巴菲特致股东的信（2002年）④保险业务运营

Insurance Operations

If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively; and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly “impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.

保险业务运营

如果我们的保险事业长期以来想要产生低成本的浮存金，必须要做到以下几点：(a)必须有毫不妥协的纪律承保，(b)稳健保守地提列损失准备金，(c)避免那些看起来"不可能发生"意外所累积的风险敞口影响到公司的偿付能力。除了一家公司以外，我们其它所有主要的保险事业大致都能严守这些原则。

The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross, enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.

这个例外正是通用再保险，所幸去年该公司进行了许多的改进动作，现在我很高兴地向各位报告，在 JoeBrandon 的领导以及 TadMontross 的协助下，该公司在以上提到的这几点皆有重大的进展。

When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.

当我在 1998 年同意伯克希尔并购通用再保险时，我以为该公司一直谨守以上所列的三项原则，因为我已追踪该公司营运达数十年，也发现到其历史承保纪律相当一致，同时损失准备金提列也相当保守。在合并当时，我并未发现通用再保险的承保标准有任何下滑。

I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially changed and unbeknownst to management – and to me – the company was grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say, terrorists detonated several large-scale nuclear bombs in an attack on the U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-solid if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened the company’s existence.

不过事后证明我的判断大错特错，通用再保险的文化以及作风在近年来已彻底的变质，管理层和我本人在内却不自知，这家公司的当前承保定价严重不当。此外，通用再保险还不知不觉地累积了致命的风险，例如，恐怖份子就有可能连续引爆大规模的核弹来攻击美国，虽然发生这样灾难的机率微乎其微，但保险公司却绝对必须谨慎地将风险限制在让公司的财务坚如磐石的境地，以防万一这种不可能的事情意外发生。事实上，如果通用再保险没有合并进伯克希尔的话，单单世贸中心袭击事件的损失就足以危及公司的经营。

When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s operations that I should have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do – and they did it.

911 世贸中心恐袭事件的发生，严重地暴露了通用再保险营运上的盲点，这是我早该注意却偏偏没有注意到的一点，所幸我的运气还算不错，有 Joe 跟 Tad 在身边，他们刚被赋予更大的权力，并渴望迅速纠正过去的错误。他们知道该做什么，而且他们做到了。

It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind us.

虽然保险契约有时间递延性，不过 2002 年整体的结果还算令人满意，虽然我们仍未将核子生化等事故(NCB)累积的风险降到可以忍受的限度之内，但目前这个问题已成过去式。

On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply doesn’t count.

在另外一方面，通用再保险的承保态度也已做了彻底的转变，目前整个团队都明白，我们只愿意承保定价合理的业务，无论对承保业绩造成什么影响。Joe 跟 Tad 只根据通用再保险的获利能力考核自己，至于规模大小则完全不作数。

Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what its costs are is heading for big trouble.

最后，我们正尽一切努力准确地提列损失准备金，如果我们做不到这一点，那么我们可能根本就不知道我们真实的成本，任何一家不了解自家公司成本的保险业者，将来肯定会遇到大麻烦。

At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid – but we failed badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”

记得在 2001 年底，通用再保险试图将以前年度已发生但未支付的提列损失准备金补足，但事后证明我们做的还差得很远，因此，该公司在 2002 年不得不再补提 13.1 亿美元以修正以前年度的估计错误。当我再次回顾通用再保险被发现的准备提列错误时，我突然想到有一首乡村歌曲的歌词形容的相当贴切：真希望现在的我仍然不知道，以前我不知情的那段往事。

I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a particular mindset – which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise – if they are to overcome this devastating bias. Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General Re as well.

