巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）③股票回购

Share Repurchases

股票回购

Last September, we announced that Berkshire would repurchase its shares at a price of up to 110% of book value. We were in the market for only a few days – buying $67 million of stock – before the price advanced beyond our limit. Nonetheless, the general importance of share repurchases suggests I should focus for a bit on the subject.

2010 年 9 月，我们宣布伯克希尔将会以账面价值的 110%的价格回购自己的股票。我们在股票市场上只得到几天的买入机会，只回购了 6700 万美元股价就上涨超过我们的上限。尽管如此，考虑到股票回购的普遍重要性，我应该专门谈一下。

Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met: first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.

只有满足以下两个前提条件，查理和我才愿意回购股票：第一，公司有充足的资金，完全能够满足业务上的运营和流动性需求；第二，保守地估算，公司的股价相对于其内在价值有很大的折扣。

We have witnessed many bouts of repurchasing that failed our second test. Sometimes, of course, infractions – even serious ones – are innocent; many CEOs never stop believing their stock is cheap. In other instances, a less benign conclusion seems warranted. It doesn’t suffice to say that repurchases are being made to offset the dilution from stock issuances or simply because a company has excess cash. Continuing shareholders are hurt unless shares are purchased below intrinsic value. The first law of capital allocation – whether the money is slated for acquisitions or share repurchases – is that what is smart at one price is dumb at another. (One CEO who always stresses the price/value factor in repurchase decisions is Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan; I recommend that you read his annual letter.)

我们已经亲眼见证过很多起股票回购，但都不满足第二个回购条件。当然，有时违规行为(甚至是严重的违规)也是无辜的；许多 CEO 一直认为自己公司的股票是低估的。而在其它情况下，似乎可以得出一个不太好的结论。如果说回购股票是为了抵消股票发行引发的股权稀释，或是仅仅因为公司有太多富余的现金，这是完全没有说服力的。除非公司以低于内在价值的价格回购股票，否则，继续持股的股东的利益肯定受到损害。不管资金是用于收购企业还是用于回购股票，资本配置的第一定律都是，在一个价格上，聪明的一边永远对应着愚蠢的一边。

Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) Nevertheless, we don’t enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling.

查理和我看到伯克希尔的股价远低于内在价值时，内心的感受十分复杂。我们非常愿意为继续持股的股东多赚钱，而做到这一点最可靠的方法莫过于，当我们知道自己的股价只有内在价值的 9 折、8 折甚至更低时，大力回购自己的股票。就像我们的一位董事所说，这就像在桶里射鱼，等到桶里的水流光以后，鱼也就不再扑腾了。尽管如此，我们并不喜欢折价回购合伙人的股票，即使我们这样做可以让他们卖的价格更高，因为如果我们不回购他们只能以更低的价格卖给别人。因此，当我们回购时，我们希望那些卖出的股东，能够充分了解他们所出售的资产的真实价值。

At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.

按照我们设定的最高 110%账面价值的回购限价之下，回购显然会增加伯克希尔的每股内在价值。如果我们回购的越多越便宜，继续持股的股东获益就会越大。因此，一旦市场机会来临，我们可能会以我们最高限价或者更低的价格积极的回购股票。但是你们应当知道，我们没有任何兴趣去支撑股价。在特别低迷的市场，我们出价只会越来越低。如果我们持有的现金等价物低于 200 亿美元时，我们也不会回购股票。在伯克希尔公司，保持压倒性的财务实力毫无疑问高于一切。

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This discussion of repurchases offers me the chance to address the irrational reaction of many investors to changes in stock prices. When Berkshire buys stock in a company that is repurchasing shares, we hope for two events: First, we have the normal hope that earnings of the business will increase at a good clip for a long time to come; and second, we also hope that the stock underperforms in the market for a long time as well. A corollary to this second point: “Talking our book” about a stock we own – were that to be effective – would actually be harmful to Berkshire, not helpful as commentators customarily assume.

这次股票回购的讨论，让我有机会谈一下很多投资者对于股价变化的非理性反应。当伯克希尔买入一家正在回购股票的公司时，我们希望两个事件能够发生：第一，我们通常希望，在未来很长一段时期内，公司的收益将以良好的速度持续增长；第二，我们同时也希望，公司的股价长期表现不佳。对于第二点必然导致产生下面的推论：如果市场是有效的，那么公开谈论我们持有股票，实际上对伯克希尔来说是有害的，而不是像很多评论人士通常认为的那样有益。

Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisano did a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Their operational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.

