巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）⑥保险业务-GEICO保险以及其它直接保险

Insurance - GEICO and Other Primary Operations

When we moved to total ownership of GEICO early last year, our expectations were high - and they are all being exceeded. That is true from both a business and personal perspective: GEICO's operating chief, Tony Nicely, is a superb business manager and a delight to work with. Under almost any conditions, GEICO would be an exceptionally valuable asset. With Tony at the helm, it is reaching levels of performance that the organization would only a few years ago have thought impossible.

保险业务-GEICO保险以及其它直接保险

去年当我们完全取得 GEICO 保险的所有权之后，我们曾对它抱以深切的期望，如今这些期望不但全部实现，甚至是有过之而无不及，不论是从企业或个人的观点来看皆是如此，GEICO 保险的领导者托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)不但是一个杰出的经理人同时也是令人感到愉快的工作伙伴，不论在任何的情况下，GEICO 保险永远都是我们价值不菲的珍贵资产，有 Tony 负责掌舵，GEICO 保险正迈入几年前根本不敢想象的营运高峰。

There's nothing esoteric about GEICO's success: The company's competitive strength flows directly from its position as a low-cost operator. Low costs permit low prices, and low prices attract and retain good policyholders. The final segment of a virtuous circle is drawn when policyholders recommend us to their friends. GEICO gets more than one million referrals annually and these produce more than half of our new business, an advantage that gives us enormous savings in acquisition expenses - and that makes our costs still lower.

GEICO 保险的成功没有任何神秘之处，该公司的竞争优势完全来自其超低成本的经营模式，低成本带来低售价，低售价自然能够吸引并留住优良的保险客户，而整个经营流程在满意的客户向他们的朋友推荐 GEICO 保险时画下完美的句号。靠着客户的推荐，GEICO 保险每年至少因此增加 100 万张保单，占新增业务量的半数以上，也使得我们新接业务成本大幅下降，从而又进一步降低我们的成本。

This formula worked in spades for GEICO in 1996: Its voluntary auto policy count grew 10%. During the previous 20 years, the company's best-ever growth for a year had been 8%, a rate achieved only once. Better yet, the growth in voluntary policies accelerated during the year, led by major gains in the nonstandard market, which has been an underdeveloped area at GEICO. I focus here on voluntary policies because the involuntary business we get from assigned risk pools and the like is unprofitable. Growth in that sector is most unwelcome.

这种模式在 1996 年大放异彩，主动上门的自愿性车险保单量成长了 10%，过去二十年来，该公司最高也不过是在有一年达到 8%而已，更好的是，这些自愿性车险保单的增加主要源自于非标准的保单市场，这个市场对GEICO 保险来说算是亟待开发的一块，我之所以一再强调自愿性保单的原因在于，从风险池中分配到的非自愿的强制性保单根本就没什么利润，那方面的成长就可有可无。

GEICO's growth would mean nothing if it did not produce reasonable underwriting profits. Here, too, the news is good: Last year we hit our underwriting targets and then some. Our goal, however, is not to widen our profit margin but rather to enlarge the price advantage we offer customers. Given that strategy, we believe that 1997's growth will easily top that of last year.

如果不能产生合理的承保利润，GEICO 保险保费收入的成长就没有任何意义，不过再一次我们得到的答案是正面的肯定，去年我们顺利达到原先设定的承保目标，甚至还超越，不过我们真正的目标不是要扩大承保利差，而是将利润通过价格的调整回馈给客户，在这样的策略之下，我们相信 1997 年一定会超越 1996 年的表现。

We expect new competitors to enter the direct-response market, and some of our existing competitors are likely to expand geographically. Nonetheless, the economies of scale we enjoy should allow us to maintain or even widen the protective moat surrounding our economic castle. We do best on costs in geographical areas in which we enjoy high market penetration. As our policy count grows, concurrently delivering gains in penetration, we expect to drive costs materially lower. GEICO's sustainable cost advantage is what attracted me to the company way back in 1951, when the entire business was valued at $7 million. It is also why I felt Berkshire should pay $2.3 billion last year for the 49% of the company that we didn't then own.