我向各位保证，未来我们的首要任务就是避免损失准备金提列不足，但我无法保证一定能做到。财产险经理人大多倾向少提损失准备金(多记利润)，而想要克服这种糟糕的心理偏差，他们必须将其特殊的心态做个调整，说起来或许你会讶异，这完全与精算专业无关。同时，再保险人在合理提列准备金方面比直接保险人面临的困难多得多。不过即便如此，伯克希尔的损失准备金提列这点做得还算不错，而我们也决意让通用再保险比照处理。

In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial strength.

总的来说，我相信通用再保险倒闭的风险已被排除，现在已准备好为伯克希尔贡献大量无成本的浮存金，该公司仍然拥有过去我一再提到的竞争优势，同时在去年它又获得另外一项重要的竞争优势，那就是其它三家原本同列 AAA 最高信用评级的全球主要竞争对手，都在去年至少被一家评级机构调降一个评级，在这些保险巨头当中，唯有通用再保险一路维持 AAA 评级。

No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s largest reinsurers – a company regularly recommended to primary insurers by leading brokers – has all but ceased paying claims, including those both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap” reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s dangerous – and possibly life-threatening – for the insurer to deal with any but the strongest reinsurer around.

再没有其它特点比这个更重要了。相较之下，一家世界级的大型再保公司，通常名列保险经纪人推荐给客户的首选，目前已近乎暂停支付损失理赔金，包含那些有效且到期的部分。该公司积欠数百家保险公司高达数十亿美元的理赔金，这些保险公司必须面临大幅冲销应收款的命运，「便宜」对再保业来说，绝对是愚蠢的交易，当保险业者今天将资金付给再保业者以换取十年、二十年后的保障承诺时，唯有跟实力最强的再保业者打交道，才有可能避免无谓且有时甚至危及企业生存的风险。

Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I would wish for anyone – and it is paying off.

伯克希尔的全体股东应非常感谢 Joe 跟 Tad 在 2002 年为我们所做的一切，他们去年一整年特别的辛苦，当然这一切的努力都是值得的。

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At GEICO, everything went so well in 2002 that we should pinch ourselves. Growth was substantial, profits were outstanding, policyholder retention was up and sales productivity jumped significantly. These trends continue in early 2003.

在 GEICO，2002 年所有的事都再顺利也不过了，好到甚至让我们无法置信，成长的幅度相当可观，获利也相当突出，保户续约率持续提升，同时业务生产力也大幅跃升，而且这些现象在 2003 年依然继续维持。

Thank Tony Nicely for all of this. As anyone who knows him will attest, Tony has been in love with GEICO for 41 years – ever since he went to work for the company at 18 – and his results reflect this passion. He is proud of the money we save policyholders – about $1 billion annually versus what other insurers, on average, would have charged them. He is proud of the service we provide these policyholders: In a key industry survey, GEICO was recently ranked above all major competitors. He is proud of his 19,162 associates, who last year were awarded profit-sharing payments equal to 19% of their base salary because of the splendid results they achieved. And he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire shareholders.

感谢 TonyNicely 为我们所做的一切，认识他的人都知道，他跟 GEICO 结缘已达 41 个年头，当时他的年龄只有 18 岁，而他的成绩有目共睹，他一向对于能为客户节省保费感到相当自傲，相较于其它保险业者，GEICO平均每年可为保户省下 10 亿美元的保费，同时他也对 GEICO 提供的服务相当有信心，根据业界的一项调查，GEICO 目前名列消费者满意度第一名，同时他更对旗下 19162 位同仁引以为傲，去年这些同仁因为优异的表现，总共为自己赚取了相当于 19%底薪的奖金，最后他也对持续为伯克希尔贡献稳定成长的获利感到自豪。

GEICO took in $2.9 billion in premiums when Berkshire acquired full ownership in 1996. Last year, its volume was $6.9 billion, with plenty of growth to come. Particularly promising is the company’s Internet operation, whose new business grew by 75% last year. Check us out at GEICO.com (or call 800-847-7536). In most states, shareholders get a special 8% discount.

