巴菲特致股东的信（2009年）④保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value – and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.

我们的财产险业务一直是公司的增长引擎，它为我们取得了惊人的成绩，并在未来的时间里继续充当这一角色。当前财产险公司帐面价值超过其有形资产净额 155 亿美元，这是我们商誉科目中的金额。当然，通过我下面对财产险领域经济模式特点的解释可以了解到，这些公司的价值要远远超过其帐面价值。

Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

保险公司运营模式的突出特点即预先收取保费而滞后支付客户索赔。在一些极端情况下，如一些企业工人的事故赔偿，赔偿期甚至长达几十年之久。这种先收后付的模式使得我们能够得以持有大量资金，我们称之为"浮存金"。尽管这部分资本最终将会流向客户，但同时，我们能够利用这部分资金进行投资并为伯克希尔带来利润。尽管不断有保单及索赔进进出出，但我们所持有的浮存金规模相对于保费收入仍基本保持稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也会越来越多。

If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.

如果保费收入超过了最终赔偿及运营费用支出总额，那么我们除浮存金的投资收益外，还获得了承保收益。这种组合为我们提供了使用免费资金的机会，更有利的是，我们甚至还因为持有免费资金而获得了报酬。当然，期望这一理想的结果也产生了激烈的行业竞争，在大多数年份里，这种竞争使得整个财产险行业的承保严重亏损。事实上，承保亏损正是该行业为其获得浮存金所付出的代价。通常这一成本并不高，但在一些灾难频发的年份中，承保损失的成本会超过其浮存金带来的投资收益。

In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.

在我看来，伯克希尔拥有全球最好的大型保险运营机构，这或许有失偏颇，但我绝对会说，我们拥有世界上最好的经理人。自 1967 年进入保险领域至 2009 年底，我们的浮存金从当时的 1600 万美元上升至 620 亿美元。此外，我们的运营已连续 7 年实现了承保盈利。我很有信心，在未来的大部分年份里，我们也将能保持承保盈利的骄人局面(当然不是所有年份)。如果是这样，那么我们的浮存金将是免费的。就像有人向我们存入 620 亿美元的存款，我们可以在不必支付利息的情况下，使用这些资金进行投资为我们带来利润。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.

让我再次强调，无成本浮存金并不是整个财产险行业的普遍现象，在大多数年份，保费并不足以支付客户索赔及公司运营费用。因此，数十年来该行业的有形资产回报率远远低于标普 500 指数，伯克希尔之所以取得骄人的成绩，仅仅是因为我们拥有众多出色的经理人在经营那些非比寻常的业务。我们保险公司的那些 CEO 们理应得到你们的感谢，是他们使得伯克希尔的价值增加了数十亿美元。在此，我很荣幸向大家介绍这些明星 CEO 们。

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Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.

让我们从 GEICO 保险公司开始，它因为每年 8 亿美元的广告宣传预算而为大家所熟知，这几乎是汽车险领域第二名广告费用的两倍。GEICO 首席执行官托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)18 岁进入公司工作，现年已经 66 岁的托尼仍然每天跳着踢踏舞来上班，正如我在 79 岁时所做的一样。我们都为从事自己热爱的事业而感到幸运。

GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.

GEICO 的客户同样对公司也有着温暖的感觉。自伯克希尔 1996 年接手 GEICO 以来，其市场占有率由 2.5%上升到了 8.1%，投保人净增加 700 万。他们或许是因为我们的壁虎形象可爱而与我们取得联系，但他们最终选择了从我们这里购买保险则是为了省钱。他们对我们服务与价格的肯定而成为了我们稳定的客户。(也许你也可以，请拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com)

Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.

伯克希尔分两个阶段完成了对 GEICO 的收购。1976-1980 年，我们出资 4700 万美元购买了 GEICO 约三分之一的股份，多年了，GEICO 大量回购股票使得我们的份额增长至 50%左右。1996 年 1 月 2 日，我们再次以 23亿美元现金的形式购买了 GEICO 剩余的 50%股份，这一价格大概是我们最初购买价格的 50 倍。

An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:

华尔街流行的一个老笑话很好地诠释了我们这段经历：

Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.

客户："很感谢你帮助我以 5 美元的价格买进了 XYZ 股票，我听说现在它已经涨到 18 美元了。"

Broker: Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.

经纪人："是的，这才刚刚开始呢。事实上，由于该公司表现强劲，相比 5 美元时，现在在 18 美元买进甚至会更好。"

Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.

客户："见鬼。我就知道我应该再等等的。"

GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.

