巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）⑥制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这个板块的业务可以说是面面俱到包罗万象。不过让我们先看一下整体的资产负债表和利润表。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor. Charlie’s has been better; he voted no more than “present” on several of my errant purchases.

这个板块包括多家公司，销售的产品包括从棒棒糖到喷气飞机。有些企业享有极其出色的竞争优势，以非财务杠杆的净有形资产收益率衡量，高达 25%甚至 100%以上。其他一些企业这种收益率则在 12-20%之间。但是也有少数企业回报率非常糟糕，这是因为我在资本配置工作中犯下了一些严重的错误。我之所以犯下这些错误，是因为我错误地判断这些被收购企业未来的竞争优势，或者错误判断这些企业所在行业的未的经济前景。我在投资时会努力看清楚企业未来 10 年或 20 年的发展前景，但有时我的判断非常糟糕。查理做的比我要好一些，他对我的一些错误收购投了反对票，而不是仅仅"列席"会议。

Berkshire’s newer shareholders may be puzzled over our decision to hold on to my mistakes. After all, their earnings can never be consequential to Berkshire’s valuation, and problem companies require more managerial time than winners. Any management consultant or Wall Street advisor would look at our laggards and say “dump them.”

我们决定继续持有我错误收购的那些企业，这可能会让伯克希尔的新股东感到迷惑不解。毕竟这些公司的收益永远不会对伯克希尔的整体估值产生助力，而且有问题的公司要比优秀的公司需要我们付出更多的管理时间。任何一个管理咨询顾问或或华尔街投资顾问，都会看着我们这些已经成为累赘的公司说："甩掉他们吧"。

That won’t happen. For 29 years, we have regularly laid out Berkshire’s economic principles in these reports (pages 93-98) and Number 11 describes our general reluctance to sell poor performers (which, in most cases, lag because of industry factors rather than managerial shortcomings). Our approach is far from Darwinian, and many of you may disapprove of it. I can understand your position. However, we have made – and continue to make – a commitment to the sellers of businesses we buy that we will retain those businesses through thick and thin. So far, the dollar cost of that commitment has not been substantial and may well be offset by the goodwill it builds among prospective sellers looking for the right permanent home for their treasured business and loyal associates. These owners know that what they get with us can’t be delivered by others and that our commitments will be good for many decades to come.

我们是不会这么做的。过去 29 年来，我们一直在年报中定期阐述伯克希尔的经营原则，其中第 11 条讲的是，我们一般情况不愿卖掉业绩表现糟糕的公司(大多数情况下业绩表现落后是因为行业因素而不是管理缺陷)。我们的做法与达尔文主义者相差甚远，你们很多人可能并不赞同。我可以理解你们的看法。但是，我们曾经并将继续向我们收购的企业卖家承诺，在任何情况下，我们都将不惜一切代价继续保留这些公司。到目前为止，坚守这些承诺而付出的金钱成本并不算高，而且很可能会被我们在潜在企业出售者中建立的良好声誉而抵销，因为这些卖家是想为他们所珍视的业务和忠实的伙伴寻找一个合适且永久的归宿。这些企业所有人知道，他们从我们这里能够得到其他任何人都无法给予的承诺，我们对他们的承诺未来数十年都将忠诚不变。

Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.

但是请你们理解，查理和我既不是愿意长期忍受亏损的受虐狂，也不是盲目乐观的乐天派。如果我们制定的第 11 条规则中的任何一个缺点出现——如果这些企业可能未来长期都是一个吞金兽，或如果劳资冲突非常激烈，我们将迅速果断的彻底放弃这些企业。在我们过去 47 年的经营历史中，这种情况只发生过几次，而且我们现在拥有的企业没有一家由于陷入困境而要求我们必须考虑放弃。

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The steady and substantial comeback in the U.S. economy since mid-2009 is clear from the earnings shown at the front of this section. This compilation includes 54 of our companies. But one of these, Marmon, is itself the owner of 140 operations in eleven distinct business sectors. In short, when you look at Berkshire, you are looking across corporate America. So let’s dig a little deeper to gain a greater insight into what has happened in the last few years.