1996 年在我们完全买下 GEICO 时，它的年度保费收入约为 29 亿美元，去年这个数字增加到 69 亿美元，而后续成长依然可期，其中尤以网络营销最具潜力，去年这个部门成长率高达 75%，记得到 GEICO.com 看看(或电800-847-7536)，在大部分的州，股东都可以得到 8%的特别折扣。

Here’s one footnote to GEICO’s 2002 earnings that underscores the need for insurers to do business with only the strongest of reinsurers. In 1981-1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to try their hand at writing commercial umbrella and product liability insurance. The risks seemed modest: the company took in only $3,051,000 from this line and used almost all of it – $2,979,000 – to buy reinsurance in order to limit its losses. GEICO was left with a paltry $72,000 as compensation for the minor portion of the risk that it retained. But this small bite of the apple was more than enough to make the experience memorable. GEICO’s losses from this venture now total a breathtaking $94.1 million or about 130,000% of the net premium it received. Of the total loss, uncollectable receivables from deadbeat reinsurers account for no less than $90.3 million (including $19 million charged in 2002). So much for “cheap” reinsurance.

关于 GEICO 在 2002 年的收益有一件事要附带报告，这件事突显了保险公司绝对只能与最好的再保公司开展业务的重要性。话说 1981-1983 年间，当时负责经营 GEICO 的经理人决定要在商业防护及产品责任险上试试身手，这类风险看起来似乎不大。事实上，公司在当年也不过收取了约 305 万美元的保费，并将几乎全部保费——298 万美元投保了再保险以限制损失在小范围内，GEICO 仅留下区区 7.2 万美元作为承担自留风险的对价。谁知这一小口苹果竟让公司留下了难以抹灭的惨痛经验，总计 GEICO 后来为此承受的损失高达 9410 万美元，约当所收取净保费的 1300 倍。在这笔损失中，来自 deadbeat 再保险公司无法收回的应收账款是 9030 万美元(其中包含 2002 年认列的 1900 万损失)，便宜实在是没好货啊！

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Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division was the major reason our float cost us so little last year. If we ever put a photo in a Berkshire annual report, it will be of Ajit. In color!

阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)领导的再保险部门是我们去年浮存金成本之所以能够压得这么低的主要原因，如果伯克希尔的年报必须要摆年度风云人物照片，那肯定会是 Ajit，而且一定要用彩色的！

Ajit’s operation has amassed $13.4 billion of float, more than all but a handful of insurers have ever built up. He accomplished this from a standing start in 1986, and even now has a workforce numbering only 20. And, most important, he has produced underwriting profits.

从 1986 年开始，Ajit 的部门，截至目前已经为我们累积了 134 亿美元的浮存金，这是其它业者前所未有的成绩，而雇用员工人数不过 20 人，更重要的是，他还享有承保收益。

His profits are particularly remarkable if you factor in some accounting arcana that I am about to lay on you. So prepare to eat your spinach (or, alternatively, if debits and credits aren’t your thing, skip the next two paragraphs).

如果各位再将我之前提到过的几项会计因素考虑进去，这样的利润就更显得难能可贵，所以各位请准备好你们的大力丸(如果你对会计借贷事项没兴趣，可以跳过后面两段不看)。

Ajit’s 2002 underwriting profit of $534 million came after his operation recognized a charge of $428 million attributable to “retroactive” insurance he has written over the years. In this line of business, we assume from another insurer the obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses they have already incurred – often for events that took place decades earlier – but that are yet to be paid (for example, because a worker hurt in 1980 will receive monthly payments for life). In these arrangements, an insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less than the losses we expect to pay. We willingly accept this differential because a) our payments are capped, and b) we get to use the money until loss payments are actually made, with these often stretching out over a decade or more. About 80% of the $6.6 billion in asbestos and environmental loss reserves that we carry arises from capped contracts, whose costs consequently can’t skyrocket.

