巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）⑦金融与金融产品

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这个业务板块是我们公司中规模最小的，其中包括 XTRA(拖车)和 CORT(家具)两家租赁公司，以及美国领先的预制房屋制造商和融资提供方 ClaytonHomes。除了这三家我们 100%控股的子公司，在该业务板块中还包括一系列金融资产以及我我们持有的 Berkadia 商业抵押公司 50%的股权。

It’s instructive to look at what transpired at our three operating businesses after the economy fell off a cliff in late 2008, because their experiences illuminate the fractured recovery that later came along.

分析我们这三家运营公司在 2008 年末经济跌落悬崖后所发生的事情很有启发意义，因为他们的经历体现了危机之后各个行业的复苏各不相同。

Results at our two leasing companies mirrored the “non-housing” economy. Their combined pre-tax earnings were $13 million in 2009, $53 million in 2010 and $155 million in 2011, an improvement reflecting the steady recovery we have seen in almost all of our non-housing businesses. In contrast, Clayton’s world of manufactured housing (just like site-built housing) has endured a veritable depression, experiencing no recovery to date. Manufactured housing sales in the nation were 49,789 homes in 2009, 50,046 in 2010 and 51,606 in 2011. (When housing was booming in 2005, they were 146,744.)

我们的两家租赁公司的业绩表现反映了"非住房"行业的经济状况。他们两家公司过去 3 年的税前利润分别是：2009 年 1300 万美元，2010 年 5300 万美元，2011 年 1.55 亿美元，其盈利的持续增长也反映出我们在几乎所有非住房相关行业中所看到的稳步复苏。相比之下，Clayton 的预制房屋业务(跟固定地址上建造的房屋几乎一模一样)经历了一场真正的萧条，至今没有任何复苏的迹象。美国的预制房屋销售量过去 3 年分别是：2009 年 49789 套，2010 年 50046 套，2011 年 51606 套。(而在 2005 年住房市场繁荣期间年销量为 146744 套)。

Despite these difficult times, Clayton has continued to operate profitably, largely because its mortgage portfolio has performed well under trying circumstances. Because we are the largest lender in the manufactured homes sector and are also normally lending to lower-and-middle-income families, you might expect us to suffer heavy losses during a housing meltdown. But by sticking to old-fashioned loan policies – meaningful down payments and monthly payments with a sensible relationship to regular income – Clayton has kept losses to acceptable levels. It has done so even though many of our borrowers have had negative equity for some time.

尽管经历了如此艰难的萧条，但 Clayton 仍保持盈利，主要是因为其抵押贷款组合在极其艰难的经济环境下仍然表现良好。由于 Clayton 是预制房屋市场最大的贷款人，而且通常是贷款给中低收入家庭，所以你可能会推断，Clayton 肯定在住房市场崩溃中遭受了惨重的损失。但由于我们坚守传统贷款的基本原则，即高比例的首付以及占正常收入合理水平的月供，所以 Clayton 把损失维持在可以接受的水平，尽管我们许多借款人一直都是负资产的情况下，仍然如此。

As is well-known, the U.S. went off the rails in its home-ownership and mortgage-lending policies, and for these mistakes our economy is now paying a huge price. All of us participated in the destructive behavior – government, lenders, borrowers, the media, rating agencies, you name it. At the core of the folly was the almost universal belief that the value of houses was certain to increase over time and that any dips would be inconsequential. The acceptance of this premise justified almost any price and practice in housing transactions. Homeowners everywhere felt richer and rushed to “monetize” the increased value of their homes by refinancings. These massive cash infusions fueled a consumption binge throughout our economy. It all seemed great fun while it lasted. (A largely unnoted fact: Large numbers of people who have “lost” their house through foreclosure have actually realized a profit because they carried out refinancings earlier that gave them cash in excess of their cost. In these cases, the evicted homeowner was the winner, and the victim was the lender.)

众所周知，美国在房屋所有权和抵押贷款政策上偏离了轨道，如今我们的经济正在为这些错误付出巨大的代价。包括政府、贷款人、借款人、媒体以及评级机构等在内，我们所有人都参与了这种自我毁灭性的行为。这些愚蠢行为的根本原因是，几乎所有人都相信，房屋的价格必定会随着时间的推移而一直上涨，任何下跌都是暂时的、无关紧要的。接受这种前提假设，就意味着在房地产交易中任何价格和做法都是合理的。各地的房主都感到自己变得更加富有了，纷纷抢着通过再融资将其房屋增值部分"货币化"。这些大规模的现金流入助长了整个经济的消费狂潮。这个过程的一切看起来似乎都非常美好。(一个几乎不被注意的事实是：数量众多的人由于丧失抵押品赎回权而"失去"自己的房屋，可是事实上他们却已经实现了盈利，因为他们在此之前通过再融资拿到的现金远超原来付出的成本。这这种情况下，被驱逐出房屋的房主是赢家，而贷款人才是真正的受害者)。

In 2007, the bubble burst, just as all bubbles must. We are now in the fourth year of a cure that, though long and painful, is sure to succeed. Today, household formations are consistently exceeding housing starts.

2007 年，泡沫破裂了，正如所有泡沫必定会经历的那样。我们如今正处于破裂后逐渐恢复的第 4 个年头，尽管这一恢复过程漫长而痛苦，但终将成功。今天，新家庭的形成数量持续高于房屋开工数量。

Clayton’s earnings should improve materially when the nation’s excess housing inventory is worked off. As I see things today, however, I believe the intrinsic value of the three businesses in this sector does not differ materially from their book value.

当美国过剩的房屋库存逐步消化之后，Clayton 的盈利将会大幅提高。然而，根据现在我所看到的情况，我认为这三家企业的内在价值与其账面价值相比并没有显著的差异。