巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）②2001年的并购案

Acquisitions of 2001

A few days before last year’s annual meeting, I received a heavy package from St. Louis, containing an unprepossessing chunk of metal whose function I couldn’t imagine. There was a letter in the package, though, from Gene Toombs, CEO of a company called MiTek. He explained that MiTek is the world’s leading producer of this thing I’d received, a "connector plate," which is used in making roofing trusses. Gene also said that the U.K. parent of MiTek wished to sell the company and that Berkshire seemed to him the ideal buyer. Liking the sound of his letter, I gave Gene a call. It took me only a minute to realize that he was our kind of manager and MiTek our kind of business. We made a cash offer to the U.K. owner and before long had a deal.

2001 年的并购案

就在去年股东会的前几天，我收到从圣路易寄来的一个大包裹，里面装了一块看不出做何用途的金属块，包裹里还有一封信，来自 MiTek 公司的 CEO 吉恩·图姆斯(Gene Toombs)，他解释说 MiTek 是专门制造该产品的世界级领导厂商(mii.com)，是用来做屋梁的连接板，他进一步表示 MiTek 的英国母公司因自身债务问题有意出售这家公司，他认为伯克希尔应该是最合适的买家，我相当欣赏他写这封信的语气，所以当下打电话给他，几分钟的谈话，我就发觉他是属于我们类型的经理人，而 MiTek 也是我们想要的公司类型，于是我们向其英国母公司提出了 4 亿现金收购要约，没多久后就正式成交。

Gene’s managerial crew is exceptionally enthusiastic about the company and wanted to participate in the purchase. Therefore, we arranged for 55 members of the MiTek team to buy 10% of the company, with each putting up a minimum of $100,000 in cash. Many borrowed money so they could participate.

Gene 所带领的经营团队对于公司相当有信心，并希望参与收购，所以最后我们安排 MiTek 团队 55 位成员购买了 10%的股权，每人最低的投资金额为 10 万美元，其中很多人都是靠借钱参与投资的。

As they would not be if they had options, all of these managers are true owners. They face the downside of decisions as well as the upside. They incur a cost of capital. And they can’t "reprice" their stakes: What they paid is what they live with.

这些没有认股期权的经理人真的称得上是公司的拥有者，完全站在股东的立场设想，他们真正愿意与公司同甘共苦，自己承担资金成本，也没有办法让自己的认股价格重新修正，他们付出的就是赖以生活的全部。

Charlie and I love the high-grade, truly entrepreneurial attitude that exists at MiTek, and we predict it will be a winner for all involved.

查理跟我欣赏 MiTek 存在的这种高格调、真正的企业家精神，我们相信这绝对可以创造出多赢的局面。

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In early 2000, my friend, Julian Robertson, announced that he would terminate his investment partnership, Tiger Fund, and that he would liquidate it entirely except for four large holdings. One of these was XTRA, a leading lessor of truck trailers. I then called Julian, asking whether he might consider selling his XTRA block or whether, for that matter, the company’s management might entertain an offer for the entire company. Julian referred me to Lew Rubin, XTRA’s CEO. He and I had a nice conversation, but it was apparent that no deal was to be done.

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2000 年初，我的好朋友朱利安·罗伯逊(JulianRobertson)宣布将结束其投资合伙企业：老虎基金，除了四项主要的持股投资之外，其余的投资将全部予以清算，其中之一就是 XTRA 公司(持股 27%)，一家货柜卡车租赁业务的领导企业，于是我打电话给 Julian 问到他及公司的经营团队是否有意将整家公司出售，Julian 建议我直接联络 XTRA 的 CEO 卢·鲁宾(LewRubin)，后来我们两个人相谈甚欢，可惜的是双方似乎很难达成交易(1998 年Julian 曾以 19 亿美元报价出售给阿波罗管理公司失败)。

Then in June 2001, Julian called to say that he had decided to sell his XTRA shares, and I resumed conversations with Lew. The XTRA board accepted a proposal we made, which was to be effectuated through a tender offer expiring on September 11th. The tender conditions included the usual "out," allowing us to withdraw if the stock market were to close before the offer’s expiration. Throughout much of the 11th, Lew went through a particularly wrenching experience: First, he had a son-in-law working in the World Trade Center who couldn’t be located; and second, he knew we had the option of backing away from our purchase. The story ended happily: Lew’s son-in-law escaped serious harm, and Berkshire completed the transaction.