2002 年 Ajit 的承保收益达 5.34 亿美元，其中已包括所承担 4.28 亿美元的追溯再保险损失。这一业务领域，我们承受其它保险业者已经发生损失但尚未履行完毕的义务，这类损失通常早在几十年前就已经发生，但理赔金到现在却还没有付完，(举例来说一件 1980 年发生的石棉职业灾害，但现在可能还持续按月支付终生的理赔金)。在这类协议中，由保险业者一次支付一大笔保险费给我们，但金额仍远低于我们将来预期要付出的总数。而我们之所以愿意这样做，原因在于：a)我们赔付的金额仍有其上限，b)在理赔金真正付出之前，持续时间往往长达数十年以上，我们得以运用这笔资金投资。在我们受理的 66 亿美元的石棉及环境伤害损失准备金中，有 80%是有上限的合约，因此其损失成本不至于无限制飙升。

When we write a retroactive policy, we immediately record both the premium and a reserve for the expected losses. The difference between the two is entered as an asset entitled “deferred charges – reinsurance assumed.” This is no small item: at yearend, for all retroactive policies, it was $3.4 billion. We then amortize this asset downward by charges to income over the expected life of each policy. These charges – $440 million in 2002, including charges at Gen Re – create an underwriting loss, but one that is intentional and desirable. And even after this drag on reported results, Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last year.

当我们签下一张追溯再保险保单时，我们立即将保费收入入帐，并把预期会发生的损失提列准备金，至于两者的差额则以一项资产科目"DCRA 递延费用-已承担再保险"入帐，这金额通常都不小，截至年底，资产负债表中的这个科目，金额高达 34 亿美元，之后我们会按这笔资产的预计年限分年摊销，并列为损益减项，2002 年的摊销金额高达 4.4 亿美元(含通用再保险部分)，这些承保损失是我们事先就预期到的必然科目，但即便报告收益因此受到拖累，Ajit 去年依然缔造了可观的承保收益。

We want to emphasize, however, that we assume risks in Ajit’s operation that are huge – far larger than those retained by any other insurer in the world. Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit’s results in any given quarter or year. That bothers us not at all: As long as we are paid appropriately, we love taking on short-term volatility that others wish to shed. At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%.

不过我们想要强调的是，我们在 Ajit 营运的业务中所承担的风险是巨大的，甚至远高于世界上任何其它保险业者所承担的风险。因此，单一事件可能导致 Ajit 在任何一季或任何一个年头的业绩出现巨大波动，不过这一点一点也不会让我们感到困扰，只要我们收到的保费合理，我们乐于承担那些别人避之唯恐不及的短期损益变动，在伯克希尔，我们宁愿赚取业绩波动 15%的投资回报，也不要稳定的 12%回报。

If you see Ajit at our annual meeting, bow deeply.

各位如果在股东会上遇到 Ajit，记得献上深深的一鞠躬。

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Berkshire’s smaller insurers had an outstanding year. Their aggregate float grew by 38%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32 million, or 4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations would make one of the finest insurance companies in the country.

伯克希尔其它规模较小的保险公司其表现同样突出，合计浮存金增加了 38%，并贡献了 3,200 万美元的承保收益，约当保费收入的 4.5%，如果这些公司加起来，可以堪称为全美最好的保险公司之一。

Included in these figures, however, were terrible results in our California workers’ compensation operation. There, we have work to do. There, too, our reserving severely missed the mark. Until we figure out how to get this business right, we will keep it small.

不过除了这些好消息外，我们在加州退休基金的经营绩效却惨不忍睹，关于那边的业务我们还有许多工作要做，同时提列准备金也严重失真，直到我们确信找到如何做好这些业务之前，否则我们宁愿维持目前较小的规模。

For the fabulous year they had in 2002, we thank Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster. They added a lot of value to your Berkshire investment.

感谢 RodEldred、JohnKizer、TomNerney、DonTowle 及 DonWurster，让 2002 年成为美好的一年，是他们让各位在伯克希尔的投资平添许多价值。