巴菲特致股东的信（2013年）⑦关于投资的一些思考

Some Thoughts About Investing

关于投资的一些思考

Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike. — The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

最聪明的投资，是把它当做生意一样看待。——《聪明的投资者》本杰明·格雷厄姆

It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.

引用格雷厄姆的话作为本节开头非常恰当，因为我对投资的理解很多都归功于 Ben。稍后我更多谈论 Ben，我还会讲到股票投资。但是让我先讲两个很早以前非股票投资的投资的例子吧。虽然两笔投资对我个人财富的影响并不大，但它们却具有启发意义。

This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.

事情发生在内布拉斯加州。1973-1981 年间，中西部经历了农场价格的爆炸式增长，原因是人们普遍认为失控的通货膨胀即将到来，而一些小型农村银行宽松的贷款政策又起到了推波助澜的作用。后来泡沫破灭了，导致农场价格下跌超过 50%，这摧毁了借债的农场主和他们的债权人。那次泡沫中爱荷华州和内布拉斯加州倒闭的银行数量是最近的经济大衰退中倒闭的五倍。

In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.

1986 年，我从联邦存款保险公司 FDIC 买下了奥马哈北边 50 英里处的一个 400 英亩的农场。花了我 28 万美元，比几年前一家倒闭银行贷给农场的金额要少的多。我对经营农场一窍不通。但是我儿子喜欢农场，我从他那里了解到玉米和大豆的产量，还有对应的运营成本。根据这些估计，我计算出农场的正常回报率约 10%。我还认为随着时间的推移，生产效率会逐步提高，农作物的价格也会上涨。两个预期后来都被证明是对的。

I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.

我并不需要任何特别的知识就可以得出这样的结论：这项投资下有保底，而且很可能有大幅上涨的空间。当然偶尔会出现欠收，而且价格有时会令人失望。但这又怎么样呢？同样也会有异常好的年份，我永远不会面临被迫出售资产的压力。现在，28 年过去了，农场的利润翻了三倍，价值是我们当初投资额的五倍甚至更多。我依然对农场一窍不通，而且最近才第二次去到那片农场。

In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.

1993 年，我做了另外一小笔投资。在我担任 Salomon 的 CEO 的时候，所罗门的房东 Larry Silverstein 告诉我，ResolutionTrust 公司(RTC)正在出售纽约大学旁边的一处零售物业。同样，泡沫再次破裂了(这一次涉及商业地产)，RTC 的成立是为了处置破产的储贷机构的资产，它们当初乐观的贷款政策助长了其愚蠢的放贷行为。

Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.

这里的分析同样简单。和农场的情况类似，该物业当时无杠杆的收益率是 10%。但是考虑到 RTC 糟糕的物业管理，那些空置的店铺出租以后，利润还会增加。更重要的是，它最大的租户占了 20%左右的出租面积，但仅仅支付每平方尺 5 美元的租金，而其他租客的平均租金是 70 美元。它的廉价租约将在 9 年内到期，到时必然大幅提高租金。物业的位置也是非常理想的：纽约大学绝不会搬走。

I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.

包括 Larry 和我的朋友 FredRose 联合买下了这个物业。Fred 是一位经验丰富，高水准的房地产投资者，他和家人将会管理这个物业。他们做到了。随着旧租约到期后，利润翻了三倍。年租金回报现在达到了当初投资额的 35%。另外，我们最初的抵押贷款在 1996 年和 1999 年两次进行了重置，这让我们获得了相当于初始投资额150%的特别租金回报。我至今还没去看过这块物业。

Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.

农场和纽约大学物业的收入未来几十年还会继续增加。虽然他们的收入不会突然激增，但两笔投资都是我和我的孩子、孙子可以一辈子持有的稳固并且令人满意的投资。

I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:

我讲这两个故事是为了阐明投资的基本原理：

● You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”

1，获取令人满意的投资回报不需要成为专家。但如果你不是专家，那就要认识到自己的局限性(能力圈)，并遵从事物合理的发展规律。保持简单，不要越雷池一步。当有人承诺让你赚笔快钱时，立即答复"不行"。

● Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.

2，关注你正考虑投资资产的未来盈利能力。如果你感觉不能估计一项资产的未来收益，那就放弃它，继续看下一个。没有人有能力评估所有投资的可能性。但无所不知不是必须的；你只需要理解你所采取的行为就可以。

● If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.

3，如果你转而关注资产的预期购买的价格变化上，那么你就是在投机。投机并没有什么不好。但是我知道我无法总是投机成功，我对那些声称自己可以持续投机成功的人持怀疑态度，掷硬币时第一轮有一半人会赢；但是这些人如果继续不断玩下去都不会有赢家。另外，一项特定资产近来持续升值的事实，从来不是买入的理由。

● With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.

