巴菲特致股东的信（2004年）⑧外汇投资

Foreign Currencies

外汇投资

Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange contracts at yearend, spread among 12 currencies. As I mentioned last year, holdings of this kind are a decided change for us. Before March 2002, neither Berkshire nor I had ever traded in currencies. But the evidence grows that our trade policies will put unremitting pressure on the dollar for many years to come – so since 2002 we’ve heeded that warning in setting our investment course. (As W.C. Fields once said when asked for a handout: “Sorry, son, all my money’s tied up in currency.”)

截至去年底，伯克希尔总计持有 214 亿美元的外汇仓位，投资组合遍布 12 种外币，去年我就曾说过，这类的投资对我们来说，也是头一遭。在 2002 年以前，伯克希尔跟我本人从来就没有买卖过外汇，但越来越多迹象显示，目前我们的贸易政策，将为往后几年的汇率不断施加压力，有鉴于此，自 2002 年起，我们开始调整投资方向以做为对应，就像老牌喜剧演员 W.C.Fields 所说的一样，「抱歉小子，我的钱全部套牢在外汇上了。」

Be clear on one point: In no way does our thinking about currencies rest on doubts about America. We live in an extraordinarily rich country, the product of a system that values market economics, the rule of law and equality of opportunity. Our economy is far and away the strongest in the world and will continue to be. We are lucky to live here.

大家一定要搞清楚一点，外汇上的投资不代表我们在唱衰美国，因为我们生活在一个极其富有的国度，这个系统相当重视市场经济，尊重法制，每个人都有公平的机会，我们无疑是当今世上最强大的经济体，而且以后也是，我们是何等的幸运。

But as I argued in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune, (available at berkshirehathaway.com), our country’s trade practices are weighing down the dollar. The decline in its value has already been substantial, but is nevertheless likely to continue. Without policy changes, currency markets could even become disorderly and generate spillover effects, both political and financial. No one knows whether these problems will materialize. But such a scenario is a far-from-remote possibility that policymakers should be considering now. Their bent, however, is to lean toward not-so-benign neglect: A 318-page Congressional study of the consequences of unremitting trade deficits was published in November 2000 and has been gathering dust ever since. The study was ordered after the deficit hit a then-alarming $263 billion in 1999; by last year it had risen to $618 billion.

但就像我在 2003 年 11 月 10 日在财富杂志发表的文章所提到的(《财富杂志：我为什么不看好美元》)，我们国家现今的贸易政策终将拖垮美元，美元价值目前已大幅下滑，且没有任何好转迹象，若政策不改，外汇市场脱序的情况将不断发生，并在政治与金融面上产生连锁效应，虽然没有人保证影响的层面有多广，政治人物却不得不正视此问题的严重性，但政客们目前所采的态度却是刻意的忽视，一项厚达 318 页的贸易赤字评估报告在2000 年 11 月国会发表时，曾引发轩然大波，当时美国一年的贸易赤字达到 2,630 亿美元，去年贸易赤字却已达6,180 亿美元的历史新高。

Charlie and I, it should be emphasized, believe that true trade – that is, the exchange of goods and services with other countries – is enormously beneficial for both us and them. Last year we had $1.15 trillion of such honest-to-God trade and the more of this, the better. But, as noted, our country also purchased an additional $618 billion in goods and services from the rest of the world that was unreciprocated. That is a staggering figure and one that has important consequences.

当然必须强调的是，查理跟我都相信，真正的贸易，也就是与他国交换货物与服务的行为，对于彼此都有相当大的益处，去年光是这类的贸易总额就达 1.15 万亿美元，但除此之外，我们另外又向外国多采购了 6,180 亿美元的产品与服务，而这些没有产生任何回报。这个惊人的数字将引发严重的后果。

The balancing item to this one-way pseudo-trade — in economics there is always an offset — is a transfer of wealth from the U.S. to the rest of the world. The transfer may materialize in the form of IOUs our private or governmental institutions give to foreigners, or by way of their assuming ownership of our assets, such as stocks and real estate. In either case, Americans end up owning a reduced portion of our country while non-Americans own a greater part. This force-feeding of American wealth to the rest of the world is now proceeding at the rate of $1.8 billion daily, an increase of 20% since I wrote you last year. Consequently, other countries and their citizens now own a net of about $3 trillion of the U.S. A decade ago their net ownership was negligible.

单向的伪贸易平衡，在经济学上总有对价，维持均衡的结果就是以本国的财富移转到国外，其形式有可能是由私人企业或政府部门所发出的借据，或者是出让股票或房产等资产的所有权，不管怎样，此举将造成美国人拥有自家资产的比例逐渐下滑，平均每天以 18 亿美元的速度流失中，这数字比去年同期又增加了 20%，目前外国人累积持有我国资产已达 3 万亿美元，在十年前这项数字还微乎其微。

The mention of trillions numbs most brains. A further source of confusion is that the current account deficit (the sum of three items, the most important by far being the trade deficit) and our national budget deficit are often lumped as “twins.” They are anything but. They have different causes and different consequences.

