巴菲特致股东的信（2006年）⑧投资业务

Investments

投资业务

We show below our common stock investments. With two exceptions, those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2006 are itemized. We don’t itemize the two securities referred to, which have a market value of $1.9 billion, because we continue to buy them. I could, of course, tell you their names. But then I would have to kill you.

下表为我们普通股方面的投资。我们将 2006 年底市值超过 7 亿美元股票列出，但有两家例外，因为这两家市值合计超过 19 亿美元的公司，我们仍在持续买进。当然，我也可以告诉各位是哪两家，但随后我可能就有必要杀人灭口了。

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

*成本项是我们实际的购买价格，也是计税的依据；这与 GAAP 会计原则所认定的"成本"有一些不同，因为少数情况下账面价值需要增加或减记。

We are delighted by the 2006 business performance of virtually all of our investees. Last year, we told you that our expectation was that these companies, in aggregate, would increase their earnings by 6% to 8% annually, a rate that would double their earnings every ten years or so. In 2006 American Express, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo, our largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 18%, 9%, 8% and 11%. These are stellar results, and we thank their CEOs.

我们对几乎所有的投资标的，于 2006 年营运的绩效表现感到高兴。如去年所提的，我们预期其整体而言，每年可在收益上创造 6~8%的成长，而此一比率，大约每十年左右，就能让企业的收益翻一倍。2006 年伯克希尔的最大持股公司美国运通、可口可乐、宝洁、及富国银行，每股收益分别成长 18%、9%、8%、及 11%，感谢这些企业 CEO 所创造的亮眼成绩。

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We’ve come close to eliminating our direct foreign-exchange position, from which we realized about $186 million in pre-tax profits in 2006 (earnings that were included in the Finance and Financial Products table shown earlier). That brought our total gain since inception of this position in 2002 to $2.2 billion. Here’s a breakdown by currency:

伯克希尔已经接近将直接持有的外汇仓位全数清算，在 2006 年实现了 1.86 亿的税前收益(包含在前面的金融及金融产品的收益报表中)。这使我们自 2002 年开始建立外汇仓位以来，获利的总数升高到 22 亿美元。以下是按货币种类划分的细目：

We’ve made large indirect currency profits as well, though I’ve never tallied the precise amount. For example, in 2002-2003 we spent about $82 million buying – of all things – Enron bonds, some of which were denominated in Euros. Already we’ve received distributions of $179 million from these bonds, and our remaining stake is worth $173 million. That means our overall gain is $270 million, part of which came from the appreciation of the Euro that took place after our bond purchase.

在间接持有外汇的获利方面，伯克希尔也大有斩获，但我从来无法精确地计算实际数字。比如，在 2002-2003 年间，我们以 8200 万美元(已经尽其所能了)买进安然公司(Enron)的垃圾债券，其中部分是以欧元计价的。我们已从这些债券里获得 1.79 亿的利息收入，而持有的债权部分，现值为 1.73 亿美元。这意味了伯克希尔总共的获利为 2.7 亿美元，其中部分是由于购买这些债券之后，拜欧元升值所赐。

When we first began making foreign exchange purchases, interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and most foreign countries favored a direct currency position. But that spread turned negative in 2005. We therefore looked for other ways to gain foreign-currency exposure, such as the ownership of foreign equities or of U.S. stocks with major earnings abroad. The currency factor, we should emphasize, is not dominant in our selection of equities, but is merely one of many considerations.

当我们开始建立外汇仓位时，美国和其它国家货币之间的利率差异，有利于直接持有外汇。但 2005 年时，利差由正转为负值，于是我们寻求其它途径持有外汇部位，比如买进海外企业股权、或有大量海外收益的美国企业。必须强调的是，汇率因素对于选股，并没有太大的意义，而仅是众多考虑之一而已。

As our U.S. trade problems worsen, the probability that the dollar will weaken over time continues to be high. I fervently believe in real trade – the more the better for both us and the world. We had about $1.44 trillion of this honest-to-God trade in 2006. But the U.S. also had $.76 trillion of pseudo-trade last year – imports for which we exchanged no goods or services. (Ponder, for a moment, how commentators would describe the situation if our imports were $.76 trillion – a full 6% of GDP – and we had no exports.) Making these purchases that weren’t reciprocated by sales, the U.S. necessarily transferred ownership of its assets or IOUs to the rest of the world. Like a very wealthy but self-indulgent family, we peeled off a bit of what we owned in order to consume more than we produced.

