巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）
⑩普通股投资

Common Stock Investments

     Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $500 million are itemized.

股票投资

下表是我们市值超过 5 亿美元的普通股投资。

     Our portfolio shows little change: We continue to make more money when snoring than when active.

我们的投资组合还是没有多大变动，我们打盹时赚的钱比起醒着时多很多。

     Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing in public companies successfully is little different from the art of successfully acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to acquire, at a sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these qualities are being preserved.

按兵不动对我们来说是一项明智的行为，就像是我们或其它经理人不可能因为谣传美联储可能调整贴现利率或是华尔街专家大幅改变他们对股市前景的看法，就决定把旗下高收益的金母鸡卖来卖去一样，我们也不会对拥有部分所有权的好公司股票任意卖出，投资上市公司部分股权的秘诀与全资收购子公司的成功方法没有什么两样，都是希望能够以合理的价格取得拥有绝佳竞争优势与才德兼备的经理人，此后，大家只需要注意的是这些特质是否发生了任何改变。 

     When carried out capably, an investment strategy of that type will often result in its practitioner owning a few securities that will come to represent a very large portion of his portfolio. This investor would get a similar result if he followed a policy of purchasing an interest in, say, 20% of the future earnings of a number of outstanding college basketball stars. A handful of these would go on to achieve NBA stardom, and the investor's take from them would soon dominate his royalty stream. To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan because he has become so important to the team.

只要执行得当，运用这样投资策略的投资人到最后会发现，少数几家公司的股份将会占他投资组合的绝大部分，这样的方式就好象一个人买下一群极具潜力的大学明星篮球队员 20%的未来权益，其中有一小部分的球员可能会进到 NBA 打球，那么投资人会发现，其因此从中收取的权利金将会占其收入的绝大部分，要是有人建议把这部分的权益卖掉就好象是要公牛队把迈克尔乔丹转让一样，只因为他对球队来说实在是太重要了。

     In studying the investments we have made in both subsidiary companies and common stocks, you will see that we favor businesses and industries unlikely to experience major change. The reason for that is simple: Making either type of purchase, we are searching for operations that we believe are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast-changing industry environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the certainty we seek.

研究我们过去收购的企业或投资的股票，大家会发现，我们偏爱那些变化不大的公司与产业。原因很简单，我们一直在寻找我们认为十年或二十年后依然拥有巨大竞争优势的公司，快速变迁的行业或许可能让人一夜之间大发横财，但却无法提供我们想要的确定性。

     I should emphasize that, as citizens, Charlie and I welcome change: Fresh ideas, new products, innovative processes and the like cause our country's standard of living to rise, and that's clearly good. As investors, however, our reaction to a fermenting industry is much like our attitude toward space exploration: We applaud the endeavor but prefer to skip the ride.  

另一方面我必须强调的是，身为普通人，查理跟我相当欢迎改变，因为新的观念、新的产品或创新的方法可以提升我们的生活水准，这点很明显的对我们有好处。但身为投资人，对于新兴行业的态度就好象在太空探险一样，对于这种勇猛的行为我们给予喝采，但是若要我们自己上场，那就算了吧！

     Obviously all businesses change to some extent. Today, See's is different in many ways from what it was in 1972 when we bought it: It offers a different assortment of candy, employs different machinery and sells through different distribution channels. But the reasons why people today buy boxed chocolates, and why they buy them from us rather than from someone else, are virtually unchanged from what they were in the 1920s when the See family was building the business. Moreover, these motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years, or even 50.

当然所有的产业都会变化，在今日喜诗糖果的经营形态与我们当初在 1972 年买下这家公司时又有很大的不同，喜诗提供了更多样的糖果、生产设备与销售渠道也大不相同，不过人们为什么购买盒装巧克力，为什么非要购买喜诗的盒装巧克力，其原因自 1920 年代喜诗家族创立以来就从来没有变过，而我想这原因在往后 20 年，乃至于 50 年都不会有所改变。

     We look for similar predictability in marketable securities. Take Coca-Cola: The zeal and imagination with which Coke products are sold has burgeoned under Roberto Goizueta, who has done an absolutely incredible job in creating value for his shareholders. Aided by Don Keough and Doug Ivester, Roberto has rethought and improved every aspect of the company. But the fundamentals of the business - the qualities that underlie Coke's competitive dominance and stunning economics - have remained constant through the years.

