巴菲特致股东的信（2012年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*

2012 年，伯克希尔为股东实现了 241 亿美元的回报。我们用其中的 13 亿美元回购了部分股份，因此公司今年账面价值增长了 228 亿。A/B 股的每股账面价值增长了 14.4%(标普 16%)。过去的 48 年(即从现任的管理层接受以来)，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到了 114214 美元，复合增长 19.7%。*

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

*本报告中使用的所有每股数字均适用于伯克希尔的A股。B股的数字是A股的1/1500。

A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.

去年伯克希尔有一些好消息，但我们还是先从坏消息说起吧。

• When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.

1，1965 年我掌管的合伙公司接手伯克希尔以来，我做梦都没想到，我们能在一年赚 241 亿美元，但与标普500 指数相比较，我们的业绩是低于平均水平的。

But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.

确实是差强人意，48 年来伯克希尔的账面价值增长率第 9 次落后于标普 500 指数的回报率(包括分红和股价上升)。需要强调的是，在这 9 次中，有 8 次标普 500 指数回报率都超过 15%。我们在逆境里做的要好一些。

To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.

迄今为止，在 5 年期的业绩衡量上，我们从来没有落后于标普，已经实现了 43 连胜。但是标普指数过去 4 年连续上涨，超过了我们的预期。如果 2013 年市场继续上涨，我们的 5 年期连胜记录就要终结了。

One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value – for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy – at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.

有一件事情你可以确信：无论伯克希尔最终业绩如何，我和我的合伙人查理·芒格，公司的副董事长，都不会改变衡量标准。我们的工作就是以比标普指数更快的速度增加公司的内在价值——我们使用账面价值作为其一个明显的低估指标。如果我们成功了，虽然伯克希尔每年股价的波动难以预测，但长期来看它将超越标普指数。如果我们失败了，我们没有给投资者带来任何价值，他们可以直接购买一只低费率的指数基金来获得标普的回报。

Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.

查理和我相信，长期来看，伯克希尔的内在价值的增长水平可能以略高于标普指数，我们对此充满信心。因为我们拥有一批优秀的企业，一批能干的经理人团队，以及以股东利益为导向的公司文化。然而，当市场下跌时，我们的相对业绩表现肯定会更好一些。在市场特别强劲的年份，我们预期将会暂时落后。

• The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.

2，2012 年第二件令人失望的事情是我没有能进行一笔重大收购。我瞄准了一些大象，但最终一无所获。

Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.

不过今年年初我们的运气发生了变化。2 月，我们达成协议收购一家全资拥有亨氏公司的控股公司 50%股份。另外一半将会由以 Jorge Paulo Lemann 为首的一小群投资者所持有，他是巴西著名的商人和慈善家。

We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.

没有比这更好的投资伙伴了。JorgePaulo 长期以来都是我的好朋友，并且是一位卓越的经理人。他的投资人团队和伯克希尔将会各自出资约 40 亿美元购买控股公司的普通股。伯克希尔还会另外投资 80 亿美元购买股息率9%的优先股。优先股还有两个优势大大增加了它的价值：首先它将会在特定时刻以显著的溢价被回购，其次这些优先股还附带认股权证，允许我们以名义价格购买持股公司 5%的普通股。

Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.

120 亿美元的总投资吸收了伯克希尔去年一大部分利润。但我们依然拥有大量的现金，并在不断地累积。所以，我们得继续工作；查理和我再次穿上狩猎服，继续寻找大象。

Now to some good news from 2012:

接下来是 2012 年的一些好消息：

• Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – our five most profitable non-insurance companies – were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “powerhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.

1，去年我告诉大家，BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、MarmonGroup 和中美能源这 5 家最赚钱的非保险公司，在2012 年税前收益将会达到 100 亿美元。它们确实做到了。尽管美国经济增长缓慢，全球多数经济体都很疲软，我们的"五驾马车"总收益为 101 亿美元，比 2011 年增加了约 6 亿。

Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.

这个集团里，只有税前收益 3.93 亿美元的中美能源是伯克希尔 8 年前就拥有的。后来，我们以现金购买了五驾马车中的三辆。在收购第 5 家 BNSF 铁路的时候，我们支付了 70%的现金，剩下的部分增发股票，使得发行在外的股份增加了 6.1%。因此，这 5 家公司为伯克希尔贡献了 97 亿美元收益增长，只产生了轻微的稀释。这与我们的目标一致，即不仅仅是实现增长，而是要实现每股收益的增长。

Unless the U.S. economy tanks – which we don’t expect – our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.