从前面的利润表列示的数据可以看出，美国经济从 2009 年中期以来正在稳步大幅复苏。这个业务部门总共包括 54 家公司。但是其中 Marmon 集团就在 11 个各不相同的行业中拥有 140 家企业。简而言之，当你分析伯克希尔的时候，实际上就是在分析整个美国企业界。所以，让我们进一步深入分析过去几年发生了什么变化。

The four housing-related companies in this section (a group that excludes Clayton, which is carried under Finance and Financial Products) had aggregate pre-tax earnings of $227 million in 2009, $362 million in 2010 and $359 million in 2011. If you subtract these earnings from those in the combined statement, you will see that our multiple and diverse non-housing operations earned $1,831 million in 2009, $3,912 million in 2010 and $4,678 million in 2011. About $291 million of the 2011 earnings came from the Lubrizol acquisition. The profile of the remaining 2011 earnings – $4,387 million – illustrates the comeback of much of America from the devastation wrought by the 2008 financial panic. Though housing-related businesses remain in the emergency room, most other businesses have left the hospital with their health fully restored.

这个业务部门中有四个与房地产相关的公司(不包括 Clayton 公司，我们将其归入金融和金融产品部分)，过去3 年税前收益分别是：2009 年 2.27 亿美元，2010 年 3.62 亿美元，2011 年 3.59 亿美元。如果把这四家与房地产相关的公司从整个板块合并报表中扣除，你会发现我们多元化的非房产相关业务过去 3 年的经营收益分别是：2009 年 18.31 亿美元，2010 年 39.12 亿美元，2011 年 46.78 亿美元。2011 年约有 2.91 亿美元收益来自于收购的路博润公司。但是 2011 年剩余的收益为 43.87 亿美元，这说明美国大部分行业已经从 2008 年金融危机造成的打击中复苏过来。虽然房地产相关行业还停留在急诊室，但其他大多数行业都已经出院并完全康复。

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Almost all of our managers delivered outstanding performances last year, among them those managers who run housing-related businesses and were therefore fighting hurricane-force headwinds. Here are a few examples:

2011 年我们旗下几乎所有的经理人都取得了优秀的业绩，其中包括管理房地产相关企业的经理人，他们正在与抵御飓风般的经营阻力。以下是其中几个做得非常优秀的经理人：

•Vic Mancinelli again set a record at CTB, our agricultural equipment operation. We purchased CTB in 2002 for $139 million. It has subsequently distributed $180 million to Berkshire, last year earned $124 million pre-tax and has $109 million in cash. Vic has made a number of bolt-on acquisitions over the years, including a meaningful one he signed up after yearend.

•Vic Mancinelli 领导 CTB 公司再次创下新纪录。CTB 是我们的农业设备生产企业。我们在 2002 年以 1.39 亿美元收购了 CTB 公司。收购之后这几年 CTB 总共向伯克希尔分配了 1.8 亿美元股利，2011 年税前收益为 1.24 亿美元，而且账上拥有 1.09 亿美元的现金。Vic Mancinelli 在过去几年又进行了多次补强型并购，其中包括 2011年底他刚刚签署的一项有意义的并购。

•TTI, our electric components distributor, increased its sales to a record $2.1 billion, up 12.4% from 2010. Earnings also hit a record, up 127% from 2007, the year in which we purchased the business. In 2011, TTI performed far better than the large publicly-traded companies in its field. That’s no surprise: Paul Andrews and his associates have been besting them for years. Charlie and I are delighted that Paul negotiated a large bolt-on acquisition early in 2012. We hope more follow.

•TTI 公司是我们旗下一家电子元件分销商，2011 年销售收入增加到 21 亿美元，比 2010 年增长了 12.4%。收益也创下新高，比 2007 年我们收购的第一年增长了 127%。2011 年 TTI 公司的业绩表现远远好于该领域的大型上市公司。这一点也不让人感到意外，因为保罗(Paul Andrews)和他的团队已经连续很多年都打败了他们。查理和我很高兴得知保罗在 2012 年初谈成了一项规模很大的补强型并购。我们期待以后他做出更多收购。

•Iscar, our 80%-owned cutting-tools operation, continues to amaze us. Its sales growth and overall performance are unique in its industry. Iscar’s managers – Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman – are brilliant strategists and operators. When the economic world was cratering in November 2008, they stepped up to buy Tungaloy, a leading Japanese cutting-tool manufacturer. Tungaloy suffered significant damage when the tsunami hit north of Tokyo last spring. But you wouldn’t know that now: Tungaloy went on to set a sales record in 2011. I visited the Iwaki plant in November and was inspired by the dedication and enthusiasm of Tungaloy’s management, as well as its staff. They are a wonderful group and deserve your admiration and thanks.

