巴菲特致股东的信（2006年）⑩其它

This and That

其它

Berkshire will pay about $4.4 billion in federal income tax on its 2006 earnings. In its last fiscal year the U.S. Government spent $2.6 trillion, or about $7 billion per day. Thus, for more than half of one day, Berkshire picked up the tab for all federal expenditures, ranging from Social Security and Medicare payments to the cost of our armed services. Had there been only 600 taxpayers like Berkshire, no one else in America would have needed to pay any federal income or payroll taxes.

伯克希尔将为其 2006 年的收益，缴纳约 44 亿美元的联邦所得税。而美国政府上一年度的支出为 2.6 万亿美元，即每天的花费约 70 亿美元。换句话说，伯克希尔可以支应所有联邦政府半天以上的所有开支，无论是社会福利、医保、及至于国防相关的成本。只要约有 600 个像伯克希尔这样的纳税者，所有的美国人就无需缴交任何所得税或工资税。

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Our federal return last year, we should add, ran to 9,386 pages. To handle this filing, state and foreign tax returns, a myriad of SEC requirements, and all of the other matters involved in running Berkshire, we have gone all the way up to 19 employees at World Headquarters.

应该要加以说明的是，我们去年向美国政府申报的所有文件，页数总共为 9386。而相关业务办理、州政府、外国政府的税务申报、美国证券交易委员会 SEC 限期完成的许多报表，以及所有与伯克希尔营运相关的各类事项，都是由全球总部的 19 位同仁所一手包办。

This crew occupies 9,708 square feet of space, and Charlie – at World Headquarters West in Los Angeles – uses another 655 square feet. Our home-office payroll, including benefits and counting both locations, totaled $3,531,978 last year. We’re careful when spending your money.

这些人员的办公场所，占地 9,708 平方英尺，而查理·芒格所在的洛杉矶美西世界总部，则有 655 平方英尺。我们去年花在总部办公的所有支出，包括员工福利、及两个办公场地费用，总数为 3,531,978 美元，显然我们在开销方面异常谨慎。

Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers’ money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here’s an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule.

企业界许多重要人物，对于美国政府的开销颇有微词，指责官僚体系在支出上，无法将纳税人的钱，视为自己的钱一样有所节制。不过，有时这些企业高层在公司的财务上，也会因为钱并不由自己口袋拿出来，而展现出不同的行为模式。我在担任所罗门投资银行董事时，所发生的一个小故事，大家就可以看得很清楚。在 1980 年代时，该公司请了一位名为 Jimmy 的理发师，每周来为高层免费理发，随行还有一位专门修指甲的人。后来，由于削减成本之故，想要接受服务的人，必须自行负担费用。其中有某位高管(并不是 CEO)，本来是每周都向吉米报到，但在新规定实施后，立刻决定三个周再来理一次发。

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Every now and then Charlie and I catch on early to a tide-like trend, one brimming over with commercial promise. For example, though American Airlines (with its “miles”) and American Express (with credit card points) are credited as being trailblazers in granting customers “rewards,” Charlie and I were far ahead of them in spotting the appeal of this powerful idea. Excited by our insight, the two of us jumped into the reward business way back in 1970 by buying control of a trading stamp operation, Blue Chip Stamps. In that year, Blue Chip had sales of $126 million, and its stamps papered California.

查理和我时不时地早早引领风潮，掌握一些在商业前景上可能发光发热的潮流。例如，虽然美国航空(里程数)和美国运通(信用卡积分)被视为客户"红利回馈"的先驱，但我们却很早就注意到，这门生意的强大吸引力。在这一洞察力鼓励下，我们于 1970 年收购了一家印花交易公司蓝筹印花。当时，该公司的年营收为 1.26 亿美元，其印花在加州各地随处可见。

In 1970, indeed, about 60 billion of our stamps were licked by savers, pasted into books, and taken to Blue Chip redemption stores. Our catalog of rewards was 116 pages thick and chock full of tantalizing items. When I was told that even certain brothels and mortuaries gave stamps to their patrons, I felt I had finally found a sure thing.

