，按理说投资人也应该跟着获得丰厚的回报，只要大家以分散且低成本的方式搭顺风车即可，事实上指数型基金同样可以达到这样的目的，但为什么实际上大多数投资人的绩效却惨不忍睹呢？

There have been three primary causes: first, high costs, usually because investors traded excessively or spent far too much on investment management; second, portfolio decisions based on tips and fads rather than on thoughtful, quantified evaluation of businesses; and third, a start-and-stop approach to the market marked by untimely entries (after an advance has been long underway) and exits (after periods of stagnation or decline). Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.

我认为这其中主要有三个原因，第一，频繁交易的成本太高，投资人的进出往往过于频繁，或者是花太多费用在投资管理之上；第二、投资决策往往基于小道消息和追逐热点，而不是基于企业的理性和定量的评价标准；第三，错误的介入时点，高买低卖。如在牛市上涨多时后高点买入，或是漫长熊市下跌后低位卖出。投资人必须谨记，过度兴奋与过高的交易成本是其大敌，而如果大家一定要投资股票，我认为正确的心态应该是，当别人贪婪时要感到恐惧，当别人恐惧时要感到贪婪。