巴菲特致股东的信（2007年）⑩充满想象力的数字--上市公司如何给收益注水

Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings

充满想象力的数字--上市公司如何给收益注水

Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.” If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.

前参议员 Alan Simpson 有句名言："那些在华盛顿高速公路上开车的人，需要不怕大堵车"。假如参议员要寻找的是真正不堵车的道路，他应该去看看美国公司的会计们走那边。

An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity – by unanimous agreement, no less – to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.

1994 年在企业"首选路线的问题"上举行了一次最重要的投票。迫于美国 CEO 们的压力，美国参议院投票以88 比 9 通过提案，让美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)闭上了嘴。此前，一项毫无异义的规定让 FASB 饱受指责，规定要求公司的管理层们，他们获得的股票期权是一种经济补偿，其价值将被作为一项费用计入公司报表。

After the senators voted, the FASB – now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs – decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.

在参议员们投票表决后，FASB(现在由参议院 88 名秘密注册会计师进行会计原则教育)颁布法令：公司可以在两种期权报告方式之间选择。"首选的"处理方式是：将期权的价值视为费用。不过法令也允许，当公司是按市场价值发行期权时，可以忽略这些费用。

A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.” I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.

轮到美国的 CEO 们说真话的时候，他们的回应一点不光彩。在接下去的 6 年里，入选标准普尔指数的 500家公司中只有两家，选择了"费用化"路线。余下公司的 CEO 们全都选择了另一条备选路线，从而忽略了一大笔巨大而明显的支出，只为在报表上报告更高的"收益"。我确信他们中的一些人也觉得，如果他们选择把期权作为费用计入，他们的董事们会在将来的某些时候，在批准经理们渴望的巨额奖金之前而三思。

It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.

事实证明，对很多 CEO 来说，那条备选路线也不够好。在日趋削弱的规定下，如果期权发行价格低于公司市场价值，仍然存在收益。不过没问题。为了规避这条恼人的规定，许多公司秘密地回溯授予期权的日期，以虚假的表明他们是按当时的市场价格获得期权的，而事实上，他们是以远低于市场价格发行的。

Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain – important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.

十多年里，针对股票期权的荒谬会计规则正在淡出，但是其他这样的会计手段依然存在，其中比较重要的是，公司在计算养老金费用时，使用的投资回报假设。毫不奇怪，许多公司将会继续选定一种假设，使其报告的"收益"低于实际水平。对于标准普尔指数 363 家制定养老金计划的公司中，2006 年平均投资回报假设是 8％。让我们看看这个假设实现的可能性。

The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.

在所有的养老基金中，平均持有债券和现金的比例大约是 28％，这部分资产的回报率不会超过 5％。当然更高的收益是有可能达到的，但同时也会带来相应(或更大)损失的风险。

This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments – must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.

这意味着剩余 72％的养老金资产大部分是公司股权，或直接持有，或通过对冲基金或私人股权投资等工具间接持有。如果要使整个基金整体收益率达到假设的 8％，这部分资产的收益率必须达到 9.2％，并且这种回报，必须是扣除所有费用之后的，但是现在的费用水平远高于以往。

How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.

这种期望的真实性有多少呢？让我们回顾一下两年前我提到的一些数据：在整个 20 世纪，道琼斯指数从 66点涨到 11497 点。这个增长看上去很大，但年复合增长率仅有 5.3％。如果一个投资者，持有道琼斯指数整整一个世纪，在期间的很多时候，他会收到很慷慨的分红，但在最后的几年里，分红大约也只有 2％左右。20 世纪是一个多么美好的世纪。

Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.

想想现在这个世纪。投资者如果仅仅想达到 5.3％的市值增长，那道琼斯指数(最近低于 13000 点)需要在2099 年 12 月 31 日收报于 200 万点左右！就是在 100 年里，为达到上世纪年化 5.3％的收益水平，需要道琼斯指数上涨 198.8 万点，在这个世纪的头八年里，我们只取得不到 2000 点的上涨。

It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?

有趣的是，市场评论人士经常在道琼斯指，突破诸如 14000 点或 15000 点这样千点整数位时，感到异常兴奋。如果他们保持这种反应，按本世纪按年化增长 5.3％计，他们将在余下的 92 年里，至少要经历 1986 次这样的兴奋。虽然说一切皆有可能，但真的有人相信这是最有可能的结果吗？

Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and high-priced managers (“helpers”).

股息收益率继续徘徊在 2％左右。即使股票年化增长率能达到上世纪 5.3％的水平，养老金计划中的股票部分，在考虑 0.5％的费用支出后，收益率也不会超过 7％左右。考虑到投资顾问和高身价基金经理的存在，0.5%的费用支出已经是相当保守的了。

Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.