•ISCAR 是我们拥有 80%股份的一家金属切割工具公司，其业绩表现一直让我们感到震惊，销售增长和整体业绩表现在其所在行业中是独一无二的。ISCAR 的经理人 EitanWertheimer、JacobHarpaz 和 DannyGoldman 是杰出的战略家和经营者。2008 年 11 月在全球经济遭受困境时，他们却逆向收购了日本领先的切削工具制造商Tungaloy。2011 年春天海啸突袭东京北部时，Tungaloy 遭受严重毁坏。但是你绝对不会想到现在的情形：Tungaloy 在 2011 年创下新的销售纪录。我在 2011 年 11 月参观了他们在 Iwaki 的工厂，Tungaloy 管理层及其员工的热情和奉献精神深深打动了我。他们是一个非常杰出的团队，值得我们表示尊敬和感谢。

•McLane, our huge distribution company that is run by Grady Rosier, added important new customers in 2011 and set a pre-tax earnings record of $370 million. Since its purchase in 2003 for $1.5 billion, the company has had pre-tax earnings of $2.4 billion and also increased its LIFO reserve by $230 million because the prices of the retail products it distributes (candy, gum, cigarettes, etc.) have risen. Grady runs a logistical machine second to none. You can look for bolt-ons at McLane, particularly in our new wine-and-spirits distribution business.

•McLance 是我们旗下的大型分销公司，由 GradyRosier 运营，在 2011 年又新增了一些新的重要客户，并创下 3.7 亿美元的税前盈利纪录。自 2003 年以 15 亿美元收购以来，公司累计税前收益为 24 亿美元，而且由于它们分销的零售商品(糖果、口香糖、香烟等)价格上涨导致其后进先出的存货规模增加了 2.3 亿美元。在管理运营物流企业方面，没有人能够比得上 Grady。McLance 未来可能会有一些补强型并购，特别是在我们新进入的葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务上。

•Jordan Hansell took over at NetJets in April and delivered 2011 pre-tax earnings of $227 million. That is a particularly impressive performance because the sale of new planes was slow during most of the year. In December, however, there was an uptick that was more than seasonally normal. How permanent it will be is uncertain.

•Jordan Hansell 在 2011 年 4 月份接管 Netjets 公司，其 2011 年税前收益为 2.27 亿美元。这是一个特别出色的业绩表现，因为在过去一年里大多数时间里，新飞机的的分时所有权销售都增长缓慢。不过 12 月销售出现了高于季节性正常水平的上升，但这种销售上升能持续多久还无法确定。

A few years ago NetJets was my number one worry: Its costs were far out of line with revenues, and cash was hemorrhaging. Without Berkshire’s support, NetJets would have gone broke. These problems are behind us, and Jordan is now delivering steady profits from a well-controlled and smoothly-running operation. NetJets is proceeding on a plan to enter China with some first-class partners, a move that will widen our business “moat.” No other fractional-ownership operator has remotely the size and breadth of the NetJets operation, and none ever will. NetJets’ unrelenting focus on safety and service has paid off in the marketplace.

几年之前，NetJets 是我最为担忧的企业，因为它的成本支出远远超过其收入，现金一直大量失血。如果没有伯克希尔的支持，NetJets 早就破产了。现在这些问题已经过去了，Jordan 正从一个成本控制良好运转顺畅的企业中稳定地创造利润。NetJests 正与一些一流合作伙伴合作计划进入中国市场，此举将进一步拓宽我们的业务"护城河"。现在没有其他任何一家分时所有权航空企业能够具有 NetJets 如此庞大的运营规模和广阔的市场范围，未来也不会有。NetJets 长期坚持不懈专注于安全和服务在市场上终于获得了回报。

•It’s a joy to watch Marmon’s progress under Frank Ptak’s leadership. In addition to achieving internal growth, Frank regularly makes bolt-on acquisitions that, in aggregate, will materially increase Marmon’s earning power. (He did three, costing about $270 million, in the last few months.) Joint ventures around the world are another opportunity for Marmon. At midyear Marmon partnered with the Kundalia family in an Indian crane operation that is already delivering substantial profits. This is Marmon’s second venture with the family, following a successful wire and cable partnership instituted a few years ago.

