巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）⑤巨灾再保险业务

Super-Cat Insurance

As in the past three years, we once again stress that the good results we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat business having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years - and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility - it's a certainty. The only question is when it will come.

巨灾再保险业务

与过去三年一样，我们再次强调，今年伯克希尔保险业务之所以能够有这么好的成绩，部分的原因要归功于巨灾险业务又渡过幸运的一年。从事这类业务，我们出售保单给保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的巨灾险业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然一年发生重大的损失，换句话说，巨灾险这项业务是否具有吸引力可能要花上好几年才能衡量，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会降临。

I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want you to panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some large catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would tend to react that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just as you should entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would lead you to panic and sell. Selling fine businesses on "scary" news is usually a bad decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built Coca-Cola over many decades and who owned a huge position in the company, was once asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff had a simple answer: "I don't know. I've never sold any.")

我之所以会把丑话说在前头，是因为我不希望某天你突然听到伯克希尔因为一场大灾难而须赔付一大笔钱时，恐慌地拋售手中的持股。如果你倾向这种反应，那么你现在就不应该持有我们的股票，就如同你碰到股市崩盘，恐慌性的拋售手中股票，我建议你最好不要投资股票。听到坏消息而把手中的好股票卖掉通常不会是一个明智的决定。数十年前创办可口可乐的天才企业家 Robert Woodruff 曾经被问到，什么情况下是出售可口可乐股票的好时机，Woodruff 简短的回答到：我不知道，我从来就没有卖过！。

In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers that are exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce it. The product we sell - for what we hope is an appropriate price - is our willingness to shift that volatility to our own books. Gyrations in Berkshire's earnings don't bother us in the least: Charlie and I would much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%. (After all, our earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis - why should we demand that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes of the sun?) We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when we have shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and that's why we regularly repeat our cautions.

谈到巨灾再保险业务，我们的客户主要是一些想要降低收益剧烈变动风险的保险公司，而我们希望我们销售的产品价格合理，我们愿意将这些收益变动的风险转移到我们身上，因为我们对于伯克希尔公司收益剧烈的变动一点都不会介意，查理跟我宁可接受波动的 15%的长期收益，也不要平稳的 12%，毕竟，我们知道公司的收益每天、每周都会大幅变动，那么我们又何必强求公司的收益变化一定要跟地球环绕太阳轨道的时间一致呢？我想，如果伯克希尔的股东合伙人也能有这样的看法，那么我们执行业务时便能更得心应手，而这也是为什么我们要一再提出相同警告的原因。

We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996. At mid-year we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes, and though there are no definitive records that would allow us to prove this point, we believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe risk ever assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the year, however, we wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority that goes into effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss more than twice that possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained all the risk for our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire's after-tax "worst-case" loss from a true mega-catastrophe is probably no more than $600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and 1.5% of our market value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look at the table on page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security markets have delivered us.

我们在 1996 年陆续接了好几单大业务，在年中我们与全美保险(Allstate)签约承保佛罗里达飓风险，虽然没有确切的资料可供佐证，但我们相信这应该是单一公司独力承受单一风险的最高记录，接着到年底，我们又与加州地震局签约承保比佛罗里达飓风高出一倍的理赔上限，保单预计从 1997 年 4 月 1 日开始生效，再一次我们独立承揽所有的风险，虽然承保的金额相当庞大，但是即使在最坏的状况下，任何一件大型灾害的税后损失也不会超过 6 亿美元，大约不到伯克希尔账面价值的 3%或市值的 1.5%。大家要了解这类风险的影响性，相比起股票市场的变动对我们的影响性来说，前者可谓是小巫见大巫。

In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive advantages. First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that we both can and will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were a truly cataclysmic disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial panic would quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected reinsurers that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that their clients faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never "lay off" part of the risks we insure is that we have reservations about our ability to collect from others when disaster strikes. When it's Berkshire promising, insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.

在巨灾再保险业务，我们主要有三项竞争优势，首先向我们投保再保险的客户都知道我们有能力，也会在最糟糕的情况下履约赔付，因为万一真的发生什么大的灾难，很难保证金融恐慌就不会接踵而至，届时在其客户最需要援助时，可能连一些原本享有盛誉的再保公司都拿不出钱来，而事实上我们之所以从来不将风险再转嫁出去的一个原因也是因为我们对于灾难发生时，其它保险公司能否顺利支付赔款的能力持保留态度。反之只要是伯克希尔做出的保证，所有的保户都可以百分之百确定一定可以立即得到理赔。

Our second advantage - somewhat related - is subtle but important. After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question have very substantial capacity available - but it will naturally be our long-standing clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable "stand-by" fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get coverage from us should the market tighten.

我们的第二项优势，跟第一项有点关联，虽然不显著但却相当重要，当一件大灾害发生后，保险公司可能发现很难找到愿意再保险的公司，虽然此时需求最为迫切。在这个时候，伯克希尔庞大的产能保证绝对可以提供任何服务，当然我们会优先受理原来与我们有长期往来的客户，这个经验已经使得全世界的保险公司与再保公司了解与我们维持往来的必要性，事实上，我们现在正从许多再保公司那里收取预备费，以防万一市场情况紧绷时，他们可以确保取得再保的优先机会。

Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide dollar coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.

我们拥有的最后一项优势是我们能够提供别处得不到单一最高的投保上限，寻找大客户的保险业者都知道，只要打一通电话到伯克希尔，就可以立即得到确定满意的答复。

A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes - our largest risk - seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid homeowners' losses on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models had told them to expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared to the "worst-case" possibility for California. Understandably, insurers became - ahem - shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing earthquake coverage into their homeowners' policies.

