巴菲特致股东的信（2010年）⑨投资业务

Investments

投资业务

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

以下表格反映了 2010 年年底伯克希尔公司持有的市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资

In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience – and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century – undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.

我们在报表中反映的收益只是投资组合公司支付给我们的股息。然而，2010 年我们在这些被投资公司的未分配收益中所占的份额超过 20 亿美元。这些留存收益特别重要。根据过去一个世纪的投资经验，这些未分配收益将创造相当甚至超过的市值收益，尽管是以不规则的方式。(事实上，有时这种相关性是相反的，正如一位投资者在2009 年所说，这比离婚还糟糕！我已经损失了一半的净资产，但我妻子还在。)我们预计，我们持股公司未来的市场收益最终将至少等于这些公司的留存收益。

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In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).

此前对伯克希尔常规盈利能力的估计中，我们对未来的投资收益进行了三次调整(但没有考虑刚才提到的未分配收益因素)。

The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these – our Swiss Re note – was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others – our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks – are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.

第一次调整是负面的，去年我们讨论了五笔大型固定收益投资，这些投资为我们的报告收益贡献了大量收益。其中，瑞士再保险债券于 2011 年初被赎回。高盛和通用电气的优先股可能在年底前被赎回。通用电气有权在 10 月份回购我们所持有的优先股，并且表明了该意向。高盛有权赎回，只需要提前 30 天通知，但美联储目前还没有批准(上天保佑)。不过美联储可能要不了多久就会批准。

All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so – in aggregate about $1.4 billion – but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That’s the bad news.

这三家企业必须向我们支付溢价才能进行回购，总计约 14 亿美元。不过所有的回购计划都不受投资者的欢迎。回购后，我们的盈利能力将会大幅降低，这是个不利消息。

There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held $38 billion of cash equivalents that have been earning a pittance throughout 2010. At some point, however, better rates will return. They will add at least $500 million – and perhaps much more – to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of “normal” earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.

还有两个好消息来抵消不利影响。截止去年年底，我们持有的现金等价物是 380 亿美元，它们在 2010 年一直收益微薄。但是，在某个时候利率将有所提高。我们的投资收益因此将至少增加 5 亿美元，可能会更高。类似这种货币市场收益率上升的情况不会马上到来。但我们在评估"常规"盈利能力时，将提高的利率纳入估算是合适的。即便在更高的利率到来之前，我们也能能幸运地找到机会，让手中的现金得到不错的回报。那一天对我来说不会来得太早，更新伊索，坐在敞篷车的一个女孩抵得上电话簿里的 5 个(一鸟在手胜过两鸟在林)。

In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don’t fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)

此外，我们持有普通股的股息肯定会增加。最大的收益可能来自富国银行。美联储在过去两年中不考虑银行业绩好坏，限制各大银行的股息水平。富国银行在经济衰退时期持续发展，目前拥有雄厚的财务实力和盈利能力，却被迫维持低支出水平(我们无意指责美联储的决定，出于多方原因，全面限制银行红利在危机期间合情合理)。

At some point, probably soon, the Fed’s restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

美联储有可能不久后取消对于红利的限制。富国银行可以恢复合理的红利政策，到时候，我们预计从富国银行获得的红利每年将给公司增加几亿美元的收入。

Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us $88 million in 1995, the year after we finished purchasing the stock. Every year since, Coke has increased its dividend. In 2011, we will almost certainly receive $376 million from Coke, up $24 million from last year. Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.

我们持股的其他企业也可能提高股息。1995 年可口可乐公司向我们支付了 8800 万元红利，当时我们刚完成可口可乐股票的建仓。此后，可口可乐每年都在提高股息。2011 年，可口可乐股息将高达 3.76 亿美元，比去年增加 2400 万美元。我预计十年内其股息将比 3.76 亿美元翻一番。十年后，如果我们在可口可乐收入中所占的份额超过当初的投资成本(13 亿)，我也不会感到惊讶。时间是好生意的朋友。

Overall, I believe our “normal” investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.

