巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Per-share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the number of Berkshire shares increased: We issued stock in acquiring FlightSafety International and also sold new Class B shares.* Over the last 32 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 1996 年的账面价值增加 62 亿美元，或增长了 36.1%，但每股账面价值仅增长 31.8%(标普 23%)，原因在于去年我们以发行新股的方式并购了飞安国际公司，同时另外还追加发行了一些 B 级普通股，自现任管理层接手的 32 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 19011 美元，年复合成长率约为 23.8%。

* Each Class B share has an economic interest equal to 1/30th of that possessed by a Class A share, which is the new designation for the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May 1996. Throughout this report, we state all per-share figures in terms of "Class A equivalents," which are the sum of the Class A shares outstanding and 1/30th of the Class B shares outstanding.

* B 级普通股拥有 A 级普通股 1/30 的经济利益，A 级普通股是伯克希尔从 1996 年 5 月之前发行的唯一股份，本报告中所谓的每股数字系以 A 级普通股等价数为基础，亦即全部 A 级普通股数加上 B 级普通股数的 1/30。

For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial statements, a matter that requires me to present one of my less-than-thrilling explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make it brief.

基于技术性原因，我们必须将 1995 年的财务报表予以重编，需要适当解释一下会计奥秘，我会长话短说。

The restatement was required because GEICO became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it was previously classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint - taking into account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained - the value of the 51% of GEICO we owned at year-end 1995 increased significantly when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days later. Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step acquisition," however, required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time we moved to 100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book value - amounted to $478.4 million. As a result, we now carry our original 51% of GEICO at a value that is both lower than its market value at the time we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower than the value at which we carry that 49% itself.

重编是因为，此前被归为投资的 GEICO 保险在 1996 年 1 月 2 日正式成为伯克希尔 100%持有的子公司，从经济的角度看，考量可观的租税优惠与其它好处，我们原先在 1995 年底持有的 51%的 GEICO 保险股权，在我们取得剩余 49%股权之后，其价值大幅增加，然而对于这种渐进式并购，一般公认会计原则却要求我们必须在取得100%股权时，将原来帐上 51%的成本反向予以调减，使得帐面价值减少为 4.784 亿美元(51%按市值改为按净资产)，这结果使得我们原来 51%股权的帐面价值不但远低于取得剩余 49%股权时它的市价，也低于我们取得的这49%股权的价值。

There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value I have just described: Twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares at a premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B shares for cash and again in December when we used both A and B shares as part-payment for FlightSafety. In total, the three non-operational items affecting book value contributed less than one percentage point to our 31.8% per-share gain last year.

不过，刚刚提到账面价值的减少也有抵偿：我们在 1996 年两度溢价发行股份，第一次是在 5 月发行 B 级普通股募集资金，第二次是在 12 月发行 A 级与 B 级普通股，以并购国际飞安公司，总的来说，以上三项非经营性项目对于去年本公司 31.8%的每股账面价值成长率的净影响还不到 1%。

I dwell on this rise in per-share book value because it roughly indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have repeatedly told you, what counts at Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last time you got that message from us was in the Owner's Manual, sent to you in June after we issued the Class B shares. In that manual, we not only defined certain key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth our economic principles.

今年我之所以一再强调每股账面价值的增长，原因在于它大致等于我们近一年的实质进展，不过就像是查理跟我一再提醒各位的，对伯克希尔来说，真正重要的不是帐面价值，而是内在价值，最近一次跟各位提到是在去年 6 月本公司发行 B 级普通股时，在送给各位的股东手册当中，我们不但对于一些名词予以定义，诸如内在价值等，同时也公布了我们的企业原则。

For many years, we have listed these principles in the front of our annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we reproduce the entire Owner's Manual. In this letter, we will occasionally refer to the manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions and explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic value," see pages 64 and 65.

