巴菲特致股东的信（1997年）⑩自我检讨

A Confession

I've mentioned that we strongly prefer to use cash rather than Berkshire stock in acquisitions. A study of the record will tell you why: If you aggregate all of our stock-only mergers (excluding those we did with two affiliated companies, Diversified Retailing and Blue Chip Stamps), you will find that our shareholders are slightly worse off than they would have been had I not done the transactions. Though it hurts me to say it, when I've issued stock, I've cost you money.

自我检讨

我已经提到，我们在收购中强烈倾向于使用现金，而不是伯克希尔股票。一项对记录的研究会告诉你原因，如果把我们所有使用股票的并购案加在一起(扣除早期的多元零售与蓝筹印花两个案子不算)，你会发现我们的股东所得的结果可能比我们不做这些交易还要糟糕。虽然说出来让我很伤心，不过我还是必须承认，每当我发行股票，就等于是让股东们亏钱。

Be clear about one thing: This cost has not occurred because we were misled in any way by sellers or because they thereafter failed to manage with diligence and skill. On the contrary, the sellers were completely candid when we were negotiating our deals and have been energetic and effective ever since.

不过有一点要澄清的是，之所以会如此绝对不是因为我们遭到卖方的误导或是在被买下后不用心经营，相反的，这些卖方在交易谈判当时皆坦诚布公，同时也很努力经营事业。

Instead, our problem has been that we own a truly marvelous collection of businesses, which means that trading away a portion of them for something new almost never makes sense. When we issue shares in a merger, we reduce your ownership in all of our businesses -- partly-owned companies such as Coca-Cola, Gillette and American Express, and all of our terrific operating companies as well. An example from sports will illustrate the difficulty we face: For a baseball team, acquiring a player who can be expected to bat .350 is almost always a wonderful event -- except when the team must trade a .380 hitter to make the deal.

主要的问题在于，我们原本就已经拥有的绝佳企业组合，因此不论拿什么新的东西来换都不划算，也就是说每当我们发行新股用来并购新的企业时，就等于是间接减少我们原本拥有的绝佳企业的股权比例，不论是只有部分股权的可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀及美国运通，或者是旗下所有的经营业务皆是如此。在运动场上有一个例子可以充分说明我们所面临的难题，对一只棒球队来说，挖到一位打击率高达 35%的选手肯定是件令人欣喜的事，除非是你必须被迫用一个打击率高达 38%的球员去交换。

Because our roster is filled with .380 hitters, we have tried to pay cash for acquisitions, and here our record has been far better. Starting with National Indemnity in 1967, and continuing with, among others, See's, Buffalo News, Scott Fetzer and GEICO, we have acquired -- for cash -- a number of large businesses that have performed incredibly well since we bought them. These acquisitions have delivered Berkshire tremendous value -- indeed, far more than I anticipated when we made our purchases.

正因为目前我们的球员名单已布满了打击率 38%的高手，所以我们总是希望尽量用现金来进行并购，而事实证明我们的成绩远高于预期，从 1967 年的国民保险公司开始，接着是喜诗糖果、布法罗新闻报、斯科特费泽以及 GEICO 保险等等，这些企业在我们用现金买下之后的表现非常出色，它们也为伯克希尔带来了巨大的价值，这实在是远高于我们当初的预期。

We believe that it is almost impossible for us to "trade up" from our present businesses and managements. Our situation is the opposite of Camelot's Mordred, of whom Guenevere commented, "The one thing I can say for him is that he is bound to marry well. Everybody is above him." Marrying well is extremely difficult for Berkshire.

我们相信实在是很难将我们现在拥有的业务与其管理层交换出去，我们现在的处境与圆桌骑士团成员Camelot Mordred 刚好相反，王后 Guenevere 说他一定可以找到理想的伴侣，因为世上所有人的条件都比他还要好，但是对伯克希尔来说，要找到足以匹配的伴侣实在是难上加难。

So you can be sure that Charlie and I will be very reluctant to issue shares in the future. In those cases when we simply must do so -- when certain shareholders of a desirable acquiree insist on getting stock -- we will include an attractive cash option in order to tempt as many of the sellers to take cash as is possible.