总体看来，我们的常规投资收益将和2010 年的收入持平，尽管前面所说的赎回将减少我们在 2011 年和 2012 年的收益。

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Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 – an age Charlie and I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire – his call was a surprise.

去年夏天，路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)向我表示他有意退休，由于他才 74 岁，查理和我认为这个年纪对伯克希尔来说还很年轻，他的来电要求让我们感到吃惊。

Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?

1979 年，路易担任 GEICO 保险公司的投资经理，他为该公司的服务非常宝贵。在 2004 年的年报中我详细介绍了他的投资业绩，我之所以停止了更新，是因为他的突出业绩让我感到自愧不如。

Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.

路易从未自己炫耀他的才能，但我会，路易是一个伟大的投资大师，我们都会想念他。

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Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren’t around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.

四年以前，我曾经说过，等到查理、路易和我都不在后，公司需要增加一名或多名年轻的投资经理。当时我们有多位杰出的候选人可以立刻接任我 CEO 的工作，就像现在一样，但我们在投资领域还没有合适的后备人选。

It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.

很容易找到许多近期业绩卓越的投资经理人。但过去出色的表现虽然重要，却不能以此判断未来的业绩。至关重要的是如何取得业绩，投资经理如何理解和感知风险也至关重要(这绝不能用太多学者所选择的贝塔系数来衡量)。在风险评价标准方面，我们希望找到能力罕见超群的候选人，他能够预计到以前从未出现过的经济情景的影响。最后，我们需要全身心为伯克希尔效力的候选人，而不仅仅把这当做一份工作。

When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.

查理和我遇到托德·库姆斯(Todd Combs)的时候，我们就知道他符合我们的各项要求。托德和路易·辛普森的待遇相同，将根据他相对于标普指数的表现，获得一份薪水外加相关奖金。我们已制定收入延期和结转的安排，防止波动剧烈的投资受到不当支付的影响。对冲基金行业见证了普通合伙人 GP 的一些可怕行径，他们在股价上涨时获得了巨额回报，而当糟糕业绩出现时，有限合伙人 LP 则失去了此前的收益。有时，这些普通合伙人 GP 迅速启动另一个基金，以便他们套取未来的预期利润，而不必承担过去的损失。把资金托付给这类基金经理的投资者实际上成了替罪羊，而不是合伙人。

As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire’s holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as “long-short,” “macro,” “international equities.” At Berkshire our only style box is “smart.”)

只要我还担任 CEO，我就会继续管理伯克希尔的大部分资产，包括债券和股票。托德将初步管理 10-30 亿美元的基金，他可以每年重新调整这一规模。他投资的重点将是股票，但并不局限于股票。(基金顾问喜欢将投资类型描述成"对冲"、"宏观"和"国际"等模式，而在伯克希尔我们只有一种模式，即"精明"的投资。)

Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.

随着时间推移，如果能找到合适的人选，我们将增加 1-2 名投资经理。如果我们这么做，我们可能会让每位投资经理的绩效薪酬，80%来自于他管理的投资组合，20%来自于其他经理人的投资组合。我们希望建立一个能为个人的成功带来巨大回报的薪酬体系，同时也能促进他们之间相互合作而不是竞争。

When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted – but not to have a vote – on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.

等到查理和我不在后，我们的投资经理将按照 CEO 和董事会规定的方式对整个投资组合负责。因为出色的投资者为企业收购带来了良好的视角，我们希望他们能够就可能的企业并购是否明智方面进行咨询，但不是表决。当然，董事会将会对任何重大并购作出决策。

One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd’s joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was “little-known” and expressed puzzlement that we didn’t seek a “big-name.” I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Ajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops – that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)

一个补充：当我们宣布托德将加盟我们的时候，有些评论员指出，托德是无名之辈，对于我们没有找到声名显赫的经理人表示困惑。我想知道，他们究竟有多少人在 1979 年听说过路易·辛普森，在 1985 年认识阿吉特·贾恩，在 1959 年听说过查理。我们的目标是找到一位资历尚浅的经理人，而不是久经沙场的老将。对于一个 80 岁的 CEO 来说，这可能不是最明智的比喻。