巴菲特致股东的信（2020年）⑥伯克希尔合伙企业

The Berkshire Partnership

伯克希尔合伙企业

Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.

伯克希尔是一家注册在特拉华州的公司，我们的董事必须遵守该州的法律。其中一项要求是，董事会成员必须以公司及其股东的最佳利益行事。我们的董事们信奉这一信条。

In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.

此外，伯克希尔的董事们当然也希望公司能让客户满意、培养并奖励36万名员工中的人才、与贷款机构保持良好的信誉，并在我们经营的众多城市和州被视为好公民。我们非常重视这四个群体。

None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.

然而，在股息分配、战略方向、CEO遴选、业务收购与剥离等事项上，这些群体都没有投票权。这些责任完全落在伯克希尔的董事们肩上，他们必须忠实地代表公司及其所有者的长期利益。

Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.

除了法律上的要求之外，查理和我对伯克希尔的众多个人股东感到有一份特殊的责任。讲一些个人往事或许能帮你理解我们这种不寻常的纽带，以及它如何影响我们的行为。

Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).

在进入伯克希尔之前，我通过一系列合伙企业为许多个人管理资金，最早的三家成立于1956年。随着时间的推移，运营多个实体变得越来越复杂，于是在1962年，我们将12家合伙企业合并为巴菲特合伙有限公司 (Buffett Partnership Ltd., "BPL")。

By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.

到那时，我和妻子几乎所有的钱都和众多有限合伙人的资金一起投入了进去。我不拿工资，也不收管理费。作为普通合伙人，只有在有限合伙人获得超过年化6%的回报之后，我才能获得报酬。如果回报率达不到这个水平，差额将在我未来的利润份额中扣除。（幸运的是，这种情况从未发生过：合伙企业的回报率总是超过6%这条"及格线"。）随着岁月流逝，我的父母、兄弟姐妹、叔叔阿姨、堂表亲和姻亲们的大部分资产都投入了合伙企业。

Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.

查理在1962年成立了他的合伙企业，运作方式和我类似。我们都没有任何机构投资者，我们的合伙人中也很少有金融行家。加入我们的人只是信任我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。这些人——凭直觉也好，听朋友建议也罢——正确地判断出：查理和我对资本的永久亏损极度厌恶，除非我们有把握能做出不错的成绩，否则不会接受他们的钱。

I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.

1965年BPL取得伯克希尔的控制权后，我无意间一头扎进了企业管理的世界。后来，到了1969年，我们决定解散BPL。跨过年底之后，合伙企业按比例分配了所有现金和三只股票，其中价值最大的是BPL在伯克希尔70.5%的股权。

Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.

与此同时，查理在1977年清盘了他的合伙企业。他分配给合伙人的资产中，有一笔重要的蓝筹印花 (Blue Chip Stamps) 股权——这家公司由他的合伙企业、伯克希尔和我共同控制。蓝筹印花也是我的合伙企业解散时分配的三只股票之一。

In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the same page.

1983年，伯克希尔与蓝筹印花合并，由此伯克希尔的注册股东人数从1,900人扩大到2,900人。查理和我希望每一个人——老股东、新股东和潜在股东——都能了解同样的信息。

Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.

因此，1983年的年报一开篇就列出了伯克希尔的"主要经营原则"。第一条原则是这么说的："虽然我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。"这句话定义了我们1983年与股东的关系；它今天依然适用。查理和我——以及我们的董事们——都相信，这条准则将在未来几十年里继续服务于伯克希尔。

Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.

伯克希尔的所有权目前分布在五个"桶"里，其中一个由我这位"准创始人"占据。这个桶注定会逐渐清空，因为我持有的股票每年都在捐赠给各种慈善机构。

Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.

其余四个桶中有两个属于机构投资者，每家机构都在管理别人的钱。不过，这也是两者唯一的相似之处：它们的投资方式截然不同。

In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.

其中一个"桶"里装的是指数基金，这是投资界一个规模庞大且迅速膨胀的群体。这些基金只是简单地复制它们所追踪的指数。指数基金投资者的最爱是标普500指数 (S&P 500)，伯克希尔是其成分股之一。需要强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔的股票纯粹是因为它们被要求这么做。它们处于自动驾驶模式，买卖只是为了调整权重配比。

In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.

另一个"桶"里是专业基金经理，他们管理着客户的资金，这些客户可能是富裕个人、大学、退休基金成员或其他任何人。这些专业经理人的职责是根据他们对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一项投资转移到另一项。这是一个令人尊敬但也很艰难的职业。

We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.

