巴菲特致股东的信（2013年）②保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

“Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.” — 1967 Annual Report Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published.

1967 年年报："我们对保险业的投资是我们努力实现多元化的收益来源的重要一步。"让我们先来看看伯克希尔的核心业务保险业，这是自 1967 年的年报发布以来不断驱动我们扩张的引擎。

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect- now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume.

财产意外险公司先收取保费，事后进行理赔支付。在一些极端情况下，比如某些工伤保险，赔付可能长达几十年。这种现在收钱，将来赔付的模式让我们持有大量的"浮存金"，这些浮存金最终会支付到保户手中。同时，保险公司可以使用这些浮存金为自己投资。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模和保费收入维持一个相当稳定的关系。

Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

所以，随着我们业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。我们浮存金的增长情况如下表所示：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow.

浮存金进一步增长越来越困难了。积极的一面是，GEICO 的浮存金几乎确定会增长。

In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.) If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

我们国民保险的再保险业务有一些合同会流失，浮存金也将相应下降。即便未来我们出现浮存金的下降，那也会是非常轻微的——每年最多不会超过 3%。相较于我们的流动性规模，我们保险合同的特性决定了，我们永远不会受制于任何短期的流动性需求压力。(在这方面，财险业务和某些形式的寿险业务有非常大的区别。寿险可能出现集中退保挤兑。)如果我们的保费收入超过了承保费用和最终的赔付支出总和，我们会在利用浮存金投资获得的投资收益之外，还录得承保收益。赚到这种利润的时候，我们是在享受免费使用这些资金投资，更好的是，我们还因为持有资金而获得报酬。(就像去银行贷款，银行还倒贴给你利息)。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry – despite the float income all companies enjoy – will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.

不幸的是，保险公司实现这个美好结果的强烈愿望导致了激烈的竞争，竞争如此惨烈以至于大多数年份，产险行业整体处在严重的承保亏损中。实质上承保亏损就是整个行业为了获得浮存金而支付的成本。比如，美国最大且管理良好的州立农业保险公司，截止到 2012 年前的 12 年里有 9 年都录得承保亏损(依据我写作本报告时所能获得的最新一年的财务数据)。尽管所有的保险公司都享受了浮存金的投资收益，但动态竞争几乎可以保证整个保险行业将继续保持其低于其他行业的惨淡回报水平。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.

正如前一部分提到的，我们已经连续 11 年录得承保盈利，在此期间我们的税前承保收益累计达 220 亿美元。展望未来，我们相信将在大多数年份继续保持承保盈利。这是我们所有保险经理人每日关注的焦点，他们明白浮存金的价值，但糟糕的承保亏损将会吞噬它的价值。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims – some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.

那么我们的浮存金是如何影响内在价值的呢？当伯克希尔计算账面价值的时候，所有的浮存金都作为负债被扣除了，就好像我们明天就要兑现债务，并且再也无法补充回来。但把浮存金当做一种严格意义上的负债是错误的，它实际上应该被看做一笔循环基金。2013 年我们向索赔人支付超过 500 多万笔总计 170 亿美元，赔付每天都会减少浮存金。但可以肯定的是，我们每天都承接新保单从而增加浮存金。如果我们循环的浮存金是无成本并且是长期存在的，我相信对伯克希尔来说确实如此，那这项负债的真实价值就远远低于账面负债。

A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

在资产账面上与这一被夸大的负债相对应的是归属于我们保险公司的 155 亿"商誉"，很大程度上，这些商誉代表了我们为保险业务获取浮存金的能力所付出的代价。然而商誉的账面成本与其真实价值无关。比如说一家持续产生大额承保亏损的保险公司，其账面上的任何商誉资产都应该被视为零，无论其历史成本是多少。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔的情况不是那样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司的真实商誉(我们愿意为购买一家能产生类似质量的浮存金的保险公司所支付的价格)，远超过账面上记录的历史成本。浮存金的价值是我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值明显超过账面价值的一个原因，也是一个重要原因。

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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔颇具吸引力的经济特性之所以存在，是因为我们有一群卓越的经理人，他们经营着我们承保纪律严明、拥有强大且难以复制的商业模式的保险业务。让我将给大家介绍一些主要的公司。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega- catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.

首先，浮存金规模排在第一的是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因领导。阿吉特对其他人都不愿意承保，或者没有足够资本进行承保的风险进行承保。他的运营以独特的方式结合了能力、速度、果断，以及最重要的保险专业智慧于一身。然而他从未让伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险之下。实际上，我们比多数大保险公司在规避风险方面都更加谨慎。举例来说，如果保险行业因某项巨灾遭遇了 2500 亿美元的亏损，这是历史上所发生过最大规模亏损的 3 倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，当年依然能够实现盈利，因为它有如此多的利润来源。如果灾难导致市场动荡，我们仍将保持充沛现金，等待巨大的投资机会。与此同时，所有其他主要保险公司和再保险公司都将陷入亏损，有些甚至将面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit’s mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.

从 1985 年开始，阿吉特就创建了一家拥有 370 亿美元浮存金，实现巨额累计承保收益的再保险公司，这是一项任何其他保险公司的 CEO 都难以望其项背成就。阿吉特的大脑就是一个创意工厂，无时不刻搜寻着任何可以扩展他现有业务的机会。

One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully.

去年 6 月阿吉特组建了伯克希尔专业保险公司("BHSI")。这是我们首次进入商业保险领域，全国主要的保险经纪人和企业风险管理人都非常认可我们。这些专业人士明白，在财务稳健方面没有任何其他保险公司可与伯克希尔相比，这保证了它们未来多年的任何合法索赔都会得到及时全额的赔付。

BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.