实际上，就在 1970 年，约当有 600 亿张印花券，被收集者累积成册，前往我们的特约商店兑换商品。我们的商品奖励目录的页数厚达 116 页，满满都是令人迫不急待想兑换的商品。当我得知连一些特种行业、及葬仪业者，都会给顾客印花券时，我以为我终于找到了稳赚不赔的生意。

Well, not quite. From the day Charlie and I stepped into the Blue Chip picture, the business went straight downhill. By 1980, sales had fallen to $19.4 million. And, by 1990, sales were bumping along at $1.5 million. No quitter, I redoubled my managerial efforts.

然而，事实上并不尽然。从我们踏入此一领域后，却是一路走下坡。到了 1980 年，该公司营收滑落至 1,940万美元。接着到 1990 年，犹如陷入泥淖的营收，更只剩下 150 万美元。由于我不是轻言退缩的人，在管理上我付出了更加倍地努力。

Sales then fell another 98%. Last year, in Berkshire’s $98 billion of revenues, all of $25,920 (no zeros omitted) came from Blue Chip. Ever hopeful, Charlie and I soldier on.

营收又再衰退了 98%。到了去年，在伯克希尔 980 亿美元的营收中，来自蓝筹印花公司的贡献，一共只有 25920 美元(没省略任何 0)。但我和查理还是怀抱着无比的希望，继续坚持下去。

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I mentioned last year that in my service on 19 corporate boards (not counting Berkshire or other controlled companies), I have been the Typhoid Mary of compensation committees. At only one company was I assigned to comp committee duty, and then I was promptly outvoted on the most crucial decision that we faced. My ostracism has been peculiar, considering that I certainly haven’t lacked experience in setting CEO pay. At Berkshire, after all, I am a one-man compensation committee who determines the salaries and incentives for the CEOs of around 40 significant operating businesses.

如我去年的股东信中所提，在我担任 19 个公司(不含伯克希尔和关系企业)的董事职务上，几乎所有的薪酬委员会，都视我如同伤寒玛丽般、避之唯恐不及。只有一家公司的薪酬委员会，邀请我担任委员，但在大多数关键性的决定上，我的意见却还是立刻遭到否决。在制定公司 CEO 薪酬水平上，经验不可谓不丰富的我，却受到如此的排斥，实在令人匪夷所思。毕竟，伯克希尔的薪酬委员会，我是唯一的成员，为集团中近四十个重要的营运事业，决定了所有经理人的薪水和奖励方案。

How much time does this aspect of my job take? Virtually none. How many CEOs have voluntarily left us for other jobs in our 42-year history? Precisely none.

在此类工作方面，究竟占了我多少时间？几乎是没有。那在我们 42 年来的营运历史中，有多少经理人想要跳槽？也是一个也没有。

Berkshire employs many different incentive arrangements, with their terms depending on such elements as the economic potential or capital intensity of a CEO’s business. Whatever the compensation arrangement, though, I try to keep it both simple and fair.

伯克希尔采用了许多完全不同的激励安排，其条款取决于 CEO 所负责业务的经济潜力、或资本密集程度等因素。但无论是什么样的薪酬方案，我总是尽量本着简单、同时维持公平的原则。

When we use incentives – and these can be large – they are always tied to the operating results for which a given CEO has authority. We issue no lottery tickets that carry payoffs unrelated to business performance. If a CEO bats .300, he gets paid for being a .300 hitter, even if circumstances outside of his control cause Berkshire to perform poorly. And if he bats .150, he doesn’t get a payoff just because the successes of others have enabled Berkshire to prosper mightily. An example: We now own $61 billion of equities at Berkshire, whose value can easily rise or fall by 10% in a given year. Why in the world should the pay of our operating executives be affected by such $6 billion swings, however important the gain or loss may be for shareholders?