在买进股票时，我们同样在寻找类似的可预测性，以可口可乐来说，可口可乐产品所代表的热情与想象在CEO 罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔(Roberto Goizueta)的带领下风靡世界，此举为公司股东创造出可观的价值，在唐·基奥(Don Keough)与 Doug Ivester 的协助之下，罗伯托重新塑造公司的各个方面，不过可口可乐公司的本质，强大的竞争优势与主导地位多年来却从未改变。

     I was recently studying the 1896 report of Coke (and you think that you are behind in your reading!). At that time Coke, though it was already the leading soft drink, had been around for only a decade. But its blueprint for the next 100 years was already drawn. Reporting sales of $148,000 that year, Asa Candler, the company's president, said: "We have not lagged in our efforts to go into all the world teaching that Coca-Cola is the article, par excellence, for the health and good feeling of all people." Though "health" may have been a reach, I love the fact that Coke still relies on Candler's basic theme today - a century later. Candler went on to say, just as Roberto could now, "No article of like character has ever so firmly entrenched itself in public favor." Sales of syrup that year, incidentally, were 116,492 gallons versus about 3.2 billion in 1996.

最近我正在研读可口可乐 1896 年的年报(所以大家不要以为你的阅读已经落后了，我们比你还晚)，虽然当时可口可乐已经是软饮料的领导者，但那也不过只有十年的光景，然而在当时该公司却早已规划好未来的百年大计，面对年仅 14.8 万美元的销售额，公司总裁 Asa Candler 表示：我们告诉全世界，可口可乐是为所有人的健康和良好感觉而打造的卓越产品，这一点我们并没有落后。虽然我认为健康这档子事还有待努力，但我很高兴可口可乐在一百年后的今天，始终还是遵循 Candler 当初立下的愿景，Candler 又继续谈到：没有其它东西的味道能够像可乐一样深植人心。当年的可乐糖浆销售量不过只有 11.6 万加仑，时至今日，销售量已达到 32 亿加仑。

     I can't resist one more Candler quote: "Beginning this year about March 1st . . . we employed ten traveling salesmen by means of which, with systematic correspondence from the office, we covered almost the territory of the Union." That's my kind of sales force.

我实在忍不住想要在引用 Candler 的另一段话：“从今年三月开始，我们雇用了十位巡回推销员，在与总公司保持密切联系下我们的业务范围已涵盖整个美国。”这才是我心目中的销售力量。

     Companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled "The Inevitables." Forecasters may differ a bit in their predictions of exactly how much soft drink or shaving-equipment business these companies will be doing in ten or twenty years. Nor is our talk of inevitability meant to play down the vital work that these companies must continue to carry out, in such areas as manufacturing, distribution, packaging and product innovation. In the end, however, no sensible observer - not even these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they are assessing the matter honestly - questions that Coke and Gillette will dominate their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime. Indeed, their dominance will probably strengthen. Both companies have significantly expanded their already huge shares of market during the past ten years, and all signs point to their repeating that performance in the next decade.

像可口可乐与吉列这类的公司应该打上“确定性”标签，分析师对于这些公司在未来一、二十年饮料或刮胡刀市场的预测可能会有些许的不同，而我们所说的确定性，并不意味这些公司可以不必继续贯彻在制造、营销、包装与产品创新上的努力。但是，最终没有那位明智的观察家，甚至是公司最强力的竞争对手，也不得不承认可口可乐与吉列，在终其一生的投资生涯，仍将在其各自的领域中独领风骚，实际上，他们的优势还有可能会继续增强。过去十年来，两家公司在原有极大的市占率基础上又扩大许多，而所有的迹象显示，在往后的十年间，他们还会继续以此态势扩大版图。

     Obviously many companies in high-tech businesses or embryonic industries will grow much faster in percentage terms than will The Inevitables. But I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.

当然比起一些高增长的高科技或新创的事业来说，这些被永恒持股公司的成长力略显不足，但我宁愿相信一个确定的好结果，也不愿期望一个不确定的伟大结果(与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟在手)。

     Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable, there are dozens of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive attacks. Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable, Charlie and I recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio, therefore, we add a few "Highly Probables."

虽然查理跟我本人终其一生追求永不卖出的公司，但能够真正让我们找到的却属凤毛鳞角，光是取得市场领导地位并不足以保证成功，看看过去几年来通用汽车、IBM 与西尔斯这些公司，都曾是领导一方的产业霸主，在所属的产业都被赋予其无可取代的优势地位，大者恒存的自然定律似乎牢不可破，但实际结果却不然，也因此对于每一个看似确定的公司来说，都有无数的竞争者环视，这些公司虽然曾经红极一时，但却完全经不起竞争的考验，考虑到成为具备确定性公司的条件，查理跟我意识到，其数量绝对不可能超过五十家或甚至是不到二十家，所以就我们的投资组合来说，只有几家真正具备确定性的公司，另外几家则是属于极有可能的潜在公司。

     You can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses. The overpayment risk surfaces periodically and, in our opinion, may now be quite high for the purchasers of virtually all stocks, The Inevitables included. Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.

