巴菲特致股东的信（1999年）⑤GEICO保险

GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)

GEICO made exceptional progress in 1999. The reasons are simple: We have a terrific business idea being implemented by an extraordinary manager, Tony Nicely. When Berkshire purchased GEICO at the beginning of 1996, we handed the keys to Tony and asked him to run the operation exactly as if he owned 100% of it. He has done the rest. Take a look at his scorecard:

GEICO 保险(1-800-847-7536/GEICO.com)

GEICO 保险 1999 年的成长十分惊人，原因很简单：一个绝佳的经营想法由最优秀的经理人托尼·莱斯利加以落实，当伯克希尔在 1996 年初买下 GEICO 保险时，我们立刻把钥匙交到 Tony 的手上，请他把这家公司当作是自己拥有的一样的心态去经营，接下来就看他的表演，大家可以看一看他的成绩单。

(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
(2) Revised to exclude policies moved from one GEICO company to another.

(1)仅限“自愿”；不包括已分配的风险等。
(2)修订以排除从一个GEICO公司转移到另一个的政策。

In 1995, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $242 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,631. And we are just starting: The pace will step up materially in 2000. Indeed, we would happily commit $1 billion annually to marketing if we knew we could handle the business smoothly and if we expected the last dollar spent to produce new business at an attractive cost.

1995 年，GEICO 保险花了 3300 万美元在营销活动之上，旗下拥有 652 位电话咨询顾问，去年公司预算提高为 2.42 亿美元，顾问人数增加为 2631 人，这还只是刚起步而已，展望 2000 年还会大幅的成长，营销预算预计会突破 10 亿美元，只要我们确认每一块钱都花在刀口之上，同时自信有能力顺利处理蜂拥而至的生意。

Currently two trends are affecting acquisition costs. The bad news is that it has become more expensive to develop inquiries. Media rates have risen, and we are also seeing diminishing returns -- that is, as both we and our competitors step up advertising, inquiries per ad fall for all of us. These negatives are partly offset, however, by the fact that our closure ratio -- the percentage of inquiries converted to sales -- has steadily improved. Overall, we believe that our cost of new business, though definitely rising, is well below that of the industry. Of even greater importance, our operating costs for renewal business are the lowest among broad-based national auto insurers. Both of these major competitive advantages are sustainable. Others may copy our model, but they will be unable to replicate our economics.

就目前而言，有两项因素会影响到保单取得成本，不利的是现在每增加一个询问电话的单位成本比过去大大提高，媒体曝光率虽然增加，但询问的响应却相对减少，也就是说在我们与竞争对手同时卯足全力加强宣传时，每家公司的每段广告所贡献的询问电话也同步递减，所幸这种负面效果因为我们成交率(每通询问电话真正成交的比率)稳定地增加而减少，总的来说，我们新保单的取得成本虽然增加，但还是远低于同业的水准，而更重要的是，我们续约保单的营运成本更是全美保险业者当中最低的，这两项极重要的竞争优势应该可以继续维持下去，别人或许可以抄袭我们的营运模式，但他们绝对没有办法复制我们的经济规模。

The table above makes it appear that GEICO's retention of policyholders is falling, but for two reasons appearances are in this case deceiving. First, in the last few years our business mix has moved away from "preferred" policyholders, for whom industrywide retention rates are high, toward "standard" and "non-standard" policyholders for whom retention rates are much lower. (Despite the nomenclature, the three classes have similar profit prospects.) Second, retention rates for relatively new policyholders are always lower than those for long-time customers -- and because of our accelerated growth, our policyholder ranks now include an increased proportion of new customers. Adjusted for these two factors, our retention rate has changed hardly at all.

上表显示 GEICO 保险的保单续约率正在下降当中，这其中有两个原因造成此种假象，第一，过去几年来，我们的产品组合重心已从原先续约率本来就比较高的指定保户(公务员)，转成续约率普遍比较低的标准与非标准保户(普通大众)，虽然名称不同，但三者的盈利水准差异不大。第二，新保户的续约率通常都比长期保户的续约率来得低许多，而因为近年来我们的业务成长快速，所以新保户的比重相对提高，在扣除这两项因素之后，我们的续约率其实变化不大。

We told you last year that underwriting margins for both GEICO and the industry would fall in 1999, and they did. We make a similar prediction for 2000. A few years ago margins got too wide, having enjoyed the effects of an unusual and unexpected decrease in the frequency and severity of accidents. The industry responded by reducing rates -- but now is having to contend with an increase in loss costs. We would not be surprised to see the margins of auto insurers deteriorate by around three percentage points in 2000.