当我们采用奖励制度时(而且会十分丰厚)，总是要与该名 CEO 所负责的营运结果，有直接的关连。我们不希望让他们产生投机的心理，以为可以得到与事业表现无关的回报。如果一个 CEO 的打击率只有三成，那他就应该获得相同成绩的收入，即使是他控制范围以外的因素，导致伯克希尔的表现不尽人意。而对于打击率只有一成五的 CEO 来说，就算其它事业的成功，让伯克希尔大展鸿图，他也不应该因此获得任何好处。举例来说：伯克希尔目前持有 610 亿美元的股权，其任何一年的价值，很轻易地就可能上升或下降 10%。无论此一盈亏对股东的重要性如何，但对那些为我们经营事业的主管而言，究竟有什么样的理由，他们的收入要和这 60 亿美元的变动，有任何的关连？

You’ve read loads about CEOs who have received astronomical compensation for mediocre results. Much less well-advertised is the fact that America’s CEOs also generally live the good life. Many, it should be emphasized, are exceptionally able, and almost all work far more than 40 hours a week. But they are usually treated like royalty in the process. (And we’re certainly going to keep it that way at Berkshire. Though Charlie still favors sackcloth and ashes, I prefer to be spoiled rotten. Berkshire owns The Pampered Chef; our wonderful office group has made me The Pampered Chief.)

企业 CEO 在绩效差强人意，但却仍可领取天文数字薪酬的许多事例，已经广为流传。但大家比较少听说到的真相是，美国的企业 CEO 普遍也过着十分优越的生活。应该强调的是，他们当中有许多人真的是能力非凡，而且大多数一周工作时数也远超过 40 个小时，只是大家看待他们的方式，通常被视为皇室成员。而伯克希尔目前对待CEO 的方式，必定还是会持续下去。虽然查理比较偏好的是勤俭克难，但我宁愿被过度溺爱。伯克希尔旗下有家公司，名为娇宠大厨，而我们良好的企业文化，则让我成为了娇宠的大家长。

CEO perks at one company are quickly copied elsewhere. “All the other kids have one” may seem a thought too juvenile to use as a rationale in the boardroom. But consultants employ precisely this argument, phrased more elegantly of course, when they make recommendations to comp committees.

一家企业提供给 CEO 的福利津贴，很快就会被其它公司所复制沿用。在董事会中，"别家小孩都这样"的想法，可能因为过于幼稚，比较不会被视为合理的解释。然而，当业界的顾问人员，在对薪酬委员会提出建议时，实际上却是以此为主要的论点。当然，他们只是用更优雅一些的方式，来加以修辞而已。

Irrational and excessive comp practices will not be materially changed by disclosure or by “independent” comp committee members. Indeed, I think it’s likely that the reason I was rejected for service on so many comp committees was that I was regarded as too independent. Compensation reform will only occur if the largest institutional shareholders – it would only take a few – demand a fresh look at the whole system. The consultants’ present drill of deftly selecting “peer” companies to compare with their clients will only perpetuate present excesses.

通过信息的披露，或是聘请"独立董事"来担任薪酬委员，对这类在薪酬发放上不合理、且过于慷慨的普遍作法，并无法产生任何实际上的改变。说实在的，我之所以会被许多薪酬委员会拒于门外，最可能的理由，就是因为我被视为是"过于独立"的董事。薪酬制度的改革只有在几个最大的机构投资者(数目不必多)提出要求，就能使整个系统出现全新的气象。目前这些顾问在面对客户，巧妙运用"同业"水平、来作为比较基准的手法，只会让目前在薪酬发放已过份慷慨的现象，在企业界更为盛行下去。

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Last year I arranged for the bulk of my Berkshire holdings to go to five charitable foundations, thus carrying out part of my lifelong plan to eventually use all of my shares for philanthropic purposes. Details of the commitments I made, as well as the rationale for them, are posted on our website, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Taxes, I should note, had nothing to do with my decision or its timing. My federal and state income taxes in 2006 were exactly what they would have been had I not made my first contributions last summer, and the same point will apply to my 2007 contributions.