多年来，我们在年报前头列出这些原则，在这封信里，我们偶尔也会提到股东手册，这样我们就可以不必再重复解释一些常用的名词，比如说如果你想要了解一下什么叫内在价值，建议大家可以再翻翻那本手册。

Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table that Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key indices of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments but after all interest and corporate overhead expenses. The operating-earnings column excludesall dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the two columns show what Berkshire would have reported had it been broken into two parts.

从去年开始，我们首度提供给各位一张查理跟我本人认为可以帮助大家估计伯克希尔公司内在价值的表格，在随后该表的更新版本中，我们追踪两项与价值相关的重要指标，第一栏是我们平均每股持有的投资规模(包含现金与约当现金)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与期间费用之后(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，来自经营业务的每股收益，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把伯克希尔拆成两部分的话，这两栏数字将分别代表这两个部门的损益绩效。

As the table tells you, our investments per share increased in 1996 by 29.0% and our non-investment earnings grew by 63.2%. Our goal is to keep the numbers in both columns moving ahead at a reasonable (or, better yet, unreasonable) pace.

从这张表大家可以看出，我们 1996 年的每股投资金额增加了 29%，而非投资的本业收益则增加了 63.2%，我们的目标是让这两栏的数字以合理的速度稳定地成长，当然若是偶尔能以不合理的速度暴增也不错。

Our expectations, however, are tempered by two realities. First, our past rates of growth cannot be matched nor even approached: Berkshire's equity capital is now large - in fact, fewer than ten businesses in America have capital larger - and an abundance of funds tends to dampen returns. Second, whatever our rate of progress, it will not be smooth: Year-to-year moves in the first column of the table above will be influenced in a major way by fluctuations in securities markets; the figures in the second column will be affected by wide swings in the profitability of our catastrophe-reinsurance business.

不过这样的预期可能会受到两项现实因素制约，首先，我们很难再达到或接近过去那样高的成长速度，原因在于伯克希尔现在的资本规模实在是太庞大了，事实上以我们现在的资本规模已经可以排在全美企业的前十名，过多的资本一定会影响到整体的回报率。其次，不管成长的速度如何，都很难以平稳的速度增加，第一栏的数字将很容易随着股市大环境上下波动，第二栏的数字则会跟着巨灾再保业务盈利的不稳定变动而变化。

In the table, the donations made pursuant to our shareholder-designated contributions program are charged against the second column, though we view them as a shareholder benefit rather than as an expense. All other corporate expenses are also charged against the second column. These costs may be lower than those of any other large American corporation: Our after-tax headquarters expense amounts to less than two basis points (1/50th of 1%) measured against net worth. Even so, Charlie used to think this expense percentage outrageously high, blaming it on my use of Berkshire's corporate jet, The Indefensible. But Charlie has recently experienced a "counter-revelation": With our purchase of FlightSafety, whose major activity is the training of corporate pilots, he now rhapsodizes at the mere mention of jets.

在这张表中，股东指定捐赠的款项被列为第二栏的减项，虽然我们将之视为股东的福利而非支出，企业其它的支出同样也被放在第二栏当作减项，这些开支远低于其它美国大企业的平均水准，每年我们企业总部的税后费用占账面价值的比率大约不到万分之二，即便如此查理还是认为这样的比率高得离谱，我想主要要怪罪于我个人所使用的伯克希尔企业专机“无可辩解号“，不过最近在我们买下国际飞安这家专门负责训练飞行的公司之后，查理的态度有了 180 度的转变，现在只要一提到飞机他就狂乐不已。

Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds incur corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers - that average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the returns their investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I make no promises about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however, that virtually all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders. We are here to make money with you, not off you.

认真的说，控制成本开支绝对重要，举例来说很多共同基金每年的经营费用大多在 1%上下，这等于间接剥削了投资人将近 10%的投资回报，虽然查理跟我不敢向各位保证我们的投资绩效，但我们却可以向各位保证，伯克希尔所赚的每一分钱都归股东所有，我们在这里是跟各位一起赚钱，而不是利用各位赚钱的。