巴菲特致股东的信（2009年）②我们如何衡量自己

How We Measure Ourselves

我们如何衡量自己

Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have – or have not – accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.

我们评估管理层绩效的标准刊登在首页。查理和我一开始就认为，要有一个理性和坚定的标准来衡量我们完成和未完成的工作。这让我们避免看到业绩之箭落在何处然后在其周围画上靶心。

Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?

将标普 500 指数作为我们的基准是一个很容易的选择，因为我们的股东持有指数基金几乎不费什么代价就能实现这样的业绩。那么，他们有什么理由为我们仅仅创造同样绩效而给我们付钱？

A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.

对于我们而言，难度更大的决定是如何衡量伯克希尔相比标普 500 指数的进步。简单的使用股价变化来衡量也有充分的理由。实际上，在一段较长时间内股价是最好的考验。不过，每一年的市场价格可能会极其不稳定，即使涵盖时间长达 10 年的评估，也可能因衡量期间开始和结束时愚蠢的高价或低价而极大扭曲。微软的史蒂夫鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)和通用电气的杰夫伊梅尔特(Jeff Immelt)对此就有体会，他们在接掌这些企业时，都遭遇股价暴跌到令人流鼻血的地步。

The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value – understated though it is – supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.

衡量我们年度进展的理想标准或许是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变动，奈何这一价值难以用精确的方法计算，所以我们使用了一个粗略的替代标准：每股的账面价值。依靠这一标准有其自身的缺点，我们在后文对此进行了讨论。此外，大多数企业股票的账面价值都低估了内在价值，在伯克希尔当然也是如此。总的说来，我们企业的内在价值远高于其账面价值，而且在我们最重要的保险业务中差额巨大。即使如此，查理和我认为，我们的账面价值(虽然被低估)，是追踪内在价值变动的最有力工具。运用这种衡量标准，正如本封信开篇一段所言，自 1965财年以来，伯克希尔账面价值年复合增长率达 20.3%。

We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.

我们应该注意到，如果选用股价作为我们的衡量标准，伯克希尔的业绩看起来会更好，自 1965 财年年初以来的年复合增长率达到 22%。令人惊讶的是，年复合增长率的这一温和差额，导致 45 年间，市场价值增长801516%，而账面价值的增长 434057%。市值增长更高是因为，在 1965 年，伯克希尔股票以盈利不佳的纺织资产账面价值的适当折扣出售，而如今，伯克希尔股票一般以其一流业务的账面价值溢价出售。

Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 – and there have been 41 of these – during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.

总之，业绩表格传达了三个信息，其中两个为正面信息和另一个极为负面。首先，在从 1965-1969 年开始、至 2005-2009 年结束的 41 个五年期内，我们账面价值的增速都超过了标普 500 指数的增速；其次，虽然我们在市场向好的几年中落后于标普 500 指数，但在市场不利的年份，我们一直优于指数。换言之，我们的防守要好于进攻，这种情况很可能会持续下去。

The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.

最大的负面因素是，随着公司规模增长，我们的业绩优势大幅减少，这一令人不快的趋势肯定会持续下去。可以肯定的是，伯克希尔拥有许多出众的业务和一批真正优秀的经理人，并以一种不同寻常的企业文化运营，使他们能够最大限度发挥自己的才干。查理和我相信，这些因素随着时间的推移将继续创造好于平均水平的业绩。但是，巨大的资金规模已经形成沉重的锚，而我们未来的优势(如果有的话)，将只是我们过去优势的一小部分。