去年，我已将大部分持有的伯克希尔股权，移转给五个慈善基金会。此一安排，是我生前规划的一部分，最终我会将名下所有持股，全数投入于慈善目的。有关我所做的承诺、及所持的理由，都发布在我们的网站：www.bershirehathaway.com。我应该指出的是，此一决定及实行时机，都并非出于税负的考虑。2006 年我必须缴交给联邦、或州政府的所得税，与我去年夏天的首次捐献前，维持完全相同的水平，对 2007 的所得税来说，也没有任何不同。

In my will I’ve stipulated that the proceeds from all Berkshire shares I still own at death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within ten years after my estate is closed. Because my affairs are not complicated, it should take three years at most for this closing to occur. Adding this 13-year period to my expected lifespan of about 12 years (though, naturally, I’m aiming for more) means that proceeds from all of my Berkshire shares will likely be distributed for societal purposes over the next 25 years or so.

根据我遗嘱中的主张，我在过世时仍持有的伯克希尔股份，将以为期十年的时间加以变卖，以投入慈善事业。由于处理上并不算复杂，因此最多再花三年，就能完成所有程序。将这 13 年的时间，加上我预期自己还能再活约 12 年(当然，我的目标不只如此)，就意味着我所有伯克希尔持股的卖出所得，将在未来 25 年间，完全移作社会公益用途。

I’ve set this schedule because I want the money to be spent relatively promptly by people I know to be capable, vigorous and motivated. These managerial attributes sometimes wane as institutions – particularly those that are exempt from market forces – age. Today, there are terrific people in charge at the five foundations. So at my death, why should they not move with dispatch to judiciously spend the money that remains?

决定此一时程，是由于我希望这些钱，交给我所知悉有能力、活力、及动机的人，能够在有限的时间内相对迅速的加以运用。由于这些管理上的特质，常随着机构(尤其不受市场力量影响的机构)的老化而衰减。

Those people favoring perpetual foundations argue that in the future there will most certainly be large and important societal problems that philanthropy will need to address. I agree. But there will then also be many super-rich individuals and families whose wealth will exceed that of today’s Americans and to whom philanthropic organizations can make their case for funding. These funders can then judge firsthand which operations have both the vitality and the focus to best address the major societal problems that then exist. In this way, a market test of ideas and effectiveness can be applied. Some organizations will deserve major support while others will have outlived their usefulness. Even if the people above ground make their decisions imperfectly, they should be able to allocate funds more rationally than a decedent six feet under will have ordained decades earlier. Wills, of course, can always be rewritten, but it’s very unlikely that my thinking will change in a material way.

目前，这五个基金会都是由不可多得的人才来管理，因此在我离开人世时，何不让他们快速行动，明智的花掉我所遗留的财产？对偏重在基金会永续经营方面的人来说，强调未来一定会有更重大的社会问题，需要慈善组织的密切关注。我同意此一看法，但我认为将来一定会出现更多的超级富豪及家族，其财富规模将超过美国现有的水平，能够在慈善组织的号召下，提供所需捐助的基金。届时，这些资助者，就可根据当时的实际需要，提供机构在运作上所需的动能，将焦点放在那时才发生的重大社会问题，以寻求最佳解决之道。如此一来，这些机构的理念及有效性，就可在市场上接受验证。有些基金会理应获得大量支持，但许多社会目标已然完成者，剩余的基金该如何处置，反而形成更大的问题。即使活着的人在决策上不尽理想，但在资金的分配上，也还是应该比几十年前死者的好意安排，更符合实际的需要。当然，遗嘱随时都能改写，但让我的想法出现重大改变，恐怕是不大可能的。

A few shareholders have expressed concern that sales of Berkshire by the foundations receiving shares will depress the stock. These fears are unwarranted. The annual trading volume of many stocks exceeds 100% of the outstanding shares, but nevertheless these stocks usually sell at prices approximating their intrinsic value. Berkshire also tends to sell at an appropriate price, but with annual volume that is only 15% of shares outstanding. At most, sales by the foundations receiving my shares will add three percentage points to annual trading volume, which will still leave Berkshire with a turnover ratio that is the lowest around.

