巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）②内在价值与股价的关系

The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price

In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at $36,000, I told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent years had outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the latter gain had been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance could not continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that moment consider Berkshire to be undervalued.

内在价值与股价的关系

去年当伯克希尔的股价约在 36,000 美元时，我曾向各位报告过(1)伯克希尔这几年的股价表现超过了内在价值，虽然后者的成长幅度也相当令人满意，(2)这样的情况不可能无限制地持续下去，(3)查理跟我不认为当时伯克希尔的价值被低估了。

Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic value has increased very significantly - aided in a major way by a stunning performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later - while the market price of our shares has changed little. This, of course, means that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business. Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both much different from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more appropriate.

自从我发出这些警告之后，伯克希尔的内在价值已经大幅地增加了，主要的原因在于 GEICO 保险惊人的表现(关于这点在后面还会向大家详细报告)，而在此同时伯克希尔的股价却维持不动，这代表在 1996 年伯克希尔的内在价值表现优于股价，也就是说，伯克希尔今天的价格/价值比相比一年以前有很大的不同，这同时也是查理跟我认为比较合理的情况。

Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must of necessity match the business gains of the company. When the stock temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business, a limited number of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized benefits at the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated have an edge over the innocents in this game.

就长期而言，伯克希尔股东的整体利得一定会与企业的经营收益一致，当公司的股价表现暂时优于或劣于企业经营表现时，少数股东(不管是买进还是卖出的一方)将会从交易的对方身上占到一些便宜，通常来说，在这场游戏中老练的一方比天真的一方更具优势。

Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that our shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire, we wish also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders at the expense of others. These are goals we would have were we managing a family partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the manager of a public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that partnership interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit; in a public company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic value are in sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but a manager - by his policies and communications - can do much to foster equity.

虽然我们主要的目标是希望伯克希尔股东持有公司所有权所获得的利益最大化，但于此同时，我们也期望股东之间利益再分配最小化。如果我们管理的是一家家族企业，这会是我们的目标。我们相信这也适用在上市公司的经营之上。对合伙企业来说，合伙权益在合伙人加入或退出时必须能够以公平合理的方式评量，同样地。对于上市公司来说，惟有让公司的股价与内在价值一致，公司股东之间的公平性才得以实现。显然，这样理想的情况很难一直维持，不过身为公司经理人可以通过其政策与沟通的方式来大力维持这样的公平性。

Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the more bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial experience - and the less it will matter what premium or discount to intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock. That's one reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons. Overall, I think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably ranks number one among large American corporations in the percentage of its shares held by owners with a long-term view.

当然，股东持有的时间越长，那么伯克希尔本身的表现与他的投资回报就会越接近，而他买卖股份时的价格相较于内在价值是折溢价的影响程度也就越小，这也是为什么我们希望能够吸引具有长期投资意愿的股东加入的原因之一，总的来说，我认为就这点而言，我们算是做的相当成功，伯克希尔大概是所有美国大企业中拥有最多具长期投资观点股东的公司。