巴菲特致股东的信（2000年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 2000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.5%. Over the last 36 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $40,442, a gain of 23.6% compounded annually.*

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 2000 年的账面价值增加 39.6 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值增长 6.5%(标普跌 9.1%)，自现任管理层接手的 36 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 40442 美元，年复合成长率约为 23.6%。*

* 在年报中所谓的每股数字系以 A 级普通股近似数为基础，这是本公司在 1996 年以前流通在外唯一的一种股份，B 级普通股则拥有 A 级普通股 1/30 的权利。

Overall, we had a decent year, our book-value gain having outpaced the performance of the S&P 500. And, though this judgment is necessarily subjective, we believe Berkshire’s gain in per-share intrinsic value moderately exceeded its gain in book value. (Intrinsic value, as well as other key investment and accounting terms and concepts, are explained in our Owner’s Manual on pages 59-66. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 64.)

总的来说，伯克希尔在去年的表现还算不错，不管是每股账面价值还是内在价值的表现都超越标普 500 指数(-9.1%)，虽然这样的说法略显主观，但我们认为伯克希尔每股内在价值的成长甚至超过帐面价值的成长，(不管是投资学或是会计学，内在价值都是相当关键的一个名词，有关内在价值详细的说明，请参阅股东手册)。

Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.

去年我们一口气完成八件并购案，其中有两件从 1999 年就开始谈，这些案子的金额总计高达 80 亿美元，所有资金完全来自自有资金，没有任何举债，其中 97%是以现金支付，其余 3%则是股票，所以流通在外股份仅增加 0.3%，这八家企业的年营业额合计高达 130 亿美元，雇用员工 5.8 万名，更棒的是目前我们手上的现金依然满满，随时准备再买下更大的公司。

I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.

后面我还会再详细跟各位报告合并案的内容，在这里，我要向各位报告，展望 21 世纪，我们将大举进军砖块、地毯、隔热品与油漆等实体的尖端产业。

On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as the year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new business. I told you last year that we would get our money’s worth from stepped-up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We’ll examine the reasons later in the report.

另一方面，GEICO 保险的保户成长速度出现停滞的现象，取得新保单的成本越来越高，去年我曾跟各位保证说我们所投入大笔广告经费超值，事实证明我的判断是错误的，在后文我们还会再仔细检讨原因。

Another negative ¾ which has persisted for several years ¾ is that we see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We’re not alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in general is far from exciting.

另外还有一项几年来一直存在的负面消息，那就是目前我们的股票投资组合的价位还是没有太大的吸引力，我们确实拥有一些质地不错的股票，但这些公司的股价大多已合理反应其价值，所以在未来很难再有爆发性的投资回报，这绝非单一现象，目前整体股市的长期前景并不像一般人想的那么乐观。

Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than when we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is the indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a considerably lower rate ¾ percentage-wise ¾ than is the case at almost all other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the future.

最后还有一项每年都会发生的坏消息，伯克希尔的副董事长兼主要合伙人查理·芒格以及我本人，相较于去年又都老了一岁，所幸比起其它美国大企业来说，伯克希尔的主要经理人老化的速度可以说要慢得多(年度/年龄)，而且这种差异以后还会越来越大。

Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire’s per-share value at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P 500. As the table on the facing page shows, a small annual advantage in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anything-but-small long-term advantage. To reach our goal we will need to add a few good businesses to Berkshire’s stable each year, have the businesses we own generally gain in value, and avoid any material increase in our outstanding shares. We are confident about meeting the last two objectives; the first will require some luck.

就长期而言，查理跟我还是一样把伯克希尔每股内在价值成长的速度，锁定在稍微超过标普 500 指数的目标上，如同前面那张表所示，虽然只是每年几个百分点的差异，但只要能够持之以恒，久而久之也能产生不少的差距，当然每年为了达到这个目标，我们都必须固定再为伯克希尔增添几家好公司，并让原先就已经拥有这些好公司的价值保持成长，同时还要避免流通在外的股数继续大幅膨胀，个人觉得要做到后两点没有太大问题，但第一点则真的要碰运气。

It’s appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both easy and fun last year ¾ just as they do every year. First, our operating managers continue to run their businesses in splendid fashion, which allows me to spend my time allocating capital rather than supervising them. (I wouldn’t be good at that anyway.)

在这里要特别感谢两组团队让我去年的工作一如既往的轻松愉快，首先，我们旗下事业的经理人依然继续坚守岗位表现杰出，完全不用我操心，使我可以将大部分的心思放在如何分配资金之上。(当然这本来就不是我的专长)

Our managers are a very special breed. At most large companies, the truly talented divisional managers seldom have the job they really want. Instead they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present employer or elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they and their colleagues are likely to feel they have failed.

我们旗下的经理人是非常特殊的一群，在大部分的公司，真正有能力的部门经理很少安于本职工作，他们通常渴望能够尽快晋升成为总裁，不论是在现在的公司或跳槽到别家公司都可以，而要是他们不积极争取，他个人以及其同事，反而会认定他为懦夫。

At Berkshire, our all-stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones that they hope and expect to keep throughout their business lifetimes. They therefore concentrate solely on maximizing the long-term value of the businesses that they "own" and love. If the businesses succeed, they have succeeded. And they stick with us: In our last 36 years, Berkshire has never had a manager of a significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to join another business.

在伯克希尔，我们所有的明星经理人都乐在本身的工作，一份他们想要而且期望能够终生拥有的事业，也因此他们可以完全专注在如何把这份他们拥有且热爱事业的长期价值最大化，如果这份事业成功了，也就等于他们自身成功了，他们一直与我们同在，在伯克希尔过去 36 年来，还没有听说过任何一位旗下事业经理人自动跳槽离开伯克希尔的。

The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin’s advice: "A small leak can sink a great ship.") Now we have 13.8 people.

还有另外一群伙伴，我要深深致上谢意，那就是伯克希尔企业总部的员工，在新并购的八个事业加入之后，我们全球的员工总数增加到 11.2 万人，为此查理跟我的态度稍微软化，答应让总部人员编制增加一名至 13.8 人(查理总是提醒我富兰克林的名言，为山九仞，功亏一篑)。

This tiny band works miracles. In 2000 it handled all of the details connected with our eight acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory and tax filings (our tax return covers 4,896 pages), smoothly produced an annual meeting to which 25,000 tickets were issued, and accurately dispensed checks to 3,660 charities designated by our shareholders. In addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks served up by a company with a revenue run-rate of $40 billion and more than 300,000 owners. And, to add to all of this, the other 12.8 are a delight to be around.

这一小群精英再次创造了奇迹，2000 年他们一口气处理了八件并购案大大小小各项事宜、应付例行法令、行政规范与税务申报(光是申报书就厚达 4896 页)、让总计 2.5 万名股东出席的股东会圆满落幕并正确无误地发出股东指定捐赠的支票给 3660 家慈善机构，除此之外，对于一家集团营业额高达 400 亿美金、股东超过 30 万人的大公司，其日常行政事务有多少可想而知，说到这里，有这 12.8 人在身边感觉真好。

I should pay to have my job.

我实在是不应该领薪水，而要付薪水。