巴菲特致股东的信（2010年）⑤保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，事后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如对于工人事故赔偿问题所引发的索赔，索赔支付可能会持续数十年。这种"先收钱后付款"的模式使我们持有大量的现金，我们称其为"浮存金"，这些"浮存金"最终将流向投保人。同时，我们可以用"浮存金"为伯克希尔投资并获利。尽管个人保单和索赔来去不停，但我们持有的浮存金相比保单数量却特别稳定。因此，随着公司业务的增长，浮存金也会增长。我们是如何增长的，请看下表：

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

如果我们收到的的保费超过运营费用和最终赔付损失的总和，则记为承保利润，这将加计入到保险浮存金产生的投资收益之中。如果承保产生了利润，我们就能享受到免费使用这些资金，更棒的是，还因为持有这种免费资金而获得回报。哎，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果，这导致了激烈的竞争。在绝大多数年份，竞争是如此激烈，以至于财产意外险行业整体遭遇严重的承保亏损。实际上这一损失是财产意外险行业持有保险浮存金所付出的代价。例如，州立农业保险到目前为止是美国最大的保险公司，尽管其经营管理良好，但在过去10 年之中，有 7 年都发生了承保损失。在此期间，总承保损失超过 200 亿美元。

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

伯克希尔我们连续八年获得承保盈利，在此期间的盈利总计达到 170 亿美元。我相信我们在将来的绝大多数年份(尽管不是全部)都将继续保持盈利。如果我们达到了这个目标，我们持有的浮存金将比零成本更棒。就像有人向我们存入 660 亿美元，每年还因为这些钱而向我们支付费用，然后允许我们拿去投资获利，我们必将受益。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

我要再次强调一下，"无成本"的浮存金并不是整个财产意外险行业的一个预期结果。在大多数年份，行业的保险费不足以支付理赔和运营费用。因此，几十年来，保险业有形资本的回报率远远低于美国全行业实现的平均收益率，这种令人失望的表现肯定会持续下去。伯克希尔之所以拥有雄厚的经济效益，是因为我们有一些卓越的经理人，他们经营着一些非同寻常的业务。除了 GEICO 保险外，我们还拥有另外两家大型保险公司和数家小公司。每个公司都因为自己的特色而熠熠生辉。

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First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

首先是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾恩负责。阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)敢于承保他人不愿意，或者其他资本不愿意接手的风险，其经营融合了能力、速度和果断，更重要的是，在保险业，他拥有独具一格的思维方式。他从未让伯克希尔遭受与自身实力不成比例的风险。实际上，我们在这一点上比业内的其他大型保险公司更为保守。在 2010 年，阿吉特·贾恩大幅提高了人寿再保险业务，保险费高达 20 亿美元，这将在今后持续数十年(来自瑞士再保险)。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

自 1985 年以来，阿吉特·创建了一家拥有 300 亿美元浮存金和巨额承保利润的保险公司，这一成就是其他任何保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的壮举。阿吉特所取得的成就为伯克希尔增添了数十亿美元的资产。即使氪石都无法击败他。(氪石是科幻故事里无敌的氪星人终极弱点)

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We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还拥有通用再保险公司，由泰德·蒙特罗斯(Tad Montross)负责管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

实际上，保险业务的健康运营需要遵循四条准则：1、了解可能导致承保损失的所有风险；2、保守地估计造成实际损失的任何风险的可能性以及一旦发生损失情况下的可能成本；3、一般来讲，在扣除预期索赔损失和运营费用之后，设定的保费能够获得平均的承保收益；4、如果不能获得合理的保费就放弃这项业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三条准则的考验，却在第四条碰了壁。华尔街的急功近利、机构和经纪人带来的压力，或者是雄性激素驱动的 CEO 不肯接受业务下滑，导致许多保险公司以低价承保。"别人在做，我们也必须要做"，这种想法让许多企业身陷困境，而保险行业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

Tad 一贯恪守这四条准则，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。通用再保险公司在他的领导下拥有巨额可以免费使用的保险浮存金，并获得承保利润。我们预计该公司的浮存金规模能够持续下去。

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Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有许多小型保险公司，其中，它们中的绝大多数都有专属经营领域。总体而言，这些保险公司一直以来都是盈利的，向我们提供了大量的浮存金(见下表)。我和查理非常珍视这些企业和他们的经理人。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

下表为我们财产意外险业务所有四个部门的业绩记录：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型的保险公司中，我认为伯克希尔是世界上最好的保险公司。