巴菲特致股东的信（2003年）⑩金融及金融产品

Finance and Financial Products

金融及金融产品

This sector includes a wide-ranging group of activities. Here’s some commentary on the most important.

这个部门包含各种不同的业务，以下择要说明如下。

• I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed-income securities that have been quite profitable in the last few years. These opportunities come and go – and at present, they are going. We sped their departure somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital gains we show in the table that follows.

• 我个人所管理的一些 AAA 评级的固定收益证券，过去几年的获利都还不错，这些机会来来去去，但就现阶段而言，我们找不到什么机会，于是去年我们主动弃他们而去，这部分的利益约占表上已实现收益的 24%。

Though far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit risk and are conducted in exceptionally liquid securities. We therefore finance the positions almost entirely with borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so also are the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now have means that in the near future our earnings in this category will decline significantly. It was fun while it lasted, and at some point we’ll get another turn at bat.

虽然不是那么简单易懂，但由于这些交易未牵涉到信用风险，且多为流动性极高的有价证券，因此我们几乎都是以融资的方式买进这些部位，所以当这部分的资产减少，相对应的负债也跟着消失，目前仅存的少数部位意味着在未来这部分的收益将大幅减少，过去持有他们的经验相当愉快，我相信不久之后，又会轮到我们上场打击。

• A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General Reinsurance.

• 至于清理通用再保险证券部门的经验就没有那么令人感到愉快了，衍生性金融商品交易部门在我们买进该公司时就已经存在了。

When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn’t pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit’s managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend – nearly two years later – we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453 counterparties. (As the country song laments, “How can I miss you if you won’t go away?”)

当我们在 2002 年初开始着手清算通用再保险证券时，它还有 23218 份合约流通在外，总计有 884 位交易对象(我甚至不会念某些交易对方的名字，更不用说要去评估这些公司的信用)，打从那时起，部门经理人就开始努力小心地清理这些部位，然而经过两年之后，直到去年底，我们还有 7580 份合约流通在外，牵涉 453 个交易对象，(就像有首乡村歌曲形容的，如果你不离去，我又如何能想念你呢？)。

The shrinking of this business has been costly. We’ve had pre-tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came from a portfolio of contracts that – in full compliance with GAAP – had been regularly marked-to-market with standard allowances for future credit-loss and administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign market – we’ve had no credit losses of significance – and in an orderly manner. This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.

清除这个部门的代价相当高，光是 2002 年及 2003 年的税前损失就达到 1.73 亿美元及 0.99 亿美元，必须强调的是，这些损失全部来自于那些已依照一般公认会计原则按时依公平市价，参酌适当的未来信用损失估列以及行政成本的合约，更甚者，在我们清算的过程期间，市场的变动还算相当温和，处理过程也有条不紊，同时也未发现有任何重大的信用损失，这样的结局比起万一发生金融危机，许多衍生品交易双方同时无法履约的惨况，已算是不幸的大幸。

If our derivatives experience – and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mind-blowing size and audacity that were revealed last year – makes you suspicious of accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up. No matter how financially sophisticated you are, you can’t possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its positions. Indeed, the more you know about derivatives, the less you will feel you can learn from the disclosures normally proffered you. In Darwin’s words, “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.”

如果在看到我们处理衍生品的经验，加上房地美去年被揭发大规模的舞弊行为后，让你开始怀疑这方面的会计原则，这就表示你变聪明了，不管你具备有多丰富的金融知识，你都无法经由阅读这些从事衍生品公司的相关披露文件来了解它到底背负了多少潜藏的风险，事实上，你越了解这些衍品，你就越知道这些制式文件能够给你的讯息多么地有限，套句达尔文的话，初生之犊不畏虎，越无知胆子越大，越有经验就越怕死。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would have.

接下来是忏悔时间，如果当初我当机立断关掉通用再保险证券部门，我确信可以为大伙省下税前 1 亿美元的损失，查理跟我当初在并购通用再保险时，就知道其证券部门很令人生厌，只是当时帐面上的收益数字误导了我们，虽然我们总是觉得这部门有极高的风险，且无法有效的衡量或限制，更有甚者，我们知道这部分所可能产生的任何重大问题，都与金融或是保险方面的问题有关，这些问题可能会影响伯克希尔其它地方。换个角度说明，如果说我们打算继续支撑衍生品部门，这代表我们必须放弃伯克希尔本身原来可以运用的资金与信用所创造出潜在的更大利益，(历史的经验告诉我们，1974 年，当我们成为一场重大保险欺诈案的受害者时，我们就有过这样的经历。有一段时间，因为我们无法判断当时的欺诈事件将会引发多少的损失，这使得我们被迫将众多的资金摆在流动性最高的现金等价物之上。

Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.)

若非如此，当时我们大可以趁股市低位大举买进更多物美价廉的好股票)。

Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities – no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.

要是换查理作主，他肯定会快刀斩乱麻，立即关闭通用再保险证券部门，绝对不要怀疑，可惜的是我犹豫不决，也因此导致股东们必须花更高的代价才能摆脱这个业务的纠缠。

• Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents.