让我们以 IBM 为例。正如所有企业观察人士知道的那样，IBM 前任两位 CEO 郭士纳(Lou Gerstner)和彭明盛(Sam Palmisano)做得非常出色，把公司从 20 年前几近破产的边缘挽救回来，到现在打造成了一个卓越的公司。他们的管理成就实在是卓越非凡。

But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, a skill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, made value-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.

但是，他们的财务管理同样做的非常出色，尤其是最近这些年公司的财务弹性大幅提升。事实上，我实在想不出有那家大公司拥有如此优异的财务管理技术，这显著增加了 IBM 股东们的投资收益。IBM 明智地运用债务融资，几乎完全只用现金进行增加公司内在价值的企业并购，而且非常积极地回购自己的股票。

Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%. Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us. Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for the day: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?

如今，IBM 有 11.6 亿股流通股，其中我们持有 5.5%约 6390 万股。当然，未来 5 年公司的盈利情况对我们来说非常重要。除此之外，在这 5 年公司准备花费 500 亿美元左右回购股票。我们今天的小测验是：在这段时间里，伯克希尔等长期股东应该为什么事情而欢呼？

I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.

我不会吊你胃口的。答案是：我们应该期望 IBM 未来 5 年的股价持续低迷下去。

Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire 250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and we would own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-year period, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding after five years, of which we would own 6.5%.

让我们来算算吧。如果在此期间 IBM 的平均股价为每股 200 美元，该公司将以 500 亿美元的价格回购 2.5亿股股票。因此，将剩下约 9.1 亿股流通股，我们持有的 6390 万股所占的持股比例将会从现在的 5.5%上升到约7%。如果股价走势相反，在 5 年内该股平均股价上涨为 300 美元，IBM 将仅能回购 1.67 亿股。5 年后，我们将拥有剩余 9.9 亿股流通股的 6.5%。

If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100 million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price” repurchase scenario had taken place.

如果 IBM 在第 5 年的盈利达到 200 亿美元，那么在"令人失望"更低的股价情景下，我们在这些收益中所占的份额，将比股价更高的情景下，多出整整 1 亿美元。在未来的某个时候，我们的持股价值可能比"高价"回购情景发生时的价值，高出 1.5 亿美元。

The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.

逻辑非常简单：如果将来你准备成为[股票的净买入者]，不管是用你自己的钱直接买入，还是通过持股一家正在回购股票的公司间接买入，股价上涨都会损害你的利益。股价低迷不振反而会增加你的利益。然而，感情因素往往会让事情复杂化：大多数人，包括那些将来会是股票净买入者的投资者，看到股价上涨就会感到内心非常舒服。这样的股东，就像一个天天开车上班的人，仅仅因为他的油箱还有一天的油量，就为油价上涨而欢呼。

Charlie and I don’t expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking – we’ve observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that – but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. And here a confession is in order: In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.

查理和我并不期望能让你们中多数人接受我们的思维方式，我们已经观察到了足够多的人类行为，深深知道这是徒劳的。但我们确实希望你们能够了解我们自己的计算逻辑。在这里我应该坦白的说：在我年轻的时候，也是一看到市场上涨就会非常高兴。后来我读了本·格雷厄姆写的《聪明的投资者》，第八章讲的是投资者应该如何看待股价的波动。我立刻两眼放光，低估值成了我的朋友。拿起那本书是我一生中最幸运的一刻。

In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.

最终，我们对 IBM 投资的成功将主要取决于其未来的收益。但一个非常重要的第二因素是，该公司用其准备投入的巨额资金回购了多少股份。如果回购使 IBM 的流通股减少至 6390 万股(只剩下我自己)，我将放弃我著名的节俭，给伯克希尔员工一个带薪假期。

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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them. Because we may be repurchasing Berkshire shares from some of you, we will offer our thoughts in each section as to how intrinsic value compares to carrying value.

现在，让我们来看看我们四大主要运营业务。由于各类业务之间资产负债表和利润表的特点差异巨大，把它们合并一起会妨碍分析。因此我们把它们作为四个独立的业务来展示，这也是查理和我看待这些业务的方式。因为我们可能会从你们有些股东手里回购股票，所以我们将会在每类业务分析中，提供我们自己对于内在价值和账面价值如何比较的思考。