巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s loss in net worth during 2001 was $3.77 billion, which decreased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.2%. Over the last 37 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,920, a rate of 22.6% compounded annually.*

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

公司 2001 年的账面价值减少 37.7 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值下降 6.2%(标普下跌 11.9%)，自现任管理层接手的 37 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到现在的 37920 美元，年复合成长率约 22.6%。*

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

* 本报告中使用的所有数据都适用于伯克希尔的A股，这是公司在1996年之前唯一发行在外的股票。B股的经济权益等于A股的1/30。

Per-share intrinsic grew somewhat faster than book value during these 37 years, and in 2001 it probably decreased a bit less. We explain intrinsic value in our Owner’s Manual, which begins on page 62. I urge new shareholders to read this manual to become familiar with Berkshire’s key economic principles.

过去 37 年，每股内在价值成长的速度一直高于账面价值增加的幅度，不过时至 2001 年情况可能有所改变，有关内在价值的说明请参见股东手册，我建议新加入的股东多看看这本手册，如此方能对伯克希尔的一些主要经营原则有所了解。

Two years ago, reporting on 1999, I said that we had experienced both the worst absolute and relative performance in our history. I added that "relative results are what concern us," a viewpoint I’ve had since forming my first investment partnership on May 5, 1956. Meeting with my seven founding limited partners that evening, I gave them a short paper titled "The Ground Rules" that included this sentence: "Whether we do a good job or a poor job is to be measured against the general experience in securities." We initially used the Dow Jones Industrials as our benchmark, but shifted to the S&P 500 when that index became widely used. Our comparative record since 1965 is chronicled on the facing page; last year Berkshire’s advantage was 5.7 percentage points.

两年前，在 1999 年的报告中，我曾提到当时："我们经历了有史以来最差的业绩表现，不论是从绝对或相对的角度来看"，我还说：我们比较重视相对的结果"，这个观念从我在 1956 年 5 月 5 号成立第一个投资合伙企业时就已成形，犹记得当天晚上，我与 7 位创始有限合伙人开会时，我给了在场的每个人一张便条，上面罗列了一些"基本原则"，其中有一条是这样写的："我们的业绩到底好不好，要看整体股市表现而定"，一开始我们是以道琼斯工业指数为标竿，后来则改用接受度较高的标普 500 指数，自 1965 年以来的比较记录列示在年报的首页上，去年伯克希尔以 5.7%的相对优势胜出。

Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that "you can’t eat relative performance." But if you expect ¾ as Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, and I do ¾ that owning the S&P 500 will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index must prove rewarding. Just as you can eat well throughout the year if you own a profitable, but highly seasonal, business such as See’s (which loses considerable money during the summer months) so, too, can you regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however variable the absolute numbers may be.

有些人并不认同我们将重点摆在相对数字的做法，认为"相对绩效并不保证就能获利"，但如果你抱持与查理跟我本人一样的观念，预期标普 500 指数长期的绩效应该会相当不错的话，则就长期而言，只要投资人的绩效每年都能比它好一点，其回报自然而然也颇为可观，就如同喜诗糖果那般，虽然一年四季营运波动很大(基本上每年夏天它都是在亏钱)，但依然利润丰厚，无论绝对数字波动多大，拥有它保证可以让你躺着收钱。

Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire’s equity portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September 11th, this error caught up with us. I’ll tell you more about my mistake later and what we are doing to correct it.

虽然去年我们企业的整体表现还算令人满意，但我个人的表现却刚好相反，我本身管理伯克希尔大部分的股票投资，其成绩却乏善可陈，而且这情况已经维持好几年了，更要命的是，我竟允许通用再保险在没有安全边际的情况下承保业务，而 911 事件的发生正好把我们逮个正着，后面我还会向大家报告我所犯的错误，以及我们要如何来改正它。

Another of my 1956 Ground Rules remains applicable: "I cannot promise results to partners." But Charlie and I can promise that your economic result from Berkshire will parallel ours during the period of your ownership: We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or option grants that would make our results superior to yours.

另外还有一条 1956 年的基本原则，现在看来依然适用，那就是：我个人不敢保证绩效"，不过查理跟我可以向各位保证，在持有伯克希尔股票期间所得到的效益，绝对会与我们本身的相同，我们不会靠领取奖金或股票期权等方式，使得我们所得到的利益高于各位。

Additionally, I will keep well over 99% of my net worth in Berkshire. My wife and I have never sold a share nor do we intend to. Charlie and I are disgusted by the situation, so common in the last few years, in which shareholders have suffered billions in losses while the CEOs, promoters, and other higher-ups who fathered these disasters have walked away with extraordinary wealth. Indeed, many of these people were urging investors to buy shares while concurrently dumping their own, sometimes using methods that hid their actions. To their shame, these business leaders view shareholders as patsies, not partners.