• 虽然我们把通用再保险庞大的人寿及健康再保险业务归类在保险事业之下，另外我们则把阿吉特·贾恩负责的人寿及年金业务归类在财务及金融商品业务项下，这是因为他的业务大部分都牵涉到套利资金，我们的年金保险的种类，从网络直销到因重大职业伤害而要求我们在 70 年后付款的协议清偿都有。

We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.

由于我们以折扣价购买的某些固定收入证券加速偿还了本金，我们在这一业务中实现了一些额外收入。这种现象已经结束，因此在未来几年里，这部分业务的收益可能会有所下降。

• We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value.

• 目前我们投资了 6.04 亿美元在价值资本公司 Value Capital 之上，这是由马克·伯恩 Mark Byrne 所领导的合伙企业，他的家族一直以来都是伯克希尔重要的支柱，伯克希尔仅为 ValueCapital 的有限责任合伙人，并未参与实际的营运管理，这家企业主要专精于高度避险的固定收益投资，Mark 相当聪明且诚实，他和他的家人在Value Capital 同样有大笔的投资。

Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities – which usually are above $20 billion – are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.

由于安然等公司滥用会计原则的关系，相关规定在近日将会修改，要求我们将 Value Capital 所有的资产与负债并入伯克希尔合并报表之中，我们认为这样的要求并不合理，由于 Value Capital 的负债经常维持在 200 亿美元的高档，而这显然不是属于我们的负债，不过不用过多久，等到其它投资人加入 Value Capital 后，我们在该公司的权益比例将逐渐下降，合并的条件也就跟着消失。

• We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind-down of Finova, a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that’s the way it has worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova’s portfolio that the $5.6 billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.

• 过去我已跟各位提过 Berkadia，这是我们在三年前与 Leucadia 合资成立的公司，主要目的是用来经营管理并支援一家面临倒闭的 Finova 金融公司，根据当初的计划，我们将提供大部分的资金而 Leucadia 则负责管理，事后证明彼此合作愉快，确实在 Leucadia 的 JoeSteinberg 及 IanCumming 的领导之下，Finova 顺利成功地将原有的资产组合予以清算，这也使得当初我们提供的 56 亿美元的连带保证随着取消，如此快速清偿唯一的副作用是往后我们可以因此获得的利益将大幅减少，不过总的来说，Berkadia 为我们赚进大把的钞票，而 Joe 及 Ian 实在是不可多得的合伙人。

• Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT (office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest improvement in their earnings this year.

• 目前我们的租赁业务包含 XTRA(运输设备)以及 CORT(办公室家具)等，两者过去两年的营运都乏善可陈，经济衰退使得需求下降的幅度超乎预期，不过他们在各自的产业依旧处于领导的地位，而我也预期他们今年的收益将会有所改善。

• Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufactured-housing finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on Clayton’s balance sheet, but a by-product was the “front-ending” of income (a result dictated by GAAP).

• 通过 Clayton 的并购案，我们同时也取得庞大的预制房屋融资业务，Clayton 如同这行的其它同业，习惯将这部分的贷款予以证券化，这样的做法虽然可以缓解 Clayton 财务报表的压力，但同样也使得其收益迫于一般公认会计原则的规定提前确认。

We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance-sheet strength, and believe that over the long-term the economics of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain its loans.

我们资产负债表的实力一向雄厚，从来就不急着将利益提前认列入帐，同时也相信目前手上所持有的客户债权，其长期的经济利益肯定优于通过证券化所能得到的收益，基于这样的理由，Clayton目前已开始保留其客户贷款。

We believe it’s appropriate to finance a soundly-selected book of interest-bearing receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would). Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton’s portfolio and re-lend these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.

我们认为，应该可以让一些经过精挑细选的应收帐款，以融资举债的方式支应(就像是一般银行的做法一样)，因此伯克希尔将先对外借钱，再将资金转融给 Clayton，利息则按伯克希尔的借贷成本加计 1%。这样的加码既可以让伯克希尔超优的债信评级发挥用处取得合理的回报，同时另一方面，Clayton 也可以划算的成本取得资金。

In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re-lending, with Clayton using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided “catch-up” funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.

2003 年，伯克希尔以这样的方式借了 20 亿美元，并将这笔钱转借给 Clayton，Clayton 则将大部分的资金从有意退出此业务的金主手中买回应收帐款，其余的资金则用来弥补年前已发行的高收益债券，但由于后续无法继续发行所产生的资金缺口。

You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It’s because of our “every tub on its own bottom” philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.

大家或许会觉得奇怪，为何满手现金的我们还要对外举债，主要的原因在于，我们奉行一个萝卜一个坑的策略，我们认为任何子公司要借钱，都必须支付一个合理的费率来支应其应收款项，而不是由母公司给予补贴，否则有钱的老爸只会害了儿子，同时我们在伯克希尔累积的现金，原本就是用来做并购或是买进有机会获利的股票之用，而 Clayton 的贷款组合预估在未来几年内将会成长到 50 亿美元，相信只要有合理的信用评估程序，应该可以贡献不错的收益数字。

For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.

为了让事情简单化，我们将 Clayton 全部的收益归到本项下，虽然有些部分的收益并非来自消费金融业务。