部分股东对这些获得捐助的基金会，可能在变卖持股时，对我们股价所造成的冲击，表达了他们的关切。这其实不足为惧，因为许多股票的年成交量，往往超过其在外流通股数的 100%，但其股价仍可维持在内在价值附近。而伯克希尔的年成交量，只有在外流通股数的 15%，仍可维持在合理的股价水平。获得我手中持股的基金会在卖出时，最多只会增加年成交量的百分之三，伯克希尔的股票周转率，仍然是处在市场的最低水平。

Overall, Berkshire’s business performance will determine the price of our stock, and most of the time it will sell in a zone of reasonableness. It’s important that the foundations receive appropriate prices as they periodically sell Berkshire shares, but it’s also important that incoming shareholders don’t overpay. (See economic principle 14 on page 77.) By both our policies and shareholder communications, Charlie and I will do our best to ensure that Berkshire sells at neither a large discount nor large premium to intrinsic value.

整体而言，伯克希尔的事业表现，才是决定其股价的根本原因。在极大多数的状况下，其价位都将在合理的区间之内变动。对于定期将卖出伯克希尔持股的那些基金会而言，价格的合宜是重要的，但对伯克希尔的新进股东来说，不让他们付出过高的成本，也是同样重要的事(请参阅股东手册经济原则的第 14 点)。无论是经营方针，以及股东的沟通交流方面，伯克希尔的主管们都竭尽所能，确保股价与内在价值间，既不会出现大幅折价，也没有大量溢价的空间。

The existence of foundation ownership will in no way influence our board’s decisions about dividends, repurchases, or the issuance of shares. We will follow exactly the same rule that has guided us in the past: What action will be likely to deliver the best result for shareholders over time?

针对基金会的持股，绝不会影响伯克希尔董事会，在股利、股票回购、及发行新股方面的决策。我们将遵循与过去完全一致、持续提供着启示的规则：长期而言，什么行动极可能带给股东最佳的成果？投资顾问

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In last year’s report I allegorically described the Gotrocks family – a clan that owned all of America’s businesses and that counterproductively attempted to increase its investment returns by paying ever-greater commissions and fees to “helpers.” Sad to say, the “family” continued its self-destructive ways in 2006.

在去年的股东信中，我以寓言的方式象征性描述了一个拥有所有美国企业股权的 GotRocks 家族，企图以违反生产原则的方式，支付给"帮手们"愈来愈高的佣金及费用，来增加投资回报率。悲哀的是，这个家族在 2006年，仍然持续往自我毁灭的路前进。

In part the family persists in this folly because it harbors unrealistic expectations about obtainable returns. Sometimes these delusions are self-serving. For example, private pension plans can temporarily overstate their earnings, and public pension plans can defer the need for increased taxes, by using investment assumptions that are likely to be out of reach. Actuaries and auditors go along with these tactics, and it can be decades before the chickens come home to roost (at which point the CEO or public official who misled the world is apt to be gone).

这个家族执迷不悟地做傻事，部分是对于可获得的回报，怀抱了不符实际的预期。有时候，这类错觉完全是自私的。举例来说，通过一些遥不可及的投资回报假设，私人企业的退休金计划，可以暂时将获利数字美化。而政府的公共养老金计划，也能将原本应增加的税收予以延后。精算师与审计人员，也在这些手法上同流合污，因为真正的结果，要几十年后才看得到。届时，这些误导全世界的企业 CEO 和公务员，早就消失无踪了。

Meanwhile, Wall Street’s Pied Pipers of Performance will have encouraged the futile hopes of the family. The hapless Gotrocks will be assured that they all can achieve above-average investment performance – but only by paying ever-higher fees. Call this promise the adult version of Lake Woebegon.

同时，华尔街也持续以绩效来吸引这个家族，为他们缘木求鱼的愿望来加油添醋。这个不幸的 Gotrocks 家族，以为只要支付了持续升高的费用，家族中所有成员，就能获取优于平均成绩的投资绩效。这就像大人版的 LakeWoebegon 故事一样。(在 1985 年小说《LakeWobegonDays》故事里，住在这里的每个孩子都有优于平均的表现。)

In 2006, promises and fees hit new highs. A flood of money went from institutional investors to the 2-and-20 crowd. For those innocent of this arrangement, let me explain: It’s a lopsided system whereby 2% of your principal is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes nothing – or, for that matter, loses you a bundle – and, additionally, 20% of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide. For example, a manager who achieves a gross return of 10% in a year will keep 3.6 percentage points – two points off the top plus 20% of the residual 8 points – leaving only 6.4 percentage points for his investors. On a $3 billion fund, this 6.4% net “performance” will deliver the manager a cool $108 million. He will receive this bonanza even though an index fund might have returned 15% to investors in the same period and charged them only a token fee.