之后到了 2001 年 6 月，Julian 打电话给我表示他决定出售 XTRA 的股份，于是我恢复与 Lew 的谈判，终于XTRA 的董事会接受了我们的提案(13 亿美元,5.78 亿现金+7.1 亿债券融资)，该提案通过截止日期为 9 月 11 日的公开收购要约完成。这项公开收购案包括一项例行条款，约定买方有退出的权利，如果在收购截止日前，股市有重大异常的变化，谁也没想到 9/11 当天，Lew 竟经历了一次难忘的痛苦经历，一开始，他有一位在纽约世贸中心上班的女婿下落不明，其次，他很清楚我们有权取消整个收购案，所幸最后故事有个圆满的结局，Lew 的女婿侥幸逃过一劫，而伯克希尔则如原先预期完成了收购案。

Trailer leasing is a cyclical business but one in which we should earn decent returns over time. Lew brings a new talent to Berkshire, and we hope to expand in leasing.

货柜车租赁业是一项周期性业务，不过它仍是一个我们预期长期能够获得合理回报的行业，Lew 为伯克希尔带来了新的人才，我们期望将来能够扩张在租赁业的布局。

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On December 3rd, I received a call from Craig Ponzio, owner of Larson-Juhl, the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames. Craig had bought the company in 1981 (after first working at its manufacturing plant while attending college) and thereafter increased its sales from $3 million to $300 million. Though I had never heard of Larson-Juhl before Craig’s call, a few minutes talk with him made me think we would strike a deal. He was straightforward in describing the business, cared about who bought it, and was realistic as to price. Two days later, Craig and Steve McKenzie, his CEO, came to Omaha and in ninety minutes we reached an agreement. In ten days we had signed a contract.

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12 月 3 人日我接到乐森卓尔公司(Larson-Juhl)的老板克雷格·庞齐奥(Craig Ponzio)的电话，该公司是美国订制相框的领导厂商，Craig 是在 1981 年买下这家公司的(上大学期间在其制造工厂工作过)，自此公司的营业额从300 万美元成长到 3 亿美元，虽然在 Craig 打电话给我之前，我完全不知道有这家公司的存在，不过几分钟的谈话令我感到我们很有可能达成交易，他对于企业业务坦率直言，同时也在乎买方的来历背景，至于所提价格也相当合理，两天之后，Craig 跟公司总裁史蒂夫·麦肯齐(SteveMcKenzie)来到奥马哈，前后只花了 90 分钟双方就达成共识，并于十天后正式签订合约(2.25 亿现金收购)。

Larson-Juhl serves about 18,000 framing shops in the U.S. and is also the industry leader in Canada and much of Europe. We expect to see opportunities for making complementary acquisitions in the future.

Larson-Juhl 为全美 1.8 万家相框装裱店提供服务，同时也是加拿大及欧洲大部分地区的领导厂商，我们期望在不久的未来还有类似的并购机会。

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As I write this letter, creditors are considering an offer we have made for Fruit of the Loom. The company entered bankruptcy a few years back, a victim both of too much debt and poor management. And, a good many years before that, I had some Fruit of the Loom experience of my own.

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在我写这封信的同时，鲜果布衣的债权人正在考虑接受我们的收购报价，这家公司由于负债过于沉重加上管理不当，在几年前宣布破产，而事实上，在许多年以前，我个人也曾与鲜果布衣有过接触的经验。

In August 1955, I was one of five employees, including two secretaries, working for the three managers of Graham-Newman Corporation, a New York investment company. Graham-Newman controlled Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron ("P&R"), an anthracite producer that had excess cash, a tax loss carryforward, and a declining business. At the time, I had a significant portion of my limited net worth invested in P&R shares, reflecting my faith in the business talents of my bosses, Ben Graham, Jerry Newman and Howard (Micky) Newman.

1955 年 8 月，当时我还是纽约一家投资公司，格雷厄姆-纽曼公司仅有的五位员工之一(包含三位经理加上二位秘书)，当时格雷厄姆-纽曼控制了费城里丁煤铁的公司(P&R)，该公司专门生产无烟煤，拥有多余的资金、可扣抵的税务亏损以及日益下滑的业务，在当时我将个人有限资金的大部分投资在这家公司上头，此举充分反映我对本杰明.格雷厄姆，杰瑞纽曼(JerryNewman)以及霍华德纽曼(HowardNewman)三位老板投资哲学的信仰。

This faith was rewarded when P&R purchased the Union Underwear Company from Jack Goldfarb for $15 million. Union (though it was then only a licensee of the name) produced Fruit of the Loom underwear. The company possessed $5 million in cash ¾ $2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase ¾ and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)

