巴菲特致股东的信（2000年）②2000年的并购案

Acquisitions of 2000

Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer the phone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.

2000年的并购案

在伯克希尔，我们的并购策略极其简单：那就是静待电话铃响。可喜的是，现在电话好象有点应接不暇，原因在于有越来越多的公司及其经理人慕名而来想要加入伯克希尔的行列，关于我们并购公司的标准请参见后文。

Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that, in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)

接下来让我详细向各位报告过去 14 个月以来，我们到底买进了哪些公司，先说两件从 1999 年就开始谈，并于 2000 年完成的交易，(本表并未包含旗下子公司零零星星所买下规模较小的个案，通常它们都会被统一纳入个别子公司的营运报告中)。

● I described the first purchase ¾ 76% of MidAmerican Energy ¾ in last year’s report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting privileges, we perform only a "one-line" consolidation of MidAmerican’s earnings and equity in our financial statements. If we instead fully consolidated the company’s figures, our revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported, though net income would remain the same.

● 第一个并购是中美能源 76%的股权，在去年的报告中，我就曾提到，由于行政法规限制我们对该公司的控制权，所以我们只能通过长期投资权益法，将该公司的经营收益与股东权益纳入母公司的财务报表之上，事实上要是能够将该公司的财务数字充分反应在母公司的帐上，则伯克希尔的营收将至少增加 50 亿美元以上，当然损益数字并不会有任何变化。

● On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.

1999 年 11 月 23 号我收到由布鲁斯·科特(BruceCort)署名的传真，后附一篇刊登在《华盛顿邮报》有关科特商业服务公司(CORT Business Services)收购失败的新闻，事实上，除了名字巧合之外，BruceCort 与 CORT 公司完全没有关系，这位先生是一位二手飞机经纪商，巧合的是，他本人还曾经在 1986 年卖过一架飞机给伯克希尔，在这张传真之前，我已经有十年没有跟他有过任何接触。

I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense.

在此之前，我对 CORT 公司一无所知，但我马上打印出该公司申报的 SEC 文件，一看之下大喜过望，就在当天，我向 Bruce 表示我对该公司很有兴趣，并请他立即帮我安排与该公司 CEO 保罗·阿诺德(PaulArnold)会面，不久后 Paul 跟我在 11 月 29 号碰面，当下我就知道我们很有可能会成交，那是一家朴实无华的好公司，有一个出色的经理人，同时价格也合理(当然多多少少受到先前流标的影响)。

Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in "rent-to-rent" furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to "rent-to-own" operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit.

CORT 拥有 117 个展厅，是全美"以租养租"(rent-to-rent)办公室家具租赁行业的领导者(也用于公寓临时居住者)，必须说明的是，这个业务与分期付款式购买不同(rent-to-own 先租后买)，后者通常向信用不良收入有限的人出售电子产品及家具。

We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.

我们很快地通过持有 80%股权的子公司 Wesco 以 3.86 亿美元的现金买下 CORT，大家可以在 Wesco 公司 1999 年和 2000 年的年报中找到更多有关 CORT 运营细节，查理跟我都很喜欢与 Paul 一起共事，而 CORT 的表现更超乎我们的预期，我们算是押对宝了。

● Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks ¾ "excess and surplus lines" in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.

● 去年初，通用再保险的罗恩·弗格森(Ron Ferguson)帮我联络上鲍勃·贝里(BobBerry)，其家族 49 年来一直拥有美国责任保险公司(U.S. Liability Insurance)，这家保险公司连同其它两家姊妹公司，属于中等规模、声誉卓著的特殊险保险公司，套句保险业界的行话，那是好又多的业务，而 Bob 在与我接触之后，也同意以一半股票，一半现金的方式进行交易。

In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament.

近几年来，都是由汤姆·纳尼(TomNerney)为 Berry 家族经营这家公司，不论是成长速度或是盈利能力的表现都相当突出，Tom 本身更是精力充沛，不但亲自认养四名小孩(其中有两个来自俄国)，他本身还担任教练执教一支来自费城的青少女篮球队，这只球队去年拥有 62 胜 4 败的辉煌战绩，并在 AAU 全国锦标赛中夺得亚军。

Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection.

