巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）⑨一个赌注——你的钱是如何流向华尔街的

“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street)

一个赌注——你的钱是如何流向华尔街的

In this section, you will encounter, early on, the story of an investment bet I made nine years ago and, next, some strong opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played a role in the bet.

本节中，我首先会讲述一个我在9 年前做的投资对赌的故事，然后分享一些我在投资上的观点。作为开始，我想简单的介绍一下LongBets，这是一家在我的对赌中发挥重要作用的独特机构。

Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.

LongBets 是由亚马逊的杰夫贝佐斯(JeffBezos)发起成立的，是一家管理长期赌注的非盈利组织。为参与对赌，"赌约发起者"在Longbets.org 网站上提出一个命题，该命题将在很久之后被证明是对是错。然后，他们会等待一个持相反观点的人在赌约的另外一端下注。当一名"怀疑者"站出来时，赌约的双方会各自指定一家慈善组织作为他们赌约获胜的受益人；在LongBets 上下注，然后在LongBets 网站上写一篇短文来为命题辩护。当赌约结束时，LongBets 会向获胜方的慈善组织支付对赌款项。

Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:

LongBets 网站很有意思，以下是两个例子。

In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.

2002 年，企业家MitchKapor 宣称，"到2029 年，没有任何电脑或是智能设备能通过图灵测试"。图灵测试能判断计算机是否能够模拟人类的思维能力。发明家Ray Kurzweil 持相反的观点。双方对各自的观点押下了1 万美元的赌注。我不知道谁能赢，但我敢打赌，没有任何电脑能复制查理。

That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were $1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off $500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)

同年，微软的CraigMundie 宣传，到2030 年无人驾驶飞机将能正常的搭载乘客。而谷歌的EricSchmidt 则持相反的观点。赌注为每人1 千美金。最近为了缓解Eric 的压力我主动提出加入赌注，他迅速分给我500 美元。我喜欢他的假设，如果我们输了，我会在2030 年左右支付。

Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)

现在，说说我自己的赌约和历史过程。在2005 年伯克希尔的年报中，我认为，从整体来看，由专业人员进行的主动投资管理业绩，其长期表现会落后于呆坐不动的业余投资者。我解释道，从整体来看，相比那些投资于一只低成本的被动指数基金的业余投资者，各种"投资顾问"收取的高额费用，会让他们客户的业绩表现更糟糕。（参见第114–115页，此处重印了我2005年年报中对该观点的原述。）

Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five – to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?

随后，公开提出了一个50 万美元的赌约：任何一位职业投资者都可以选择至少5 只对冲基金(一种很受欢迎高收费的投资工具)，在一段很长的时间内，他们的业绩表现将会落后于，只收取象征性费用的被动投资标普500指数基金的业绩表现。我提出赌约期限为10 年，并提名一只低成本的Vanguard 标普指数基金作为我的赌注。随后，我坐下来充满期待的等待着，各位基金经理站出来捍卫自己的职业(他们可以把自己管理的基金包括在5 只基金之中)。毕竟这些基金经理催促着客户为他们的能力下了数十亿美元的赌注。既然这样，他们为什么会害怕拿自己的一点钱出来玩一下这个赌约呢？

What followed was the sound of silence. Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man – Ted Seides – stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form a fund-of-funds – in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.

随之而来的是一片寂静。尽管有成千上万的专业投资经理人，通过吹嘘自己的选股能力积累了惊人的财富，但只有一人TedSeides 站了出来接受了我的挑战。Ted 是Protégé Partners 的联合投资经理人，这是一家资产管理公司，从有限合伙人手中筹集资金成立了一个基金中的基金(FOF，fund-of-funds)。

I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.

换句话说，Ted 的基金是投资多只对冲基金的基金。在赌约设立之前，我并不认识Ted，但是我喜欢他，钦佩他愿意把钱下注到自己曾经说过的话上。他对我直言不讳，而且一丝不苟地提供我们监测赌约所需的所有数据。

For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund. The five he selected had invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a single manager.

在十年赌约ProtégéPartners 这一方，Ted 挑选了5 只FOF 基金作为投资标的。它们业绩表现将平均化，并与我选择的Vanguard 标普指数基金进行对比。Ted 选择的5 只FOF 基金将其资金投资到了100 多只对冲基金中，这意味着基金的整体表现不会因某一位基金经理的表现好坏而受到影响。

Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.

当然，Ted 选择的5 只FOF 基金都有一层费用，高于直接投资对冲基金的费用。这种叠加的收费模式中，大部分的费用是由基础对冲基金收取的；而每只FOF 基金，都对其在挑选对冲基金的假想技能方面，而收取额外的费用。

Here are the results for the first nine years of the bet – figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the charitable beneficiary I designated to get any bet winnings I earned, will be the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.