所以，大家可以预见的是，在未来查理跟我将会越来越不愿意以发行新股的方式进行并购，要是遇到非如此不可的情况时，也就是被并购者坚持要拿股票的时候，我们也会附带提供一个比较优越的现金对价，以促使更多的股东选择领取现金。

Merging with public companies presents a special problem for us. If we are to offer any premium to the acquiree, one of two conditions must be present: Either our own stock must be overvalued relative to the acquiree's, or the two companies together must be expected to earn more than they would if operated separately. Historically, Berkshire has seldom been overvalued. In this market, moreover, undervalued acquirees are almost impossible to find. That other possibility -- synergy gains -- is usually unrealistic, since we expect acquirees to operate after we've bought them just as they did before. Joining with Berkshire does not normally raise their revenues nor cut their costs.

此外当我们并购上市公司还会遇到另一项问题，那就是如果我们提供被并购者任何溢价的话，必须要能够符合以下两项条件其中之一，要么就是相对于对方伯克希尔的股价被高估；要么就是两家公司合并后所赚得的收益高于两家独立营运时的收益。关于这个问题，就过去的经验，伯克希尔的股价很少被高估，相对地以目前的市场状况，实在很难再找到其它股价相对被低估的公司。至于另外一个可能性，也就是所谓的协同效应，通常都很不切实际，我们顶多能期望被并购的事业在被买下之后的表现跟之前一样好就不错了，因为加入伯克希尔不代表营收就能够自动增加或成本就能够自动地减少。

Indeed, their reported costs (but not their true ones) will rise after they are bought by Berkshire if the acquiree has been granting options as part of its compensation packages. In these cases, "earnings" of the acquiree have been overstated because they have followed the standard -- but, in our view, dead wrong -- accounting practice of ignoring the cost to a business of issuing options. When Berkshire acquires an option-issuing company, we promptly substitute a cash compensation plan having an economic value equivalent to that of the previous option plan. The acquiree's true compensation cost is thereby brought out of the closet and charged, as it should be, against earnings.

事实上，被收购方还有一些以股票期权充当薪资补充方案的公司，在我们买下之后，其帐列成本往往会暴增(但并不会影响实际真实的成本)，在这种情况下，被收购方过去的盈利被高估了，因为他们所采取的完全忽略期权发行成本的会计惯例，在我们看来是完全错误的。因此，当伯克希尔买下一家有股票期权的公司时，我们会立刻将其更换为与原来股票期权相当的现金补偿方案，如此一来，被收购方真实的薪资成本方能显露出来，以反应公司真实的盈利状况。

The reasoning that Berkshire applies to the merger of public companies should be the calculus for all buyers. Paying a takeover premium does not make sense for any acquirer unless a) its stock is overvalued relative to the acquiree's or b) the two enterprises will earn more combined than they would separately. Predictably, acquirers normally hew to the second argument because very few are willing to acknowledge that their stock is overvalued. However, voracious buyers -- the ones that issue shares as fast as they can print them -- are tacitly conceding that point. (Often, also, they are running Wall Street's version of a chain-letter scheme.)

伯克希尔在并购上市公司所采用的原则也是所有买家必须考量的因素，支付收购溢价对任何收购方都没有意义，除非是以下特殊的情况：a)相对于被收购方，其股价被高估；b)两家企业合并后所赚取的利润高于原先单独的利润。可以预见的是，收购方通常会坚持第二种观点，因为很少有人愿意承认自己的股票估值过高。然而贪得无厌的收购方，以比印钞票还快的速度印股票的这群人，最后却默认了自己的股价确实被高估。通常他们玩的就像华尔街版的连锁信游戏。

In some mergers there truly are major synergies -- though oftentimes the acquirer pays too much to obtain them -- but at other times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove illusory. Of one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisors will come up with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only in fairy tales are emperors told that they are naked.

有些合并案确实可以发挥协同效应，但通常买家所付出的代价过高。在另一些合并中，预期节省的成本与营收增加的效益最后被证明是一场空。不过有一点可以确定的是，不管这个并购案多么的不合理，只要 CEO 有强烈的意愿，其内部的员工与外部的专家顾问都能够拿出一份看似合理的评估报告来支持其立场，只有在童话中才有人敢大胆地告诉国王他没有穿衣服。