好的财产意外险公司本来就不多，但我们却拥有不少，这超过我们应得之份，美国责任险公司的加入，无异为我们更增添辉煌。

● Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock.

● 本布里奇珠宝公司(Ben Bridge)是另外一件靠电话成交的个案，在这之前我们双方连面对面谈话都没有，埃德·布里奇(Ed Bridge)跟他的堂兄乔恩·布里奇(Jon Bridge)共同经营这家位于西海岸拥有 65 家分店的珠宝公司，Ed 是巴内特·赫茨伯格(BarnettHelzberg)的好朋友，1995 年我们向 Barnett 买下 Helzberg 珠宝。在听到Bridge 有意出售公司之后，Barnett 立刻强烈建议伯克希尔买进，于是 Ed 打电话向我说明公司营运的状况，同时送了一些报表资料过来，双方就此成交，这次是一半现金，一半股票。

Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family ¾ including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed ¾ enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record.

该公司 1912 年由手表匠塞缪尔·西尔维曼(Samuel Silverman)在西雅图市中心创立，后来他将公司卖给女婿本·布里奇，1937 年将公司给转交给儿子 Herb 及 Bob 经营，1950 年代开设了第二家店，1960 年代，他们开始扩展到西部的购物中心。之后家族又将公司传给他们的儿子 Ed 与 Jon，他们已是第四代经理人了，其家族在当地享有非凡的盛誉。过去七年来，该公司的营业额分别成长了 9%、11%、13%、10%、12%、21%及 7%，这个记录真是惊人。

It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned black belts as purchasers).

对于该家族而言，公司的运作能否一如往常至关重要，没有人愿意坐视其它珠宝连锁商趁虚加入，并用协同效应和降低成本等馊主意让公司营运走下坡(虽然大家可以预知根本不会奏效，但还是一定会被要求试看看)，所以我明确告知，仍由 Ed 及 Jon 负全责，他们也知道我说话算话，毕竟本人还有自知之明，要我负责经营一家珠宝专卖店，铁定会是一场灾难。（虽然我的家人买珠宝买到可以获颁黑带的荣衔）

In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re proud to be associated with both the family and the company.

令人敬佩的是，Bridges 家族将出售公司的所得，与协助公司成功的数百位员工一起分享，我们很荣幸可以与这样的家族及公司建立关系。

● In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots ¾ including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands ¾ and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states.

● 同年七月，我们买下西部牛仔靴子的领导厂商贾斯汀工业公司(Justin Industries, Inc)，旗下品牌包含Justin、TonyLama、Nocona 及 Chippewa，同时他们也是德州以及邻近五州建筑砖块的主要制造商。

Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don’t invest with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the "mystery company" was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.

这一次我们的并购之旅实属偶然。5 月 4 号我收到一位署名 MarkJones 的传真，我根本就不认识这个人，他提议伯克希尔可以参与并购一家不知名的公司，我回传真给他，表示除非是极少数特例，否则我们不跟别人一起参与投资，不过要是他肯把资料送给我们参考，事后若并购成功，我们愿意支付他一笔介绍费，他回复说这家神秘公司叫做 Justin，于是我便到沃斯堡(FortWorth)与该公司 CEO 约翰·罗奇(John Roach)及创办人兼大股东约翰·贾斯汀(John Justin)会面，不久之后，我们顺利以 5.7 亿美元的现金收购。

John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act ¾ as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.

John 非常热爱 Justin 公司，但却由于严重的健康问题不得不自公司退休，(后来他更不幸在隔年二月去世)，John 是位优秀的市民、企业家以及人士，所幸他还培养了两位杰出的经理人，Acme 制砖公司的哈罗德·梅尔顿(Harold Melton)和贾斯汀靴业(Justin Boot)的兰迪·沃森(Randy Watson)，两人各自独立经营这两家事业。

Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin.

Acme 制砖公司的规模稍大，22 座工厂每年生产出超过 10 亿块砖，大约占全美砖块总产出的 11.7%，砖块业务有其区域性限制，在其经营的区域 Acme 享有垄断地位，当德州人被问到知名砖块的品牌时，75%的人会想到 Acme，只有 16%想到第二名，(在买下这家公司之前，我竟连一个砖块品牌都不知道，各位知道吗？)这种品牌的认同度不仅仅归功于 Acme 的产品品质，更深深地反映出该公司几十年来深耕地方服务的成果。

I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire ¾ whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century ¾ is now one of the very few authentic "clicks-and-bricks" businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley.

