巴菲特致股东的信(2004年)⑥制造业、服务业与零售业的运营


Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造业、服务业与零售业的运营

Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.

以下所代表的营业项目可说是海纳一切,让我们直接来看所有的资产负债表与利润表的合并数字。

This eclectic group, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s, earned a very respectable 21.7% on average tangible net worth last year, compared to 20.7% in 2003. It’s noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving these returns. Clearly, we own some very good businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth – a matter that is reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.9%.

这些精挑细选的组合,所销售的产品从冰激凌到波音 737 客机,应有尽有,去年平均净有形资产回报率高达21.7%,比起前一年的 20.7%还要高,特别值得说明的是他们极少运用财务杠杆,他们无疑是最优秀的企业,当然由于我们大多以高于账面价值相当大的幅度买下,因此资产负债表上有大量的未摊销商誉,这使得我们平均账面价值回报率降为 9.9%。

Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.

以下是主要经营业务的税前收益明细:

•In the building-products sector and at Shaw, we’ve experienced staggering cost increases for both raw-materials and energy. By December, for example, steel costs at MiTek (whose primary business is connectors for roof trusses) were running 100% over a year earlier. And MiTek uses 665 million pounds of steel every year. Nevertheless, the company continues to be an outstanding performer.

• 在建材与地毯业务方面,面临了原料成本与能源价格持续上涨的困境,比如至去年 12 月,MiTek 钢材的采购成本就比去年整整高出一倍,(其主要的产品是屋梁衍架连接件),该公司每年需耗用 6.65 亿磅的钢材,不过即便如此,该公司表现依然出色。

Since we purchased MiTek in 2001, Gene Toombs, its CEO, has made some brilliant “bolt-on” acquisitions and is on his way to creating a mini-Berkshire.

自 2001 年我们买下 MiTek 后,该公司总裁 GeneToombs 就进行了好几件补强式的并购,逐渐打造出属于自己的小型伯克希尔。

Shaw fielded a barrage of price increases in its main fiber materials during the year, a hit that added more than $300 million to its costs. (When you walk on carpet you are, in effect, stepping on processed oil.) Though we followed these hikes in costs with price increases of our own, there was an inevitable lag. Therefore, margins narrowed as the year progressed and remain under pressure today. Despite these roadblocks, Shaw, led by Bob Shaw and Julian Saul, earned an outstanding 25.6% on tangible equity in 2004. The company is a powerhouse and has a bright future.

这一年 Shaw 地毯经历了一系列纤维原材料成本的大幅上涨,这个重大的打击使得其成本剧增 3 亿美元,当你在地毯上行走,其实所踩的是经过处理的石油化学产品,虽然我们以调涨售价做为回应,但时间上还是有些落差,这使得毛利空间持续受到压缩,但即便如此,在 Bob 与 Julian 的领导下,去年还是为我们赚取了 25.6%的股东权益回报,这家公司充满动力,且深具潜力。

•In apparel, Fruit of the Loom increased unit sales by 10 million dozen, or 14%, with shipments of intimate apparel for women and girls growing by 31%. Charlie, who is far more knowledgeable than I am on this subject, assures me that women are not wearing more underwear. With this expert input, I can only conclude that our market share in the women’s category must be growing rapidly. Thanks to John Holland, Fruit is on the move.

• 在服装业方面,鲜果布衣的内衣销售增加了 1 千万打(1dozen=12,英制为 12 进制),增幅为 14%,其中女用内衣与少女内衣更成长了 31%,这方面查理比我还懂得多,他跟我保证女性朋友目前穿得内衣还不够多,这更让我确信,我们在这方面的市场占有率正急速增加中,多亏 JohnHolland,鲜果布衣又重新振作起来。

A smaller operation, Garan, also had an excellent year. Led by Seymour Lichtenstein and Jerry Kamiel, this company manufactures the popular Garanimals line for children. Next time you are in a Wal-Mart, check out this imaginative product.

另外一家更小的公司 Garan 童装,去年的表现也相当不错,在 Seymour Lichtenstein 和Jerry Kamiel的带领之下,这家公司专门制造知名童装品牌 Garanimals,下次你去沃尔玛逛时,记得顺道去看看他们饶富创意的产品。

•Among our retailers, Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) were particular standouts last year.

• 在其它零售业者当中,Ben Bridge 珠宝及 R.C.Willey 家具,去年的表现也相当不错。

At Ben Bridge same-store sales grew 11.4%, the best gain among the publicly-held jewelers whose reports I have seen. Additionally, the company’s profit margin widened. Last year was not a fluke: During the past decade, the same-store sales gains of the company have averaged 8.8%.

在 Ben Bridge 单店营业额成长了 11.4%,毛利也同步增长,这是所有上市珠宝商中表现最好的,去年的成绩绝非侥幸,该公司过去十年平均成长率达到 8.8%。

Ed and Jon Bridge are fourth-generation managers and run the business exactly as if it were their own – which it is in every respect except for Berkshire’s name on the stock certificates. The Bridges have expanded successfully by securing the right locations and, more importantly, by staffing these stores with enthusiastic and knowledgeable associates. We will move into Minneapolis-St. Paul this year.