由于美国贸易逆差的问题恶化，美元持续走贬的可能性居高不下。我热切地相信公平的贸易往来，对美国及任何国家来说都是好事，而 2006 年，大约有 1.44 万亿的贸易规模属于此类。但在去年，美国同时也存在了7600 亿的伪贸易，也就是只有进口，却没有相等的货品或服务出口的状况。大家不妨沉思一下，若我们全部只有7600 亿的进口(目前约占 GDP 的 6%)，然而却没有任何出口的情势，评论家会如何描述。在大举向外采购，却缺乏相对应的销售收入，美国势必要变卖资产，或向世界其它国家融资。就像是一个相当富有、但奢靡无度的大家族一样，在生产能力不足以支应消费时，我们被迫要舍弃一些目前拥有的东西。

The U.S. can do a lot of this because we are an extraordinarily rich country that has behaved responsibly in the past. The world is therefore willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.

这对美国来说，并没有多大的问题。因为我们仍是非常富裕的国家，而过去的信用也不错。因此，全世界还很乐意接受美国的债券、房地产、股票、以及企业。由于资产雄厚，我们仍有继续挥霍的本钱。

These transfers will have consequences, however. Already the prediction I made last year about one fall-out from our spending binge has come true: The “investment income” account of our country – positive in every previous year since 1915 – turned negative in 2006. Foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card. And, like everyone who gets in hock, the U.S. will now experience “reverse compounding” as we pay ever-increasing amounts of interest on interest.

然而，这样的变卖家产，后果是不堪设想的。我去年曾预测，大肆挥霍的后果，其中之一已经成真：美国的"投资收益"账户，在 2006 年转为负数(自 1915 年以来皆为正值)。目前外国人从美国投资方面所产生的利得，已经超过美国人在海外投资所赚取的金额。目前的状况，如同美国人已经用尽了银行账户内的钱，并且将目光转向信用卡。然而，就像借高利贷一样，由于要支付不断增加的利息，美国目前正面临一个"反向复利"的处境。

I want to emphasize that even though our course is unwise, Americans will live better ten or twenty years from now than they do today. Per-capita wealth will increase. But our citizens will also be forced every year to ship a significant portion of their current production abroad merely to service the cost of our huge debtor position. It won’t be pleasant to work part of each day to pay for the over-consumption of your ancestors. I believe that at some point in the future U.S. workers and voters will find this annual “tribute” so onerous that there will be a severe political backlash. How that will play out in markets is impossible to predict – but to expect a “soft landing” seems like wishful thinking.

我想强调的是，即使知道此一做法极不明智，美国人仍可在未来十到二十年，过得比今天还要好，人均财富也将升高。只是在此同时，美国公民为了支应庞大负债的成本，在每年的生产成果中，有绝大一部分，是要转交给外国人的。每天辛勤的工作，有很多时间只是在为前一代的过度消费，而付出代价，实在是令人不爽。因此未来会有一天，美国的劳工及选民，终会对这种"贡献"感到厌烦，引发严重的政治反弹。市场将如何面对此一效应，我们根本无法评估，但若对于所谓"软着陆"抱着期望，恐怕只是自我安慰的想法而已。

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I should mention that all of the direct currency profits we have realized have come from forward contracts, which are derivatives, and that we have entered into other types of derivatives contracts as well. That may seem odd, since you know of our expensive experience in unwinding the derivatives book at Gen Re and also have heard me talk of the systemic problems that could result from the enormous growth in the use of derivatives. Why, you may wonder, are we fooling around with such potentially toxic material?

我应该告诉过大家，伯克希尔所有由直接外汇部位上实现的收益，都是来自于远期合约。这是一种衍生性金融商品，我们还签订了其它种类的衍生性合约，这可能让大家感到奇怪。我们都清楚通用再保险公司的衍生合约账户，在进行壮士断腕后，所得到的惨痛经验；同时也听我谈论过，衍生性商品运用的惊人成长，将导致金融市场上的系统性问题。你们也许会纳闷，为什么伯克希尔现在还要跟这个有害物质一起厮混呢？

The answer is that derivatives, just like stocks and bonds, are sometimes wildly mispriced. For many years, accordingly, we have selectively written derivative contracts – few in number but sometimes for large dollar amounts. We currently have 62 contracts outstanding. I manage them personally, and they are free of counterparty credit risk. So far, these derivative contracts have worked out well for us, producing pre-tax profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (above and beyond the gains I’ve itemized from forward foreign-exchange contracts). Though we will experience losses from time to time, we are likely to continue to earn – overall – significant profits from mispriced derivatives.

答案是，衍生性金融商品也像股票及债券一样，有时也会被严重错误的定价。因此，许多年来，伯克希尔在衍生性合约的签订，一向是具有选择性的，在数量上不多，但有时金额却很庞大。我现在亲自管理 62 个流通在外的衍生性合约，确保交易对手没有信用风险。截至目前，这些衍生性合约的效益还不错，为伯克希尔赚取了数亿美元的税前收益(远远超过前面有关远期外汇报表上的获利数字)。虽然时时都有亏损的可能，但是整体来说，还是很有可能继续从价格与价值的偏差中，获得可观的利益。

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I have told you that Berkshire has three outstanding candidates to replace me as CEO and that the Board knows exactly who should take over if I should die tonight. Each of the three is much younger than I. The directors believe it’s important that my successor have the prospect of a long tenure.

