巴菲特致股东的信（2006年）⑤制造、服务及零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务及零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔在这个事业群的活动，可说是包罗万象。不过，让我们先看看整体的资产负债表和利润表的概要。

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 25% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.8%.

这家五花八门的业务集团，销售从棒棒糖到房车的各种产品，去年的平均有形净资产的回报率为 25%，令人欣喜。值得注意的是，此一营运结果仅用了极小的财务杠杆。显而易见的，我们持有的这些企业，实在是表现非凡。不过，我们在收购这些事业时大多支付了高出净资产相当多的溢价，这反映在上面的商誉科目。而这一事实，也让相对于平均账面价值回报率，掉到 10.8%。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:

以下是这个事业群中几家表现显著的公司：

•Bob Shaw, a remarkable entrepreneur who from a standing start built Shaw Industries into the country’s largest carpet producer, elected last year, at age 75, to retire. To succeed him, Bob recommended Vance Bell, a 31-year veteran at Shaw, and Bob, as usual, made the right call. Weakness in housing has caused the carpet business to slow. Shaw, however, remains a powerhouse and a major contributor to Berkshire’s earnings.

• 鲍勃·萧(BobShaw)是一位非凡的创业家。身为萧氏工业创办人的他，把公司发展为全美最大的地毯制造商。去年，75 岁的 Bob 决定退休。为了接替他，Bob 推荐了在萧氏地毯工作了 31 年的老兵 VanceBell。就像以往一样，Bob 做了正确决定。虽然房市走疲，使得地毯事业的发展也跟着迟缓，然而萧氏地毯公司依旧是伯克希尔的主力事业，贡献了可观的收益。

•MiTek, a manufacturer of connectors for roof trusses at the time we purchased it in 2001, is developing into a mini-conglomerate. At the rate it is growing, in fact, “mini” may soon be inappropriate. In purchasing MiTek for $420 million, we lent the company $200 million at 9% and bought $198 million of stock, priced at $10,000 per share. Additionally, 55 employees bought 2,200 shares for $22 million. Each employee paid exactly the same price that we did, in most cases borrowing money to do so.

• MiTek 是屋顶椼架连接件的制造商，伯克希尔在 2001 年收购该公司，目前公司也拓展成迷你集团。不过事实上，以目前的发展速度来看，"迷你"一词很快将变得不恰当。当初以 4.2 亿美元收购 MiTek 时，我们以 9%的利率借给它 2 亿美元，并且买下价值 1.98 亿美元的股票(以每股 1 万美元的价格购入)。另外，55 名员工以 2200 万的美元购入 2200 股。每名员工和我们付出的价格一样，并且大部分的人是用借钱的方式完成。

And are they ever glad they did! Five years later, MiTek’s sales have tripled and the stock is valued at $71,699 per share. Despite its making 14 acquisitions, at a cost of $291 million, MiTek has paid off its debt to Berkshire and holds $35 million of cash. We celebrated the fifth anniversary of our purchase with a party in July. I told the group that it would be embarrassing if MiTek’s stock price soared beyond that of Berkshire “A” shares. Don’t be surprised, however, if that happens (though Charlie and I will try to make our shares a moving target).

这些员工都十分庆幸自己做了这个决定。五年后 MiTek 的销售额成长 3 倍，股价为 71,699 美元。尽管它收购了 14 家公司，斥资 2.91 亿，MiTek 不但还清了伯克希尔的债务，还余有 3500 万现金。我们在 7 月时欢庆收购 5 周年纪念，我告诉经营团队如果 MiTek 的股价超越了伯克希尔的 A 股，那对伯克希尔来说，还真的很尴尬。各位，如果此事成真，千万别感到惊讶(虽然芒格跟我试着把伯克希尔的股票推向目标)。

•Not all of our businesses are destined to increase profits. When an industry’s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline. Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance. (As a wise friend told me long ago, “If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.”) And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry, a trend that has caused the profits of our Buffalo News to decline. The skid will almost certainly continue.

• 不过并不是所有业务的获利都提升了。当行业的基本面崩坏时，即使有才能的管理层，也仅能试着减缓其衰退速率。最后，逐渐崩坏的基本面会战胜管理层的才能。(就像一个有智慧的朋友曾经告诉我："要想成为一个好的企业家，就一定要进入一个好行业")。报业的基本面绝对是每况愈下，如此的情势使得伯克希尔布法罗新闻报的获利下降，而且还会持续下去。

When Charlie and I were young, the newspaper business was as easy a way to make huge returns as existed in America. As one not-too-bright publisher famously said, “I owe my fortune to two great American institutions: monopoly and nepotism.” No paper in a one-paper city, however bad the product or however inept the management, could avoid gushing profits.