除非美国经济出现衰退(我们预期这不太可能)，我们的"五驾马车"2013 年将会实现更高的利润。5 位负责的优秀的 CEO 们将确保这一点实现。

• Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.

2，尽管我去年一笔大额收购都没做成，但是我们子公司的经理人做得要好的多。去年是我们"补强型"收购创纪录的一年，我们花了 23 亿美元收购了 26 家公司，这些公司被并入我们现有的业务中。这些交易没有让伯克希尔增发任何股票。

Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.

查理和我喜欢这样的收购：通常它们是低风险的，不让总部承受任何负担，并且扩展了我们久经考验的经理人施展拳脚的空间。

• Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.

3，我们的保险业务去年杀疯了。不但为伯克希尔贡献了 730 亿美元免费的浮存金用于投资，还贡献了 16 亿美元的承保收益，这是连续实现承保盈利的第 10 个年头。这简直就是一个怎么吃掉了却还在的蛋糕。

GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.

GEICO 是保险业务里的领头羊，在不牺牲承保纪律的情况下继续扩大其市场份额。自 1995 年我们收购以来，GEICO 在个人车险的市场份额从 2.5%增长到了 9.7%。保费收入从 28 亿增长到了 167 亿。未来还有巨大的增长空间等着它。

The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.

GEICO 的卓越表现应归功于托尼·莱斯利和他手下的 2.7 万名员工。另外，我们还要感谢我们的吉祥物 Gecko。它都一直坚守在岗位上，风雨无阻的告诉大家如何到 GEICO.com 买更便宜的保险。

When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.

当我为大家祈福的时候，我为 GEICO 祈祷两次。

• Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well .

4，事实证明，我们的新投资经理 Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler 是聪明正直诚信的典范，在投资组合管理之外，在许多方面都在为伯克希尔提供帮助，并且他们与我们的企业文化相融。我们找到这两位简直是捡到宝。2012 年，他们两人都以两位数的优势跑赢了标普 500 指数。这让我有点抬不起头(用了非常小号的字体)。

Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.

因此，我们已经将他们各自管理的资金规模增加到了约 50 亿美元(部分来自我们子公司的养老金)。Todd 和Ted 都非常年轻，在查理和我离开后将长期掌管伯克希尔巨额的投资组合。他们接手以后大家可以高枕无忧。

• Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.

5，伯克希尔年末的雇员总数创记录地达到了 288,462 名，比上年增加 17,604 名。我们总部的员工人数依然维持在 24 名。暂时还没有任何疯狂的迹象。

• Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo – all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.

6，伯克希尔的四大投资美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行，都经历了一个好年景。我们在 4 家公司的持股比例都有所增加。我们增持了富国银行(现在的持股比例达 8.7%，2011 年末未 7.6%)，和 IBM(6.0%，2011 年为 5.5%)。同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购增加了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的持股比例从 8.8%增加到 8.9%，在美国运通的持股比例从 13.0%增加到 13.7%。

Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.” The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.

伯克希尔在这四家公司的持股比例未来还会增加。MaeWest 说的对："好东西越多越精彩。"这四家公司运营着非凡的业务，并且由有才华的、以股东利益为导向的经理人管理。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家优秀公司非控制性但足够大的一部分，也不愿意拥有一家平庸公司的全部权益。相对于那些只能收购他们自己能够经营的类似业务的公司，我们在资本配置上的灵活性，使我们具有一个巨大优势。

Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.

以我们年末的份额计算，2012 年我们在"四巨头"中所占的收益份额是 39 亿。但在我们报告给你的收益中，我们只包括了我们获得的 11 亿股息。但请不用担心：没有报告的 28 亿收益和报告的具有同样价值。

The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases – which enhance our share of future earnings – and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).

四家公司保留的收益通常用于回购(这高了我们在未来盈利所占的份额)，以及对具有良好前景的投资机会的再投资。随着时间推移，我们预计四巨头的收益将大幅提升。如果我们是正确的，伯克希尔的股息将增加，更重要的是，我们未实现的投资收益也将增加(去年底四巨头的未实现的资本利得合计未 267 亿美元)。

• There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capital- allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan’s new country song, “Every Storm Runs Out of Rain.” We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.