Ed 跟 Jon 是 Bridge 家族第四代的成员,并把公司当做是自家般在经营,除了股票上登记的名字改成伯克希尔外,其它一切不变,靠着选址正确,Bridge 成功地扩张据点,此外更重要的,每个据点的员工都充满了热情与专业知识,今年我们将进军明尼苏达州的双子城(Minneapolis-St.Paul)。

At Utah-based R. C. Willey, the gains from expansion have been even more dramatic, with 41.9% of 2004 sales coming from out-of-state stores that didn’t exist before 1999. The company also improved its profit margin in 2004, propelled by its two new stores in Las Vegas.

至于犹他州的 R.C.Willey,其成长的态势更加惊人,拜外地新店所赐,公司营业额成长了 41.9%,毛利也有所改善,其中包含内华达州拉斯维加斯的两家新店。

I would like to tell you that these stores were my idea. In truth, I thought they were mistakes. I knew, of course, how brilliantly Bill Child had run the R. C. Willey operation in Utah, where its market share had long been huge. But I felt our closed-on-Sunday policy would prove disastrous away from home. Even our first out-of-state store in Boise, which was highly successful, left me unconvinced. I kept asking whether Las Vegas residents, conditioned to seven-day-a-week retailers, would adjust to us. Our first Las Vegas store, opened in 2001, answered this question in a resounding manner, immediately becoming our number one unit.

我要跟大家说,这些店事实上是我的主意,只是我本来以为它们做不起来,虽然我明明知道 BillChild 跟 R.C.Willey 在犹他州的辉煌战果,他们在当地耕耘已久,但我就是觉得这种周日不开张的做法在外地肯定行不通,但结果证明我们在爱达荷州 Boise 的第一家店就一炮而红,但我还是不相信,不断质疑已经习惯没有周休的拉斯维加斯居民是否也吃这一套,这种怀疑在我们当地的第一家店于2001 年开张,彻底被粉碎,单店营业额居所有分店首位。

Bill and Scott Hymas, his successor as CEO, then proposed a second Las Vegas store, only about 20 minutes away. I felt this expansion would cannibalize the first unit, adding significant costs but only modest sales. The result? Each store is now doing about 26% more volume than any other store in the chain and is consistently showing large year-over-year gains.

Bill 跟他的继任 CEO:ScottHymas 趁胜追击,在 20 分钟车程远的地方开设第二家分店,当时我认为此举将拖垮第一家店的营运,成本大增而销售一般,结果呢?两家店的营业额比起其它分店都高出 26%,且营业额年年成长。

R. C. Willey will soon open in Reno. Before making this commitment, Bill and Scott again asked for my advice. Initially, I was pretty puffed up about the fact that they were consulting me. But then it dawned on me that the opinion of someone who is always wrong has its own special utility to decision-makers.

R.C.Willy 很快就要在内华达州 Reno 市开店,但在正式投入之前,Bill 跟 Scott 礼貌性地征询我的意见,一开始,我对于他们向我请教感到颇为自豪,但最后证明,他们只是把我的看法,当做反向参考意见。

•Earnings improved in flight services. At FlightSafety, the world’s leader in pilot training, profits rose as corporate aviation rebounded and our business with regional airlines increased. We now operate 283 simulators with an original cost of $1.2 billion. Pilots are trained one at a time on this expensive equipment. This means that as much as $3.50 of capital investment is required to produce $1 of annual revenue. With this level of capital intensity, FlightSafety requires very high operating margins in order to obtain reasonable returns on capital, which means that utilization rates are all-important. Last year, FlightSafety’s return on tangible equity improved to 15.1% from 8.4% in 2003.

• 航空服务的获利也有所改善,飞安公司是全世界最大的飞行员训练公司,拜企业航空业务反弹及与区域性航空公司合作所赐,获利增加,目前我们拥有 283 座模拟器,帐面成本 12 亿美元,飞行员只能在这些昂贵的设备中一次一人接受训练,这意味着每 3.5 美元的资本设备投资只能创造出 1 美元的年营业收入,在如此资本密集的情况下,惟有高利润率才足以获得合理的投资回报,因此,设备利用率便显得相当重要,去年该公司的有形资产回报率由 8.4%提升至 15.1%。

In another 2004 event, Al Ueltschi, who founded FlightSafety in 1951 with $10,000, turned over the CEO position to Bruce Whitman, a 43-year veteran at the company. (But Al’s not going anywhere; I won’t let him.) Bruce shares Al’s conviction that flying an aircraft is a privilege to be extended only to people who regularly receive the highest quality of training and are undeniably competent. A few years ago, Charlie was asked to intervene with Al on behalf of a tycoon friend whom FlightSafety had flunked. Al’s reply to Charlie: “Tell your pal he belongs in the back of the plane, not the cockpit.”