我跟芒格还年轻时，在美国经营报业可以很轻易获得可观的获利。就像某位不太聪明的发行人名言："我的财富，来自于美国社会的两大支柱：垄断和裙带关系"。在某家报社垄断的城市中，无论报纸内容多么差强人意，无论管理多么无能，都能创造暴利。

The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century, newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.

产业的迟缓可能仅有一个理由可以解释。在 20 世纪大部分的时间中，报纸是美国大众主要的信息来源。不管主题为体育、财经，或政治，报纸都有至高的地位。另外很重要的是，报纸广告提供最简单的招聘信息，以及了解镇上超市商品价格的渠道。

The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest.

绝大部分的家庭感知到报纸对日常生活的重要。但是可理解的，大多数的人并不想为第二份报纸买单。广告客户喜欢找发行量最多的报社，而读者往往希望购买拥有最多广告和新闻版面的报纸。如此的循环，导致报业的丛林生存法则："强者恒强"。

Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually – and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly – and often in a disapproving way – reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm . . .)

如此一来，当一个大城市存在两家或更多报纸时(一个世纪以前，这个现象相当普遍)，通常领先的报社将会成为最后的赢家。而当竞争结束，报社在广告及报纸的定价能力方面将得到释放。一般而言，广告客户及读者的费率每年都会上调，利润滚滚而来。对股东来说，这曾是获利的天堂。(有趣的是，虽然报纸定期或通常让人不以为然的方式报道汽车或钢铁业的盈利能力，但却从未让读者了解自己的点石成金的状况。嗯….)

As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was changing, writing that “the media businesses . . . will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties, moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses.

但早在 1991 年的股东信，我就断言这种不受经济景气影响的状况，正在改变。我写道："媒体事业，最后将发现其营运结果，将比我、整个产业、或是债权人几年前所预期的好景，逊色不少。"有些报社对我这番评论、或后来陆续出现的警告感到不悦。而且，愿意接手报业资产的人仍络绎不绝，以为其仍是坚不可摧的老虎机一样。事实上，许多在报业定期记录、及分析重要国际事件的聪明经理人，对发生在自己身上的事，要么视而不见，要么漠不关心。

Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.

然而，现今所有的报社老板都了解到他们渐渐地在这场"眼球争霸战"中败阵下来。简单来说，如果有线电视和卫星广播以及互联网比报纸早诞生，那么也许根本就不会有报纸了。

In Berkshire’s world, Stan Lipsey does a terrific job running the Buffalo News, and I am enormously proud of its editor, Margaret Sullivan. The News’ penetration of its market is the highest among that of this country’s large newspapers. We also do better financially than most metropolitan newspapers, even though Buffalo’s population and business trends are not good. Nevertheless, this operation faces unrelenting pressures that will cause profit margins to slide.

Stan Lipsey 把布法罗新闻报经营得有声有色，并且我也对编辑 Margaret Sullivan 感到无比骄傲。布法罗新闻报在报纸市场的渗透率，比起全国其它报纸都来得高。在财务营运方面，即使布法罗的人口及商业趋势并不是很好，但我们的财务状况也仍旧比其它大都会的报纸来得优异。不过，营运还是面临无情的压力，这将导致利润率持续下滑。

True, we have the leading online news operation in Buffalo, and it will continue to attract more viewers and ads. However, the economic potential of a newspaper internet site – given the many alternative sources of information and entertainment that are free and only a click away – is at best a small fraction of that existing in the past for a print newspaper facing no competition.

当然，我们在布法罗拥有领先的网络新闻业务，并且这将会持续吸引更多浏览者及广告客户。但是，报纸网站的经济潜力，充其量仅是过去报纸垄断荣景的一小部分。考虑到许多网站提供了许多免费的信息及娱乐选择，并且只要用鼠标一点，就把浏览者送走了。

For a local resident, ownership of a city’s paper, like ownership of a sports team, still produces instant prominence. With it typically comes power and influence. These are ruboffs that appeal to many people with money. Beyond that, civic-minded, wealthy individuals may feel that local ownership will serve their community well. That’s why Peter Kiewit bought the Omaha paper more than 40 years ago.

但对当地居民来说，发行当地专属的报纸，就像是当地拥有运动球队一样，可以马上吸引目光。随之而来的通常是权力及影响力，这些都是吸引有钱人的好处。更甚之，有公民意识的富人，可能会觉得地方报纸将为他们的社区服务。这就是为什么 Peter Kiewit 经营奥马哈报纸超过 40 年的原因。

We are likely therefore to see non-economic individual buyers of newspapers emerge, just as we have seen such buyers acquire major sports franchises. Aspiring press lords should be careful, however: There’s no rule that says a newspaper’s revenues can’t fall below its expenses and that losses can’t mushroom. Fixed costs are high in the newspaper business, and that’s bad news when unit volume heads south. As the importance of newspapers diminishes, moreover, the “psychic” value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.