当 P&R 决定以 1500 万美元从 JackGoldfarb 手中买下联合内衣公司时，这种信仰获得了丰厚的回报，联合公司(虽然它只是被授权生产的厂商)当时专门生产鲜果布衣的内衣，该公司拥有 500 万美元的现金，其中 250 万美元是 P&R 支付的并购款，另外每年约 300 万美元的税前收益，将因 P&R 本身亏损部位而得到免税的好处，另外更棒的是在剩下的 1,250 万美元尾款当中，有整整 900 万美元是支付的免付利息的票据，由联合公司日后年度收益超过 100 万美元时提拨半数支付，(真是令人怀念的往日时光，每当想起这类的交易就让我雀跃不已)。

Subsequently, Union bought the licensor of the Fruit of the Loom name and, along with P&R, was merged into Northwest Industries. Fruit went on to achieve annual pre-tax earnings exceeding $200 million.

后来，联合公司进一步买下鲜果布衣的商标权，同时跟着 P&R 并入西北工业，鲜果布衣后来累计的税前收益超过 2亿美元。

John Holland was responsible for Fruit’s operations in its most bountiful years. In 1996, however, John retired, and management loaded the company with debt, in part to make a series of acquisitions that proved disappointing. Bankruptcy followed. John was then rehired, and he undertook a major reworking of operations. Before John’s return, deliveries were chaotic, costs soared and relations with key customers deteriorated. While correcting these problems, John also reduced employment from a bloated 40,000 to 23,000. In short, he’s been restoring the old Fruit of the Loom, albeit in a much more competitive environment.

约翰·霍兰德(JohnHolland)是鲜果布衣营运最辉煌时期的经营者，然而 John 却于 1996 年宣布退休，之后的管理层开始大幅举债，资金被用来并购了一堆没有效益的公司，公司最后终于宣布破产，John 随后被重新聘用，并对于营运进行大幅改革。在 John 回来之前，交货混乱，成本激增，与主要客户之间的关系日益恶化，而John 在陆续解决这些问题之后，也开始裁减公司不当的冗员，将员工人数由 40,000 人减为 23,000 人，简言之，他又让鲜果布衣恢复往日荣光，只是外在的产业环境竞争却日益激烈。

Stepping into Fruit’s bankruptcy proceedings, we made a proposal to creditors to which we attached no financing conditions, even though our offer had to remain outstanding for many months. We did, however, insist on a very unusual proviso: John had to be available to continue serving as CEO after we took over. To us, John and the brand are Fruit’s key assets.

在鲜果布衣进入破产程序之后，我们提出了一项收购提案，其中并无任何融资计划，且有效期间长达数月，不过在此同时我们也坚持几项特殊的条款，首先我们要求在接手之后，John 必须继续担任公司的总裁，因为在我们看来，John 跟鲜果布衣的商标是该公司最主要的资产。

I was helped in this transaction by my friend and former boss, Micky Newman, now 81. What goes around truly does come around.

在这项合并交易中，我得到昔日老板兼好友，现年 61 岁的米基纽曼相当多的帮助，我们的友情常在。

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Our operating companies made several "bolt-on" acquisitions during the year, and I can’t resist telling you about one. In December, Frank Rooney called to tell me H.H. Brown was buying the inventory and trademarks of Acme Boot for $700,000.

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我们旗下的子公司在去年也进行了几项补强收购，其中有一件我一定要提，去年十二月，Frank Rooney 打电话给我表示布朗鞋业正打算以 70 万美元买下 Acme 靴子的存货及商标权。

That sounds like small potatoes. But ¾ would you believe it? ¾ Acme was the second purchase of P&R, an acquisition that took place just before I left Graham-Newman in the spring of 1956. The price was $3.2 million, part of it again paid with non-interest bearing notes, for a business with sales of $7 million.

这听起来好象没什么大不了，但你知道吗？Acme 是继 P&R 之后的第二件并购案，时间大约是我在 1956 年春天离开格雷厄姆-纽曼公司之前不久，当时的交易价格是 320 万美元，其中也包含无息票据支付，买下了年营业额 700 万美元的公司。

After P&R merged with Northwest, Acme grew to be the world’s largest bootmaker, delivering annual profits many multiples of what the company had cost P&R. But the business eventually hit the skids and never recovered, and that resulted in our purchasing Acme’s remnants.