4，在我的两笔小额投资中，我只考虑这些资产将产出什么，根本不关心它们每天的估值。比赛最后的赢家是那些专注于赛场的球员赢得的，而不是那些眼睛紧盯着计分板的球员。如果你周末不看股价的时候可以放轻松，那么试着工作日的时候也这样做。

● Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)

5，总结宏观观点，或听信别人的宏观或市场预测都是浪费时间。实际上这是危险的，因为它可能会模糊你对真正重要事实的看法。(每当我听到电视评论员油嘴滑舌地分析市场的下一步走势时，我就会想起 Mickey Mantle犀利的评论，"你不坐到直播间里去，都不知道原来棒球比赛有这么简单"。)(米奇·查理斯·曼托 MickeyCharlesMantle，1931-1995 年，是 1974 年被选入名人堂的美国职棒球员。他生涯 18 个球季都效力于纽约洋基队，赢得 3 座美联 MVP 以及入选 16 次明星赛。Mantle 参加过 12 次世界大赛并拥有7 枚世界大赛冠军戒指。1995 年 Mantle 因肝癌去世，享年 63 岁。)

● My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.

6，我的两笔投资分别在 1986 年和 1993 年做出。紧接着 1987 和 1994 年的经济、利率、或者股市会如何发展对两笔投资都没有影响。我已经不记得当时的报纸头条和专家的意见。不管有什么新闻，内布拉斯加农场的庄稼会继续生长，学生会继续来纽约大学。

There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.

我的两笔投资和股票投资有一个重要的区别。股票会每分钟为你提供报价，而我至今也没有见过我的农场和纽约大学物业的市场报价。

It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.

疯狂波动的股价本该成为股票投资者的一项巨大优势，对少数投资者来说确实如此。毕竟如果有一个喜怒无常的人每天给我报价，他要么买下要么卖出农场，而这些价格在短期内随着他的情绪忽上忽下，那我不就可以从它疯狂的行动中赚钱吗？如果他的报价低的可笑，而我又有些闲钱，那我就会买下他的农场。如果他的报价高的要命，我要么卖给他，要么继续种地。

Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.

然而，股票投资者往往会让被其他投资者反复无常且通常不理性的行为所影响，导致他们的行为也失去理性。因为有太多关于市场、经济、利率和股价走势的评论，一些投资者认为应该听听专家的建议，更糟糕的是，认为应该根据他们的建议采取买卖行动。

Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.

那些拥有农场或房产时可以安静持有几十年的人，当他们接触到一连串的股票报价，并伴随着评论员们发出"别光坐着，你得做点什么"的鼓动时，往往会变得头脑发热。对这些投资者来说，流动性已经从一项绝对的优势变成了诅咒。

A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.

"闪电暴跌"或者其他一些市场的极端波动并不会伤害投资者，就好像一个反复无常、口若悬河的邻居不会影响我的农场投资一样。事实上，当价格与价值严重脱节时，如果真正的投资者有现金可用，那么暴跌的市场反而会对他的投资有所帮助。在投资时，恐惧的市场是投资者的朋友；疯狂的市场才是投资者的敌人。

During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?

在 2008 年发生的非常严重的金融危机恐慌期间，我从没想过要卖掉我的农场或者纽约大学的物业，即便是严重的经济衰退即将到来。而且，如果我拥有一项良好长期前景的业务 100%的权益，光是考虑卖掉它的想法都是非常愚蠢的。那我为什么要考虑卖掉那些优秀业务的小额持股呢？确实，它们中一些会令人失望，但是作为组合整体而言它回报会非常不错。真的有人相信美国无与伦比的生产性资本和无限的人力资本将会毁于一旦吗？

* * * * * * * * * * * *

When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.

查理和我买股票的时候，我们认为股票是企业的一小部分，我们的分析与我们买下整个企业时所使用的分析非常类似。首先我们必须决定，是否可以合理的估计公司未来 5 年或者更长时间的收益范围。如果答案是可以，我们将在股票以相对于我们估计下限的合理价格买入。如果我们不具备估计未来盈利的能力(通常是这样)，那我们就会转向其他投资。在我们合作的 54 年里，我们从来没有因为宏观或者政治环境的因素，或者因为其他人的看法而放弃过有吸引力的投资。事实上，这些都不是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。

It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.

然而至关重要的是，我们要认清自己"能力圈"的边界，并保持呆在自己的能力圈里面。即便如此，有时我们还是会在买卖股票和企业收购方面犯一些错误。但是这样不会引发灾难，例如，当一个持续上涨的牛市引发大家基于价格趋势购买股票，或者希望有所行动的欲望而购买股票。

Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.

当然，多数的投资者并没有把研究商业前景作为他们生活中的优先事项。如果他们明智的话会得出这样一个结论：他们对特定业务的了解并不足以预测它们未来的盈利能力。

I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20 th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21 st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.

