巴菲特致股东的信（2007年）⑨投资业务

Investments

投资业务

We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.

下面列出到年底我们持有的股票，它们的市值至少是 6 亿美元。

Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.

总的来说，我们所投资公司的经营表现让我们欣慰。在 2007 年，我们持有市值最大的四家公司中的三家：美国运通、可口可乐以及宝洁公司，每股收益分别增长了 12％、14％和 14％。第四家富国银行由于房地产泡沫的破裂其收益稍有下降。不过，我相信它的内在价值还是在增加，即使只增加了一点点。

In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.

在陌生世界的各行各业里，请注意，美国运通和富国银行都是 HenryWells 和 WilliamFargo 创建的，分别创建于 1850 年和 1852 年。宝洁和可口可乐分别创建于 1837 年和 1886 年。创业不是我们的游戏。

I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” – a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors – have widened during the year. All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.

我必须强调的是：我们不是通过任何一年投资标的的市场价格来衡量我们投资的进展。相反，我们通过适用于我们自己所拥有企业的两个标准来评估它们的表现。第一条标准，扣除行业整体状况后的实际收益增长。第二条更主观的标准是，它们的"护城河"是否在这一年里变得更宽，"护城河"是一种隐喻，指的是公司拥有的，会让它的竞争对手日子难过的竞争优势。这四大公司在这项测试中毫无疑问，都能得分。

We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion. By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina’s management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.

去年我们有一笔很大的卖出。在 2002-2003 年，伯克希尔投资 4.88 亿美元买入中国石油 1.3％的股权。按这个价格整个公司的价值大约为 370 亿美元。那时查理和我认为该公司的内在价值约为 1000 亿美元。到 2007年，有两个因素显著提高了它的内在价值：油价大幅攀升；以及公司的管理层在石油和天然气资源储备方面做到很好。去年下半年，公司的市值上升到 2750 亿美元，与其他类似的大型石油公司相比，价值大致相当。所以，我们以 40 亿美元卖出了中国石油的股票。

A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government – defense, social security, you name it – for about four hours.

一个脚注：我们为中国石油交易上的收益向美国国税局缴纳了 12 亿美元的利得税。此笔税款大约是美国政府运作 4 小时的所有费用，这包括了国防、社会保障等，我能叫得出的所有费用。

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Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.

去年我告诉你们，我管理着伯克希尔 62 个衍生品合约。(我们还有一些合约，遗留在了通用再保险流失的账簿里)。今天，我们有 94 个这样的合约，它们主要分为两类。

First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

第一类合约，我们签了 54 个，要求我们为各种高收益指数中包含的某些债券承担违约风险。这些合约的到期日各不相同，从 2009 年到 2013 年。到年底，我们从这些合约中收到 32 亿美元的保费，已支付了 4.72 亿美元的损失；并且在最坏的情况下(尽管这种极端的情况不太可能发生)，还需要再支付 47 亿美元。

We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet.

我们确定还会支付更多，但我相信，撇开我们持有的大笔资金能够带来的投资收益不说，仅就保费收入而言，这些合约也被证明是有利可图的。在年底我们的资产负债表中，为这些合约的"风险敞口"，记录了 18 亿美元的"衍生合约负债"。

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

第二类合约，涉及到我们针对四种股票指数(标普 500 指数和三种国外的指数)卖出的各种看跌期权。这些看跌期权的原始期限为 15 年或 20 年，它们会受到市场的影响。我们为此收到 45 亿美元的保费，年底我们记录的衍生合约负债是 46 亿美元。这些合约中的看跌期权只能在到期日行权，它们的到期时间在 2019 年到 2027 年之间。届时，只有当相关的股票指数水平，低于看跌期权合约当日报价时的，我们才需要付钱出去。同样的，我相信这些合约，总体上将是盈利的。我们也将在持有这些保费的 15 或 20 年里，通过投资获得可观的收益。

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.

对于我们的衍生品合约有两点是很重要的。第一，在所有交易里，我们都是通过卖出合约收钱的一方，这意味着我们并没有交易对手风险。

Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

第二，这些衍生品合约适用的会计准则，不同于我们的投资组合。投资组合资产价值的变化将以净资产的形式，显示在伯克希尔的资产负债表上，但它不会影响当期的收益，除非我们出售(或是减记)持有的股份。而衍生品合约的价值变化，必须每个季度的计入收益中。

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

因此，我们持有的衍生品头寸，有时会造成公司报告收益的大幅波动，可查理和我相信这些头寸的内在价值变化很小。即便这些波动很容易在单个季度达到 10 亿美元或更多，他和我也不会对此有所困扰，我们希望你也不会。大家会记得，在巨灾保险业务中，我们总是愿意，用短期收益报告的大幅波动，换取长期账面价值的巨大增长。这也是我们在衍生品交易中的投资哲学。

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The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.

美元贬值在 2007 年，美元对其它主要货币进一步贬值，原因显而易见：美国人喜爱购买世界其它地区生产的产品，超过世界其他地区的人们对美国产商品的喜爱。这就不可避免地造成，美国每天将大约价值 20 亿美元的借据和资产输送给世界其他地区。随着时间推移，这会对美元造成压力。

When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion. Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007. Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.

