巴菲特致股东的信（2015年）⑥制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们在这一板块的业务包罗万象。不过让我们先来看一看整个业务板块的资产负债表和利润表。

Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

我们符合GAAP 会计原则的收支数据参见完整报告。相比之下，上表中的运营费用是非GAAP 会计原则计算的，因为它们不包括一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是一些无形资产的摊销)。我们这样做是因为查理和我认为，经过调整后的数字比GAAP 数字更能精确反映表中业务的实际收支情况。

I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they could not differ more.

我不会解释所有的调整，其中一些调整微小且不易解释，但认真的投资者应理解无形资产的不同性质。有些无形资产的价值会随着时间推移而损耗殆尽，而有些完全不会受损。例如软件的摊销费用就是非常真实的费用。相反，其它无形资产(如客户关系)是不应被"摊销"的。如果通过购买法会计计算显然不能反映真实情况。GAAP 会计准则认为这两种费用没有区别，也就是说，在计算收益的时候，两者都被列为费用，尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们的差异再大不过了。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non- existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.

在符合GAAP 的完整报告中，有11 亿美元的摊销费用已作为费用扣除。我们认为其中只有20%是"真实"的，其余的则不是。由于我们进行了多次收购，伯克希尔曾经不存在的"非真实"费用变得非常重要，随着我们继续收购更多的公司，"非真实"摊销费用几乎肯定会进一步上升。在完整报告中列示了根据GAAP 计算的无形资产的现状。

The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)

我们目前还有68 亿美元无形资产有待摊销，其中41 亿美元将在未来五年摊销完毕。当然，最终每一美元非真实成本将全部被扣除。到那时，即使真实的收益持平，报告收益也会增加。(这是我给继任者的一份礼物。)

I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?

我建议你最好忽略一部分GAAP 会计原则计算的摊销费用。但这么做会让我有些担心，因为我知道管理层告诉股东忽略一些真实费用几乎已成常态。其中"股票补偿"是最令人震惊的例子。这个费用项目名称中有"补偿"两个字，如果补偿不算费用的话，那是什么？如果收入计算不包括真实费用和经常性费用，那它们应该包含在哪里？

Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring “earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.

华尔街分析师也经常在这场闹剧中扮演重要角色，用这些管理层提供的虚假的、忽视"补偿"的收益数据做分析。也许是这些分析师不专业，或者他们怕与管理层关系搞坏，或者他们就是玩世不恭，认为其他人都这么做，为什么自己不顺应潮流呢。不管他们理由是什么，这些分析师传递误导性信息欺骗投资者是有罪的。

Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.

折旧费用是一个更复杂的问题，但几乎总是真实的费用。毫无疑问伯克希尔也有折旧费用。我希望我们能在保持业务竞争力的同时尽可能减少折旧支出，但51 年来我还没弄清如何做到这一点。事实上，我们铁路业务的折旧支出远远低于维持铁路业务正常运转所需资本支出，这也导致了GAAP 的收益高于真实收益。整个铁路行业都存在这种夸大收益的情况。当CEO 和投资银行家吹捧息税折旧摊销前的收益(EBITDA)，作为估值基础时，那么他十有八九就在故意忽悠你。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.

当然了，我们公布的报告收益将继续遵循GAAP 会计准则。然而为了解真实信息，你一定要记得把我们报告中的大部分摊销费用加回来，然后还要再减去一些，以反映BNSF 铁路少计的折旧费用。

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Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

让我们回到我们的制造、服务和零售业务，这些业务销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机等各种产品。以未加杠杆的净有形资产计算，其中一些业务经济效益极佳，实现的税后回报率高达25%甚至超过100%。其他业务的回报率在12-20%之间。

A few, however – these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation – have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.

不过，有少数几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯的严重错误。在多数情况下，我对公司或其所在行业的经济动态的评估是错误的。我们正在为我的误判付出代价。有时候，我在评估现任或继任经理人的忠诚度和能力方面犯了错误。可以肯定的是，我将来还会犯更多错误，如果我们幸运的话，这种情况将发生在我们较小的业务中。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.

整体来看，这一集团的公司是一家优秀企业。尽管它们持有大量超额现金，只使用了象征性的债务杠杆，它们2015 年平均使用了256 亿美元净有形资产，但其税后回报率高达18.4%。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts enter the fold.

当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们已经为大多数业务所拥有的净有形资产支付了大量的溢价，其成本反映在我们报告的庞大的商誉和其它无形资产数字上。但总的来说，我们这样部署资本的方式为我们带来了可观的资本回报。等到随着金霸王(Duracell)和PrecisionCastparts 的加入，该业务板块的收益将在2016 年大幅增长。这个业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一单独评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。

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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 88-91.

在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。