而在 P&R 与西北公司合并后，Acme 持续成长跃居全世界规模最大的靴子制造商，每年的获利是当初 P&R 投资成本的好几倍，不过后来该公司的营运还是不可避免的逐渐走下坡，乃至于残存的资产被我们所买。

In the frontispiece to Security Analysis, Ben Graham and Dave Dodd quoted Horace: "Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor." Fifty-two years after I first read those lines, my appreciation for what they say about business and investments continues to grow.

在格雷厄姆与陶德所写的《证券分析》一书中，开头引用 Horace 的一句名言，"现在已然衰朽者，将来可能重放异彩；现在备受青睐者，将来却可能黯然失色。"在我头一次听到这句话的 52 年后，我个人对于这句话描写企业与投资真理的赞赏日益增加。

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In addition to bolt-on acquisitions, our managers continually look for ways to grow internally. In that regard, here’s a postscript to a story I told you two years ago about R.C. Willey’s move to Boise. As you may remember, Bill Child, R.C. Willey’s chairman, wanted to extend his home-furnishings operation beyond Utah, a state in which his company does more than $300 million of business (up, it should be noted, from $250,000 when Bill took over 48 years ago). The company achieved this dominant position, moreover, with a "closed on Sunday" policy that defied conventional retailing wisdom. I was skeptical that this policy could succeed in Boise or, for that matter, anyplace outside of Utah. After all, Sunday is the day many consumers most like to shop.

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除了这些补强收购，我们的经理人仍然不断的寻找内部自我成长的方法，关于这一点，这里有一则两年前我告诉各位 R.C.Willey 向北进军爱达荷州 Boise 的后话，大家应该还记得，R.C.Willey 的董事长 Bill Child 想将业务拓展到犹他州以外的地区，他的公司在当地的年营业额超过 3 亿美元，(Bill 在 48 年前接手时的营业额只有 25万美元)，这家公司是在违反传统零售原则，坚持周日不营业的情形下达成垄断地位的，然而我还是很怀疑这项原则是否也能在爱荷华州 Boise 或是任何犹他州以外的地方成功推行，毕竟周日是许多消费者出外血拼的日子。

Bill then insisted on something extraordinary: He would invest $11 million of his own money to build the Boise store and would sell it to Berkshire at cost (without interest!) if the venture succeeded. If it failed, Bill would keep the store and eat the loss on its disposal. As I told you in the 1999 annual report, the store immediately became a huge success ¾ and it has since grown.

Bill 当时坚持要做一件非同寻常的事情，那就是他将自己投资 1100 万美元成立 Boise 分店，然后等分店经营顺遂后，再以成本卖回给伯克希尔(而且不算利息)，而如果经营万一失败，Bill 将自行负担一切损失，而正如我在1999 年年报中提过的，该店事后证明相当成功而且还在持续壮大。

Shortly after the Boise opening, Bill suggested we try Las Vegas, and this time I was even more skeptical. How could we do business in a metropolis of that size and be closed on Sundays, a day that all of our competitors would be exploiting? Buoyed by the Boise experience, however, we proceeded to locate in Henderson, a mushrooming city adjacent to Las Vegas.

在 Boise 分店开张后不久，Bill 又建议可以向南到拉斯维加斯试试看，这次我则抱持更怀疑的态度，我们怎么可能在这个规模如此大的城市开店，同时还在竞争对手大发利市的周日打烊，不过受到 Boise 经验的鼓舞，我们还是决定进军邻近拉斯维加斯的新兴城市亨德森(Hendersn)。

The result: This store outsells all others in the R.C. Willey chain, doing a volume of business that far exceeds the volume of any competitor and that is twice what I had anticipated. I cut the ribbon at the grand opening in October ¾ this was after a "soft" opening and a few weeks of exceptional sales ¾ and, just as I did at Boise, I suggested to the crowd that the new store was my idea.

结果是：这家店的营业额打破 R.C.Willey 其它连锁分店的销售记录，业绩比当地所有的竞争对手都还要好，是我原先预期的两倍，在进行几个礼拜的试卖会后，我受邀在 10 月的正式开幕仪式莅临剪彩，而如同我在 Boise时一样，向在场来宾暗示这是我个人的构想。

It didn’t work. Today, when I pontificate about retailing, Berkshire people just say, "What does Bill think?" (I’m going to draw the line, however, if he suggests that we also close on Saturdays.)

不过此举显然无效，现在每当我对于零售业侃侃而谈时，公司的人一定会说，喔！那 Bill 又是怎么想呢？(不过我必须先说明我最后的底线，如果他敢提议周六也休息就给我走着瞧)。