巴菲特致股东的信（2005年）⑥制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们这部分业务种类繁多，让我们先看看总体的资产负债表和利润表主要数据：

This eclectic collection, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s, earned a very respectable 22.2% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly, we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.1%.

这个多种多样的业务组合，销售的产品从 DillyBars 冰淇淋到波音 737 的部分所有权应有尽有，其 2005 年平均有形资产净值收益率达到令人称奇的 22.2%。值得说明的是，这部分业务经营取得如此之高的收益率，只使用了很小的财务杠杆。显而易见，我们拥有非常卓越的企业，可是我们是以显著高于其账面价值的价格收购其中大部分企业的，这种溢价反映在资产负债表的商誉上，这使我们平均账面价值收益率减少为 10.1%。

Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.

以下是规模较大的业务类型或经营单位的税前收益情况：

•In both our building-products companies and at Shaw, we continue to be hit by rising costs for raw materials and energy. Most of these operations are significant users of oil (or more specifically, petrochemicals) and natural gas. And prices for these commodities have soared.

• 我们的建筑产品企业和 Shaw 地毯仍然受到原材料和能源成本上升的打击，这些企业中大多数是石油(更准确地说是石化产品)和天然气的消费大户，这些商品的价格已经快速上涨。

We, likewise, have raised prices on many products, but there are often lags before increases become effective. Nevertheless, both our building-products operations and Shaw delivered respectable results in 2005, a fact attributable to their strong business franchises and able managements.

我们同样也提高了产品的销售价格，但在提价生效之前往往有相当长时间的滞后，尽管如此，我们的建筑产品企业和 Shaw 地毯的经营业绩还是令人称赞的，这应该归功于他们强大的商业特许权和能干的管理层。

•In apparel, our largest unit, Fruit of the Loom, again increased earnings and market-share. You know, of course, of our leadership position in men’s and boys’ underwear, in which we account for about 48.7% of the sales recorded by mass-marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, etc.). That’s up from 44.2% in 2002, when we acquired the company. Operating from a smaller base, we have made still greater gains in intimate apparel for women and girls that is sold by the mass-marketers, climbing from 13.7% of their sales in 2002 to 24.7% in 2005. A gain like that in a major category doesn’t come easy. Thank John Holland, Fruit’s extraordinary CEO, for making this happen.

• 在服饰鞋业方面，我们最大的企业鲜果布衣收益与市场份额再次双双增长。当然，我们在男士和女士内衣市场上的领先优势尽人皆知，根据沃尔玛、Target 等大型卖场的统计，我们的销售份额约为 48.7%，与 2002 年我们收购这家企业时的 44.2%相比显著上升。从较小的基数开始，我们在大卖场销售的成年妇女和女孩的内衣的市场份额从 2002 年的 13.7%上升到 2005 年的 24.7%。在一个主要服饰类别市场上能够实现如此的增长并非易事，为此我们要特别感谢公司的 CEO：JohnHolland 创造了这一奇迹。

•I told you last year that Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) had same-store sales gains far above the average of their industries. You might think that blow-out figures in one year would make comparisons difficult in the following year. But Ed and Jon Bridge at their operation and Scott Hymas at R. C. Willey were more than up to this challenge. Ben Bridge had a 6.6% same-store gain in 2005, and R. C. Willey came in at 9.9%.

• 2005 年我曾告诉各位：BenBridge 珠宝和 R.C.Willey 家居的销售额远远超过业内同行。你们可能会认为，一个年度的爆炸性增长会导致第二年的业绩难以比肩，但 BenBridge 的 Ed 和 JonBridge、R.C.Willey 的ScottHymas 面对这种挑战却仍旧实现了继续增长，2005 年 BenBridge 单店销售额增长了 6.6%，R.C.Willey 单店增长了 9.9%。

Our never-on-Sunday approach at R. C. Willey continues to overwhelm seven-day competitors as we roll out stores in new markets. The Boise store, about which I was such a skeptic a few years back, had a 21% gain in 2005, coming off a 10% gain in 2004. Our new Reno store, opened in November, broke out of the gate fast with sales that exceeded Boise’s early pace, and we will begin business in Sacramento in June. If this store succeeds as I expect it to, Californians will see many more R. C. Willey stores in the years to come.

当我们在新的市场开出新店铺时，R.C.Willey 继续以周日不营业的经营方式横扫一周经营七天的竞争对手，几年之前我还十分怀疑的 Boise 店，2005 年销售额竟然增长了 21%，刷新了 2004 年 10%的纪录。2005 年 11月新开的内华达州 Reno 店一开张就挤破了大门，销售额很快超过了 Boise 店早期的水平。2006 年 6 月加州中部Sacramento 店将开始营业，如果这家店能够像我所预料的那样成功的话，那么，未来几年内在加州将会看到更多 R.C.Willey 专卖店。

•In flight services, earnings improved at FlightSafety as corporate aviation continued its rebound. To support growth, we invest heavily in new simulators. Our most recent expansion, bringing us to 42 training centers, is a major facility at Farnborough, England that opened in September. When it is fully built out in 2007, we will have invested more than $100 million in the building and its 15 simulators. Bruce Whitman, FlightSafety’s able CEO, makes sure that no competitor comes close to offering the breadth and depth of services that we do.

