巴菲特致股东的信（2013年）④制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

“See that store,” Warren says, pointing at Nebraska Furniture Mart. “That’s a really good business.”

"看看那间商场"，沃伦指着内布拉斯加家具商场(NFM)说，"那真是一个非常好的生意。"

“Why don’t you buy it?” I said.

"那你为什么不买下它？"我说。

“It’s privately held,” Warren said.

"它是家私人企业，不管怎样我一定会买下它的。"沃伦说。

“Oh,” I said.

"哦。"我说。

“I might buy it anyway,” Warren said. “Someday.”

"不管怎样我一定会买下它的。"沃伦说。“某一天。”

— Supermoney by Adam Smith (1972)

——《超级金钱》(Supermoney1972)，作者 Adam Smith

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们在这部分的业务种类繁多。让我们来看看整个集团的的资产负债表和利润表关键数据。

Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

符合 GAAP 准则的收入和支出数据列示在 29 页。上表中的运营成本剔除了一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是某些无形资产的摊销)，这是不符合 GAAP 准则的。我们列示这些数据是因为查理和我认为调整后的数字比 GAAP下显示的数字更准确地反映了整块业务真实的成本和利润。

I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不打算逐一解释所有的调整(有些是细微并且晦涩的)，但是认真的投资者必须要理解无形资产的本质区别：有些无形资产的价值随时间消耗殆尽，而另一些则不会贬值。比如说软件，其摊销费用是真实的成本支出。但对于某些无形资产，例如对客户关系，购买法会计下的摊销则显然不是真实的成本。GAAP 会计准则并不对这两者进行区分。尽管从投资者的角度看，它们完全不同，但在会计上计算利润是它们都会被记作成本。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.

在 29 页列示的 GAAP 会计准则的数据下，该部门 6.48 亿美元的摊销费用被计入了成本。我们大致认为其中的 20%是"真实"的(这也是我们上面的表格包括的部分)，其他的则不是。这种差别因为我们做了非常多的收购而变得影响巨大。未来随着我们收购更多的公司，这样的差别还会越来越大。

Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and – alas – it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.

当然，最终对应的资产完全被摊销完之后，相应的非真实的成本也就没有了。但这通常需要 15 年，到时我的接班人才能享受到摊销完之后报表上增加的利润了。

Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.

但是，我们报告的每一分钱折旧，都是真正的成本支出。对其他任何公司来说也是这样。当华尔街人士用 EBITDA 作为估值指标时，要捂紧你的钱包。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.

当然我们公开的财报依然会遵循 GAAP 会计准则。但是为了认清现实，请记得把我们报告的大部分摊销费用加回来。

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The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.

这个板块的公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机，无所不包。其中有些公司有非常好的经济特性，它们无杠杆的净有形资产税后回报率从 25%到 100%多。其他一些公司的回报率介于 12-20%。但也有少数公司回报率很糟糕，这是我在资产配置上所犯下的一些严重错误。我并没有受到误导：我只是错误地估计了公司或者其所在行业的经济形势。

Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.

幸运的是我犯得错误一般是些小型的收购。我们的大型收购总体都运营良好，少数甚至是非常好。但以上不会是我犯得最后一个错误。并非事事都如我所料。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.

把整个板块看作一个公司的话，这家公司业务非常优秀。2013 年它们平均使用了 250 亿的净有形资产，由于大量的现金和极低的杠杆，实现了 16.7%的税后收益率。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.

当然，如果收购价过高，买入一些经济特性优秀的公司也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务的净有形资产都支付了大量溢价，这些成本反映在财报巨额的商誉资产中。不过总体来说，我们收获了与投资额相称的可观回报。此外，总的来说这些业务的内在价值远超其账面价值。即便如此，在保险行业和受管制的行业，其内在价值和账面价值之间的差距更加巨大。那里才是真正的大赢家所在之处。

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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, both current and potential competitors read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if they knew our numbers. So, in some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 80-84.

这个集团的公司太多，我们不能一一道来。而且它们现有和潜在的竞争对手都能看到这份报告。公开某些公司的数据将会对它们不利。所以，对伯克希尔来说，规模不是非常大的公司我们仅按要求披露信息。不过，你可以在后文找到更多详细内容。

I can’t resist, however, giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart’s expansion into Texas. I’m not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire – it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire’s $225 billion equity base. But I’ve now worked 30 years with the marvelous Blumkin family, and I’m excited about the remarkable store – truly Texas-sized – it is building at The Colony, in the northern part of the Dallas metropolitan area.

我还是忍不住要向大家汇报一下内布拉斯加家具商场在德克萨斯扩张的最新进展。我把它拿出来说，并不是因为它对伯克希尔的业绩有什么重要性，毕竟要推动伯克希尔 2250 亿的资产规模，这一家店微不足道。但我现在已经和 Blumkin 家族合作 30 多年了，我为这家位于达拉斯市北 Colony 区的新店而兴奋，这是一家真正覆盖德克萨斯州的商场。

When the store is completed next year, NFM will have – under one roof, and on a 433-acre site – 1.8 million square feet of retail and supporting warehouse space. View the project’s progress at www.nfm.com/texas. NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (in Omaha and Kansas City, Kansas), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away. If you live anywhere near Dallas, come check us out.

明年商城建成以后，NFM 将会在 433 英亩的地面上拥有 180 万平方英尺的零售和仓储空间。可以在 www.nfm.com/texas 查询项目的进展情况。NFM 已经拥有全国销售额最大的两家店铺了(分别位于奥马哈和堪萨斯市)，两家的年销售额分别达到 4.5 亿左右。我预计德克萨斯的新店将会刷新上述纪录。如果大家住在达拉斯附近，欢迎大家来看看。

I think back to August 30, 1983 – my birthday – when I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 1 1 ⁄ 4 -page purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. (It’s reproduced on pages 114 - 115.) Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company’s financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was what, and her word was good enough for me.

回想起 1983 年 8 月 30 日，那天刚好是我的生日，我拿着自己起草的 1 页多点的收购提案去见 B 夫人(RoseBlumkin)。B 夫人在没有改动一个字，在没有投资银行家和律师在场的情况下接受我的收购协议(这是专业人士觉得在天堂才会发生的事)。虽然公司的财务报告并没有经过审计，我也毫不担心。B 夫人简单告诉我实际情况，她的话对我来说足够好了。

Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 – definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM’s financial statements from 1946 on pages 116 - 117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 – no zeros omitted – of cash the company then possessed, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son, Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.

那时候 B 夫人 89 岁了，后来一直工作到 103，这绝对是我们风格的女强人。大家看一看后文附上的 NFM 在 1946 年的财报。NFM 现在所有的一切都从当初 72,264 美元净资产、50 美元的现金，以及B 夫人、她的儿子 Louie、孙子 Ron 和 Irv 难以置信的天才衍化而来。

The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At Mrs. B’s request, the family always sang God Bless America at its gatherings.

故事里最妙的地方是，B 夫人从来没上过学。而且她从俄国移民到美国时甚至连英文都不会说。但是她热爱这个接纳它的国家：家庭聚会时他们经常应 B夫人的要求合唱上帝保佑美国。

Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B’s incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B’s lessons, they need none from me.

有抱负的企业经理人应该好好学习让 B 夫人成功的那些朴素却稀有的品质。每年都有超过 40 所大学的学生们来拜访我，我以带领他们参观 FM 作为开场。如果他们吸收了 B 夫人的经验，他们不需要向我学任何东西。