去年我就曾向各位表示 1999 年 GEICO 保险以及整个保险业界的承保利润率将会下滑，事后证明确是如此，过去几年来由于意外发生的频率与严重性出乎意料的低，所以整个业界得以享有不错的利润率，而同行也因此陆续调降费率反应，只是好景不常，最近损失又有逐步上扬的趋势，所以要是 2000 年的承保利润率再下滑 3%的话，我们一点都不会感到意外。

Two negatives besides worsening frequency and severity will hurt the industry this year. First, rate increases go into effect only slowly, both because of regulatory delay and because insurance contracts must run their course before new rates can be put in. Second, reported earnings of many auto insurers have benefitted in the last few years from reserve releases, made possible because the companies overestimated their loss costs in still-earlier years. This reservoir of redundant reserves has now largely dried up, and future boosts to earnings from this source will be minor at best.

此外，保险业还有两项因素可能使得意外发生的频率与程度加剧而受到伤害。第一是，费率的反应通常需要一段时间，一方面是法律规范的限制，一方面是新费率要等到旧合约到期后才能开始实施。第二，许多保险同业由于几年来损失成本普遍高估，所以累积的损失准备金回冲的结果，使得财务报表上收益看起来还不错，不过这些额外多出来的准备金已损耗的差不多了，后续能够支撑收益数字的准备金数量将极其有限。

In compensating its associates -- from Tony on down -- GEICO continues to use two variables, and only two, in determining what bonuses and profit-sharing contributions will be: 1) its percentage growth in policyholders and 2) the earnings of its "seasoned" business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. We did outstandingly well on both fronts during 1999 and therefore made a profit-sharing payment of 28.4% of salary (in total, $113.3 million) to the great majority of our associates. Tony and I love writing those checks.

为了奖励员工的辛劳，自 Tony 以下，GEICO 保险都利用惟二的两项数据当作评估绩效与奖金分红的标准，一是保费收入增长的比率；二是续约保户(泛指投保超过一年的客户)的承保盈利表现。1999 这年两项数字都十分优异，因此我们加发了相当于 28.4%年薪的奖金(金额合计 1.133 亿美元)给公司所有的员工，Tony 跟我一向很乐意签发这类支票。

At Berkshire, we want to have compensation policies that are both easy to understand and in sync with what we wish our associates to accomplish. Writing new business is expensive (and, as mentioned, getting more expensive). If we were to include those costs in our calculation of bonuses -- as managements did before our arrival at GEICO -- we would be penalizing our associates for garnering new policies, even though these are very much in Berkshire's interest. So, in effect, we say to our associates that we will foot the bill for new business. Indeed, because percentage growth in policyholders is part of our compensation scheme, we reward our associates for producing this initially-unprofitable business. And then we reward them additionally for holding down costs on our seasoned business.

在伯克希尔，我们希望奖励规定不但明了易懂，且与我们希望同仁努力完成的目标方向一致，签发新保单的成本相当的高(而且如同刚刚提到的，还有越来越高的趋势)，也因此如果将这部分的成本列入计算奖金的公式当中，这正是我们在入主 GEICO 保险前公司管理层的做法，此举无异让员工认为取得新保单是对他们的一种变相惩罚，虽然这明明对伯克希尔来说是很有益处的一件事，所以我们站出来告诉员工，请大家放心，公司会为新保单所付出的成本买单，甚且把保户增长率也当作是奖励公式的一部分，员工得以因为这类新增加但不赚钱的保单而获得奖励，当然要是有人能够降低续约保户维持成本的，同样也能获得奖励。

Despite the extensive advertising we do, our best source of new business is word-of-mouth recommendations from existing policyholders, who on the whole are pleased with our prices and service. An article published last year by Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine gives a good picture of where we stand in customer satisfaction: The magazine's survey of 20 state insurance departments showed that GEICO's complaint ratio was well below the ratio for most of its major competitors.

