巴菲特致股东的信（1996年）⑪全美航空

USAir

When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline." Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25% preferred stock of USAir.

全美航空

当维珍亚特兰大航空公司的老板 Richard Branson 被问到要如何才能够变成一个百万富翁，他的回答很简单：其实也没有什么！首先你要先成为一个亿万富翁，然后再去买一家航空公司就成了！但由于各位的董事长-也就是我本人不信邪，所以我在 1989 年决定以 3.58 亿美元投资取得全美航空年利率 9.25%的优先股。

I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely-competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

那时我相当喜爱同时也崇拜全美航空当时的总裁 Ed Colodny，直到现在仍是如此，不过我对于全美航空业的分析研究实在是过于肤浅且错误百出，我被该公司过去历年来的盈利能力所蒙骗，同时过分相信优先股可以提供给我们在债权上的保护，以致于忽略了最关键的一点：那就是全美航空的营收规模受到毫无节制的激烈价格竞争而大幅下滑的同时，其成本结构却仍旧停留在从前管制时代的高位，这样的高成本结构若不能找到有效解决的办法，将成为灾难的前兆，无论航空公司过去的记录多么令人瞩目(如果历史能给出所有答案，福布斯前 400 人就会图书管理员)。

To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements in its labor contracts - and that's something most airlines have found it extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception. Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.

要让成本结构合理化，全美航空必须大幅修改其劳资契约，不过这些偏偏航空公司又难以实现，除非公司真正面临破产威胁或是已经破产倒闭。而全美航空也不例外，就在我们投资该公司优先股不久之后，公司营收与支出的缺口突然开始大幅扩大，在 1990-1994 年间，全美航空累计亏损了 24 亿美元，此举让公司普通股的股东权益几乎耗损殆尽。

For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by 75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.

在这段期间内，全美航空还是继续支付优先股股利给我们，直到 1994 年才停止，也因此在不久后，由于对该公司前景展望不太乐观，我们决定将全美航空优先股投资的帐面价值调减 75%，只剩下 8,950 万美元，在1995 年，我甚至打算以面额 50%的折价出售这笔投资，所幸最后并没有成功。

Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right: Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends" - to run five percentage points over the prime rate - would be accrued on any arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was omitted for two years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 13.25% and 14%.

幸运的是在投资全美航空所犯的一连串错误当中，我总算做对了一件事，那就是当初在投资时，我们在优先股投资合约当中，特地加了一项“惩罚股息”条款，也就是说万一该公司延迟支付股息的话，除原有欠款外，还必须外加依基本利率 5%的利息，也就是说因为这两年我们没有收到 9.25%的股息，所以以后全美航空必须就未支付的款项加计 13.25%与 14%的利息。

Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996, when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9 million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge thank-you for extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment. Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly by an industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has basic cost problems that must be solved.

面对这样的惩罚条款将督促全美航空尽快清偿对我们的欠款，而等到 1996 年下半年全美航空开始转亏为盈时，他们果真开始清偿这笔合计 4,790 万美元的欠款，为此我们特别要感谢全美航空现任总裁 Stephen Wolf，是他让这家落难的航空公司得以付出这笔钱，同时全美航空的表现也归因于航空业景气复苏，当然该公司还是有成本结构的问题有待解决。

In any event, the prices of USAir's publicly-traded securities tell us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par value of $358 million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over the years collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including $30 million received in 1997).

不过不论如何，目前全美航空普通股的市价显示，我们所持有优先股的价值应该恢复到 3.58 亿美元的面额左右，另外不要忘了，这几年来我们还陆陆续续从该公司收到 2.4 亿美元的股息(包含 1997 年的 3,000 万美元)。

Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid, I tried once more to unload our holdings - this time for about $335 million. You're lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

1996 年初，我们还尚未收到积欠的股息之前，我再度尝试以 3.35 亿美元出售这些优先股，所幸这次又没成功，使得我们得以从胜利的关口逃过失败的命运。

In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're so rich, why aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you may conclude he had a point.

在另外一个场合，有一位朋友问我：“你很有钱，可是为什么还这么笨？“在进一步检讨本人在全美航空这个案子上的表现后，你可能会觉得他说得很有道理。