接班人计划我过去已经表示，伯克希尔已有 3 位杰出的候选人，将接替我担任 CEO 的职务。而且董事会也明确地知道，要是我今晚就过世，该会由谁来接任。3 位中无论是谁，都比我年轻很多。伯克希尔的董事们也都相信，继任者的任期要长，是很重要的一点。

Frankly, we are not as well-prepared on the investment side of our business. There’s a history here: At one time, Charlie was my potential replacement for investing, and more recently Lou Simpson has filled that slot. Lou is a top-notch investor with an outstanding long-term record of managing GEICO’s equity portfolio. But he is only six years younger than I. If I were to die soon, he would fill in magnificently for a short period. For the long-term, though, we need a different answer.

坦白来说，伯克希尔在投资方面人选的接班上没有做好充分的准备。不过，这有其历史因素：过去有一段时间，查理是潜在继任者，但最近路易·辛普森填补了这个空缺。路易是位长期投资的高手，在管理 GEICO 公司的股票投资组合期间，创造了相当出色的长期绩效。但他仅比我小 6 岁，如果我的大限到了，那么他可以短时间内完美的填补空缺，可能也并不太长。所以长期而言，伯克希尔需要另外的解决之道。

At our October board meeting, we discussed that subject fully. And we emerged with a plan, which I will carry out with the help of Charlie and Lou.

在我们十月的董事会上，我们已针对这一问题彻底讨论。我们制定了一个接班人计划，查理和路易将协助我共同执行。

Under this plan, I intend to hire a younger man or woman with the potential to manage a very large portfolio, who we hope will succeed me as Berkshire’s chief investment officer when the need for someone to do that arises. As part of the selection process, we may in fact take on several candidates.

依照计划，我打算雇用一位更年轻、且有潜力管理大型投资组合的人(男女均可)，视状况的需要，继任成为伯克希尔首席投资官。但在评选的过程中，实际上会挑出几位候选人。

Picking the right person(s) will not be an easy task. It’s not hard, of course, to find smart people, among them individuals who have impressive investment records. But there is far more to successful long-term investing than brains and performance that has recently been good.

挑出合适的人选，不是件容易的事。当然，从投资绩效斐然的人才中，再找出聪明的人选并不困难。但是长期投资要想成功，即使有精明的头脑、以及短期的优异绩效，还是有很遥远的距离。

Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.

随着时间的推移，市场会出现非比寻常、甚至诡异至极的事情。只要一个大错，就可能毁掉过去一长串的成功投资纪录。所以，伯克希尔需要一个生来就能辨认并规避重大风险的人，包括那些以前从未出现过的风险。而现行许多金融机构所普遍采用的模型，无法发现投资策略中潜藏的重大风险。

Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.

秉性也十分重要。独立思考、情绪稳定、以及对人性及机构行为的敏锐理解，这些对于长期投资的成功都至关重要。我看过很多聪明绝顶的人，但都缺乏这些特质。

Finally, we have a special problem to consider: our ability to keep the person we hire. Being able to list Berkshire on a resume would materially enhance the marketability of an investment manager. We will need, therefore, to be sure we can retain our choice, even though he or she could leave and make much more money elsewhere.

最后，我们还有一个特别的问题需要考虑：我们能让受聘者留任多久。在伯克希尔的资历加到个人履历上，可以让此投资经理人，在市场上更加抢手。因此，我们要能确保最后所选择的人，即使在别的地方收入更高，也能坚持留在伯克希尔。

There are surely people who fit what we need, but they may be hard to identify. In 1979, Jack Byrne and I felt we had found such a person in Lou Simpson. We then made an arrangement with him whereby he would be paid well for sustained overperformance. Under this deal, he has earned large amounts. Lou, however, could have left us long ago to manage far greater sums on more advantageous terms. If money alone had been the object, that’s exactly what he would have done. But Lou never considered such a move. We need to find a younger person or two made of the same stuff.

我们所需要的人才，必定是存在的，只是可能比较难以辨认而已。1979 年，JackByrne 和我，认定那个人就是辛普森。于是我们和他达成协议，若能维持过人的绩效，收入就必然可观，辛普森因此在财富上，得到丰硕的成果。然而，辛普森大可以在几年前，因为更优厚的合约条件而离职，去管理更大笔的资金。如果钱是他唯一的选择，他早就离开伯克希尔了，但辛普森从未有此念头。我们就是需要找到一位或两位更年轻的人，前提就是要具备辛普森的特质。

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The good news: At 76, I feel terrific and, according to all measurable indicators, am in excellent health. It’s amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow.

好消息是：76 岁的我，感觉自己状况极佳。而且根据所有衡量指标，我的健康程度都在优良的水平。对于一个常喝樱桃可乐、及吃汉堡的家伙来说，实在是再神奇不过的事。