当然，每个人都期望自己收益率超过市场的平均水平。那些"投资顾问"由衷的鼓励和灌输他们的客户这种观念。但是作为一个雇佣这些投资顾问的群体，他们的收益率一定是低于平均水平。原因很简单：1)整体而言，投资者必然获得一个平均回报，减去他们承担的交易费用；2)被动型投资者和指数投资者，由于他们交易不活跃，他们获得的回报，是平均回报减去一个非常低的交易费用。3)在赚取市场平均收益的群体中，剩下的一部分就是交易活跃的投资者。但是这个群体将产生高额的交易、管理和顾问咨询费用。所以交易活跃的投资者回报率将比不活跃的投资者的回报率要低得多。这意味着，"懵懂无知"的被动型投资者一定会胜出。

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about double-digit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

我必须指出的是，在本世纪里，那些预计从股票中赚到 10％年化收益的人，他们设想的是 2％的年收益来自分红，8％来自股价上涨。他们相当于含蓄的预计，2100 年道琼斯指数会在 2400 万点的水平！如果你的理财顾问说会从股票上赚到两位数的投资回报，那就把上面的数学问题解释给他听，一定会让他感到狼狈。许多"投资顾问"显然是童话"绿野仙踪"里女王后裔，她说："为什么我在早饭前就已经相信了超过六件不可能发生的事情呢？"要当心那些油嘴滑舌的投资顾问，他们在往你头脑里塞进幻想的同时，也在往自己的口袋里揣满酬金。

Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.

一些公司在欧洲和美国都有养老金计划，在他们的会计中，几乎所有公司都认为，美国养老金计划将会比海外的养老金赚的更多。这种差异令人费解：为什么这些公司不派他们的美国养老金经理们，去管理公司海外养老金资产，好让他们在这些资产上施展自己魔力？我从来没有见过有人解释这个谜题，但是负责审查这些回报假设的审计人员和核算师似乎对此没有异议。

What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.

然而毫无疑问的是，为什么 CEO 们要选择一个如此高的投资回报假设：这样他们就可以报告更高的收益。而且即便他们错了，正如我认为的那样，那恶果也只是在他们退休后的很长时间里才会发生。

After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”

数十年来，美国公司一直在尽可能高的虚报当前收益，或是更糟的企图，这些行为应该收敛了。他们应该听听我搭档查理·芒格的话："如果你三次把球击出左边界，那下次击球时，瞄得稍微靠向右些。"

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Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

无论未来公司的股东面临什么样的养老金成本意外，纳税人要经历的打击，要远胜公司股东们许多倍。公共养老金虽然承诺巨大，但在很多方面，养老基金资金却严重不足。只是因为引爆这颗定时炸弹的导火索还很长，政治家们畏缩于加税后造成的痛苦。反正只有在这些官员去世后很久，这些问题才会出现。这些官员们很容易作出这些养老的承诺，包括提前退休(有时是 40 岁以下的人)和慷慨的生活成本调整等计划。在这个人们寿命越来越长而且通货膨胀确定无疑的世界里，那些承诺将决不容易兑现。

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Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.

在阐述了美国公司会计中"荣誉制度"的失败之后，我需要指出的是，在伯克希尔庞大的资产负债表项目中，它是确实存在的。在每个我们提供给你们的报表中，我们必须为我们保险的业务估算损失储备金。如果我们的估算有误，将意味着我们的资产负债表和损益表都是错的。所以，我们自然会尽自己所能让这部分估算精确。然而，在每一份报告中，我们的估算肯定会有差错。

At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.

在 2007 年底，我们列示了 560 亿美元的保险负债。这表示我们推测，在年底前发生的所有损失事件，最终将进行赔付的金额，(除了约 30 亿美元准备金已按现值贴现)。我们为知道的数以千计的事件进行了估算，以反映我们需要支付的美元价值，包括在支付过程中需要支付的相关费用(如律师费)。在某些案子里，由工伤赔偿保障引发的，对某些严重伤害的索赔，将支付 50 年或更长时间。

We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.

我们还为年底前已发生但尚未报告的损失储备了大笔的准备金。有时，被保险人本身也不知道是否有损失发生(想想哪些多年未被发现的职务侵占案件)。我们有时候接到索赔，损失来自我们几十年前承保的保单。

A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000. He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10. He paid that, too – and still another $10 charge he received a month later. When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”

几年前我曾告诉过你们一个故事，形象说明我们在精确估算损失责任方面的问题：一个小伙子正在欧洲进行一次重要的商务旅行，这时他妹妹来电话告诉他：父亲过世了。但小伙子解释说，他没法回去，但鉴于自己没有在葬礼上出什么力，他愿意承担葬礼的费用。在他回来后，他的妹妹告诉他，葬礼办得顺利，并寄给了他一张8000 美元的账单，他付了。但一个月后，他又收到从殡仪馆开出的一张 10 美元账单。他又付了。又一个月后，他又收到另一张同样的 10 美元账单。当第三张 10 美元账单寄给他时，这个困惑的男人打电话给他妹妹询问发生了什么事。她回答说，"哦，我忘了告诉你，爸爸下葬的时候，穿的是租来的西装。"

At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.

在我们的保险公司，我们有一个未知的，但肯定数量巨大的"租来的西装"被埋在世界各地。我们试图精确估算他们的账单。在十年或二十年后，我们甚至能够很好的猜测，我们现在的估算有多不准确。但即便是这样保守的估算也会让人意料之外，我个人认为，我们的准备金是充足的，但在过去，我也犯过好几次错误。