以下是赌约前9 年的对赌结果。对赌的结果显示，我指定的慈善受益人Girls Inc. of Omaha(将获得我赢得的赌金)将在明年1 月份迫不及待地打开邮件领取奖金，这是毋庸置疑的。

Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, see their annual audits.

脚注：根据我与Protégé Partners 达成的协议，这些母基金的名称从未公开披露。然而，我看过他们的年度审计。

The compounded annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short” positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks would have provided a tailwind for index funds.

截至目前，该标普指数基金的年均复合增长率为7.1%，长期来看，这一回报率很容易被证明是股市典型的回报水平。有一个很重要的事实是：整个赌约期间，如果股市表现相当疲软，这可能有助于对冲基金的相对表现，因为许多对冲基金持有大量的"空头"仓位。反过来，如果股市异常狂热，将对指数基金有所助益。

Instead we operated in what I would call a “neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016, an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means $1 million invested in those funds would have gained $220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have gained $854,000.

事实是，9 年期间我们处于一个"中性"的股市环境中。期间，截至2016 年5 只FOF 基金平均年化回报率仅为2.2%，这意味着投资于这5 只基金的100 万美元将获得22 万美元。与此同时，投资指数基金将获得85.4 万美元。

Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.

请记住，管理基础对冲基金的100 多名基金经理，每人都有巨大的经济动机去获取最大的投资收益。此外，由于母基金的基金经理是根据基础对冲基金的业绩的表现来获得业绩报酬，Ted 选择的5 只FOF 基金经理同样有动机尽可能选择最好的对冲基金。

I’m certain that in almost all cases the managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for their investors were dismal – really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved – fees that were totally unwarranted by performance – were such that their managers were showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”

我可以确定，在任何情况下，两级基金的经理人都是诚实和聪明的人。然而，对于他们的投资者来说，结果是惨淡的，真的非常惨淡。遗憾的是，所有对冲基金和FOF 基金收取了巨额固定管理费用(该管理费用与基金的业绩表现完全无关)，以致于基金经理们在过去9 年里旱涝保收。正如电影《华尔街》主角Gordon Gekko 所言："收费(金钱)永不眠"。(Fees never sleep)(Greed is good 贪婪无罪)

The underlying hedge-fund managers in our bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.

在我们的赌约中，对冲基金经理从有限合伙人那里获得的报酬，可能平均略低于现行对冲基金标准的"2/20"费率。即每年固定2%管理费，即使亏损巨大也要照付不误，另外利润分成20%且不能追回(如果盈利年份后出现亏损年份)。在这种不公平的安排下，对冲基金的操盘手只需有能力简单地积累可管理的基金资产，那么许多基金经理就会变得非常富有，即使他们的投资表现非常糟糕。

Still, we’re not through with fees. Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds, some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees. Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% – gulp! – of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly – and with virtually no cost – achieved on their own.

不过，收费还没完。别忘了还有上层FOF 基金经理需要"喂养"。这些经理人通常会额外收取资产1%的固定管理费。此外，尽管期间5 只FOF 基金的整体业绩表现不佳，但一些经理人仍经历了几年好日子，并收取了"业绩"提成费用。因此，我估计在过去9 年里，5 只FOF 基金获得的所有收益中约有60%流向了两级基金经理的腰包！这是他们收取的不当回报。因为数百位有限合伙人通过投资指数基金，在几乎不用付出成本的情况下，自己轻松就可以实现他们所谓的业绩。

In my opinion, the disappointing results for hedge-fund investors that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in the future. I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced (and that is still posted there). Here is what I asserted:

在我看来，这次赌约暴露出的，令对冲基金投资者失望的结果，几乎肯定会在未来重演。赌约开始时，我在LongBets 网站上发布了一份声明中阐述了我的理由，以下是我的观点：

Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S&P 500 will outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.

从2008 年1 月1 日开始并于2017 年12 月31 日结束的过去十年里，标准普尔500 指数的表现将超过对冲基金的基金组合的表现，因为基金的业绩需要扣除管理费、运营成本和支出。

A lot of very smart people set out to do better than average in securities markets. Call them active investors.

许多非常聪明的人打算在证券市场上获得超过平均水平的投资回报，我们将其称为主动投资者。

Their opposites, passive investors, will by definition do about average. In aggregate their positions will more or less approximate those of an index fund. Therefore, the balance of the universe—the active investors—must do about average as well. However, these investors will incur far greater costs. So, on balance, their aggregate results after these costs will be worse than those of the passive investors.