上万亿对一般人来说或许是遥不可及的天文数字，更让人容易搞混的是目前的「经常帐户赤字」(由三个项目组成，其中最重要的项目就是贸易逆差)，这与我国的「预算赤字」，并称为双胞胎，但两者的成因不同，造成的影响也不同。

A budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and their citizens have no net ownership of the U.S., 100% of our country’s output belongs to our citizens under any budget scenario, even one involving a huge deficit.

预算赤字不会减少美国人的国家蛋糕份额，仅会造成本国内财富的重分配，别的国家与人民不会增加对我们资产的所有权，也就是说就算是巨额赤字飙上天，国内所有的产出所得，仍将归我国民所有。

As a rich “family” awash in goods, Americans will argue through their legislators as to how government should redistribute the national output – that is who pays taxes and who receives governmental benefits. If “entitlement” promises from an earlier day have to be reexamined, “family members” will angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain. Maybe taxes will go up; maybe promises will be modified; maybe more internal debt will be issued. But when the fight is finished, all of the family’s huge pie remains available for its members, however it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.

当一个国家强盛富裕时，美国人民可通过立法者来争取如何分配国家产出，也就是谁必须付税而谁可以得到政府的补助，如果必须重新审视早期的权力承诺，家族成员便会激烈地争辩谁将受累，或许税收会上涨，或许承诺会调整，或许发行更多公债，但一旦纷争结束，家中所有的饼不管怎么分，依旧是由所有成员来分享，绝不会有外人进来分一杯羹。

Large and persisting current account deficits produce an entirely different result. As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like a family that consistently overspends its income. As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the “finance company” and less for itself.

但目前积重难返的经常帐户赤字将产生完全不同的结果，随着时间推移，对我们的债权越来越多，我们拥有的越来越少，事实上，世界上其它国家的人们从我们身上抽取的税赋一天比一天高，而我们就像是一个入不敷出的家庭，而且慢慢会发现，辛苦的工作所得，将被债主吸得一干二净。

Should we continue to run current account deficits comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the U.S. by other countries and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. And, if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would need to send a net of $.55 trillion of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the U.S. investments then held by foreigners. At that date, a decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18 trillion (assuming low inflation, which is far from a sure thing). Therefore, our U.S. “family” would then be delivering 3% of its annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the past. In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.

若是我们让经常帐户赤字的情况继续恶化下去，未来十年内外国人持有我国资产的数目将爆增到 11 万亿美元，而若以平均 5%的投资回报率来计，我们每年还须额外支付 5500 亿美元的劳务与产品给外国人，仅仅是为外国人持有的美国投资提供回报。再过十年，我们的 GDP 可能会是 18 万亿美元(假设维持低通胀，虽然这还不是很确定)，届时美国家庭，为了过去的挥霍无度，每年都要奉献出 3%的全年所得给外国人，在这种状况下，真的就要变成所谓的父债子还了。

This annual royalty paid the world – which would not disappear unless the U.S. massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses – would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country that is now aspiring to an “Ownership Society” will not find happiness in – and I’ll use hyperbole here for emphasis – a “Sharecropper’s Society.” But that’s precisely where our trade policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.

每年要支付给外国投资者的利息，除非是美国人从现在开始缩衣节食，同时持续地增加贸易顺差，否则定将引起国内的政局纷扰，虽然在这种情况下，美国人依旧能够维持不错的生活水平，事实上拜经济成长所赐，甚至过得比现在还好，但光想到每年定期要向外国朝贡，对于一个强调「所有权社会」的国家来说，可能就会引起国人一肚子气，一个现在渴望建立「所有权社会」的国家不会在一个「佃农社会」中找到幸福感。在这里我必须夸张一点地讲，「佃农社会」，这正是共和党与民主党这些政客，准备带领我们前进的方向。

Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of government, have stated that our current-account deficits cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29-30, 2004 say: “The staff noted that outsized external deficits could not be sustained indefinitely.” But, despite the constant handwringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions to tame the burgeoning imbalance.

美国政府内外许多重量级的财经学者，都一再重申，目前的经常帐户赤字不可能持续下去，举例来说，美联储公开市场操作委员会于 2004 年 6 月 29-30 日的会议记录中便提到，幕僚群已注意到我们绝对无法负荷长期大量的外部赤字，尽管一些重量级人物不断大声疾呼，但实际上他们还是无法提出彻底解决贸易赤字的具体方案。

In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned that “a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer.” And so far it hasn’t. Yet policymakers continue to hope for a “soft landing,” meanwhile counseling other countries to stimulate (read “inflate”) their economies and Americans to save more. In my view these admonitions miss the mark: There are deep-rooted structural problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge current-account deficit unless trade policies either change materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could prove unsettling to financial markets.

在我 16 个月以前于财富杂志刊登的一篇文章当中，我就曾警告，持续贬值的美元并不能解决问题，到目前为止，确是如此，然而政府官员却依然希望经济能够软着陆，同时敦促本国人省着点花用，其它国家刺激(应该说是膨胀)本国经济，在我看来这些建言都没有切中要点，除非贸易政策大幅改弦更张或是美元大幅贬值到惊天动地的程度，否则根深蒂固的结构性失衡问题仍将持续困扰金融市场的运作。

Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam Smith: “What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.”