•我们很高兴看到 Marmon 公司在 FrankPtak 的领导下取得的进步。除了取得了内部增长以外，Frank 还定期进行补强型并购，这些并购总体上将会显著增加 Marmon 公司的盈利能力。他在过去几个月里就花费约 2.7 亿美元收购了三家公司。在全球范围内成立合资企业是 Marmon 另外一个发展机会。2011 年中 Marmon 公司与Kundalia 家族合作成立了一家印度起重机公司，目前已经产生了可观的盈利。这是 Marmon 与这个家族合作成立的第二个合资企业，几家之前他们合资的电线电缆公司非常成功。

Of the eleven major sectors in which Marmon operates, ten delivered gains in earnings last year. You can be confident of higher earnings from Marmon in the years ahead.

在 Marmon 经营的 11 个主要行业中，有 10个行业在过去一年都取得了盈利。你应该对 Marmon 未来几年取得更高的收益充满信心。

•“Buy commodities, sell brands” has long been a formula for business success. It has produced enormous and sustained profits for Coca-Cola since 1886 and Wrigley since 1891. On a smaller scale, we have enjoyed good fortune with this approach at See’s Candy since we purchased it 40 years ago.

•"采购大宗商品，销售品牌产品"，长期以来都是一个企业经营成功的秘诀。自 1886 年成立的可口可乐和自1891 年成立的箭牌，这个秘诀让它们创造出巨大且持续的利润。自 40 年前我们收购喜诗糖果开始，我们也享受了喜诗糖果运用这个方法创造的高回报，尽管喜诗的规模要小得多。

Last year See’s had record pre-tax earnings of $83 million, bringing its total since we bought it to $1.65 billion. Contrast that figure with our purchase price of $25 million and our yearend carrying-value (net of cash) of less than zero. (Yes, you read that right; capital employed at See’s fluctuates seasonally, hitting a low after Christmas.) Credit Brad Kinstler for taking the company to new heights since he became CEO in 2006.

去年喜诗糖果的税前收益达到创纪录的 8300万美元，使得我们收购以来累计盈利达到了 16.5 亿美元。相比之下我们的收购价格只有 2500 万美元，而且年末扣除现金后的账面价值小于零。是的，你没看错，喜诗使用的资本季节性波动很大，圣诞节之后会达到最低点。这一切都要归功于 BradKinstler，从 2006 年他接任 CEO 之后带领这家公司不断达到新的高度。

• Nebraska Furniture Mart (80% owned) set an earnings record in 2011, netting more than ten times what it did in 1983, when we acquired our stake.

•我们持股 80%的内布拉斯加家具商城 NFM 在 2011 年创下新的盈利纪录，是 1983 年我们收购时的十倍以上。

But that’s not the big news. More important was NFM’s acquisition of a 433-acre tract north of Dallas on which we will build what is almost certain to be the highest-volume home-furnishings store in the country. Currently, that title is shared by our two stores in Omaha and Kansas City, each of which had record-setting sales of more than $400 million in 2011. It will be several years before the Texas store is completed, but I look forward to cutting the ribbon at the opening. (At Berkshire, the managers do the work; I take the bows.)

但这还不算是大新闻。更重要的是，NFM 收购了达拉斯北部的 433 英亩的大片土地，我们将会在此建造几乎可以肯定是全美最大的家具商城。目前全美最大的家具商店是我们在奥马哈和堪萨斯的两家分店，两家商场在2011 年都创下了超过 4 亿美元的销售纪录。德州的这家商场还需几年才能建成，但是我现在就盼望着去参加开业剪彩。在伯克希尔，经理人负责干活，我负责接受喝彩和表扬。

Our new store, which will offer an unequalled variety of merchandise sold at prices that can’t be matched, will bring huge crowds from near and far. This drawing power and our extensive holdings of land at the site should enable us to attract a number of other major stores. (If any high-volume retailers are reading this, contact me.)

我们的新店将提供无与伦比的商品种类和低价格，肯定会吸引无数远近的客户蜂拥而来。如此巨大的客户吸引力，再加上我们在这个地方拥有的大量土地，肯定能够使我们吸引很多大型卖家加入。(任何销量很大的零售商读到这封信，有兴趣的请与我联系。)

Our experience with NFM and the Blumkin family that runs it has been a real joy. The business was built by Rose Blumkin (known to all as “Mrs. B”), who started the company in 1937 with $500 and a dream. She sold me our interest when she was 89 and worked until she was 103. (After retiring, she died the next year, a sequence I point out to any other Berkshire manager who even thinks of retiring.)

