巴菲特致股东的信（2010年）②业绩

Performance

业绩

Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.

查理和我认为，那些受托管理别人资金的人，应该在其工作伊始就确定绩效目标。如果缺乏业绩标准，管理层将会倾向先射出业绩之箭，然后在周围画上靶心。

In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

就伯克希尔而言，我们很早就告诉过大家，我们的目标是，使每股内在价值增长超过标准普尔 500 指数(含股息)。在有些年份我们超过了，但也有一些年份我们没有超过。但是，如果随着时间推移，我们无法达到这一目标，我们就没有为我们的投资者带来任何东西，他们完全可以通过购买一只指数基金来实现同等的或者更好的回报。

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.

当然，如何计算内在价值也是一项挑战。将这个问题交给查理和我，你将得到两个不同的答案。想要精确是不可能的。

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

为了消除主观性，我们在衡量业绩时，采用账面价值作为内在价值的一个低估的替代指标。可以肯定的是，我们的一些业务价值远远超过他们的账面价值。(在这份报告的后半部分，将介绍一个案例研究)。因为内在价值相比账面价值的溢价，每年很少巨幅波动，所以，账面价值可以作为衡量我们表现的一个合理工具。

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

第2页的业绩对比表说明了 46 年以来，伯克希尔相对于标准普尔 500 指数的业绩变化。在早期年份，伯克希尔的业绩非常好，而现在的业绩只能说是令人满意。我们在此想强调的是，那些富饶的年份已经一去不复返。我们目前管理的巨额资本已经不存在任何实现非凡的业绩的可能性。然而，我们将竭尽所能，使得业绩超过平均水平。达到这个标准对你们来说是公平的。

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

需要注意的是，我们不应该忽略年度数据，也不应该过于看重。地球绕太阳公转的速度，与投资理念和运营决策产生业绩所需的时间并不同步。例如，在 GEICO，我们 2010 年的广告支出高达 9000 万美元，而所吸引的保险客户并没有立即为我们带来利润。如果我们的广告支出能够有效的翻番，我们将很高兴这么做，即使短期业绩将进一步承压。在对铁路和公用事业进行大额投资的时候，我们也着眼于未来的回报。

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

为了让你们对业绩有一个更长远的看法，我们重新编制了首页的年度业绩对比数据，以 5 年为期总共 42 期，它们讲述了一个有趣的故事。比较来看，我们最好的年份结束于 1980 年代。然而，接下来的 17 年是市场的黄金时期。尽管我们的相对优势缩小，但伯克希尔仍然取得了惊人的绝对回报。

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

1999 年之后市场停滞(不知道你们是否注意到这一点？)，因此，从那时起，伯克希尔所实现的相对于标普 500 指数的令人满意的回报率，只带来了温和的绝对收益。

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.

展望未来，我们希望伯克希尔所实现的收益率能够比标普 500 指数平均高几个点，尽管这远非确定。如果我们达到了这个目标，几乎可以肯定，在股市低迷的年份，我们将实现较好的相对业绩，而在股市狂热的年份则会相对较差。