• 在航空服务业务方面，航空公司业务的反弹使飞安公司 FlightSafety 的收益得到改善。为了支持公司业务持续增长，我们大笔投资新的飞行模拟器，我们最近的扩张是 2005 年 9 月份在英国 Farnborough 新运营一个主要飞行训练基地，拥有 42 个训练中心。到 2007 年完全建成时，我们将累计投资 1 亿美元用于基础建筑及 15 台飞行模拟器。FlightSafety 非常能干的 CEO：BruceWhitman 确信，没有任何竞争对手所提供服务在深度和广度上能够与我们相媲美的。

Operating results at NetJets were a different story. I said last year that this business would earn money in 2005 – and I was dead wrong.

利捷航空(NetJets)的经营成果却是一个完全不同的故事。2004 年我曾放言其业务将在 2005 年实现盈利，但我却错得一塌糊涂。

Our European operation, it should be noted, showed both excellent growth and a reduced loss. Customer contracts there increased by 37%. We are the only fractional-ownership operation of any size in Europe, and our now-pervasive presence there is a key factor in making NetJets the worldwide leader in this industry.

应该说明的是，我们欧洲地区的业务在实现了良好的增长的同时，成本也有所下降，客户合同数量增长了 37%。我们是欧洲地区经营共享飞机所有权业务的唯一一家企业，我们目前在欧洲地区业务遍地开花的局面是 NetJets 成为这一行业全球领导者的关键因素。

Despite a large increase in customers, however, our U.S. operation dipped far into the red. Its efficiency fell, and costs soared. We believe that our three largest competitors suffered similar problems, but each is owned by aircraft manufacturers that may think differently than we do about the necessity of making adequate profits. The combined value of the fleets managed by these three competitors, in any case, continues to be less valuable than the fleet that we operate.

可是我们的美国业务尽管客户大幅度增长，却出现了严重的亏损，其经营效率下降、成本急升。我们相信，我们三个最大的竞争对手也遭受到了同样的打击，但他们都隶属于各自飞机制造商，因此可能并不像我们那样非常关注获得足够利润的必要性。无论如何，这三家竞争对手管理的飞行机队的综合价值都继续远低于我们运作的机队的价值。

Rich Santulli, one of the most dynamic managers I’ve ever met, will solve our revenue/expense problem. He won’t do it, however, in a manner that impairs the quality of the NetJets experience. Both he and I are committed to a level of service, security and safety that can’t be matched by others.

Rich Santulli 这位我所认识的最具活力的经理人将会解决公司的收入成本问题，但他绝不会以损害公司服务质量的方式来解决问题。我和他都保证我们的服务、安保、飞行安全水平肯定是其他任何对手难以比拟的。

•Our retailing category includes See’s Candies, a company we bought early in 1972 (a date making it our oldest non-insurance business). At that time, Charlie and I immediately decided to put Chuck Huggins, then 46, in charge. Though we were new at the game of selecting managers, Charlie and I hit a home run with this appointment. Chuck’s love for the customer and the brand permeated the organization, which in his 34-year tenure produced a more-than-tenfold increase in profits. This gain was achieved in an industry growing at best slowly and perhaps not at all. (Volume figures in this industry are hard to pin down.)

• 我们的零售业务中包括喜诗糖果这家我们早在 1972 年收购的公司，这也是我们历史最为悠久的非保险企业，当时我们马上决定由 46 岁的 ChuckHuggins 来负责。尽管我们俩当时在选择经理人上还是新手，芒格和我在这次任命上却打出了一个"本垒打"。在 34 年的任期中(80 岁)，他对客户和品牌的热爱已经渗透到整个组织中，使这家公司的盈利增长了 10 倍。值得指出的是，这一成就是在一个增长得很慢甚至可以说是几乎没有增长的产业中所取得的(在这个行业中，销售数量的数据很难搞清楚)。

At yearend, Chuck turned the reins at See’s over to Brad Kinstler, who previously had served Berkshire well while running Cypress Insurance and Fechheimer’s. It’s unusual for us to move managers around, but Brad’s record made him an obvious choice for the See’s job. I hope Chuck and his wife, Donna, are at the annual meeting. If they are, shareholders can join Charlie and me in giving America’s number one candy maker a richly-deserved round of applause.