有关加州大地震方面有几点需要在这里做说明，因为这是我们最大的风险部位所在，1994 年发生的北岭大地震使得保险业的住宅保险损失远超过计算机所估算的预期范围。不过，与加州最坏情况相比，这次地震的强度比起预估可能的最坏情况，还算是相对轻微的，所以可想而知某些保险业者肯定都吓坏了，因此开始考虑将地震险从他们的住宅险保单条款中撤掉。

In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California's insurance commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy to be written by a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority. This entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996, needed large layers of reinsurance - and that's where we came in. Berkshire's layer of approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority's aggregate losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about $5 billion. (The press originally reported larger figures, but these would have applied only if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement; instead only 72% signed up.)

深富远见的加州保险专员 Chuch Quackenbush 立即设计出一份新的住宅地震保单，由加州资助的加州地震局保险公司承保，该公司预计从 1996 年 12 月 1 日开始正式运营，并需要大量再保险的庇护，这时候就轮到我们上场了，如果地震局在 2001 年 3 月 31 日之前因地震发生的损失超过 50 亿美元时，伯克希尔将赔付 10 亿美元。(媒体原先报导的数字比这更高，不过那是在所有保险业者都一同加入时的情况，总计最后只有 72%的业者参与签约)。

So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout during the policy's term? We don't know - nor do we think computer models will help us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera. In fact, such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense of security and thereby increase their chances of making a really huge mistake. We've already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments. Witness "portfolio insurance," whose destructive effects in the 1987 market crash led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should have been jumping out of windows.

大家一定会问，保单有效期间我们真正赔付的机率到底有多大？老实说我们实在是不知道，而我们也不认为用计算机模型可以帮我们什么忙，基本上计算机做出的预测根本就是垃圾，它们反而会让做决策的人误以为得到某种确定的假象，从而使得他们犯下大错的机会大增，过去不管是在保险中还是投资中，这种离谱的情况屡见不鲜，以投资组合保险为例，它在 1987 年股市大崩盘时所造成的惨况，有人开玩笑说，当时应该要跳楼是计算机而不是那些被计算机所愚弄的人。

Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable, insurers can underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man's precise age to know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight to recognize his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember that virtually all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we try to price our super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums end up being eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time, we will find out how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly. The super-cat business is just like the investment business in that it often takes a long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.

虽然保险业者无法准确地评估风险到底有多大，不过我们却还是可以明智的承接保单，就像是你并不需要知道一个人的确切年龄就能判断他是否到了可以去投票的年龄，或是并不需要知道一个人确切体重就能知道他该不该减肥。同样的，从事保险这一行，大家必须谨记的是，基本上所有的意外都不会让人感到愉快，所以在接下保单时，我们心里早有预备，准备把 90%的保费收入花在损失理赔与相关费用之上，慢慢的一段时间下来，我们就会发现，这样的定价是否合理，这需要时间来证明，巨灾再保险这一行就像是投资事业一样，绝对需要一段很长的时间，你才能确切的知道自己到底在干什么。

What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have the best person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit Jain, whose value to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field, disastrous propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced all too many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a large runoff portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s, able though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you, won't make mistakes of this type.

不过有一点我绝对可以向各位保证，我们拥有全世界最优秀的巨灾再保险专家，那就是阿吉特·贾恩(AjitJain)，他在伯克希尔的价值大到难以想象，在再保险这一行，灾难性的保单比比皆是，我很清楚的原因是我个人在 1970 年代就承保太多个地雷，而 GEICO 在 1980 年代初期，即使当时拥有最能干的经理人，也同样签了一堆愚蠢的保单。不过我可以向各位保证，阿吉特不会犯这样的错误。

I have mentioned that a mega-catastrophe might cause a catastrophe in the financial markets, a possibility that is unlikely but not far-fetched. Were the catastrophe a quake in California of sufficient magnitude to tap our coverage, we would almost certainly be damaged in other ways as well. For example, See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac could be hit hard. All in all, though, we can handle this aggregation of exposures.

另一方面我也说过，特大灾难的发生同样也会间接导致金融风暴的发生，这样的可能性虽然不大，但也不是不可能，要是加州真的发生规模大到我们理赔上限的大地震，我们旗下其它事业也可能会受到严重的打击，比如说喜诗糖果、富国银行或房利美等，不过总的来说，我们应该可以妥善处理发生的状况。

In this respect, as in others, we try to "reverse engineer" our future at Berkshire, bearing in mind Charlie's dictum: "All I want to know is where I'm going to die so I'll never go there." (Inverting really works: Try singing country western songs backwards and you will quickly regain your house, your car and your wife.) If we can't tolerate a possible consequence, remote though it may be, we steer clear of planting its seeds. That is why we don't borrow big amounts and why we make sure that our super-cat business losses, large though the maximums may sound, will not put a major dent in Berkshire's intrinsic value.

就这方面而言，我们试着事先规划伯克希尔的未来，时时谨记查理常说的一句格言：我只想知道自己最后会死在哪里，然后永远都不去那里！”(反过来想真的有效，大家可以试着多唱唱以前流行的乡村歌曲，很快的你就会发现重新找回了你的房子、车子跟老婆)，如果我们没办法承担可能的后果，不管其可能性有多小，那么我们就必须避免播下罪恶的种子，这也是为什么我们不大幅举债的原因，同时虽然巨灾险损失理赔的上限金额看起来很大，但对伯克希尔本身价值的影响却极其有限。