BHSI 由 Peter Eastwood 领导，他是一名经验丰富、广受尊敬的保险人。Peter 组建的豪华团队已经为许多世界 500 强企业提供了大量承保，当然也包括规模较小的一些公司。BHSI 将会成为伯克希尔的重要资产之一，几年内将贡献数十亿美元的保费收入。如果大家在年会上碰到 Peter 的话，向他致以伯克希尔式的问候。

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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另外一家再保险巨头，由 TadMontross 掌管的通用再保险。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

从根本上说，一个健全的保险公司必须遵守四项承保原则。它必须(1)理解所有可能导致保单形成损失的风险敞口；(2)保守地衡量风险敞口实际形成损失的概率以及可能的损失规模；(3)设定合理的保费，平均来看，要能在覆盖潜在的赔付成本和运营成本后实现承保盈利；(4)在无法获得适当定价时愿意放弃承保。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

很多保险公司顺利通过前三条，但在第四条上不及格。它们根本无法放弃它们竞争对手正在疯抢的的业务。"别人这么干，我也得这么干"，这句老话在很多行业都造成了麻烦，但这在保险行业造成的麻烦尤其多。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

Tad 遵守了所有的四条保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金比免费的资金还要诱人，并且我们预计，平均而言这种情况将继续下去。我们尤其对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务充满热情，自 1998 年我们收购通用再保险公司以来，这项业务持续增长并不断盈利。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

当初我们买下通用再保险时，公司问题缠身，许多评论员(包括我在内)短暂的认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。不过那一天早就过去很久了。现在，通用再保险是一块宝石。

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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.

最后还有 GEICO 保险，63 年前我就是从这家保险公司开始入行的。GEICO 由托尼·莱斯利掌管，他 18 岁就加入了公司，到 2013 年，已经服役 52 年。1993 年 Tony 当上了 CEO，公司从那一刻开始起飞。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.

1951 年 1 月我第一次接触到 GEICO 时，就被其相对于业界巨头所享有的无与伦比的成本优势所震撼。这项优势至今依旧保持，并且是公司最最重要的资产。没人喜欢买车险。但几乎人人都喜欢开车。必不可少的车险成了大多数家庭的主要开支。便宜对他们来说非常重要，而只有低成本的保险公司能为他们提供这样的车险。

GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling.

GEICO 的成本优势是其市场份额年年上升的原因。它的低成本优势是其它竞争对手难以逾越的、持久的护城河。我们的小蜥蜴一直在宣传 GEICO 如何为大家省钱。最近公司进行了新一轮的运营成本削减，它的传说还将继续引人注目。

In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn’t already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That’s “goodwill,” and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO’s business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.

1995 年，我们买下 GEICO 剩余的一半尚未拥有的股份时，比我们收购的净有形资产多花了 14 亿美元。这被记作"商誉"，并且在财报上的数值一直不变。但是随着 GEICO 的业务增长，其真实的经济商誉也在不断增长。我认为这个数值现在接近 200 亿。

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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还有一些规模较小的保险公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。整体上，这些公司是一个不断增长的业务，并一直为我们贡献承保收益。另外，如下表所示，它们也为我们提供了大量浮存金。查理和我非常珍视这些公司和经理人。

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Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.

简单的说，保险出售的是对未来的承诺。"客户"现在付钱，保险公司承诺未来某些事件发生时付款。

Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay – even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives – is all-important.

有时，这一承诺需要几十年才会得到检验。(想想那些 20 来岁时买的寿险。)因此，保险公司的支付赔付的能力和意愿就至关重要，即使在支付赔款时刚好赶上经济危机。

Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world’s largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long- lived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however – one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor – would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.

伯克希尔的信誉是无与伦比的，最近几年的事实更加证明了一点，一些全球最大、最富经验的保险公司正在试图摆脱它们巨额其长期的赔付责任，尤其涉及到石棉索赔的保单。它们希望将这些负债转移给再保险公司。但是如果选择了错误的再保险公司，也就是那些将会陷入财务困境或者运营不良的再保险公司，对原保险公司来说意味着将面临重新承担赔付责任的风险。

Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd’s in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.) Berkshire’s ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd’s transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer’s promise would have given Lloyd’s the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd’s claims said it best: “Names [the original insurers at Lloyd’s] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”

无一例外，所有寻求帮助的最大保险公司都会联系伯克希尔。实际上，2007 年 Lloyd's 将数千笔 1993 年前投保的已知索赔以及同一时期未知但数量巨大的索赔(这些索赔必定会出现)的保单出售给了我们，这是一笔创纪录的交易。(是的，我们将会收到适用于 1993 年之前发生的事件的索赔。)伯克希尔因 Lloyd's 的交易最终的赔付规模今天还不得而知。但是可以确定的是，伯克希尔一定会赔付上限为150 亿内的一切有效索赔。没有任何其他保险公司的承诺能给予 Lloyd's 伯克希尔所提供的安心。当时负责处理Lloyd's 保单索赔的公司 CEO 说得好："这些人(Lloyd's 的原承保人)希望晚上能睡个安稳觉，我们想我们已经给他送去了世界上最好的床垫。"

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Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

伯克希尔优秀的经理人团队，卓越的财务实力，以及多元化的保险业务线，构成了它在保险行业独一无二的宽阔护城河。这样的组合是伯克希尔股东们的巨大财富，并且随着时间推移，它会变得越来越有价值。