赞成维持现状的支持者喜欢引用亚当史密斯的话，如果每个家庭的做法都审慎无误，那么整个国家的方向就错不了，如果外国人能够生产出比我们自己还要便宜的东西，那当然是用我们自家产出较具竞争优势的东西拿来做交换。

I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith’s statement refers to trade of product for product, not of wealth for product as our country is doing to the tune of $.6 trillion annually. Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that “prudence” consisted of his “family” selling off part of its farm every day in order to finance its overconsumption. Yet that is just what the “great kingdom” called the United States is doing.

我同意这点，但是请注意，史密斯先生的说法，指的是以物易物，而不是拿财富来做交换，尤其是当我们一年要典当 6000 亿美元的资产，同时我相信他同样也不赞同家人以变卖资产的方式来弭补过度消费的缺口，而很不幸的，这正是当今最伟大的国家美国正在做的事。

If the U.S. was running a $.6 trillion current-account surplus, commentators worldwide would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme form of “mercantilism” – a long-discredited economic strategy under which countries fostered exports, discouraged imports, and piled up treasure. I would condemn such a policy as well. But, in effect if not in intent, the rest of the world is practicing mercantilism in respect to the U.S., an act made possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit history. Indeed, the world would never let any other country use a credit card denominated in its own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours. Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine: they may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are rich junkies as well.

换个角度来说，如果美国现在享有的是 6000 亿美元的贸易顺差的话，其它国家一定会立刻跳出来谴责我们的贸易政策，将之视为重商主义，也就是长久以来，为人所垢病的鼓励出口、压抑进口、囤积财富的经济政策，我也会谴责这种做法。但事实上就算不是有意的，目前世界上其它国家确实正对美国实行重商主义，觊谀我国丰厚的资产以及深厚的家底。确实除了美国以外，世界上再也没有其它国家可以享有几乎无上限的信用额度，截至目前为止，大部分的外国人还是相当乐观，他们认定我们是花钱如流水的败家子，而且是极其富有的败家子。

Our spendthrift behavior won’t, however, be tolerated indefinitely. And though it’s impossible to forecast just when and how the trade problem will be resolved, it’s improbable that the resolution will foster an increase in the value of our currency relative to that of our trading partners.

但我们这种挥金如土的行为，不可能无限制地持续下去，虽然很难预估这样的贸易问题未来将如何收尾，但可以肯定的是，绝对不可能依靠美元对其它货币大幅升值的结局。

We hope the U.S. adopts policies that will quickly and substantially reduce the current-account deficit. True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record losses on its foreign-exchange contracts. But Berkshire’s resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets, and both a strong dollar and a low-inflation environment are very much in our interest.

我们很希望美国能够提出一套立即解决贸易逆差的方案，虽然，这样将使得伯克希尔帐上立即产生大量的外汇交易损失，但由于伯克希尔大部分的资产还是摆在以美元为计价的资产之上，强势的美元以及低通膨的环境还是我们的最爱。

If you wish to keep abreast of trade and currency matters, read The Financial Times. This London-based paper has long been the leading source for daily international financial news and now has an excellent American edition. Both its reporting and commentary on trade are first-class.

如果你想要持续追踪贸易与汇率问题，建议你看《金融时报》，这份伦敦地区发行的报纸长期引领国际金融讯息，同时还发行有美国版，它们在贸易方面的报导与社论都堪称一流。

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And, again, our usual caveat: macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may well turn out to be wrong in our currency judgments. (Indeed, the fact that so many pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.) If so, our mistake will be very public. The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all of Berkshire’s assets in dollars even as they declined significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake.

当然照例我还是要提出警告，宏观经济是没有人搞得懂的玩意儿，包括查理和我在内，很少有人展现出特别技巧。我们在汇率上的判断不一定对，事实上，近来也有很多专家跟着凑热闹，一起高喊美元弱势的现象，反而让我们觉得不安。果真如此，那我们可就糗大了。讽刺的是，要是我们按兵不动，将伯克希尔的资金摆在美元资产之上，就算其价值大幅下滑，反而没有人会注意。

John Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” (Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may be derided but never does an individual lemming get criticized.) From a reputational standpoint, Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign-exchange commitment. But we believe in managing Berkshire as if we owned 100% of it ourselves. And, were that the case, we would not be following a dollar-only policy.

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在其名著《通论》中曾经提到：普世的智慧告诉我们，寻常的失败可能比不寻常的成功对声誉的影响更好。或者讲得再通俗一点，旅鼠或许以愚蠢著称，但却没有任何一只旅鼠单独挨骂。若是从声誉的角度来说，查理跟我在外汇上的作法，很可能让自己的面子挂不住，但我们还是尽心尽力的经营伯克希尔就好像我们 100%拥有一样，这也是我们不独爱美元资产的根本原因。