我们和 NFM 以及管理层 Blumkin 家族相处得都非常愉快。1937 年，RoseBlumkin(人称 B 夫人)创办了这家企业，当时她只有 500 美元和一个梦想。她 89 岁的时候把公司 80%的股份卖给了我，又一直工作到 103 岁。(她退休后仅仅一年就去世了。我经常把这个退休的严重后果告诉伯克希尔公司里面任何一个想要退休的经理人)。

Mrs. B’s son, Louie, now 92, helped his mother build the business after he returned from World War II and, along with his wife, Fran, has been my friend for 55 years. In turn, Louie’s sons, Ron and Irv, have taken the company to new heights, first opening the Kansas City store and now gearing up for Texas.

B夫人的儿子 Louie，现在已经 92 岁了，他从二战后退伍回家后帮助他的母亲创办了这家企业，他和他的妻子Fran 过去 55 年来一直都是我的朋友。后来，Louie 的儿子 Ron 和 Irv 将公司带到了新的高度，他们先是在堪萨斯开设一家分店，现在又准备进军德州。

The “boys” and I have had many great times together, and I count them among my best friends. The Blumkins are a remarkable family. Never inclined to let an extraordinary gene pool go to waste, I am rejoicing these days because several members of the fourth Blumkin generation have joined NFM.

这两个"男孩"和我一起度过了很多美好的时光，我把他们看作是我最好的朋友。Blumkins 家族是一个了不起的家族。我从来不会让这个家族非凡的基因浪费掉，最近 Blumkin 家族第四代中有几位已经加入了 NFM，这让我感到非常高兴。

Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.

总体而言，伯克希尔旗下这一板块的内在价值大大超过它们的账面价值。可是对于其中很多规模较小的公司而言，情况并非如此。我在收购小公司上犯下了更多的错误。查理很早以前就告诉过我，"如果有些事情根本就不值得去做，那就不值得做好"。我本应该更加认真地听从他的话去做。我们在大型企业收购方面做的不错，其中有几个表现极好，总体上，我们在这个业务部分是个大赢家。

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Certain shareholders have told me they hunger for more discussions of accounting arcana. So here’s a bit of GAAP-mandated nonsense I hope both of them enjoy.

有些股东告诉我，他们渴望在我每年写的信中看到更多关于会计奥秘的讨论。所以在这里有一些关于公认会计准则(GAAP)规定的荒谬，我希望大家能够喜欢。

Common sense would tell you that our varied subsidiaries should be carried on our books at their cost plus the earnings they have retained since our purchase (unless their economic value has materially decreased, in which case an appropriate write-down must be taken). And that’s essentially the reality at Berkshire – except for the weird situation at Marmon.

常识会告诉你，我们各个子公司入账时，应该用我们的收购成本加上自收购以来的留存收益(除非其经济价值大幅减少，在这种情况下必须进行适当的减记)。这基本上符合的伯克希尔的实际情况，不过 Marmon 是一个非常奇怪的例外情况。

We purchased 64% of the company in 2008 and put this interest on our books at our cost, $4.8 billion. So far, so good. Then, in early 2011, pursuant to our original contract with the Pritzker family, we purchased an additional 16%, paying $1.5 billion as called for by a formula that reflected Marmon’s increased value. In this instance, however, we were required to immediately write off $614 million of the purchase price retroactive to the end of 2010. (Don’t ask!) Obviously, this write-off had no connection to economic reality. The excess of Marmon’s intrinsic value over its carrying value is widened by this meaningless write-down.

我们在 2008 年收购了 Marmon 公司 64%的股份，在我们账上记录了 48 亿美元的收购成本。到目前为止一切顺利。然后在 2011 年初期，按照我们原先跟Pritzker 家族签订的协议，又购买了其 16%的股份，并按照一个能反映 Marmon 增值的公式所计算的支付了 15亿美元。可是在这种情况下，GAAP 却要求我们把追溯到 2010 年底的收购价格减记 6.14 亿美元。(不要提出任何疑问！)很显然这种减记与经济现实毫无关系。由于这种毫无意义的减记，导致 Marmon 的内在价值与其账面价值之间的差额进一步扩大了。(两次收购商誉占比降低减值？)