虽然我们大举投入广告活动，但我们新保单的主要来源还是来自于原来保户的口碑相传，因为他们对于我们的服务与价格感到满意而向其它人推荐，去年私人理财杂志 Kiplinger 曾经发表一篇文章，贴切的说明 GEICO 保险在消费者心中满意的程度，该杂志总计在访问了 20 个州立保险部门后发现，GEICO 保险的投诉比率最低，而且远低于主要竞争同业的平均数。

Our strong referral business means that we probably could maintain our policy count by spending as little as $50 million annually on advertising. That's a guess, of course, and we will never know whether it is accurate because Tony's foot is going to stay on the advertising pedal (and my foot will be on his). Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a major percentage of the $300-$350 million we will spend in 2000 on advertising, as well as large additional costs we will incur for sales counselors, communications and facilities, are optional outlays we choose to make so that we can both achieve significant growth and extend and solidify the promise of the GEICO brand in the minds of Americans.

由于我们已建立了不错的口碑，所以未来很有可能我们每年只要花 5 千万美元的广告费就可以维持既有的保单数量，但那仅仅是大胆的猜测，永远没有人知道其正确性，因为 Tony 仍然会持续地踩着强力广告的油门(而我也会插一脚)，不过有一点我必须要强调的是，在 2000 年的 3-3.5 亿广告预算以及更多投资在销售顾问、通讯设备等花费当中，有绝大部分并非必要支出，但我们之所以仍然愿意投入，主要就是希望在提升保费收入成长的同时，还能维持甚至加强美国人心目中 GEICO 保险对于承诺必赔的形象。

Personally, I think these expenditures are the best investment Berkshire can make. Through its advertising, GEICO is acquiring a direct relationship with a huge number of households that, on average, will send us $1,100 year after year. That makes us -- among all companies, selling whatever kind of product -- one of the country's leading direct merchandisers. Also, as we build our long-term relationships with more and more families, cash is pouring in rather than going out (no Internet economics here). Last year, as GEICO increased its customer base by 766,256, it gained $590 million of cash from operating earnings and the increase in float.

就我个人观点而言，我认为这是伯克希尔能够做的最好投资，经由大量广告，GEICO 保险可以直接与更多的美国家庭建立起直接的关系，年复一年每个家庭平均提供 1100 美元的资金给我们运用，这使得我们在众多销售各式各样产品的公司当中，成为全美最畅销的直销产品之一，而随着我们与更多的美国家庭建立起长期的关系，现金更将源源不绝的流入(在这里完全不靠网络)，去年随着 GEICO 保险的客户数量增加到 766,256 人，包含经营利润以及浮存金增加就贡献了 5.9 亿美元的资金。

In the past three years, we have increased our market share in personal auto insurance from 2.7% to 4.1%. But we rightfully belong in many more households -- maybe even yours. Give us a call and find out. About 40% of those people checking our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographic areas or work at certain occupations. Our closure rate indicates, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount -- usually 8% -- to our shareholders. Just be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that our sales counselor can make the appropriate adjustment.

过去三年以来，我们在汽车保险的占有率从原先的 2.7%提高到 4.1%，无疑地我们属于全美许多家庭的，甚至可能是你们家的，打个电话给我们试看看，大约有 40%的人在看过我们的费率之后，会发现可以为他们省下一大笔钱，我之所以没说 100%的原因在于，每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，有些保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民与从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年报附赠的 GEICO 保险资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美 40 州股东最高 8%的折扣费率，至于其它州的股东也接受开放申请取得不等的折扣。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It's with sadness that I report to you that Lorimer Davidson, GEICO's former Chairman, died last November, a few days after his 97th birthday. For GEICO, Davy was a business giant who moved the company up to the big leagues. For me, he was a friend, teacher and hero. I have told you of his lifelong kindnesses to me in past reports. Clearly, my life would have developed far differently had he not been a part of it. Tony, Lou Simpson and I visited Davy in August and marveled at his mental alertness -- particularly in all matters regarding GEICO. He was the company's number one supporter right up to the end, and we will forever miss him.

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在这里很遗憾地向各位报告，GEICO 保险前董事长 Lorimer Davidson，于去年 11 月去世，享年 97 岁，对于 GEICO 保险来说，戴维是带领公司跃上台面的企业巨人，而对我个人来说，他是我的偶像，亦师亦友，在过去年度的报告中，我不只一次的提到他对我个人的关照，很显然的要是没有他，我个人的一生可能要完全改观，Tony、Lou Simpson 与我在去年八月还曾经去拜访他，对于他当时的记忆力还佩服不已，尤其是有关 GEICO 保险的点点滴滴，一直以来，他就是 GEICO 保险公司的头号支持者，我们将会永远地怀念他。

(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.(2) Revised to exclude policies moved from one GEICO company to another.

(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
(2) Revised to exclude policies moved from one GEICO company to another.