2005 年年底，我们把喜诗的管理权杖交给了 BradKinstler，在此之前，他在为伯克希尔管理 Cypress 工伤赔偿保险(1993)和费区海默(2000)时就做得很好。对于我们来说，把经理人调来调去并不寻常，但 BradKinstler 的良好记录让我们认为，他显而易见是喜诗经理人的最佳选择。我希望 Chuck 和妻子 Donna 能够出席今年的股东大会。如果出席的话，所有股东就能与我和查理一起，给这位美国第一的糖果制造商经理人非常应得的掌声。

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Every day, in countless ways, the competitive position of each of our businesses grows either weaker or stronger. If we are delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs and improving our products and services, we gain strength. But if we treat customers with indifference or tolerate bloat, our businesses will wither. On a daily basis, the effects of our actions are imperceptible; cumulatively, though, their consequences are enormous.

每一天，我们旗下每一家企业的竞争地位，都在以无数种方式，要么变强，要么变弱。如果我们让客户更加满意、消除不必要的成本支出、改善我们的产品和服务，我们的竞争力就会更强。但如果我们对待客户时冷淡，容忍不必要的费用成本不断上升，我们的竞争力就会萎缩。就每一天而言，我们日常行为的影响难以察觉，但天长日久所累计的影响后果之巨大却难以估计。

When our long-term competitive position improves as a result of these almost unnoticeable actions, we describe the phenomenon as “widening the moat.” And doing that is essential if we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two from now. We always, of course, hope to earn more money in the short-term. But when short-term and long-term conflict, widening the moat must take precedence. If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short-term earnings targets, and consequently gets behind the eight-ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength, no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the damage that has been inflicted. Take a look at the dilemmas of managers in the auto and airline industries today as they struggle with the huge problems handed them by their predecessors. Charlie is fond of quoting Ben Franklin’s “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” But sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes of the past.

当我们的长期竞争地位，因这些几乎毫不显眼的行为，而得到改善时，我们称这种现象为"加宽护城河"，这些行为对于我们想要打造 10 年甚至 20 年以后的企业至关重要。当然，我们总是想在短期内赚到更多的钱，但当短期与长期目标冲突时，加宽护城河应该优先加以考虑。如果一个公司管理层为实现短期盈利目标，而作出糟糕的决策，并因此置成本、客户满意度、品牌吸引力于不顾，那么，以后再出色的努力也难免弥补由此造成的损害。当今汽车和航空行业的公司经理人，在努力处置其前任留下的问题时，所面临的进退两难的局面就是最好的证明。芒格和我喜欢引用本·富兰克林的名言："一盎司的预防抵得上一磅的治疗"。但有时再多的治疗也无法治愈过去的错误。

Our managers focus on moat-widening – and are brilliant at it. Quite simply, they are passionate about their businesses. Usually, they were running those long before we came along; our only function since has been to stay out of the way. If you see these heroes – and our four heroines as well – at the annual meeting, thank them for the job they do for you.

我们的经理人们专注于加宽护城河并且在这方面才华横溢，原因非常简单，他们对他们的事业充满热情。在伯克希尔收购以前，他们往往已经管理了这家公司很长时间，伯克希尔进入之后唯一的作用是保持原来的方向，而不要成为障碍。各位股东如果在年度大会上看到这些为股东们作为杰出贡献的英雄们(其中包括四位女中豪杰)，请向他们表示感谢。

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The attitude of our managers vividly contrasts with that of the young man who married a tycoon’s only child, a decidedly homely and dull lass. Relieved, the father called in his new son-in-law after the wedding and began to discuss the future:

我们的经理人的态度，与一位娶了商业大亨独生女儿的年轻小伙子形成了鲜明的对比，在婚礼之后，感到十分宽慰的父亲把他的女婿叫来，开始讨论他们的将来：

“Son, you’re the boy I always wanted and never had. Here’s a stock certificate for 50% of the company. You’re my equal partner from now on.”

"孩子，你是我盼望已久却一直未能找到的乘龙快婿，这是我的公司的50%的股权证明，从现在开始，你就是与我平起平坐的合伙人了。"

“Thanks, dad.”

"谢谢您，父亲大人。"

“Now, what would you like to run? How about sales?”

"那么，你想负责公司的哪些业务？负责销售怎么样？"

“I’m afraid I couldn’t sell water to a man crawling in the Sahara.”

"恐怕我连把水卖给一个在撒哈拉沙漠里爬行的人也做不到。"

“Well then, how about heading human relations?”

"好吧，那么负责人际关系如何？"

“I really don’t care for people.”

"我对别人根本毫不关心。"

“No problem, we have lots of other spots in the business. What would you like to do?”

"没关系，在经营中我们还有许多其他事情要做。你愿意做什么？"

“Actually, nothing appeals to me. Why don’t you just buy me out?”

"事实上，我对任何事都没有兴趣。你为什么不直接买下我的股份呢？"