巴菲特致股东的信（2002年）③财产意外险的经营哲学

The Economics of Property/Casualty

InsuranceOur core business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

财产意外险的商业模式

我们最主要的本业就是保险，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解伯克希尔，你就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这家公司所能产生的浮存金数量，(2)以及浮存金的获取成本，(3)最重要的是这些因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover, the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.

首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，保险业务就有存在的价值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗极酸的柠檬。此外，近年来不断下降的利率趋势已经将过去可以承受的承保损失转变为负担，使得保险业务举步维艰。

Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse. There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.

根据过去的记录显示，伯克希尔一向能够以很低的成本取得浮存金，确实在伯克希尔经营的这些年来，有半数以上的年头，浮存金的成本甚至低于零，也就是说这实际上等于是别人要付费请我们帮他们保管资金，然而最近这几年，我们的成本大幅飙涨，2001 年尤其恐怖，资金成本大幅飙涨至 12.8%，其中半数归因于世界贸易大楼损失，回顾过去，我们在 1983 到 1984 年间，也曾有过更悲惨的记录，便宜的浮存金绝非凭空而降。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表中所显示的数字是，伯克希尔自取得国民保险公司经营权，进入保险事业 36 年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金规模是相当大的)我们将所有的损失准备金、损失调整准备金、已承担再保险的持有资金、未到期责任准备金加总后，再扣除相关应付账款，预付并购成本、适用于已承担再保险下预付税款和相关递延费用，从而得出浮存金的数额，明白了吗？

Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no megacatastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.

去年我们的浮存金成本约为 1%，不过从前我就曾说过，大家千万不要被这样的结果冲昏了头，那完全是因为2002 年没有发生什么重大的天灾人祸所致，总有一天，我们会让碰到某些大灾难，届时我们的浮存金成本将激增。

Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses that should have beenrecorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a “desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (seethe next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion, or about 4.6% of float.

此外 2002 年我们的绩效受到下列因素影响：(1)痛苦的补提通用再保险以前年度未提列的损失准备金，(2)追溯再保险业务每年固定必须摊销的损失成本(在后面还会有详细的说明)。这两项成本金额总计 17.5 亿美元，约为浮存金的 4.6%。

Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, evenafter the charges noted, to approach a no-cost result.

可喜的是，2002 年我们整体的承保收益相当不错，这使得我们在提列以上损失之后仍接近损益两平。

Absent a megacatastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be very low – perhaps even lessthan zero. In the rundown of our insurance operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, overtime, our underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and deliver us investable fundsat minimal cost.

除非再发生什么重大的灾难，否则我预期 2003 年的浮存金成本将可以压得非常低，甚至有可能在零以下，在以下保险营运概述中，各位将可以看到我为何那么乐观。长期而言，我相信我们的承保绩效一定可以超越同业的平均水准，从而让我们以最低的成本取得投资所需的资金。