我们常常看到非经济个人报社买主出现，就好像许多收购体育特许权的买主一样。但是向往进入新闻界的大亨们可要当心，因为没有原则显示报社的收益不能低于支出，也没规则显示亏损不会愈演愈烈。经营报社的固定成本很高，并且当发行量减少时，那还真是坏消息呢。在报纸重要性降低的同时，心理上对拥有报社的精神价值也会减损，而拥有体育特许权的价值却还保有一样的地位。

Unless we face an irreversible cash drain, we will stick with the News, just as we’ve said that we would. (Read economic principle 11, on page 76.) Charlie and I love newspapers – we each read five a day – and believe that a free and energetic press is a key ingredient for maintaining a great democracy. We hope that some combination of print and online will ward off economic doomsday for newspapers, and we will work hard in Buffalo to develop a sustainable business model. I think we will be successful. But the days of lush profits from our newspaper are over.

就像先前说的，除非面临不能改善之现金流出困难，否则我们还是会坚持经营新闻媒体事业。芒格和我热爱报纸，我们一天都要读 5 份，再加上我们相信：自由且充满活力的新闻媒体，是维持民主的关键要素。我们希望印刷发行及网络的结合，可以规避报纸的末日。伯克希尔也会与布法罗一起努力，发展成一套可持续经营的商业模型。相信最后的成功将会是我们的，只是报业获利丰厚的岁月已经逝去。

•A much improved situation is emerging at NetJets, which sells and manages fractionally-owned aircraft. This company has never had a problem growing: Revenues from flight operations have increased 596% since our purchase in 1998. But profits had been erratic.

• 出售及管理共享飞机的利捷航空(NetJets)的情况大为改善。该公司的成长从来不是问题，其营收自 1998 年自伯克希尔收购以来，已经成长 596%，但在获利方面却十分不稳定。

Our move to Europe, which began in 1996, was particularly expensive. After five years of operation there, we had acquired only 80 customers. And by mid-year 2006 our cumulative pretax loss had risen to $212 million. But European demand has now exploded, with a net of 589 customers having been added in 2005-2006. Under Mark Booth’s brilliant leadership, NetJets is now operating profitably in Europe, and we expect the positive trend to continue.

1996 年我们进军欧洲导致成本暴增。在欧洲运营 5 年只获得 80 个客户，至 2006 年年中，累积的税前损失已达到 2.12 亿美元。不过目前欧洲的需求暴增，2005-2006 年新增了 589 名客户。在 Mark Booth 精明的领导之下，NetJets 在欧洲终于转亏为盈，我们期待如此的经营态势可以延续。

Our U.S. operation also had a good year in 2006, which led to worldwide pre-tax earnings of $143 million at NetJets last year. We made this profit even though we suffered a loss of $19 million in the first quarter.

2006 年美国业务也经营得不错，使得全球的税前收益达到 1.43 亿。即使在 2006 年的第一季亏损 0.19 亿，但以整年度来看，还是实现盈利。

Credit Rich Santulli, along with Mark, for this turnaround. Rich, like many of our managers, has no financial need to work. But you’d never know it. He’s absolutely tireless – monitoring operations, making sales, and traveling the globe to constantly widen the already-enormous lead that NetJets enjoys over its competitors. Today, the value of the fleet we manage is far greater than that managed by our three largest competitors combined.

如此由亏转盈的营运成绩，当然和 Mark 一起努力的 Rich Santulli 也有功劳。就像是其它伯克希尔的经理人，Rich 并不为了钱而工作，但你永远不会知道这一点。他绝对是个精力旺盛的人，负责监督营运、促进成交，并穿梭世界各地，以持续拓展本来就相当庞大的市场，让 NetJets 公司可以超越对手。今日，我们管理的机队价值，已经远远超越前三大 3 家竞争对手的总和。

There’s a reason NetJets is the runaway leader: It offers the ultimate in safety and service. At Berkshire, and at a number of our subsidiaries, NetJets aircraft are an indispensable business tool. I also have a contract for personal use with NetJets and so do members of my family and most Berkshire directors. (None of us, I should add, gets a discount.) Once you’ve flown NetJets, returning to commercial flights is like going back to holding hands.

NetJets 之所以能鹤立鸡群，是因为它提供了极致的安全及服务。在伯克希尔，及许多我们的子公司里，NetJets 的飞机是不可或缺的商业工具。而我、我的家人，以及伯克希尔董事会成员，也有和 NetJets 签下私人用途的合约(我必须要说，我们并未享有折扣)。一旦你接受过 NetJets 的服务，再回去坐一般的商用客机，好像又回到过去一样，凡事只有自求多福。