另外一件事是,于 1951 年以一万美元创立飞安公司的 AlUeltschi 在去年退休,将 CEO 的位置交给公司 43年的老臣 Bruce Whitman,但相信我,我绝不会让 Al 跑掉的。Bruce 跟 Al 拥有相同的理念,认为惟有经常接受高品质训练的人,才有资格驾御航空飞行器。几年前查理受一位在飞安公司训练不合格的企业朋友所托,向 Al 求情,结果 Al 冷酷地回答到,「告诉你的朋友,给我远离驾驶舱,乖乖地待在后舱。」

FlightSafety’s number one customer is NetJets, our aircraft fractional-ownership subsidiary. Its 2,100 pilots spend an average of 18 days a year in training. Additionally, these pilots fly only one aircraft type whereas many flight operations juggle pilots among several types. NetJets’ high standards on both fronts are two of the reasons I signed up with the company years before Berkshire bought it.

飞安公司最大的客户就是 NetJets,我们飞机共享业务的子公司,旗下 2,100 位飞行员每年平均花 18 天进行飞行训练,此外不像别人常常在不同机种间跳来跳去,我们的飞行员只专心飞一种固定机型,NetJets 在这两方面高水平的要求,是为什么我早在买下该公司以前,就成为它们客户的主要原因。

Fully as important in my decisions to both use and buy NetJets, however, was the fact that the company was managed by Rich Santulli, the creator of the fractional-ownership industry and a fanatic about safety and service. I viewed the selection of a flight provider as akin to picking a brain surgeon: you simply want the best. (Let someone else experiment with the low bidder.)

另外我之所以会买下 NetJets 的原因还有,这家公司是由 Rich Santulli 所经营,他是飞机共享产业的创办人,对于安全与服务的要求几尽疯狂,我认为挑选飞行员跟选择脑部外科医生一样重要,要挑就要挑最好的,其它次等的人选就留给别人吧。

Last year NetJets again gained about 70% of the net new business (measured by dollar value) going to the four companies that dominate the industry. A portion of our growth came from the 25-hour card offered by Marquis Jet Partners. Marquis is not owned by NetJets, but is instead a customer that repackages the purchases it makes from us into smaller packages that it sells through its card. Marquis deals exclusively with NetJets, utilizing the power of our reputation in its marketing.

去年 NetJets 再次主导市场获得了该行业净新业务的 70%,这些业务为四家主要公司瓜分。其中一部分增长来自 Marquis 推出的 25 小时券,Marquis 并非 NetJets 的关联企业只是一个客户,不过它向 NetJets 批发时数后,再以更小的包装卖给终端消费者,Marquis 只专作 NetJets 的生意,并以 NetJets 的卓越名声做为营销的重点。

Our U.S. contracts, including Marquis customers, grew from 3,877 to 4,967 in 2004 (versus approximately 1,200 contracts when Berkshire bought NetJets in 1998). Some clients (including me) enter into multiple contracts because they wish to use more than one type of aircraft, selecting for any given trip whichever type best fits the mission at hand.

去年我们在美国的签约件数,从 3,877 成长到 4,967,(1999 年伯克希尔收购 NetJets 时,其客户数约为1,200 个),有些客户(包括我在内)为了使用不同的机型,签好多项合约,以因应不同场合的需求。

NetJets earned a modest amount in the U.S. last year. But what we earned domestically was largely offset by losses in Europe. We are now, however, generating real momentum abroad. Contracts (including 25-hour cards that we ourselves market in Europe) increased from 364 to 693 during the year. We will again have a very significant European loss in 2005, but domestic earnings will likely put us in the black overall.

NetJets 去年在美国这边的获利还算不错,但大部分的获利却被欧洲的亏损所侵蚀,不过目前国外的业务确有起色,包含刚刚提到的 25 小时券在内,合约数已从 364 件增加到 693 件,虽然 2005 年预估还会继续发生庞大亏损,但美国本土的获利还是能够让我们的帐面免于出现赤字。

Europe has been expensive for NetJets – far more expensive than I anticipated – but it is essential to building a flight operation that will forever be in a class by itself. Our U.S. owners already want a quality service wherever they travel and their wish for flight hours abroad is certain to grow dramatically in the decades ahead. Last year, U.S. owners made 2,003 flights in Europe, up 22% from the previous year and 137% from 2000. Just as important, our European owners made 1,067 flights in the U.S., up 65% from 2003 and 239% from 2000.

欧洲实在是让我们付出重大的代价,且远远超过我当初的预期,但为了建立品质却是不得不走的路,我们许多美国的客户希望无论到世界上的那个地方,都能够享受相同品质的服务,而跨国旅行的需求在未来肯定会大幅成长,去年美国客户总计飞到欧洲 2,003 趟,成长了 22%,在此同时,欧洲的客户飞到美国,则有 1,067 趟,成长了 65%,相比 2000 年则增长了 239%。

〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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