巴菲特致股东的信（2009年）⑦金融及金融产品

Finance and Financial Products

金融及金融产品

Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.

我们在这一领域最大的业务是 Clayton Homes，美国最大模块化预制住宅制造商。Clayton 并非一直占据着龙头位置。十年前，该领域三大制造商 Fleetwood、Champion、Oakwood 合计占据行业 44%的产量，但这些公司现在都已破产。同时，整个行业的产量也从 1999 年的 38.2 万套下降至 2009 年的 6 万套。

The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.

该行业陷入困局有两个主要原因。第一个原因跟美国住房开工率有关，美国经济若要实现复苏就必须忍受其影响。2009 年 55.4 万套新屋开工量，是有数据 50 年以来的最低记录。但这似乎是一个好消息。

People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts – the supply side of the picture – were running about two million annually. But household formations – the demand side – only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.

几年前人们认为每年新屋开工量(供应方)200 万套是一个好消息，但新组建家庭(需求方)仅约 120 万。在经历了几年这种失衡后，不出所料，这个国家最终拥有了太多的存量住房。

There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.

有三种途径可以解决这个问题：第一，与"旧车换现金"计划相似，拆掉大量住房；第二，鼓励青年人同居加速家庭组建，但这一办法只有在当事人自愿的情况下才能得以推行；第三，将新屋开工数量减少到远低于家庭组建水平。

Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.

我们的国家理智地选择了第三种途径。这意味着在一年的时间里，住房的问题的政策将非常支持我们，那些高价豪宅和滥建问题极为严重的地方除外。当然住房价格将会远远低于泡沫时期水平，但对于每一个受此影响的售房者或信贷方造成损失的同时，都会有一个购房者从中受益。事实上，几年前那些无法承担购房压力的家庭现在发现，拥有一套住房成为了他们力所能及的事，因为房地产市场泡沫已经破裂。

The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.

住宅建造业陷入困境的第二个原因是该行业特有的：工厂预制房屋和现场建造房屋之间存在惩罚性抵押贷款利率差异。在你继续阅读之前，让我强调一个显而易见的事实，伯克希尔在这场斗争中有利益所在(Clayton)，因此你应该特别小心接下来的评论。然而，这个警告让我解释一下，为什么利率的差异会给大量低收入美国人及Clayton 公司带来问题。

The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 51⁄4%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.

住房抵押贷款市场是由联邦住房管理局 FHA、房地美、房利美制度出来的条例控制，其信贷标准占有绝对的优势，因为他们担保的抵押贷款能够实现证券化，并且实际上均将其转变成联邦政府义务。目前，符合这些担保条件的传统现场建造住宅买家，可以获得利率仅为 5.25%的 30 年期贷款。此外，作为维持超低利率水平的举措之一，目前这种贷款已大量被美联储购买。

In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however – and, of course, most buyers do – the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.

相比之下，很少有工厂预制房屋符合机构抵押贷款的资格，因此一个预制房购房者必须负担的贷款利率达到9%。对于那些采取现金支付方式的购房者，Clayton 的住房拥有着极高的购买价值，然而，如果购房者需要申请住房抵押贷款(事实上大部分购房者都需要)，那么贷款利率上的差异足以抵消预制房在价格上的吸引力。

Last year I told you why our buyers – generally people with low incomes – performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.

去年，我曾解释了为什么我们信用风险很高的买家(通常是低收入群体)但却表现出了更好的信用，因为他们的态度决定了一切。他们购买房屋是为了居住其中而并非打算从转售中赚上一笔。通常，我们的买家通常会根据核实过的偿付能力选择贷款(我们不发放骗子贷款)，并期待着某天他们能最终还清贷款。当然，如果他们失业、离婚或者遭遇了严重的健康问题，我们也有可能面临违约问题的发生，但他们很少因为房价下跌而放弃偿还贷款。即使当前失业压力剧增，但 Clayton 的拖欠和违约行为仍很适度并且没有我们制造出重大麻烦。

We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.

我们也曾努力使更多客户能够符合政府的资格，以获得现场建造房屋类似的利率优惠。但截至目前，我们只取得了一些象征性成功。因此，许多收入不高但习惯负责任的家庭不得不放弃购房，仅仅因为预制房抵押贷款利率差异导致其每月还款额过高。如果我们的低利率的贷款限定条件不被放宽，以便向所有符合首付和收入标准的购房者提供融资，那么预制房制造业务发展空间注定越来越萎缩。

Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn’t have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire’s interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire’s credit to support Clayton’s mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can’t borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.

尽管在这样情况下，我相信 Clayton 在未来几年仍将盈利，虽然盈利远远低于其真实潜力。我们没有比 CEO凯文克莱顿(KevinClayton)更优秀的经理人了，他将伯克希尔的利益视为自身利益。我们的产品一流物美价廉，并且不断改进。而且，伯克希尔也将会继续以其信用支持 Clayton 的抵押贷款计划，因为我们相信这些贷款的合理性。即使如此，我们也无法以接近政府贷款的利率去借款，这一障碍将会限制我们的销售，损害到 Clayton 和大量渴望廉价住房的美国家庭的共同利益。

In the following table, Clayton’s earnings are net of the company’s payment to Berkshire for the use of its credit. Offsetting this cost to Clayton is an identical amount of income credited to Berkshire’s finance operation and included in “Other Income.” The cost and income amount was $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008.

在下表中，克莱顿的收益是该公司因使用伯克希尔的信用而向其支付信用成本后的净额。克莱顿的这一成本，以相同的金额，被记入伯克希尔金融业务"其他收入"科目中的收益中。2009 年的成本和收益分别为 1.16 亿美元和 9200 万美元。

The table also illustrates how severely our furniture (CORT) and trailer (XTRA) leasing operations have been hit by the recession. Though their competitive positions remain as strong as ever, we have yet to see any bounce in these businesses.

下表还说明了去年的经济危机对我们的家具(CORT)和拖车(XTRA)租赁业务造成了多么严重的影响。尽管他们的竞争地位仍如以往一样牢固，但我们尚未看到这些业务有任何回暖迹象：

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At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country’s third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.

2009 年底，我们已拥有全国第三大商业抵押贷款服务商 Berkadia Commercial Mortgage 公司(以前称为Capmark)50%的股份。除了管理 2350 亿美元的投资资产外，Berkadia 是最初出现住房抵押贷款时的重要操作者，在全国拥有 25 个办事处。尽管在接下来的几年里商业房地产将面临巨大的挑战，但长远地看，Berkadia 将拥有巨大的发展机会。

Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.

我们在 Berkadia 的合作伙伴是 Leucadia 公司，由乔斯坦伯格(JoeSteinberg)和伊恩卡明(IanCumming)运营。几年前，当伯克希尔与他们一起收购陷入困境的 Finova 金融公司时，我们就曾有过愉快的合作经历。当时为了解决问题，乔和伊恩所做的努力远远超出了其份内工作，这也是我一直夸赞的。所以当他们与我联系共同购买 Berkadia 时我感到很高兴。

Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let’s call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I’ll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia.

我们也将第一次的冒险经历命名为 Berkadia，所以让我们将这次称为 Berkadia 的儿子，未来的某天，我将会在写给股东的信中谈论 Berkadia 的孙子。