而与他们相对的是被动投资者，按照定义，他们寻求获得市场平均收益。总的来说，他们的仓位大致接近指数基金的仓位。因此，市场的平衡方，即主动投资者也必须达到市场平均水平。然而，这些投资者将承担更高的成本。因此，总的来说，在扣除这些成本后，他们总体的投资收益将比被动投资者更差。

Costs skyrocket when large annual fees, large performance fees, and active trading costs are all added to the active investor’s equation. Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because their fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge funds in which the funds of funds are invested.

当巨额的年度管理费、业绩报酬和频繁交易的成本，都被累加到主动投资者的费用等式中时，其承担的成本就会飙升。而FOF 基金加剧了这一成本问题，因为他们在对冲基金收费的基础上再次收取管理费。

A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing, and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of funds.

有很多聪明的投资者都参与到对冲基金的运营。但在很大程度上，他们付出的努力被自我抵消了，他们高智商带来的超额收益并不能克服他们强加给投资者的成本。平均而言，随着时间的推移，投资低成本指数基金的业绩表现会超过投资FOF 基金。

So that was my argument – and now let me put it into a simple equation. If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point – not worth detailing – that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial.

这就是我的观点，现在我把它放进一个简易等式中。如果A 组(主动投资者)和B 组(被动投资者)构成了整个投资市场，而且B 组在扣除成本前，必定要取得平均回报水平，那么A 组也必须如此。成本更低的一组将获胜。如果A 组成本过高，其亏空将是巨大的。

There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches. In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified – early on – only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.

当然，部分有经验的人很有可能长期超过标准普尔指数的表现。然而，在我的一生中，我很早就发现，能完成这一壮举的也不过十个左右的专业人士罢了。

There are no doubt many hundreds of people – perhaps thousands – whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well. Bill Ruane – a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul – said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

毫无疑问，有成百上千甚至成千上万我从未见过的人，他们的能力可与我认识的这十人相媲美。毕竟，跑赢指数并非不可能。不过问题在于，绝大多数试图跑赢指数的经理最终都会失败。向你募集资金的人很有可能不会不是做的非常好多人。比尔·鲁安是真正了不起的人，60 年前我就认为，从长期来看，他几乎肯定能带来优秀的投资回报。他说很好："在投资管理中，从创新者到模仿者，再到众多的无为者，这是一个巨大进步。"

Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.

像部分业余投资者一样，在短期内一些专业投资者也会因为走运而获得高收益，这让寻找一位物超所值且收费高昂的罕见基金经理变得更为复杂。如果1000 位经理人在年初进行市场预测，则至少有一位经理的预测很可能在未来连续九年里连续都是正确的。当然，1000 只猴子中也有可能出现一个貌似无所不知的预言家。但二者间仍然存在差异：幸运的猴子不会发现人们排队找他进行投资。

Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation – namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees.

最后，有三个相互关联的事实，导致成功的投资酝酿着失败。首先，良好的投资业绩记录很快就会吸引到大量的资金；其次，巨额资金总是会成为沉重的投资业绩之锚：几百万的资金容易管理，几十亿的资金就很难了；第三，尽管如此，大多数经理人还是会为了个人利益而去寻求获取新的资金，因为管理的资金越多，收取的管理费就越多。

These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore, . . . I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”

这三点对我来说不是什么新鲜事：1966 年1 月，当时我管理着4400 万美元的资金，我给我的有限合伙人写了一封信："我认为，资金规模越大越可能损害未来的投资业绩，而不是增加业绩。对于我个人利益而言，这不一定适用，但对您的业绩来说是真的。因此，……我打算BPL 不再接受新的合伙人。我已经通知Susie，如果我们有更多的孩子，就由她来为他们寻找其他合伙人。"

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

最终是：当数万亿美元由收取高昂管理费的华尔街人士管理时，通常获得丰厚利润的是管理人，而不是客户。无论大型和小型投资者均应坚持投资低成本指数基金。

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If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the hands- down choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra-low-cost index funds. In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their investors large rewards while delivering them nothing – or, as in our bet, less than nothing – of added value.

如果要树立一座雕像来纪念为美国投资者做出最大贡献的人，那么JackBogle 必是首选。几十年来，Bogle一直敦促投资者投资于超低成本的指数基金。在他的长期奋斗中，大量财富流向了基金经理的腰包，而他只积累了其中很小一部分。这些经理人向投资者许诺了巨额回报，但却没有带来任何超额回报，或者像我们赌约中那样，带来的回报几近于无。

In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment-management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me.

Bogle 早年常常被投资管理行业嘲笑。然而，今天他欣慰地获悉，他已帮助数以百万计的投资者的储蓄，实现了比其他情况下高得多的投资回报。他是他们的英雄，也是我的英雄。

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Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually followed my suggestion.

