巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）④保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

我们先来看看保险业务，这是伯克希尔的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们不断扩张的发动机。

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

财产意外险保险公司先收取保费后支付索赔。在极端情况下，比如某些工人的事故赔偿，支付赔偿金可能长达几十年。这种"先收钱后赔付"的模式让我们能够持有巨额的资金，我们称其为"浮存金"，这些浮存金并不属于我们，最终将会进向别人的口袋。在持有期间，我们可以用这些浮存金进行投资，为伯克希尔赚取投资收益。尽管个人的保单和赔付进进出出，但我们持有的浮存金的总额相对保费收入的比例却非常稳定。因此，随着我们保险业务的增长，我们持有的浮存金也会相应增长。我们是如何增长的，请看下表：

It’s unlikely that our float will grow much – if at all – from its current level. That’s mainly because we already have an outsized amount relative to our premium volume. Were there to be a decline in float, I will add, it would almost certainly be very gradual and therefore impose no unusual demand for funds on us.

我们现在的浮存金规模超过 700 亿美元，未来就算有增长的话，也不太可能大幅增长。这主要是因为我们的浮存金相对于保费水平，其金额已经过大。我必须加以说明的是，即使未来浮存金出现下降的话，也几乎可能肯定是非常缓慢的下降，因此不会对我们造成不寻常的资金压力。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, has incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the last eleven years. There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry is resourceful in creating new ones.

如果我们的保费收入超过我们的费用支出和最终理赔损失之和，在财务报表上就会体现为承保盈利，这将增加我们浮存金产生的投资收益。如果产生了承保盈利，我们就可以享受到无成本使用资金的好处，更好的是，我们因持有免费资金而获得收益。不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望能够取得如此美妙的结果，因此导致了激烈的竞争，在绝大多数年份里竞争如此激烈，以至于财产意外险行业整体承保严重亏损。例如，州立农业保险公司目前是美国最大的保险公司，而且经营管理良好，但在过去 11 年期间有 8 年发生承保亏损。保险行业有很多亏钱的办法，而且这个行业还在源源不断地创造出新的亏钱的办法。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for nine consecutive years, our gain for the period having totaled $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will profit just as we would if some party deposited $70.6 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

正如年报第一部分所述，我们已经已经连续 9 年实现承保盈利，期间累计盈利高达 170 亿美元。我相信，我们很可能在未来多数年份(当然不是所有年份)继续实现承保盈利。如果我们做到了这一点，那么我们的浮存金成本要比无成本更低。我们肯定将会盈利，这就像有人在我们这里存了 706 亿美元的资金，而且支付我们一笔费用来持有这些资金，而且还让我们可以用这些资金进行投资，所得投资收益完全归我们自己。

So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.

那么，这些非常吸引人的保险浮存金会如何影响内在价值的估算？在计算伯克希尔账面价值时，我们的浮存金全部做为负债进行扣减，就像我们必须明天就偿还而且再也不能重新借到同样多的负债一样对待。但是，用这种方式来看待浮存金是不正确的，相反应该把浮存金看作是一笔不断循环滚动的基金。如果浮存金既能够是无成本的，又能够是长期持续的，那么这种负债的真正价值远远低于会计报表上的负债数额。

Partially offsetting this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” attributable to our insurance companies that is included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. If an insurance business produces large and sustained underwriting losses, any goodwill asset attributable to it should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

部分抵销这一高估负债的是我们保险公司的 155 亿"商誉"资产，它们作为一项资产计入账面价值。实际上，这种会计商誉只是代表我们为保险业务创造浮存金能力所支付的收购溢价。可是商誉的成本和它的真实价值并没有任何联系。如果一家保险公司发生了巨额的持续承保损失，那么无论其原始成本是多少，这些商誉资产都应该视为没有任何价值。

Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would pay to purchase float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔旗下的保险公司并非如此。查理和我相信，我们保险业商誉的真实经济价值，也就是我们购买创造同样品质的浮存金所需支付的价格，肯定远远超过其历史账面价值。我们的保险浮存金的巨大价值，是我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值大幅超越账面价值的一个原因，而且是一个重要原因。

Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: We don’t think there is much “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

我要再次强调，无成本的浮存金并不是整个财产意外险行业的预期结果：我们认为在保险行业并没有太多公司拥有类似于伯克希尔品质的浮存金。在大多数年份，包括 2011 年，保险行业的保费收入并不足以覆盖赔付损失和费用支出。因此，保险行业的净有形资产回报率水平，数十年来一直远远低于美国企业整体水平，保险行业这种糟糕的业绩表现几乎肯定会持续下去。伯克希尔保险业务卓越非凡的经济效益之所以存在，是因为我们拥有一些非凡的经理人在经营着一些非凡的保险业务。下面让我来告诉你我们主要的保险企业。

************

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in that respect than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever faced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a moderate profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. Concurrently, all other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, and some would face insolvency.

按照浮存金的规模排序，排名第一的是由阿吉特·贾因运营的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特为那些其它任何保险公司没有意愿或者没有资本实力承担的风险提供保险。他在保险业务的操作以独一无二的方式，融和了能力、速度、决断力、以及最最重要的智力。但是他绝对不会把伯克希尔置于与我们拥有的资源不相匹配的高风险之中。事实上，在这一点上，我们比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果整个保险行业在某次巨灾中遭受2500 亿美元的损失，这相当于保险业历史上最大损失的三倍，而伯克希尔作为一个整体，可能因为其众多的收益来源而录得温和的利润。而与此同时，所有其它主要大型保险公司和再保险公司都将出现巨额亏损，其中一些甚至面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $34 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By these accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Charlie would gladly trade me for a second Ajit. Alas, there is none.

