巴菲特致股东的信（2008年）⑨投资业务

Investments

投资业务

Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.

由于会计规则的原因，今年我们把所持有的大量普通股票分为 2 类。下表列出了第一类，详细列出了我们资产负债表中年末市值超过 5 亿美元的投资。

In addition, we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value” – our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.

另外，我们持有穆迪和圣达菲伯林顿北方铁路公司的股票，这些股份以股权价值计算，即我们的成本加上自我们持有以来的留存收益，减去如果这些收益作为股息支付将要缴纳的相关税款。当持有被投资公司所有权超过20%时，通常采用这种会计处理方式。

We purchased 15% of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody’s, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.

我们几年前购买了穆迪 15%的股票，之后再也也没有买过这支股票。期间穆迪不断回购股票，到 2008 年底，回购的股票减少了市场中的流通股，于是我们的股份被动上升到了 20%。伯林顿北方铁路公司也回购了他们的股票，但我们持续购买这支股票，持股份额也已到达 20%。

Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at “equity accounting” values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.

除非事实或者规则改变，你将会看到无论这些股票的市值是多少，这些资产将以权益会计价值反映在我们的资产负债表中。你也将会看到他们收益中被我们应占部分(减去应付税)也定期的纳入我们的季度和年度收益中。

I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current $40-$50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.

此前我曾经提到过，去年我犯了一个严重的投资错误(可能还有很多，只是这个被发现了而已)。查理或者其他人都跟此事无关。在油价和天然气价格接近最高点时，我购买了大量的康菲石油的股票。我没能预计到 2008 年下半年能源价格的大幅下跌。我仍然认为未来石油价格高于现在的 40-50 美元可能性很大。但是到目前为止我错得离谱。即使石油价格回升，我选择购买的时机也让伯克希尔损失了数十亿美元。

I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”

我还犯了一些目前已经可见的错误。这些错误不那么大，但不幸的是，它们也不小。2008 年我花了 2.44 亿美元买了两家在我看来非常便宜的爱尔兰银行的股票。年底，这些股票的市价已经跌到 2700 万美元，我们亏损了 89％。自那之后，这两只股票的价格还在一路下跌。网球比赛的观众会称这种行为为"非受迫性失误"。

On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged – to you, the rating agencies and myself – to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.

去年的投资也有好的一面。我们购买了 145 亿箭牌、高盛和通用电气发行的固定收益证券。我们非常喜欢这些具有非常高当前收益率的合约，这本身就让这些投资非常令人满意。而且在这三笔投资中，我们每笔投资都获得了可观的股权投资作为额外回报。为了为这三项重大投资提供资金，我不得不出售了我们原本愿意持有的部分资产(主要是强生、宝洁和康菲石油)。然而我曾向你们评级机构和我资金保证，我将始终以充足的现金经营伯克希尔。我们从不指望靠陌生人的善意来履行明天的义务。当被迫选择，我不会为了更多利润牺牲哪怕一晚的睡眠。

The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.

投资界已经从极高的风险偏好发展到了极低的风险偏好。这种转变可真不小，钟摆已经从一个极端摇摆到了另一个极端。仅仅数年前，即使政府短期债券无风险回报率接近于零，长期债券收益率微乎其微，但高等级的市政债券或者公司债券却能获得今天的收益率，这似乎是不可想象的。当未来人们撰写这十年的金融史时，肯定会提到 1990 年代末的互联网泡沫和 21 世纪初的房地产泡沫。但 2008 年美国国债泡沫可能也会被认为几乎与前几次泡沫一样非同寻常。

Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable – in fact, almost smug – in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.

如果长期持有现金等价物或者长期政府债券，几乎可以肯定这是一种糟糕的投资策略。当然，随着金融动荡的加剧，持有这些资产的投资者会越发自我感觉良好，甚至到自鸣得意的地步。当他们听到所有评论员都在说"现金为王"时，他们越发感觉自己决策英明。尽管这些为王的现金不能带来任何收益，而且随着时间推移，其购买力还在不断下降。

Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.

然而投资的目的不是为了获得赞许。事实上，赞许往往会适得其反。因为它束缚了你的思维，让你的大脑停止接受新的事实，或重新审视早先形成的结论。谨防那些让人夸赞的投资行为，那些伟大的举动通常都会让人觉得枯燥无聊。