巴菲特致股东的信(1997年)
④保险业务营运-概览


Insurance Operations -- Overview

       What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound on that, though, let's discuss "float" and how to measure its cost. Unless you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value.

保险业务营运-概览

真正令我们感到兴奋的是保险业务,GEICO 保险正处于爆炸性的成长阶段,而且这种情况预期还会继续维持下去,在进一步说明之前,让我们先解释一下何谓浮存金,以及如何来衡量它的取得成本,因为除非你对于这个课题有所了解,否则你根本就不可能有办法对伯克希尔实际的价值做合理的判断。

       To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先在保险公司的营运中,浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金,浮存金的产生原因在于,保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前,一般会先向保户收取保费,在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上,当然这样的好处也必须要付出代价,通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的相关赔付与运营费用,于是保险公司便会发生承保损失,这就是浮存金的成本,而当一家公司取得浮存金成本,长期而言低于从其它渠道取得资金的成本时,它就有存在的价值,否则一旦保险业务取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时,它就像是一颗酸柠檬。

       A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

需要特别注意的是,由于损失成本必须依靠估算,所以保险公司对于承保结果有相当大的自由度,这使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司真正的浮存金成本。估计错误,通常是无心,但有时却是故意,与真实的结果往往会有很大的差距,而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上,有经验的行家通常可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误,但对于一般投资大众来说,除了被迫接受财务报表的数字之外,别无他法,而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师事务所背书的财务报告所吓到,至于就伯克希尔本身而言,查理跟我在编列财务报表时,都尽量采取最保守的做法,因为就我们个人的经验而言,保险业所发生的意外,通常都不是什么好消息。  

       As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float -- which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money.

不过如同下表中的数字所显示的,伯克希尔的保险业务可说是大获全胜,表中的浮存金,系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后,再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本以及相关再保递延费用等。相对于我们的保费收入总额,我们的浮存金规模算是相当大的,至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损益而定,在某些年度,就像是最近五年,由于我们有承保收益,所以换句话说,我们的资金成本甚至是负的,光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始让我们赚钱了。

       Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.

自从 1967 年我们进军保险业以来,我们的浮存金规模 71 亿,每年以 21.7%复合成长率增加,更棒的是,这些资金完全没有成本,事实上还让我们赚了钱。讽刺的是,就会计原则而言,浮存金在会计报表上属于负债,但实际上,这些负债对于伯克希尔而言,其价值远高于列在帐上的其它股东权益。

       The expiration of several large contracts will cause our float to decline during the first quarter of 1998, but we expect it to grow substantially over the long term. We also believe that our cost of float will continue to be highly favorable.

虽然在 1998 第一季几项重大合约到期后,我们拥有的浮存金会略微减少,但就长期而言,我们还是预期浮存金会大幅成长,同时我们也相信取得浮存金的成本仍然会继续维持这种令人满意的态势。

〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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