GEICO 的增长在 2010 年可能会有所减缓。由于汽车销售量的下滑，美国车辆登记数目实际上也在下降，此外，高失业率使得越来越多的司机没有买保险(这几乎在任何地方都是违法的，但如果你失业了还想开车…)，然而我们"低成本生产商"的地位无疑会在未来给我们带来可观的业务。1995 年，GEICO 是全美第六大汽车保险公司，而现在我们排名第三。企业的浮存金也由 27 亿美元上涨至 96 亿美元。同样重要的是，GEICO 在伯克希尔管理的14 年里，其中的 13 年均实现了承保盈利。

I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.

1951 年 1 月，当时我还是一名 20 岁的学生，第一次访问 GEICO 我就对它产生兴趣，多亏了托尼，我今天对 GEICO 更加兴奋了。

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A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha – and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)

在 1985 年的一个周六，伯克希尔历史上发生了一项重大事件，在阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)进入我办公室的那一刻，我立即意识到我们找到了一个超级明星(他是被 Mike Goldberg 挖来，现在被提升为 St.Mike)。

We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.

我们立即让阿吉特负责运营国民保险的小型而艰难的再保险业务。多年来，他把该业务发展成为保险领域第一无二的巨头。

Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits – and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.

如今，阿吉特仅有 30 名员工，但其业务在许多保险领域都创下了交易额新高。阿吉特签下数十亿美元的风险上限，然后保留了每一分的风险，而不是分保给其它保险公司。三年前，他接手了 Lloyds 保险协会的巨额债务，参与清理与 27927 名参与者当年签下无数问题重重的保单，这些保单一度威胁到这家拥有 322 年历史的保险机构的生存。仅这一份合同的交易金额就达到了 71 亿美元。2009 年中，他谈成的一项人寿保险再保险合同将在未来50 年左右的时间里为我们带来 500 亿美元的保险费。

Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.

阿吉特的业务特点正好与 GEICO 相反。在 GEICO，我们拥有数百万的小额保单年复一年地被更新。然而阿吉特签定的保单数量很少，而且每年的保单都会发生巨大变化。在全球范围内，阿吉特是人们在寻求为巨大而非同寻常的事物购买保险时，就会打电话的人。

If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat – and you can only save one of us – swim to Ajit.

如果有一天，查理、阿吉特和我共在一条正在下沉的船上，而我们当中只有一人能获救的话，那么就救阿吉特吧。

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Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.

我们第三家保险公司是通用再保险。几年前，这家企业还处在困境之中，而如今，它却是我们保险领域里一块闪闪发光的宝石。

Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.

在泰德·蒙特罗斯(Tad Montross)领导下，通用再保险在 2009 年完成了出色的承保业绩，并且为我们在每美元保费收入中提供了罕有的大笔浮存金。除了财产险业务，泰德和他的伙伴们还开发了人寿再保险险业务，其价值日益增长。

Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key – though only partially-owned – part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.

去年，通用再保险终于拥有科隆再保险全部 100%的股份。自 1995 年以来，科隆再保险一直是我们在世界各地业务的一部分，尽管只是部分拥有。泰德和我今年 9 月将前往科隆，去向那些经理人为伯克希尔所做出的突出贡献表示感谢。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们还拥有一些规模较小的保险公司，他们中的大部分都专攻保险业中某个不常见的特殊领域。总的说来，他们业绩一直都是盈利的。从下面的数据中可以看出，这些小型保险公司一直为我们提供可观的浮存金。查理和我十分重视和感谢这些企业以及他们优秀的经理人。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

下面是我们财产险和人寿险业务四个构成部分的主要业绩：

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And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.

最后，是我的一项忏悔。去年，你们的董事长结束了一项完全由他自己造成的成本昂贵的商业惨败。

For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right – but of the wrong type.

多年来，我一直在思考为数百万忠诚的 GEICO 客户提供一些附加产品，不幸的是，我终于想到了一个绝妙的主意，向客户推销我们自己的信用卡。我推测 GEICO 的投保人极有可能拥有良好的信用风险，假如我们发行了具有吸引力的信用卡，他们可能会更青睐我们的业务。遗憾的是，我们的方向是正确的，但形式却是错误的。

Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.

在我觉醒之前，我们在信用卡税前损失约为 630 万美元，然后，我们以 55 折出售了 9800 万美元的不良应收账款组合，损失了 4400 万美元。

GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the ––––– well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

值得强调的是，GEICO 的经理们始终没有对我的想法产生兴趣，他们提醒我说，我们不会从 GEICO 客户身上揩到油水，而是会得到(坏账)，我称之为非奶油。我巧妙的暗示了我的老辣。

I was just older.

我只是更老了。