巴菲特致股东的信（2010年）③内在价值的今天和明天

Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow

内在价值的今天和明天

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

尽管我们无法准确计算伯克希尔的内在价值，但是，对于其三个关键因素，我们可以衡量其中的两个。查理和我在评估伯克希尔内在价值的时候，特别依赖这些因素。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

公司内在价值的第一个组成部分是我们的投资，包括股票、债券和现金等价物。期末，这些投资的市场价值为 1580 亿美元。

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金是在保险业务中我们所临时持有的不属于我们的货币。保险浮存金为我们的投资提供了 660 亿美元的资金。只要保险承保能盈亏平衡，这些钱就是免费的，也就是说，我们收取的保费能覆盖我们所产生赔付损失和运营成本。当然，保险承保损益波动不定。然而，纵观伯克希尔的整个历史，我们一直保持盈利。在将来，我也希望我们能够实现盈亏平衡或更好的结果。如果达到了这一点，那些由保险浮存金和留存收益提供资金的投资，都可以视为伯克希尔股东价值的重要组成部分。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

公司内在价值的第二个组成部分是来自于投资和保险承保之外的其他收益。它们来自于 68 家非保险公司，在之后有详细说明。在伯克希尔的早期，我们专注于投资。然而，在过去 20 年间，我们越来越强调拓展来自于非保险业务的收益。这个战略我们将继续下去。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

下表表明了这种改变。在表中，我们从 1970 年开始(即我们进入保险业 3 年后)，以 10 年为期列出了每股投资和每股经营收益(不包括少数股东权益)。

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

尽管在这 40 年，我们每股投资年复合增长率达到惊人的 19.9%，然而，由于近年来我们集中资金专注于购买经营业务，每股投资年增长率急速下降。

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

下表显示了这种转变的回报，这展示了我们的非保险业务的收益是如何增加的，仍然以每股为基础，并在适用的少数股权之后。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

40 年来，伯克希尔非保险业务每股税前收益年复合增长率为 21.0%，公司股价同期年复合增长率为 22.1%。随着时间的推移，你就会发现公司的股价变动与伯克希尔的投资和收益变动大致同步。市场价格和内在价值遵循的路径经常不同，尽管有时交汇时间很漫长，但它们终将交汇。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

内在价值计算还涉及第三个因素：未来留存收益的使用效率。这个要素主观性比较强，可以是积极的，也可以是消极的。我们和其他众多企业一样，很可能在未来十年内，保留的收益将等于甚至超过，我们目前所使用的资本。其中有些公司从每 1 美元的留存收益中收回 50 美分，而有些公司则收回 2 美元。

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

为了让我们或任何人能够合理地估计一家企业的内在价值，"他们将用留存收益做些什么"这个因素，必须与前面两个"我们现在拥有什么"的计算，一起进行评估。这是因为当管理层使用其所在公司部分收益进行再投资时，外部投资者只能旁观。如果一名 CEO 能够胜任这项工作，再投资前景将增加企业的当前价值，如果 CEO 的能力和动机受到怀疑，那么当前的价值将大打折扣。其结果的差异可能是巨大的。1960 年代，交给 Sears 公司或Montgomery 公司的 CEO 的每一美元，与交给沃尔玛公司 Sam Walton 的相比，其结局真是大相径庭。

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Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

查理和我希望我们非保险业务的每股收益能够以令人满意的速度增长。但是，随着数字越来越大，工作变得越来越困难。我们不仅希望当前业务经营良好，还希望出现更多大宗收购。我们整装待发，猎象之枪已经上膛，扣住扳机的手指正发痒痒。

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.

我们所具备的一些重要优势部分抵消了我们庞大规模的劣势。首先，我们拥有一批能力出众的管理人才，他们对自身的业务运营以及伯克希尔忠诚无比。我们的许多 CEO 都很富有，他们工作的唯一原因是出于对本职工作的热爱。他们是自愿的，而非为钱而来。因为没有人能够给他们提供一份让他们更喜欢的工作，所以他们不会因为受到利诱而离开公司。

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

在伯克希尔，经理人能够专注于经营各自的业务：他们无需参加总部召开的会议，也无需担忧融资问题，更不会受到华尔街的骚扰。他们只是每两年会收到本人的一封信，如果他们愿意就会给我打电话。他们工作的方式各不相同：在过去一年之中，有些经理从未与我交谈，而有些经理几乎每天都要和我交谈。我们信任的是人，而并非流程。"雇佣优秀员工，少管理他们"的箴言不仅适用于这些经理人，而且也适用于我本人。

Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

伯克希尔的 CEO们各式各样。有些人拥有 MBA，有些没上过大学。有些 CEO 按部就班进行预算；有些则是按自己意愿行事。我们的团队犹如一支由击球风格迥异的全明星组成的棒球队，我们很少要求他们做出改变。

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

我们的第二个优势与我们分配利润的方式有关。在满足业务需要之后，我们还有大量的剩余现金。绝大多数公司资本再投资，局限于自己一直经营的业务领域。这往往将它们限制在一个很小的范围内，对于为数不多的机会的竞争趋于激烈。卖方占据有力地位，如同在唯一一个女孩出现在一个男孩众多的舞会上一样。这种不均衡的的局面将对女孩有利，但对男孩来说就太糟糕了。

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.

在伯克希尔，我们配置资本的时候不会受到制度上的约束。查理和我只是受制于个人的能力，无法理解潜在收购的可能未来。如果我们克服这项障碍(通常我们并不能)，我们就能够将一项机会与其他众多机会进行比较。

When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

当我于 1965 年接管伯克希尔的时候，并没有利用该项优势。当时，伯克希尔只从事纺织业务。在我接管之前的 10 年间，公司亏损严重。我做过的最蠢的事情莫过于决定，继续在现存的纺织业务里寻找机会并扩大经营，所以在之后几年中我就一直致力于此，就在那时，在最后的灵光一闪中，我出去收购了另外一家纺织企业。啊啊啊(真是糟糕透了)！！最终，我醒悟过来，首先跨入保险业，之后又进入了其他行业。

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

除了这种"世界尽在我手"的优势之外，还有一个补充：除了评估一个企业相对于其他企业的优点之外，我们还衡量这项业务相对于有价证券的机会。而这种衡量方式却被大多是管理层忽略了。在大多数情况下，企业定价过高，而股票或债券投资可能赚取更高的收益。在这种情况下，我们买进证券，等待时机。

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性，是我们迄今所取得的大多数成就的主要原因。例如，我们的喜诗糖果或者美国商业资讯公司(Business Wire)是我们经营的最好的两项业务，也是再投资机会非常有限的两项业务，我们从中两家公司获得收益，并将其收益投入到购买 BNSF 铁路公司中去。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一项优势是，弥漫在伯克希尔内的难以复制的企业文化。在经营中，企业文化至关重要。

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

首先，代表你们的董事们像股东一样思考和行动，他们只得到了象征性地补偿：没有期权、没有受限股票，而且因此，实质上也几乎没有现金。我们没有向董事和高管提供责任保险，而其他大型上市公司都提供责任保险。如果他们搞糟了你们的钱，他们也同样失去金钱。除我个人股份以外，这些董事及其家庭所持有的伯克希尔股份价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事，以极大的热情和股东视角监督伯克希尔的行动和结果。选择他们作为财产管理员，对你们和我来讲，何其幸运！

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

这种所有者导向的文化同样在我们子公司的管理层中盛行。在很多种情况下，这些人们将伯克希尔视为一个收购他们及其家族所长期拥有的一项业务的收购方。他们带着所有者的心态加入我们，我们向他们提供一个能够保持这种所有者心态的环境。拥有一批热爱自己业务的经理人，是我们一项很大的优势。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

文化是自我传播的。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经说道，"你塑造了建筑，然后建筑塑造了你"(You shape your housesand then they shape you.)。这一智慧同样适用于企业。官僚主义的程序导致更多的官僚主义，专制将诱发专横的行为。正如一句俚语所言：当你坐在汽车后座，而车一动不动时，你就知道自己已经不再是一名 CEO 了。在伯克希尔的"全球总部"，我们每年的租金仅为 270212 美元。此外，办公室家具、艺术品、自动可乐售货机、午餐室、高科技设备等方面的投资为 301363 美元。只要查理和我视你们的钱为我们自己的钱，伯克希尔的经理人也将小心经营。

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

我们的薪酬方案、年度股东大会、甚至我们的年度报告的设计，都是为了增强伯克希尔的企业文化，使得这种文化能够排斥和驱逐带有不同倾向的经理人。这种文化氛围逐年增强，即使在查理和我离职之后很久一段时间内，这种文化将完好无缺地保留下来。

We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.

我们需要继续保持我以上描述的所有优势，才能做得相当好。我们的管理层会以身作则，这一点你们大可放心。但是，查理和我能否在资本分配方面坚持到底，部分取决于收购的竞争环境。我们将竭尽所能。