7，去年许多企业的 CEO 们在做资本配置的决策时，都被"不确定性"的经济给吓倒了(虽然他们中的许多公司盈利和现金都创达到纪录的水平)。在伯克希尔，我们完全没有他们的担心，相反 2012 年我们在工厂和设备上投资了创纪录的 98 亿美元，其中约 88%投资在美国。这比 2011 年又增加了 19%，虽然 2011 年是我们之前投资的历史记录。不管砖家们怎么说，查理和我喜欢在值得的项目上大笔投资。我们注意到 GaryAllan 新歌词："暴雨过后必是晴天"。我们依然脚踏实地，而且基本确定 2013 年又会是资本支出创纪录的一年。美国遍地都是机会。

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A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).

给我的 CEO 们的一点想法：毫无疑问，未来永远是充满不确定性的，美国从 1776 年开始就一直面对各种不确定性。只不过有时候人们非常关注那些永远存在的无数不确定性，而有时，他们却又无视它们(通常是因为那段时间太平无事)。

American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20 th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.) Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.

长期来看，美国公司前景光明。当然股票也会表现良好，因为它们的命运是和公司的业绩联系在一起的。周期性的困难在所难免，但是投资者和经理人正处在一个对他们极为有利的游戏中。(道琼斯工业指数在 20 世纪里从 66 点涨到了 11497 点，期间经历了四次损失惨重的战争，一次大萧条和多次经济衰退，最终依然蹒跚上升了17320%。而且不要忘了，投资者在整个 20 世纪也收获了可观的股息。因为游戏本身就是如此的有利，查理和我认为，依据塔罗牌的排列，砖家的预测，或者商业周期的起伏，试图在游戏中跳进跳出是一个巨大的错误。错过这个游戏的风险比呆坐里面要大得多。

My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day’s headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.

我自己的故事就是一个戏剧性的例子：1942 年春天我第一个购买股票，美国当时在太平洋战场正遭受重大损失。每天的新闻头条都在讲诉更多的困难。尽管如此，也没有人在谈论不确定性；我认识的每个美国人都坚信我们会获胜。

The country’s success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.

自那段危险时期以来，我们的国家取得的成功让人难以置信：经过通胀调整后，从 1941 年到 2012 年，人均 GDP 翻了 4 倍。在这期间，每个明天都充满不确定性。然而，美国的命运一直都非常清晰：长盛不衰。

If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you.

如果你是一个 CEO，因为短期因素的担忧，搁置了一个巨大但利润丰厚的投资项目，请打电话给伯克希尔，让我们来减轻你的痛苦。

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In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

总之，查理和我希望通过以下方式来增加我们的每股内在价值，(1)增强我们子公司的盈利能力；(2)通过"补强型"的收购进一步增加他们的收益；(3)参与到我们投资对象的增长中去；(4)当伯克希尔的股价明显低于内在价值时，回购股票；(5)偶尔进行大额收购。极少情况下，我们也会增发伯克希尔的股票来最大化最终的业绩。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.

这些业务都具有坚实的基础。一个世纪以后，BNSF 和中美能源依然会在美国经济中扮演重要角色。保险业务对个人和企业都是必不可少的——没有哪家公司比伯克希尔给这个领域投资带来更多资本。当我们看到这些以及其他优势时，查理和我就非常喜欢你们公司的前景。

Intrinsic Business Value As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of which was qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.

企业内在价值虽然查理和我不停谈论内在价值，但我们无法告诉你伯克希尔的股票精确的内在价值数字是多少(或任何其他股票)。在 2010 年的年报里，我们提出了三个要素(其中一个是定性的)，我们认为这是衡量伯克希尔内在价值的关键。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to $113,786, and our per-share pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments also increased 15.7% to $8,085.

这两个关键量化因素的最新数据：2012 年，我们的每股投资增长了 15.7%，达到 113786 美元，我们除保险和投资外业务的每股税前收益增长 15.7%，达到 8085 美元。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以每年 19.4%的复合速度增长，我们的每股收益增速则是 20.8%。伯克希尔的估计过去 42年的增速和我们两个主要价值衡量指标的增速非常接近，这并非巧合。查理和我乐于看到这两个方面都增长，但是我们的重点将始终放在提高经营收益上。

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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们来看看四个主要业务板块的运营情况。它们具有差别巨大的资产负债和收入结构。因此把它们合并到一起将会阻碍分析。因此我们将它作为四个独立业务分别讨论，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式。