我们很乐意为这个"主动型"群体工作，同时他们也在为自己的客户寻找更好的资金去处。当然，有些基金经理着眼长远，交易非常少。另一些则用计算机算法在一纳秒之内下达买卖指令。还有一些专业投资者会根据宏观经济判断进进出出。

Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.

第四个"桶"里是个人股东，他们的操作方式与我刚才描述的主动型机构经理类似。可以理解的是，当看到其他令他们兴奋的投资机会时，这些股东会把伯克希尔的股票视为潜在的资金来源。我们对这种态度毫无异议，这与我们看待伯克希尔自身持有的某些股票的方式并无不同。

All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.

话虽如此，如果查理和我对第五个"桶"不感到一份特别的亲近，那我们也太没人情味了：超过百万的个人投资者，无论未来如何，他们信任我们代表他们的利益。他们加入我们时就没打算离开，心态与我们最初的合伙人如出一辙。事实上，我们合伙企业时代的许多投资者，以及/或者他们的后人，至今仍是伯克希尔的重要股东。

A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.

这些老兵中的一个典型代表是斯坦·特鲁尔森 (Stan Truhlsen)——一位开朗慷慨的奥马哈眼科医生，也是我的私人朋友。2020年11月13日，他迎来了100岁生日。1959年，斯坦和另外10名年轻的奥马哈医生与我组建了合伙企业。这些医生们颇有创意地给他们的合伙公司取名为"Emdee有限公司"（Emdee, Ltd.）。每年，他们都会来我家和我及妻子共进庆祝晚餐。

When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.

1969年我们的合伙企业分配伯克希尔股票时，所有的医生都保留了他们分到的股票。他们可能不精通投资或会计的门道，但他们知道在伯克希尔他们会被当作合伙人对待。

Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?

斯坦在Emdee的两位老伙伴如今已年近百岁，仍然持有伯克希尔的股票。这群人惊人的长寿——再加上查理和我分别已经97岁和90岁——引出了一个有趣的问题：难道说持有伯克希尔的股票有助于延年益寿？

Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.

伯克希尔这个不同寻常的、珍贵的个人股东大家庭，或许能帮你理解为什么我们不愿去讨好华尔街分析师和机构投资者。我们已经拥有了我们想要的投资者，而且总体来说，我们不认为换一批人会更好。

There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.

伯克希尔的"座位"——也就是流通在外的股份——就这么多。我们非常喜欢已经坐在座位上的人。

Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?

当然，"合伙人"会有一些流动。不过，查理和我希望这种流动越少越好。毕竟，谁会希望频繁更换朋友、邻居或另一半呢？

In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.

1958年，菲尔·费雪 (Phil Fisher) 写了一本杰出的投资著作。书中他把经营一家上市公司比作开餐馆。他说，如果你想招揽食客，你可以选择以汉堡配可乐招牌或者以法国大餐配珍稀美酒来吸引客人，两条路都行。但是，费雪警告说，你绝不能任性地从一种风格跳到另一种：你给潜在顾客传递的信息，必须与他们走进门后看到的东西一致。

At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.

在伯克希尔，我们已经端了56年的汉堡和可乐。我们珍惜这些食物吸引来的顾客。

The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors. “Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.

美国和世界各地数以千万计的其他投资者和投机者有各式各样的股票可选，以满足他们的口味。他们会找到拥有诱人点子的CEO和市场大师。如果他们想要股价目标、粉饰过的盈利和各种"故事"，不愁找不到这样的机会。"技术分析师"会信心十足地告诉他们，图表上的某些波纹预示着一只股票接下来的走势。要求采取行动的号角永远不会停歇。

Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”

我要补充一句，这些投资者中有不少人会做得相当好。毕竟，持有股票在很大程度上是一个"正和博弈"。事实上，一只有耐心、头脑冷静的猴子，朝着列出标普500所有成分股的靶板扔50支飞镖来构建投资组合，随着时间的推移，它也能享受到股息和资本利得——只要它永远不受诱惑去更改最初的"选择"。

Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.

生产性资产——比如农场、房地产，以及没错，企业股权——能创造财富，而且是大量财富。大多数持有这类资产的人都会获得回报。所需要的只是时间的流逝、内心的平静、充分的分散化，以及尽量减少交易和费用。不过，投资者永远不能忘记，他们的支出就是华尔街的收入。而且跟我那只猴子不同的是，华尔街的人可不是为花生干活的。

When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.

当伯克希尔有空位出现时——我们希望尽量少一些——我们希望由那些理解并渴望我们所提供的一切的新来者来入座。经过几十年的管理，查理和我仍然无法许诺投资结果。但我们能够而且确实承诺：把你们当作合伙人对待。

And so, too, will our successors.

我们的继任者也将如此。