当然有时你也很有可能以过高的价格买下一家好公司，这种风险并不是没有，而以我个人的看法，像现在的时机买任何股票就都有可能必须承担这样的风险，当然也包含这些永不卖出的股票在内。在过热的股市进场买股票的投资人必须要先做好心理准备，那就是对于付出高价买进的优良企业来说，必须要有更长的一段时间才有办法让他们的价值得以彰显。

     A far more serious problem occurs when the management of a great company gets sidetracked and neglects its wonderful base business while purchasing other businesses that are so-so or worse. When that happens, the suffering of investors is often prolonged. Unfortunately, that is precisely what transpired years ago at both Coke and Gillette. (Would you believe that a few decades back they were growing shrimp at Coke and exploring for oil at Gillette?) Loss of focus is what most worries Charlie and me when we contemplate investing in businesses that in general look outstanding. All too often, we've seen value stagnate in the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of managers to wander. That's not going to happen again at Coke and Gillette, however - not given their current and prospective managements.

有一个问题倒是很值得注意，那就是有一些体质原本不错的公司，由于管理层规划的方向产生偏差，将原本良好的本业基础弃之不顾，反而跑去并购一堆平凡普通甚至糟糕的业务，当这种状况发生时，其投资人所须承受的煎熬便会加重加长，而这种不幸正是几年前发生在可口可乐与吉列身上的惨事(大家可以想象十几年前，可口可乐大举投入养虾事业，而吉列竟热衷于石油探勘吗？)，经营中失去焦点是查理跟我在思考是否投资一些外表看起来很不错的公司时最关心的重点，我想这些经理人的傲慢或不甘寂寞会使得他们胡思乱想，进而导致企业的价值停滞不前，这种情况屡见不鲜。好在这种情况应该不会再在可口可乐与吉列现在与未来储备的管理层身上发生。

                     * * * * * * * * * * * *

     Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

                     * * * * * * * * * * * *

对于各位的投资方式，让我提供一点心得给各位参考，大部分的投资人，不管法人或是散户，可能会认为投资股票最好的方式是直接去买手续费低廉的指数型基金，当然这样的做法所得到的结果(在扣除相关手续费用之后)，应该可以很轻易地击败市场上大部分的投资专家。

     Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.

其实你也可以选择建立自己的投资组合，但有几点是大家必须特别注意的，聪明的投资并不复杂，当然它也不是一件容易的事，投资人真正需要具备的是，给予所选择的企业正确评价的能力，请特别注意“所选择”这个字，你不必像很多专家一样同时研究许多家公司，相反的你要做的只是选择少数几家在你能力圈范围之内的公司就好，能力圈的大小并不重要，要紧的是你要很清楚自己的能力圈范围。

     To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging markets. You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view, though, investment students need only two well-taught courses - How to Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.

投资要成功，你不需要研究什么是 Beta 值、有效市场理论、现代投资组合理论、期权定价理论或是新兴市场，事实上大家最好不要懂得这一些理论，当然我这种看法与目前以这些课程为主流的学术界有明显不同，就我个人认为，有志从事投资的学生只要修好两门课程，亦即“如何正确的给企业估值”以及“如何看待估值与市场价格的关系”即可。

     Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.

身为一位投资人，大家其实只要以合理的价格买进一些很容易了解且其收益在未来五到十年内会大幅成长的企业的部分股权，当然一段时间下来，你会发现只有少数几家公司符合这样的标准，所以要是你真的找到这样的公司，那就一定要重仓出击，在这期间，你必须尽量避免自己受到外界诱惑而偏离这个准则，如果你不打算持有一家公司股份十年以上，那最好连十分钟你都不要拥有它，在慢慢找到这样收益加总能持续增长的投资组合后，你就会发现其市值也会跟着稳定增加。

     Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.

虽然我们很少承认，但这正是伯克希尔股东累积财富的正确方式，我们的透视收益在过去几年间大幅跃进，而同期间我们的股票价格也跟着大涨，如果这些收益没有增加，伯克希尔所代表的价值就不可能大幅成长。

     The greatly enlarged earnings base we now enjoy will inevitably cause our future gains to lag those of the past. We will continue, however, to push in the directions we always have. We will try to build earnings by running our present businesses well - a job made easy because of the extraordinary talents of our operating managers - and by purchasing other businesses, in whole or in part, that are not likely to be roiled by change and that possess important competitive advantages.

当然我们现在不断增长的资本基础将无可避免地会影响到我们未来收益成长的能力，但我们还是会继续朝着过去一致的方向前进，我们将努力经营好现有业务，这部分的难度较低，因为我们拥有一群杰出的经理人，同时继续并购或部分买进一些不会受外界环境影响且拥有竞争优势的新事业。

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〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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