此外，我也将继续将个人 99%以上的身家财产摆在伯克希尔上面，我和我内人过去从来就没有卖过任何伯克希尔的股份，而且以后也没有打算要卖。查理跟我对于近年来的常见情况感到相当不耻，许多让公司亏损累累的经理人，创始人和公司高层，竟然能够带着丰厚的利润弃股东们扬长而去，这些人在公开场合鼓励投资人高价买进公司股份的同时，自己却暗中将股票抛售到市场上，有时使用极其隐蔽的方式，这些可耻的企业经理人简直把股东当作是馅饼而非伙伴。

Though Enron has become the symbol for shareholder abuse, there is no shortage of egregious conduct elsewhere in corporate America. One story I’ve heard illustrates the all-too-common attitude of managers toward owners: A gorgeous woman slinks up to a CEO at a party and through moist lips purrs, "I’ll do anything ¾ anything ¾ you want. Just tell me what you would like." With no hesitation, he replies, "Reprice my options."

虽然安然公司(Enron)已经成为企业舞弊案的典型案例，但这种贪婪的行为在美国企业当中却绝非特例，就像我个人就曾听过一个故事，显示经理人心中普遍存在对待股东的一种心态，在一场宴会上，有位美丽媱娇的女士走到一位 CEO 的面前，用那性感的嘴唇说到："只要你想要，我愿意为你做任何事！"，只见这位总裁立刻毫不犹豫地回答说："那好，请重新定价我的股票期权！"

One final thought about Berkshire: In the future we won’t come close to replicating our past record. To be sure, Charlie and I will strive for above-average performance and will not be satisfied with less. But two conditions at Berkshire are far different from what they once were: Then, we could often buy businesses and securities at much lower valuations than now prevail; and more important, we were then working with far less money than we now have. Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our investment in Washington Post in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the combination of ten such ideas and a triple in the value of each would increase the net worth of Berkshire by only ¼ of 1%. We need "elephants" to make significant gains now ¾ and they are hard to find.

最后再补充一点看法，那就是往后伯克希尔将很难再重现以往的盛况，虽然查理跟我仍然会竭尽全力争取平均水准以上的表现，且永远不会感到自满，无奈现今有两个环境条件已与过去截然不同，在以前我们可以很容易的就买到许多物美价廉的公司及股票，同时我们当时运用的资金规模也比现在少得多，许多年以前，一个 1000万美元的好案子就可以为我们创造奇迹，比如说 1973 年对华盛顿邮报或 1976 年对 GEICO 保险的投资，然而时至今日，就算是 10 个这样的案子，每个 3 倍的增值，也仅仅能让伯克希尔的账面价值增加 0.25%而已，我们需要像大象般的大案子才有可能使得账面价值大幅成长，只不过这样的机会实在是少之又少。

On the positive side, we have as fine an array of operating managers as exists at any company. (You can read about many of them in a new book by Robert P. Miles: The Warren Buffett CEO.) In large part, moreover, they are running businesses with economic characteristics ranging from good to superb. The ability, energy and loyalty of these managers is simply extraordinary. We now have completed 37 Berkshire years without having a CEO of an operating business elect to leave us to work elsewhere.

从好的方面来看，我们拥有一个强大的经理人阵容，(大家可以在 Robert P Miles 刚出版的新书《沃伦巴菲特的 CEO 们》中，读到更多有关他们的事迹)，此外，他们所经营的业务，其竞争力在各自的产业中，在很大程度上都是数一数二的，他们的能力、精力与忠诚度都属最优等，个人经营伯克希尔 37 年以来，旗下还没有任何一位经理人离开我们跳槽到别家公司的。

Our star-studded group grew in 2001. First, we completed the purchases of two businesses that we had agreed to buy in 2000 ¾ Shaw and Johns Manville. Then we acquired two others, MiTek and XTRA, and contracted to buy two more: Larson-Juhl, an acquisition that has just closed, and Fruit of the Loom, which will close shortly if creditors approve our offer. All of these businesses are led by smart, seasoned and trustworthy CEOs.

我们的明星经营团队在 2001 年又增添了一群生力军，首先我们完成了收购两家从 2000 年就开始谈的公司：萧氏工业(Shaw Industries)，佳斯迈威(Johns Manville)。此外又买下了另外两家公司：迈迪科工业公司(MiTekIndustries)，XTRA 运输设备租赁公司，同时还有两个正在进行的收购：乐森卓尔木艺公司(Larson-Juhl) 刚刚收购完成，以及债权人批准后很快将完成收购的，水果布衣服饰公司(Fruit of the Loom)。所有这些业务都由聪明、经验丰富、值得信赖的 CEO 所领导。

Additionally, all of our purchases last year were for cash, which means our shareholders became owners of these additional businesses without relinquishing any interest in the fine companies they already owned. We will continue to follow our familiar formula, striving to increase the value of the excellent businesses we have, adding new businesses of similar quality, and issuing shares only grudgingly.

此外，去年所有的并购案全部皆以现金买断，这代表我们的股东可以不必牺牲原先就拥有优秀企业的任何权益，同时还能成为这些新加入公司的所有者，往后我们仍将继续维持这个策略，在想尽办法增加现有优秀企业的价值，以及寻找新的优秀企业加入的同时，还能不轻易的增加流通在外的股份。