巴菲特致股东的信（2003年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%. Over the last 39 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $50,498, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.*

公司 2003 年的账面价值增加 136 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值增加 21.0%(标普 28.7%)，自现任管理层接手的 39 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 50498 美元，年复合成长率约为 22.2%。*

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

* 本报告中使用的所有数据都适用于伯克希尔的A股，这是公司在1996年之前唯一发行在外的股票。B股的经济权益等于A股的1/30。

It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book. (For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 69.)

我们真正在乎的是内在价值而非帐面价值，而庆幸的是，从 1964 年到 2003 年期间，伯克希尔已经从一家原本摇摇欲坠的北方纺织公司，蜕变成一个跨足各个产业的大型集团，其内在价值大幅超越帐面价值，39 年来内在价值的成长率甚至远超过帐面价值 22.2%的成长率，(想要对内在价值以及本人与查理·芒格经营伯克希尔的商业原则有更多的了解的人，我建议大家阅读股东手册)。

Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000-03. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case.

虽然并非完美，但计算帐面价值仍不失为于衡量内在价值长期成长率的有效工具，只是单一年度账面价值的表现与标普 500 指数的比较，其意义已不若以往，主要原因在于我们股票投资部位，包含可转换特别股在内，占我们账面价值的比重已经大幅下降，从 1980 年代早期的 114%，到 2000-03 年的 50%，也因此股市波动对于我们账面价值影响的程度已经大不如前。

Nonetheless, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P’s performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.

不过即便如此，伯克希尔相对于标普 500 长期的表现还是顶重要的，因为股东们现在可以非常低的手续费买到指数型基金，间接投资标普 500，因此除非在未来我们能够以高于标普 500 的速度累积每股内在价值，否则查理跟我就没有存在的价值。

If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in Berkshire’s results will not be caused by our managers.

如果做不到，我们将没有任何借口，因为查理跟我拥有相当理想的工作环境，首先我们背后拥有超级坚强的经营团队支持我们的营运，如果有企业名人堂，那么我们旗下许多经理人肯定可以名列其中，所以错误一定不会是我们这些明星经理人造成的。

Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company’s history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street’s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital-allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.

此外，我们在管理上享有极其罕见的自由弹性，大部分的公司身上都背负了组织的包袱，举例来说，企业过去辉煌的历史可能使得其受困于前景有限的产业，更常见的问题是来自于股东的压力，迫使其经理人必须随着华尔街的基调起舞，虽然多数经理人抗拒，但还是有不少人屈服，被迫改用不同的营运与资本配置策略。

At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision-making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are – in tennis parlance – unforced errors.

在伯克希尔，我们完全没有历史或股东的压力来妨碍我们做出明智的决定，所以当查理跟我本人犯错时，套句网球界常用的术语，那肯定是「非受迫性失误」。