在 2006 年，前述的承诺、及费用都创下了新高。机构投资人的钱，如洪水般涌入这些以 2%+20%的方式收费的一群人。对这种收费方式一无所知的人，容我作一番解释：这是个一面倒的系统，因为即使毫无绩效表现(甚至是大幅亏损)，每年仍需缴交本金的 2%给基金业者；此外，只要是基金公司的绩效为正数，就必须付给它们获利的 20%，即使这样的成绩完全是因为牛市上涨。举例来说，某年绩效为 10%的基金，就可收到 3.6%(2%管理费，以及 10%扣掉 2%后的 20%)的费用，而投资人将只剩下 6.4%。对于一支 30 亿美元的基金来说，此一 6.4%的净"绩效"，将为业者带来 1.08 亿美元的收入。对业者来说，这根本就像金矿一样，因为一般的指数基金，就算年回报率高达 15%，投资人也只付出象征性的费用而已。

The inexorable math of this grotesque arrangement is certain to make the Gotrocks family poorer over time than it would have been had it never heard of these “hyper-helpers.” Even so, the 2-and-20 action spreads. Its effects bring to mind the old adage: When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money.

这种无论赚赔、坚持都要收费的古怪方式，注定了 GotRocks 家族逐步走向贫穷的命运，若他们从未听说过这些"超级帮手"，就不会如此凄惨了。但即使如此，此 2+20 的模式还是继续蔓延。这种现象让我们想到一个英文古谚："当有经验的人向有钱的人提议一项交易，有钱的人往往会得到经验，而有经验的人往往会得到钱"。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager.

在本节的末尾，让我介绍一位华尔街的好人代表，我的老朋友 Walter Schloss，他去年刚过 90 大寿。自1956-2002 年，Walter 掌管着一个十分成功的投资合伙企业，除非投资者赚到钱，否则他不收一毛钱。必须强调的是，我对他的尊崇，并不是事后诸葛。因为早在 50 年前，有个位于 St.Louis 的家族，问我是否可介绍一些既诚实、又能干的投资经理人时，Walter 就是我唯一的推荐者。

Walter did not go to business school, or for that matter, college. His office contained one file cabinet in 1956; the number mushroomed to four by 2002. Walter worked without a secretary, clerk or bookkeeper, his only associate being his son, Edwin, a graduate of the North Carolina School of the Arts. Walter and Edwin never came within a mile of inside information. Indeed, they used “outside” information only sparingly, generally selecting securities by certain simple statistical methods Walter learned while working for Ben Graham. When Walter and Edwin were asked in 1989 by Outstanding Investors Digest, “How would you summarize your approach?” Edwin replied, “We try to buy stocks cheap.” So much for Modern Portfolio Theory, technical analysis, macroeconomic thoughts and complex algorithms.

Walter 并没有上过大学，也没有上过商学院。在1956 年时，他的办公室只有一个文件柜，到 2002 年时，已增加为四个。Walter 在工作上，从来没有请过秘书、文员或财务人员，唯一的助手是他的儿子 Edwin，他是北卡罗来纳大学的艺术硕士。Walter 及 Edwin 从来不听信什么内线消息，实际上，即使是"外界"信息，他们也很少使用，完全只运用一些特定的统计方法，而那是 Walter在为格雷厄姆工作时所学习到的。在接受 1989 年杰出投资人文摘(OID)采访时，他们被问道："请问该如何归纳你们的投资法则？" Edwin 的答复是："我们只是努力买便宜的股票。"如此来看，现代的投资组合理论、技术分析、宏观经济学派、及许多复杂算法，对他们来说，似乎太多余了。

Following a strategy that involved no real risk – defined as permanent loss of capital – Walter produced results over his 47 partnership years that dramatically surpassed those of the S&P 500. It’s particularly noteworthy that he built this record by investing in about 1,000 securities, mostly of a lackluster type. A few big winners did not account for his success. It’s safe to say that had millions of investment managers made trades by a) drawing stock names from a hat; b) purchasing these stocks in comparable amounts when Walter made a purchase; and then c) selling when Walter sold his pick, the luckiest of them would not have come close to equaling his record. There is simply no possibility that what Walter achieved over 47 years was due to chance.