多年来，经常有人请求我提供投资建议，并且在回答的过程中，我学到了很多关于人类行为的知识。我通常给的建议是，投资低成本的标普500 指数基金。值得称赞的是，我那些收入不高的朋友通常都采纳了我的建议。

I believe, however, that none of the mega-rich individuals, institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice when I’ve given it to them. Instead, these investors politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to the siren song of a high-fee manager or, in the case of many institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper-helper called a consultant.

然而，我相信，当我把这一建议提供给超级富豪、机构或养老基金时，他们谁都没有采纳我的建议。相反，这些投资者会礼貌地对我的建议表示感谢，然后去听收取收费高额经理人的言论，或者许多机构会向另一种称为投资顾问的超级助手寻求建议。

That professional, however, faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment consultant telling clients, year after year, to keep adding to an index fund replicating the S&P 500? That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper-helpers, however, if they recommend small managerial shifts every year or so. That advice is often delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable investment “styles” or current economic trends make the shift appropriate.

然而，这些专业人士面临着一个问题。你能想象一个投资顾问会年复一年地告诉客户，不断增加对复制标普500 指数的基金的投资吗？那简直是自毁前程。然而，如果这些超级助手每年都建议小幅改变投资策略，他们就会收到大笔费用。这些建议往往是用艰涩难懂的胡扯来解释，为什么时髦的投资"风格"或当前的经济趋势适于进行这种改变。

The wealthy are accustomed to feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food, schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports ticket, you name it. Their money, they feel, should buy them something superior compared to what the masses receive.

有钱人习惯性地认为，他们的命运理所应当获得最好的食物、教育、娱乐、住房、整形手术、体育彩票等等。他们认为，他们的钱应该买到比其他普通大众更优质的东西。

In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” – wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like – have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is –on an expectancy basis – clearly the best choice. My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than $100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.

在生活中的很多方面，财富确实可以换来优质的产品或服务。因此，对金融"精英"而言，包括富人、养老基金、大学捐赠基金等，他们很难接受去投资那些普通投资者只花几千美元也能投资的金融产品或服务。富人的这种不情愿通常很普遍，即使这些产品(在预期的基础上)明显是最佳的投资选择。我估算(尽管非常粗略)，精英阶层为了寻求优质投资建议，在过去十年里导致的损失超过1000亿美元。算一算：几万亿美元资产即使收取1%的管理费也有这么多。当然，并非十年前所有投资对冲基金的投资者都会落后于标普指数的回报率。但我认为，我对总亏空的估算仍是保守的。

Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades have to be made up by local taxpayers.

大部分的损失都是来自公务员的养老基金。不幸地是，这些养老基金许多都面临资金不足，部分原因是他们遭受了双重打击：投资表现不佳叠加巨额管理费。由此造成的亏空将由当地纳税人在未来几十年里补足。

Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”

人类的行为不会改变。富人、养老基金、捐赠基金等仍会认为，他们应该获得一些"额外"的投资建议。那些巧妙地利用这一预期心理的投资顾问将变得非常富有。今年的灵丹妙药可能是投资对冲基金，明年可能又是别的。这一系列承诺可能的结果，在一句谚语中得到印证："当一个有钱的人遇到一个有经验的人时，有经验的人最终会得到金钱，而有钱的人离开时得到了经验。"

Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better result than any other?

很久以前，我的姐夫HomerRogers 是奥马哈一个牧场的佣金经纪人。我问他是如何诱导农民或农场主，雇佣他来帮他们把猪或牛销售给四大罐头食品公司的买家(SWIFT、Cudahy、Wilson 和Armour)。毕竟，猪就是猪，而买家也很专业，他们非常清楚牲畜究竟值多少钱。然后，我问Homer，有销售代理比其他代理做得更好吗？

Homer gave me a pitying look and said: “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.

Homer 同情地看了我一眼说：沃伦，卖什么不重要要，重要的是怎么卖"。在牧场行之有效的东西，同样适用于华尔街。

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And, finally, let me offer an olive branch to Wall Streeters, many of them good friends of mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees – even outrageous fees – to investment bankers who bring us acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid substantial sums for over-performance to our two in-house investment managers – and we hope to make even larger payments to them in the future.

最后，我要向华尔街伸出橄榄枝，他们中的很多人是我的好朋友。伯克希尔愿意向为我们带来收购机会的投资银行家支付费用，甚至是高得离谱的费用。此外，我们已经为我们的两位投资经理支付了大笔超额业绩报酬，我们希望将来能向他们支付更多。

To get biblical (Ephesians 3:18), I know the height and the depth and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that simple four-letter word – fees – when it is spoken to Wall Street. And when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully write a big check.

根据《圣经》(以弗所书3:18)，当华尔街说到"费用FEES"时，我认识到这几个字所释放出能量的高度、深度、长度和宽度。当这种能量给伯克希尔带来价值的时候，我会欣然签一张大支票。