同时我们也预期会有新的竞争者加入直销市场，而现有的一些竞争同业也有可能会扩大他们的经营区域，不过不管怎样，我们目前所建立的规模经济，绝对可以确保甚至是扩大我们经济堡垒的护城河，我们在拥有最高市占率的地区拥有最低的成本，随着保单和渗透率的增加，成本预期还会进一步地降低。GEICO 保险永续性的成本优势是 1951 年吸引我投资该公司的主要原因，当时整家公司的市值不过只有 700 万美元，而那也是为什么我在去年愿意花 23 亿美元买下另外 49%不属于伯克希尔的股权的原因。

Maximizing the results of a wonderful business requires management and focus. Lucky for us, we have in Tony a superb manager whose business focus never wavers. Wanting also to get the entire GEICO organization concentrating as he does, we needed a compensation plan that was itself sharply focused - and immediately after our purchase, we put one in.

想要让一家好公司的表现发挥到极致，必须依赖优秀的管理人员与明确的目标方向，值得庆幸的是我们已经有像 Tony 这样优秀的专业经理人以及绝对不会动摇的目标，而为了确保 GEICO 保险所有的组织成员都能像 Tony一样专注一致，我们需要一套能够与目标匹配的薪酬计划，所以在整个并购案完成之后，我们立刻落实执行。

Today, the bonuses received by dozens of top executives, starting with Tony, are based upon only two key variables: (1) growth in voluntary auto policies and (2) underwriting profitability on "seasoned" auto business (meaning policies that have been on the books for more than one year). In addition, we use the same yardsticks to calculate the annual contribution to the company's profit-sharing plan. Everyone at GEICO knows what counts.

现在，以 Tony 为首的数十名主要高级经理人所领取的薪资奖励主要就看两个指标：(1)新客户中自愿性保单的成长，以及(2) 承保的老客户常态性保单的盈利能力(指入账超过一年的保单)，此外，我们也将同样的标准运用于公司每年员工利润分享计划，所以基本上在 GEICO 保险每个人都知道真正重要的是什么。

The GEICO plan exemplifies Berkshire's incentive compensation principles: Goals should be (1) tailored to the economics of the specific operating business; (2) simple in character so that the degree to which they are being realized can be easily measured; and (3) directly related to the daily activities of plan participants. As a corollary, we shun "lottery ticket" arrangements, such as options on Berkshire shares, whose ultimate value - which could range from zero to huge - is totally out of the control of the person whose behavior we would like to affect. In our view, a system that produces quixotic payoffs will not only be wasteful for owners but may actually discourage the focused behavior we value in managers.

GEICO 保险这项计划充分说明的伯克希尔薪资奖励的原则，那就是必须要能够达到以下目标(1)适用于具体公司的具体经营状况(2)简单明了的规则，如此可以很清楚的加以衡量(3)与每个参与的员工直接相关；所以很自然的，我们避免给予员工不劳而获的乐透彩，比如说伯克希尔的认股期权，其最终的价值可能由极少到极大，但这却不是那些我们想要影响其行为的人员所能够直接控制影响的，在我们的观念中，不合理的薪资奖励办法，不但是浪费股东的钱，同时也会让旗下的经理人分心而产生不当的行为。

Every quarter, all 9,000 GEICO associates can see the results that determine our profit-sharing plan contribution. In 1996, they enjoyed the experience because the plan literally went off the chart that had been constructed at the start of the year. Even I knew the answer to that problem: Enlarge the chart. Ultimately, the results called for a record contribution of 16.9% ($40 million), compared to a five-year average of less than 10% for the comparable plans previously in effect. Furthermore, at Berkshire, we never greet good work by raising the bar. If GEICO's performance continues to improve, we will happily keep on making larger charts.