我有一个好消息告诉这些非专业人士：普通投资者并不需要那些技能。总体而言，美国企业长期以来都表现很好，并将继续欣欣向荣(当然一定会有起起伏伏)。在整个 20 世纪，道琼斯指数从 66 点涨到了 11,497 点，股息不断提高。21 世纪将见证进一步的巨额回报。非专业投资者的目标不应该是挑选出优胜企业，他和他的"顾问"都做不到，而应该拥有一个整体而言必定表现良好的跨行业组合。低费率的标普 500 指数基金将实现这一目标。

That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long- term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

这就是非专业人士投资的"目的"。"何时做"也同样重要。主要的风险是，胆小的投资者或投资新手会在市场极度繁荣的时候入场，并且在出现浮亏时幻想破灭。记住巴顿·比格斯(Barton Biggs，多次被《机构投资者》杂志评选为"美国第一投资策略师"，著有《对冲基金风云录》。)的观察："牛市就像性爱一样，在结束之前达到高潮"。解决时间问题的办法是，长期分批买入，并且市场不好股价暴跌时永远不要卖出。遵守这些规则，"无知"的投资者既能保持投资分散，又能将成本保持在最低水平，几乎肯定会取得令人满意的回报。实际上，相比那些对对自己缺点视而不见的投资者，认识到自身缺点并持现实态度的纯粹投资者，长期将会取得更好的投资结果。

If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.

即使"投资者"疯狂地相互买卖他们的农场，庄稼的产量和价格也不会增加。唯一的后果就是农场主的最终收益由于咨询费和交易费而显著下降。

Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.

尽管如此，那些收取咨询费或交易费的中介会不断怂恿机构和个人不停地交易。由此产生的摩擦成本可能是巨大的，而且对投资者来说，它吞噬了利润没有任何好处。所以，忽略那些投资建议吧，保持最低的交易成本，并且像投资农场那样投资股票。

My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.

我的钱将会投到指数基金里，因此我还得再为此说两句：我在这里所建议的和已经写在遗嘱中的内容基本是一致的。一份遗赠规定，现金将被交付到我妻子设立的信托中。(我必须使用现金进行个人遗赠，因为我所持有的全部伯克希尔股票将在我去世后的十年内会分配给一些慈善组织。)我对受托人的要求非常简单：将 10%的现金投资于短期政府债券，其余 90%投资于低费率的标普 500 指数基金上。(个人推荐先锋集团的基金 Vanguard。)我相信，这个策略的信托长期业绩将战胜大多数投资者，包括聘请了高费率管理人的养老金、机构还是个人。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.

现在回到本·格雷厄姆。本次讨论中大多数的投资思想都是从 Ben 写的《聪明的投资者》当中学到的。1949年我买到这本书，从此我的投资生涯完全改变。

Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.

在阅读本的书以前，我在投资的世界四处游荡，狼吞虎咽地阅读投资界的所有文章，尝试每一种投资方法。我读到的很大东西都曾让我着迷：我试着用图标和市场指标预测股价走势。也曾坐在交易大厅里盯着交易纸带滚过，听市场评论员的评论。所有这一切都很有趣，但是我始终无法摆脱那种毫无进展的感觉。

In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.

相比之下，Ben 的思想用优雅通俗易懂的散文进行了逻辑解释(没有任何希腊字母或者复杂的公式)。对我而言，最重要的观点在新版本的第 8 章和第 20 章。(1949 年原版章节划分和后来不同)。正是这些观点指导着我今天的投资决策。

A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.

这本书还有另外一些有意思的事：后来的版本包括一篇后记，描述了一项让 Ben 大赚一笔的未具名投资。Ben 在 1948 年写第一版的时候进行了这项投资(拥抱自己吧)，这家神秘的公司就是 GEICO 保险。如果 Ben 没有在 GEICO 还是起步阶段就意识到它的特殊品质，我和伯克希尔的未来都会大不相同。

The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.

该书 1949 年版还推荐了一家铁路公司，每股售价 17 美元而每股收益 10 美元。(我敬佩本的原因之一是，他敢使用当前的例子，如果未来并不如他所言他可能会被嘲笑。)如此低的估值在一定程度上是由于，当时的会计准则要求铁路公司将其附属公司的大量留存利润从报告的利润中剔除。

The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.

被推荐的股票就是北太平洋铁路公司，它最重要的附属公司是芝加哥、柏林顿和昆西铁路。这些铁路如今是伯克希尔全资拥有的 BNSF 铁路的主要组成部分。当我读到这本书时，北太平洋铁路公司市值约 4000 万美元。现在，它的继承者(当然增加了很多资产)每 4 天就能赚 4000 万。

I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).

我已经不记得买第一本《聪明的投资者》花了多少钱。不管是多少，它都证明了 Ben 的格言：价格是你付的数字，价值才是你所得到的。在我所有的投资当中，买这本书应该是最好的一笔(不包括我的两次结婚证)。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.

地方和州的财政问题正在加剧，很大程度上是由于政府承诺了它们负担不起的养老金。公民和政府官员通常低估了巨大的金融绦虫，它是承诺和和支付能力之间的冲突导致的财务困境。不幸的是，养老金的计算至今对大多数美国人来说都是一个迷。

Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.

养老金的投资策略也是造成上述问题的重要原因之一。1975 年，我写了一份备忘录给时任华盛顿邮报董事长的 Katharine Graham，当中讲到了养老金承诺的缺陷和投资策略的重要性。

During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.

在接下来的十年里，你会读到很多关于公共养老金计划的坏消息。我希望我的备忘录有助于你理解在存在问题的情况下立即采取补救措施的必要性。