遵循这种没有实质性风险(或定义为永久性资本损失)的策略，Walter 在他 47 年的合伙事业所创造出的业绩，远远地超越了标普 500 指数的同期表现。值得一提的是，他通过投资约 1000 家、大多为冷门的股票，缔造出这一纪录。少数几支股票的大胜，并不能完全解释他的成功。因为保守估计，数以百万计的投资经理人通过如下方式交易：(1)以随机的方式来选股，(2)与 Walter 购买的数量相当，(3)与 Walter 同时卖出持股。但即使是当中最幸运者，也难以接近 Walter 的纪录。这说明：Walter 在 47 年间取得的成就，绝对不是运气使然的。

I first publicly discussed Walter’s remarkable record in 1984. At that time “efficient market theory” (EMT) was the centerpiece of investment instruction at most major business schools. This theory, as then most commonly taught, held that the price of any stock at any moment is not demonstrably mispriced, which means that no investor can be expected to overperform the stock market averages using only publicly-available information (though some will do so by luck). When I talked about Walter 23 years ago, his record forcefully contradicted this dogma.

我在 1984 年时，首次针对 Walter Schloss 的傲人记录，公开加以讨论。当时，"市场有效假说"(EMT)是大多数主流商学院的投资课程的核心。如同那时大多数人所学到的观念，该理论认为，任何股票的价格，在任何时候，都不会出现明显的错误定价。这意味着，任何投资者只运用公开信息，都不可能超越市场平均水平(虽然运气的确能让某些人办到)。在我 23 年前谈到 Walter 时，他的纪录有力的反驳了这一理论教条。

And what did members of the academic community do when they were exposed to this new and important evidence? Unfortunately, they reacted in all-too-human fashion: Rather than opening their minds, they closed their eyes. To my knowledge no business school teaching EMT made any attempt to study Walter’s performance and what it meant for the school’s cherished theory.

但对于学术界的人来说，在接触这些新出现的重要证据时，他们的反应如何？不幸地，他们却与平常人的反应模式太过雷同：他们不但未敞开心扉加以思考，反而选择闭上眼睛。就我所知，没有一个教授市场有效假说(EMT)这门课的商学院，试图研究 Walter 的绩效表现，探讨其对于学院推崇的理论意味着什么。

Instead, the faculties of the schools went merrily on their way presenting EMT as having the certainty of scripture. Typically, a finance instructor who had the nerve to question EMT had about as much chance of major promotion as Galileo had of being named Pope.

取而代之的，这些学院派在传达市场有效假说的意义时，态度有如讲述圣经般坚定。在财务学的讲师中，胆敢对市场有效假说提出质疑者的比例，就如同伽利略被提名为教宗的可能性一样低。

Tens of thousands of students were therefore sent out into life believing that on every day the price of every stock was “right” (or, more accurately, not demonstrably wrong) and that attempts to evaluate businesses – that is, stocks – were useless. Walter meanwhile went on overperforming, his job made easier by the misguided instructions that had been given to those young minds. After all, if you are in the shipping business, it’s helpful to have all of your potential competitors be taught that the earth is flat.

因此，有数以万计的学生在进入社会后，对于所有股票每天价格的"正确性"深信不疑(跟准确地说是，没有明显的错误)，而评估企业(股票)都是徒劳的。在此同时，Walter继续表现出色，他的工作因为那些年轻人接受了这些错误观念而变得更轻松了。毕竟，对于航运业者来说，让你所有的竞争者都以为是地球是平的，应该可获益不少。

Maybe it was a good thing for his investors that Walter didn’t go to college.

对于 Walter这样的投资者而言，也许真应该庆幸的是，他没上过商学院。