每一季，GEICO 保险公司总共 9,000 名的员工都可以看到根据利润分享计划所计算出来的结果，1996 年他们确实享受到这项成果，因为根据这项计划所计算出来的数字早已打破当初规划时的最高上限，连我也知道要如何解决这个问题，那就是把上限再扩大，最后，员工总共分配到年度薪水的 16.9%的奖金，金额将近有 4,000 万美元，远高于过去五年平均不到 10%的比率，同时在伯克希尔对于员工辛勤工作的表现，我们绝对不会回以更高的门槛，如果 GEICO 的员工继续保持如此优异的表现，我们还会继续提高奖励的上限。

Lou Simpson continues to manage GEICO's money in an outstanding manner: Last year, the equities in his portfolio outdid the S&P 500 by 6.2 percentage points. In Lou's part of GEICO's operation, we again tie compensation to performance - but to investment performance over a four-year period, not to underwriting results nor to the performance of GEICO as a whole. We think it foolish for an insurance company to pay bonuses that are tied to overall corporate results when great work on one side of the business - underwriting or investment - could conceivably be completely neutralized by bad work on the other. If you bat .350 at Berkshire, you can be sure you will get paid commensurately even if the rest of the team bats .200. In Lou and Tony, however, we are lucky to have Hall-of-Famers in both key positions.

负责管理 GEICO 投资的路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)同样继续其优异的表现，去年他的投资组合超越标普 500指数 6.2%，关于 Lou 在 GEICO 保险的表现，再一次我们将其奖励计划跟其投资绩效绑在一起，不看 GEICO 保险的承保绩效或整体的成绩，而是以过去四年平均的投资绩效为准，对于有些保险公司不分承保部门或投资部门，完全不顾一方优异的表现可能被另一方糟糕的表现所抵消掉的情况，而将其薪资奖励计划完全绑在一起，一视同仁的做法感到愚不可及，在伯克希尔如果你的打击率高达 35%，我可以向你保证绝对不会亏待你，即使其它同队的球员平均打击率只有 20%，不过很庆幸在 GEICO 保险，不论是在承保部门还是投资部门，我们都拥有像Lou 与 Tony 这类足以列入名人堂的优秀球员。

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Though they are, of course, smaller than GEICO, our other primary insurance operations turned in equally stunning results last year. National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 74.2 and, as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 83.0. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded a combined ratio of 87.1 even though it absorbed the expenses of expanding to new states. Rod's three-year combined ratio is an amazing 83.2. Berkshire's workers' compensation business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, has now moved into six other states and, despite the costs of that expansion, again achieved an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set new records for premium volume while generating good earnings from underwriting. In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations (now including Kansas Bankers Surety) have an underwriting record virtually unmatched in the industry. Don, Rod, Brad and John have all created significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.

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虽然比起 GEICO 保险，我们其它主要保险业务规模要小得多，但他们在去年同样缴出惊人的成绩单，国民保险公司的传统业务综合比率只有 74.2%，同时以其保费收入来看，还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由 Don Wurster 负责的部门平均的综合比率低至 83.0%；另外由 Rod Eldred 负责的住宅保险业务(Home-State)也有相当幅度的成长，虽然去年必须负担开拓新州业务的费用，但综合比率仍只有 87.1%，过去三年平均综合比率为 83.2%；另外原先由 Brad Kinstler 负责的加州工伤赔偿保险业务现在已将业务扩展到其它六个州，虽然初期须负担沉重的开办费用，但是仍然能维持可观的承保利润；最后负责中央州立产险公司营运的 John Kizer则依然表现出色，保费收入不但大幅成长，同时承保利益更大幅增加，总的来说，我们几个小型保险业务(包含堪萨斯银行家保险在内)的表现是其它同业所比不上的，Don、Rod、Brad 与 John 全都替伯克希尔创造了可观的价值，而我们也相信他们未来的潜力仍然可期。