当美元贬值时，它既让外国人能更便宜地购买我们的产品，又使它们的产品对美国人来说变得更昂贵。这就是为什么货币贬值常被认为可以用来解决贸易赤字。的确，美元大幅贬值后，美国的贸易赤字，毫无疑问会有所缓解。但是想想看：在 2002 年，欧元平均值为 0.946 美元，我们对德国(我们第五大贸易伙伴)的贸易赤字是 360亿美元。到 2007 年，欧元平均值为 1.37 美元，而我们对德国的贸易赤字却上升到 450 亿美元。相似的情况是，加元 2002 年平均值为 0.64 美元，2007 年为 0.93 美元。我们对加拿大的贸易赤字同样也从 2002 年的 500 亿美元上升到 2007 年的 640 美元。到目前为止，美元的贬值并不能对平衡我们的贸易起很大的作用。

There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

最近有很多主权财富基金以及它们如何在购买大量美国公司的讨论。这是我们自己造成的，并不是外国政府有什么邪恶的阴谋。实际上，我们的贸易方式导致了在美国的巨额外国投资。当我们每天将 20 亿美元强加给世界其他地区时，他们必定会在这里投资点什么。当他们选择股票，而不是债券时，为什么我们要抱怨呢？

Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.

美元的贬值，错不在欧佩克，中国及其他。其他发达国家和美国一样依赖石油进口，也和中国进口石油展开竞争。在制定明智的贸易政策时，美国不应单独挑选出一些国家来惩罚或一些行业来保护。我们也不应该采取那些很容易引发报复的行动，那样只会减少美国的出口，对我们和世界其他地区来说，真正的贸易应该是互惠的。

Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)

然而，我们的立法者应该认识到，这种贸易不平衡是不可持续的，所以现在需要调整政策，以求从实质上尽早而不推迟减少这种不平衡。否则，我们每天强加给世界各地的 20 亿美元，已经造成全球令人不快的消化不良。有关贸易赤字不可持续的其它评述，请看艾伦·格林斯潘 Alan Greenspan2004 年 11 月 19 日的论述，联邦公开市场委员会 2004 年 6 月 29 日的备忘录，和本·伯南克 Ben Bernanke2007 年 9 月 11 日的讲话)

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At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

伯克希尔在 2007 年只持有一种直接外汇的头寸。它就是——请屏住你的呼吸——巴西的货币雷亚尔。就在不久以前，将美元兑换成雷亚尔被认为是不可想象的。毕竟，在过去一个世纪里，多达 5 个版本的巴西货币已经变成了狂欢节彩纸片了。正如许多货币周期性贬值和消亡的国家一样，富裕的巴西人为保护他们的财富，有时将大笔的资金转移到美国。

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.

但是任何采用这种看上去谨慎方式的巴西人，已经在过去 5 年中，都损失了一半的净资产。这是从 2002 年到 2007 年底，雷亚尔对美元的指数记录：100，122，133，152，166，199。每年雷亚尔都在走高，美元却在下跌。此外，在这段时期大部分时间里，巴西政府还在市场中买入美元，以此来压低雷亚尔的升值速度，并支撑美元的下跌。

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

我们直接外汇头寸在过去 5 年中已经带来 23 美元的税前收益。另外，我们还通过持有以外币计价的美国公司债券获利。例如，在 2001 年和 2002 年，我们以 57％面值的价格，购买了 3.1 亿欧元的亚马逊公司的债券：票面利率 6.875％，2010 年 6 月到期。当时，亚马逊公司的债券被定价为"垃圾"级信用，尽管它们根本就不是。(是的，在 Virginia，你偶尔能够发现市场效率会低的离谱，或者你也可以在任何地方发现它们，除了某些主流商学院的金融系。)

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

对我们来说，亚马逊债券的以欧元计价是一个更深层更重要的吸引力。在 2002 年我们购买的时候，欧元的平均值是 0.95 美元。因此，我们的成本以美元计仅仅是 1.69 亿美元。现在债券以 102％面值的价格被出售，欧元平均值是 1.47 美元。在 2005 年和 2006 年我们的一些债券被赎回，我们收到 2.53 亿美元。我们剩余的债券在年底价值为 1.62 亿美元。在我们已实现和未实现的 2.46 亿美元收益里，约有 1.18 亿美元是由于美元的贬值。货币确实很重要。

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.

在伯克希尔，我们将努力提高直接和间接的海外收益来源。即使我们能成功，我们的资产和收益仍将主要集中在美国。尽管我们国家存在许多不完善之处和各种各样的问题，但是美国法制，市场经济体系，以及社会精英的信仰都将为国民创造持久的繁荣。

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As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.

正如我之前告诉过你们的，一段时间以来，我们已经对 CEO 的接班人做好了充分的准备，因为我们拥有三个很出色的内部候选人。董事会很清楚的知道，一旦我死亡或能力衰退而无法胜任工作，他们将选谁来接替我的工作。并且董事会还有两个后备人选。

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.

去年，我告诉你们，我们将尽快完成伯克希尔在投资业务上的接班人计划。我们的确现在确定了 4 个候选人，他们都能接替我的投资工作。目前，所有人都管理着大量资金，并且他们都表示，如果接到电话，非常有兴趣应邀到伯克希尔来工作。董事会了解这四位的能力，如果需要，董事去期望雇佣一个或多个人。这些候选人都正当壮年，经济上非常富有，所有人希望能为伯克希尔效力，并不是为了薪酬。

(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)

(我很不情愿地打消了，要在我死后继续管理投资组合的念头。也放弃我希望给"拓展视野"一词赋予的新含义。)