而我忍不住要指出，伯克希尔管理层的思想还老顽固地深陷在 100 年前，是世界为数不多既有互联网业务，又涉足制砖业务的企业之一，另一方面进入 2000 年，我们旗下的 GEICO 保险也经由网络做生意，但是后来我们又增添了 Acme，我敢保证伯克希尔的这项举动将使硅谷的那帮人目瞪口呆。

● In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance.

● 六月，全世界最大的地毯制造商萧氏工业(Shaw Industries)的 CEO 鲍勃·萧 BobShaw，带着其伙伴朱利安·索尔(JulianSaul)一起来见我，同行的还有一位正与 Shaw 洽谈合并的公司 CEO，后者因为石绵案面临潜在庞大的诉讼赔偿，而合并交易能否成功要看这些或有负债能否通过保险来解决。

The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy ¾ far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering ¾ we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap.

两位主管拜访我的目的是希望伯克希尔能够提供他们一张保单以协助他们解决合并后所有未来潜在的石棉索赔成本，我向他们解释道，虽然我们可以签发的保单金额比任何其它保险业者都来得大，但却不可能签出金额没有上限的保单。

Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998.

Bob 跟 Julian 当场决定要是连我们都不敢下重注，赌被并购者潜在的风险，那么他们也不干，双方的交易最后因此告吹，不过在此同时我对 Shaw 企业却产生浓厚的兴趣，几个月后查理跟我与 Bob 会面敲定伯克希尔买下该公司的细节，其中有一条相当重要的条款，那就是 Bob 和 Julian 都将继续持有 Shaw 企业最少 5%的股权，此举让我们可以与这个业界最优秀的经理人一起共事，如同 Bob 跟 Julian 过去几年来辉煌的战绩，在 1998 年联手之前，他们各自都在在地毯界建立了规模庞大的成功事业。

Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t mind.

Shaw 的年营业额高达 40 亿美元，而我们则持有该公司 87.3%的股权，除了既有的保险业务营运之外，Shaw 成为我们目前最大的生意，现在如果有人要从我们身上踩过去，我们一点都不会介意。

● In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was "Tell me more."

● 7 月，本杰明·摩尔涂料公司(Benjamin Moore Paint)的董事鲍勃·德纳姆(Bob Denham)打来电话询问伯克希尔公司是否有兴趣收购该公司。我是在所罗门公司认识鲍勃的，他在那里担任过一些困难时期的法律总顾问，我对他非常尊敬。所以我的回答是“多给我一些信息”。

In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job.

8 月底，查理跟我与理查德·鲁布(RichardRoob)及伊万·杜普伊(YvanDupuy)碰面，两人分别是 Moore 涂料公司前任和现任 CEO，我们与他们一见如故，也很欣赏这家公司，当场我们就开出 10 亿现金的条件，到了 10 月份，该公司董事会通过这项交易案，而我们则在 12 月完成交易，Moore 涂料公司生产油漆已有 117 年的历史，并拥有数千家的独立经销商，这也是公司最珍贵的资产。请记得下次买油漆时指名该公司的产品。

● Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades ¾ too multifaceted to be chronicled here ¾ was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy in 1982.

最后在 12 月底，我们同意以 18 亿美元买下佳斯迈威公司(JohnsManvilleCorp，JM)，这家公司过去几十年来创造了令人难以置信的传奇，因业务太过丰富就不详述了，其中以石棉产品最为著名，当时因为石棉引发广为人知的健康问题而导致该公司在 1982 年申请破产。

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.

之后破产法庭为受害人成立了一个信托基金，其中最主要的资产就是 JM 的多数股权，而该信托基金为了要分散其资产配置，于是在去年 6 月同意将该公司卖给一位杠杆并购买家，只是后来由于该买家无法顺利取得融资而使得交易告吹。

Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.

12 月 8 日周五交易正式宣布取消，周一，查理和我打电话给该信托基金的 CEO 鲍勃·菲利斯(BobFelise)，提出一个无融资的全现金报价，隔天受托人投票接受我们的提案，并于一周后正式签订契约。

JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around.