从 1985 年开始，阿吉特创立了一家拥有 340 亿美元浮存金和可观的承保盈利的保险公司，这一成就是任何其他保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的。通过这些成就，他为伯克希尔增加了数十亿美元的价值。查理很乐意用我来交换第二个阿吉特。哈哈，可惜世界上根本找不到第二个阿吉特。

************

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们旗下还有另外一家实力强大的保险公司是通用再保险，由泰德·蒙特罗斯(TadMontross)管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

从根本上讲，一个强健的保险公司在业务运营上需要坚持四个原则：第一，必须了解所有可能会导致理赔损失的风险敞口；第二，必须保守的评估任何实际导致损失的风险敞口的概率以及可能的损失成本。(3)合理制定保费水平，以保证扣除预期赔付损失成本和运营费用之后，能够产生一个平均的承保收益。(4)如果不能收取适当的保费，宁愿选择放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, “The other guy is doing it so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Indeed, a good underwriter needs an independent mindset akin to that of the senior citizen who received a call from his wife while driving home. “Albert, be careful,” she warned, “I just heard on the radio that there’s a car going the wrong way down the Interstate.” “Mabel, they don’t know the half of it,” replied Albert, “It’s not just one car, there are hundreds of them.”

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，但第四项不及格。他们根本无法放弃竞争对手正在热切承保的业务。有句老话说："其他人都在这么干，所以我们也必须这么干"，这在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险行业尤甚。事实上，一个优秀的保险商，需要具备独立思考的心态，这就像开车回家接到妻子电话的老年人一样，她警告说，"Albert，开车小心点。我刚从广播里听说，有辆车在州际公路上逆行。"他回答说："Mabel，他们根本没有看清真相的另一半，不只是一辆车，而是有上百辆车在逆行"。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it’s a treasure.

泰德严格遵守了所有四条承保原则，这反映到他的经营业绩上。在他的领导下，通用再保持有的巨额浮存金成本比无成本更低。我们预计，未来平均而言这种情况仍将如此。在我们收购后的最初几年里，通用再保险是我们一个大麻烦，现在则是我们的大宝贝。

************

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 61 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 50 years of service in 2011.

最后要谈的是 GEICO 保险公司， 61 年前年轻的我就是通过投资这家保险公司开始领悟真正的投资之道。GEICO 由托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)管理，他 18 岁就加入公司，到 2011 年已经为公司服务了整整 50 年。

GEICO’s much-envied record comes from Tony’s brilliant execution of a superb and almost-impossible-to-replicate business model. During Tony’s 18-year tenure as CEO, our market share has grown from 2.0% to 9.3%. If it had instead remained static – as it had for more than a decade before he took over – our premium volume would now be $3.3 billion rather than the $15.4 billion we attained in 2011. The extra value created by Tony and his associates is a major element in Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value.

GEICO 令人羡慕的业绩记录，来自于托尼出色地运营着一个极棒的且几乎不可能复制的商业模式。在托尼担任 CEO 的 18 年期间，GEICO 的市场份额从 2.0%上升到 9.3%。如果市场份额维持不变，就像他接手前的十几年那样，那么我们现在的保费收入将只是 33 亿美元，而不是 2011 年的 154 亿美元保费收入。托尼和他的同事们创造的超额价值，是伯克希尔内在价值超过账面价值的主要因素。

There is still more than 90% of the auto-insurance market left for GEICO to rake in. Don’t bet against Tony acquiring chunks of it year after year in the future. Our low costs permit low prices, and every day more Americans discover that the Gecko is doing them a favor when he urges them to visit GEICO.com for a quote. (Our lizard has another endearing quality: Unlike human spokesmen or spokeswomen who expensively represent other insurance companies, our little fellow has no agent.)

仍有超过 90%的汽车保险市场份额等待 GEICO 去挖掘。千万不要打赌托尼未来不能做到年复一年地抢占大块市场份额。我们的低成本允许我们提供给客户更低的保险价格，因此，每天都会有越来越多的人发现，GEICO的吉祥物大蜥蜴 Gecko 正不断劝说他们，去访问 GEICO.com 查询汽车保险报价，这会让他们省下很多钱。(我们的大蜥蜴还有另外一个可爱的特质：和那些保险代理人或保险公司女性销售员不同，我们这个可爱的小家伙没有经纪人。)

************

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了这三家大型保险公司以外，我们旗下还有一群规模较小的的保险公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。总体而言，他们一直保持承保盈利，而且为我们提供的浮存金规模相当大。查理和我非常珍视这些保险公司及其经理人。

At yearend, we acquired Princeton Insurance, a New Jersey writer of medical malpractice policies. This bolt-on transaction expands the managerial domain of Tim Kenesey, the star CEO of Medical Protective, our Indiana-based med-mal insurer. Princeton brings with it more than $600 million of float, an amount that is included in the following table.

2011 年底我们收购了普林斯顿保险公司(Princeton Insurance)，这是一家新泽西的医疗事故保险公司。这一补强收购扩大了蒂姆(TimKenesey)的管理领域，他是我们位于印地安那州的 Medical Protective 保险公司的明星CEO。Princeton 为我们带来了超过 6 亿美元的浮存金，这一数字也包括在下面的表格里。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们所有四大块财产意外险和人寿保险业务的业绩摘要：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在所有大型保险公司中，我认为伯克希尔是世界上最好的保险公司。