JM 是全美商用与工业隔热材料的生产商，同时在屋顶系统与其它工业产品也占有相当大的市场，该公司的年营业额超过 20 亿美金，同时也享有不错的盈利能力，当然业务有明显的周期性。该公司的 CEO 杰瑞·亨利(JerryHenry)一年前本已宣布退休，但在这里我很高兴向各位报告，查理跟我已经成功说服他继续留下来。

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Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses ¾ and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.

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去年并购案之所以会蜂拥而现，主要有两个经济原因：首先，许多经理人跟老板都预见到自己公司的业务短期内即将放缓。事实上在我们这次买下来的公司当中，确实就有好几家今年的收益将会较 1999 年或 2000 年走下坡路，考虑到每个产业都会有周期性，这种下滑对于我们并无影响。只有在投资银行做的推销 PPT 中，收益才会无止尽地成长。我们不在乎这短期的波动，真正重要的是长期的结果。当然有些人会比较看重短期的成败，而这反而能增加卖方出售的意愿或降低其它潜在买家的竞争意愿。

A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, "financial" buyers of businesses ¾ those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity ¾ became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive.

第二个能让我们在 2000 年这么顺的原因，是去年垃圾债券市场状况日益低迷，由于前两年垃圾债券投资人逐渐降低他们的投资标准，以不合理的价格买进许多体质不佳的公司债，这种对标准的松懈在去年大量违约激增中的充分体现。在这种状况下，习惯靠融资并购企业的投机者(也就是仅仅用少量本金并购的人)，便很难再借到足够的钱，而且就算能够借到，其成本也不便宜，也因此当去年有公司对外求售时，杠杆并购者(LBO)的积极性锐减。由于我们习惯以买下整家公司股权的方式投资，所以我们的评估方式没有太大的改变，这使得我们的竞争力大幅提高。

Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn’t assure a deal ¾ sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management ¾ but it does help.

除了这两项有利于我们的经济因素之外，我们现在在进行并购时享有越来越大的优势，因为伯克希尔通常都是卖方的首选买方，虽然这无法保证交易一定能谈成，一方面还要看卖方是否能接受我们的报价，一方面也要看我们喜不喜欢这家公司的业务以及其管理层，但无可否认确实对交易的进行大有帮助。

We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a "financial owner." And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company.

另外我们还发现卖方是否在意公司将来的归属其实相当重要，我们喜爱与那些钟爱公司，而不只是斤斤计较出售公司能够得到多少钱的人往来，(当然我们也明白没有人会不爱钱)，当我们意识到有这样的情节存在时，通常代表了这家公司拥有相当重要的特质：诚实的帐务、产品的自信、客户的尊重以及一群专心一致的忠实员工，反之亦然，当一家公司的老板只一昧地想要卖一个好价钱，但却一点都不关心公司卖掉后的下场，那么你会经常发现公司被过度包装以期高价出售，尤其当他是靠借钱买下这家公司时，而当一家公司的老板对自己公司和员工漠不关心时，他们的行为往往也会影响整个公司的态度与行事作风。

When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime ¾ or several lifetimes ¾ of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire’s ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank.

要知道一家经典企业是由一个企业家终其一生，有时甚至是好几代，以无微不至的用心与努力才能建立起来，对于老板来说，接手的人是否承续过去辉煌的历史是相当重要的一件事，关于这点，查理跟我相当有信心，伯克希尔绝对可以提供这些企业一个美满的归宿，我们相当重视对于这些企业创办人所作的保证，而伯克希尔的控股结构绝对可以确保我们的承诺顺利落实，当我们告知 JohnJustin 他的企业总部仍将留在 FortWorth 或保证Bridge 家族他们的公司绝不会与其它珠宝公司合并时，我们可是绝对说到做到。

How much better it is for the "painter" of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.

就像是伦勃朗画作一样珍贵的公司，与其让信托人或不肖的子孙把它拍卖掉，还不如由画家本身选择其最后的归宿，这几年来我们与有这样认知的人士有过非常多愉快的经验，并让这些感觉一直延续到这些企业上，至于拍卖出售的生意，就留给别人吧。